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ABSTRACT 
This work aims to provide an alternative analysis of the regional economic 
integration and development projects of two peripheral capitalist spaces  W 
Mexico and Turkey  W within the specific spatiotemporal conditions in which 
their modern peripheral capitalist spatiality has been conditioned and re-
structured. Both Mexico and Turkey undertook very similar regional 
integration projects that emerged almost simultaneously and, more 
significantly, in conjunction with the neoliberal restructuring processes that 
unfurled during the early 1980s. In the Central American region, Mexico 
ŝŶŝƚŝĂƚĞĚ ƚŚĞ  ‘WůĂŶ WƵĞďůĂ-WĂŶĂŵĄ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇ ĞǀŽůǀĞĚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ
 ‘WƌŽǇĞĐƚŽ DĞƐŽĂŵĠƌŝĐĂ ?, ŶŽǁ ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ ŽůŽŵďŝĂ ? ĂŝŵŝŶŐ ƚŽ  ‘ĐƌĞĂƚĞ ? ĂŶ
integrated region with a high level of economic development on the basis of 
procuring sustainable and orderly functioning free market economies. With 
strikingly similar objectives, Turkey planned and materialised regional 
ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ƉƌŽũĞĐƚƐ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ůĂĐŬ^ ĞĂ ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ
ŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ůĂĐŬ ^ĞĂ ĂŶĚ dƌĂŶƐ-Caucasus region and other sub-
ƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůƉƌŽũĞĐƚƐƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĞ ‘>ĞǀĂŶƚWƌŽũĞĐƚ ?ŝŶƚŚĞĂƐƚDĞĚŝƚĞƌƌĂŶĞĂŶ ? 
This work argues that these regional integration projects have to be defined 
and analysed within the multiscalar neoliberal restructuring processes, in 
which the global capitalist spatiality has been re-territorialised  W and resisted  W 
on different socio-spatial scales. The uneven geographical development and its 
constant reproduction is recognised as the determinant factor of these 
regional integration projects, in which the Mexican and Turkish peripheral 
capitalist spatiality was first reconfigured and integrated into the centre 
through their incorporation into the NAFTA and European Customs Union. 
Subsequently, conditioned by the current neoliberal rescaling of the peripheral 
ĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐƚƐƉĂƚŝĂůŝƚǇ ?ƚŚĞƉĞƌŝƉŚĞƌĂůĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐŵĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞ ‘ŵĂƌŐŝŶĂů ?
spaces in their immediate geographies in the form of sub-regional integration 
and development projects. Therefore, this work presents the examination of 
the specific spatiotemporal processes as the only meaningful theoretical 
framework to analyse these regional integration projects, in which the uneven 
iii 
development of the peripheral capitalist social relations in Mexico and Turkey 
have been formed, reconfigured and extended. 
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Introduction: Inter-national relations or Inter-spatial relations on the 
national scale? 
 ‘DĂŶŬŝŶĚ ?Ɛ “ƐŽĐŝŽ-ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ?ĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƐDĂƌǆĐĂůůƐŝƚ )ƐŝŵƉůǇŚĂƐƚŽŽŵĂŶǇ
aspects, exhibits too many differences and goes on at too many levels to be treated 
by a single discipline. The economist, the psychologist, the demographer, the 
anthropologist, aůůŚĂǀĞƚŚĞŝƌĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƐƚŽŵĂŬĞ ?ŶĚƚŚĞƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐŝƐƚĂƐǁĞůů ? ? 
  W Henri Lefebvre,  ‘dŚĞ^ŽĐŝŽůŽŐǇŽĨDĂƌǆ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P18).  
 
This thesis aims to provide an alternative conceptualisation of the regional 
economic integration projects in Mexico and Turkey by examining the 
processes of production and reproduction of the specific socio-spatial 
conditions of the peripheral capitalist spatiality within the contemporary 
spatiotemporal context of the worldwide reconfiguration of neoliberal 
capitalism. In that sense, it can be argued that it raises two major proposals: a 
specific spatiotemporal conceptual framework for the analysis of the 
formation of the peripheral capitalist space in Mexico and Turkey, and the 
analysis of the regional integration and economic development projects of 
Mexico and Turkey in terms of the transformation of the socio-spatial 
conditions. The theorisation of the specific spatiotemporal processes in which 
the peripheral capitalist spaces in Mexico and Turkey have been formed, 
consolidated and transformed is materialised by linking the spatially and 
historically specific concepts of Luxemburg (1951; 1977), Trotsky (1936; 1970a; 
1970b) and Gramsci (1971). This conceptual framework is based on the 
dialectical materialist understanding of the social reality whose foundations 
were laid by the works of Marx and Engels and later on elaborated in the 
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conceptualisation of the production and transformation of the space by Henri 
Lefebvre. Therefore, it is possible to claim that this work establishes the 
theorisation of the peripheral capitalist spatiality and its historical formation, 
consolidation and transformation processes in dialectical terms by building 
upon this Marxist tradition.  
The second major point raised and analysed in this thesis is the contemporary 
transformation of the peripheral capitalist space in a stage of expansion which 
is defined as neoliberal rescaling or reconfiguration. In his later works where 
Lefebvre ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůŝƐĞĚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƐƚĂƚĞ ŵŽĚĞ ŽĨ ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?, this process of 
neoliberal re-territorialisation of the social space was located and analysed. 
This has also been followed by numerous other works that further theorised 
the subject (Soja et al. 1983; Massey 1985; Brenner 1997a; Brenner 1997b; 
Brenner 1998; Swyngedouw 2000; Brenner and Elden 2001). This study argues 
that the regional integration projects of Mexico and Turkey need to be 
analysed within this global neoliberal rescaling process in which the peripheral 
sociospatial organisation channels the conditions of the neoliberal spatiality to 
ƚŚĞ  ‘ŵĂƌŐŝŶĂů ? Žƌ ƌĞƐĞƌǀĞĚ ƐƉĂĐĞƐ ? /ƚ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ŽďƐĞƌǀĞĚƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞƐĞ ƌĞŐŝŽŶĂů
integration projects aim to incorporate these regions by establishing the 
necessary legal/institutional framework and physical infrastructure that the 
neoliberal capitalist social relations of production can expand towards these 
regions. It is important to emphasise that these processes of re-
territorialisation are not mechanical or deterministic processes but dialectical 
and that they encountered significant resistance and contestations on 
different social scales.     
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Through the analysis of these two peripheral capitalist spaces both in terms of 
their formation and transformation/expansion periods, this thesis aims to 
further the conceptualisation of the capitalist social space in the specific 
peripheral configurations of the social relations of capitalist mode of 
production. Mexico and Turkey are identified as two peripheral capitalist 
spaces in the neoůŝďĞƌĂů ƌĞƐĐĂůŝŶŐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌůĚ ĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐŵ ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ  ‘ƚǁŽ
nation-ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŐůŽďĂůŝƐŝŶŐ ǁŽƌůĚ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐ Ă ďĞƚƚĞƌstarting point 
for the analysis of the underlying conditions of social change. These two 
countries which are geographically located in completely different parts of the 
world, with different morphologies, climates, natural resources, territorial sizes 
and populations followed a strikingly similar spatiotemporal path of social 
development and initiated very similar integration and economic development 
projects in their regions recently. This thesis argues that only a spatiotemporal 
analysis can present a comprehensive answer for the subject matter and 
thereby presents a better reading of the formation, consolidation and 
transformation of the peripheral capitalist space in Mexico and Turkey by 
unravelling the specific, constantly changed and reproduced structural 
conditions underlying this peripheral capitalist spatiality. In other words, this 
work aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of the changing capitalist 
spatiality in Mexico and Turkey with a historical materialist conceptualisation 
of these processes, rather than reducing them to the mere historical events 
that are irrelevant for a descriptive investigation of the past formation and 
present transformation of the sociospatial organisation.  
In this respect, this section will define the main objectives and foundations of 
the work and identify the main features of a spatiotemporal analysis that is 
presented in this thesis. Therefore, firstly the problematic of space and the 
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aspatial social sciences will be considered. This will be followed by the 
identification of the relationship between the social space and social relations 
ŽĨ ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ? dŚŝƌĚůǇ ? ƐƉĂĐĞ ŝŶ Ă ŵƵůƚŝƐĐĂůĂƌ ǁŽƌůĚ ĂŶĚƚŚĞ  ‘ŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞĚ
ĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶ ?ŝŶƚŚĞĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨƚŚŝƐŵƵůƚŝƐĐĂůĂƌƚŽƚĂůŝƚǇǁŝůůďĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚ ?>ĂƐƚůǇ ?
a structural layout of the thesis will be presented.  
Space and social sciences    
As it has been stated above, this work aims to present a spatiotemporal 
analysis of the regional integration projects in Mexico and Turkey. Although 
such an aim necessitates a persistent trespassing on the well established 
borders of the history, geography, economy and political theory, this type of 
violations are perceived as the integral and necessary aspects of the work. The 
separation and compartmentalisation  Wand subsequent hierarchisation- of the 
social sciences into strongly defined and institutionalised disciplines that 
operate within the self-defined and uncontested borders is in fact the 
ƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨĂŶĞƉŝƐƚĞŵŽůŽŐŝĐĂůƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ƚŚĂƚƉƌŝǀŝůĞŐĞƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐ ?
ĂŶĚ ‘ƐǇŶĐŚƌŽŶŝĐ ?ŽǀĞƌƚŚĞ ‘ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂů ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĚŝĂĐŚƌŽŶŝĐ ? ?dŽƉƵƚŝƚĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚůǇ ?ŝƚŝƐ
a product of the conventional focus on the short time-span rather than the 
ůŽŶŐƵĞ ĚƵƌĠĞ movement of the social reality. Fernand Braudel defined this 
separation as the general crisis that the sciences of man are facing today and 
urged for the adaptation of a common language, i.e., ontology, for the social 
sciences. In this sense, he identified three common languages for a collective 
ǁŽƌŬ ?ƚŚĞŵĂƚŚĞŵĂƚŝĐƐ ?ƚŚĞůŽŶŐƵĞĚƵƌĠĞĂŶĚƚŚĞƐƉĂĐĞ  Wthe space which he 
later refers to as the necessary reduction of the all social reality that occupying 
ŝƚ ?ƌĂƵĚĞů ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?ŽŶĐƵƌƌĞŶƚǁŝƚŚƌĂƵĚĞů ?ƐĐĂůů ?ƚŚŝƐǁŽƌŬƌĞũĞĐƚƐƚŚĞ
crude compartmentalisation of the social sciences and adopts a 
spatiotemporal analysis as the essential way of observing the complex, 
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differentiated and unfixed forms of social reality and investigating the 
processes where the social reality has been dialectically formed, negated and 
transformed on multiple scales and levels.  
The hierarchical and institutionalised separation of the social sciences into 
different disciplines has been based on the separation of time from space 
which subsequently permitted the stabilisation of time and space into 
separated, fixed and immediate dimensions that the social reality takes place 
within (Massey 1999: 262). The separation of time from space had two 
immediate implications for the social sciences; adopting the  ‘Newtonian 
model ? that establishes a symmetry between the past and present in which the 
differences between past and future disappeared and dissolved within an 
eternal present and the  ‘Cartesian dualism ? that fundamentally separates 
nature and humans, being and consciousness, subject and object (Wallerstein 
1996: 2). On these two premises, firstly, an ahistorical history had been 
developed which disregards the multiplicity of social times where in fact the 
short time-span continually and infinitely opposes the long time-span (Braudel 
1958/2006: 3) and privileges the instant  ?ů ?ŚŝƐƚŽŝƌĞ ĠǀĠŶĞŵentielle) over the 
structural time  ?ůŽŶŐƵĞĚƵƌĠĞ )  (Braudel 1958/2006: 17; Wallerstein 1988: 290; 
Wallerstein 1996/2000: 165). Thereby, flattened and reified the timeless 
history served as a deductive source to collect data and validate theoretical 
assumptions for the ahistorical social research (Hobden 2002: 47; Hobson 
2002: 5-10; Hobson et al. 2010: 7).   
Secondly, an ahistoric and spaceless Cartesian perspectivalist cartography has 
triumphed within the discipline of geography which perceives the space as the 
ƚĂŬĞŶ ĨŽƌ ŐƌĂŶƚĞĚ  ‘ƉůĂƚĨŽƌŵƐ ? Žƌ  ‘ĐŽŶƚĂŝŶĞƌƐ ? ? ŚĞŶĐĞ ? ƵŶƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƚŝĐ ? ĂŶĚ
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underscores any non-ĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝǀĞ ƐƉĂƚŝĂů ǀĂƌŝĂƚŝŽŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŚŽŵŽŐĞŶŽƵƐ
ďůŽĐŬƐŽĨƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĂůƐƉĂĐĞƐ ? ?ŐŶĞǁ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ?dĂǇůŽƌ  ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ) ?dŚŝƐŶŽƚŝŽŶ
of space resulted in thĞ ‘ĚĞƐƉĂƚŝĂůŝƐĞĚ ? ? ‘ƐƉĂĐĞůĞƐƐ ?Žƌ ‘ĂƐƉĂƚŝĂů ?ƐŽĐŝĂůƐĐŝĞŶĐĞƐ
where the essential multiplicities are disregarded and became the subject of a 
clearly and objectively periodised temporal sequence (Massey 2005: 82). 
However, the spaceless social sciences do not necessarily exclude geography; 
but utilise it extensively into account as in the state-centric approaches which 
laid the ahistorical spatial ontology as the foundations of its conceptualisation 
of the territorial organisation (Brenner 1999: 45; Wallerstein 2001: 3). In 
mainstream geography and the other branches of the social sciences, the 
space has been defined as a perfect neutral fixity and stripped off from its 
historical and social qualities, perceived as self-evident and self-explanatory, 
hence, something that does not require a theory (Smith 1992: 61; Wallerstein 
1996: 26). While the positivist turn elevated ŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ
ƐƉĂƚŝĂů ?ǁŚŝĐŚŚĂĚďĞĞŶĨŽĐƵƐŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞŵŽĚĞůůŝŶŐŽĨthe space on the basis of 
objective spatial laws and spatial processes devoid from the social (and 
temporal) content, the radical critique of such an understanding of space 
focused on the importance of the differences and particularities of places and 
the social processes that the conditions of this distinctiveness has been 
produced and reproduced (Massey 1985: 10, 19; Massey 2005: 92). 
TŚŝƐƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶǁŚŝĐŚĚĞĨŝŶĞĚ ‘ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?ĂƐƚŚĞƐĞĂƌĐŚfor universally applicable 
laws of nature that are valid for all time and space first separated and 
hierarchised the natural sciences and philosophy and, later, further established 
multiple disciplines of social sciences concerned with different aspects of the 
social reality (Wallerstein 1996: 7). By the end of the 19
th
 century, these 
different disciplines were mostly stabilised and institutionalised within the 
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university system as structures that were designated to produce new 
knowledge on the basis of empirical findings and reproduce professional 
scholars who would be capable of undertaking such systematic researches on 
the separate spheres of social activity: history, economics, sociology, political 
science, and anthropology (Wallerstein 1996: 13-14; Wallerstein 2001: 19).     
Nevertheless, overcoming this rigid separation through a simple process of 
interdisciplinary dialogue does not provide a convincing solution. As 
Wallerstein (2000) pointed out that the interdisciplinary work would not 
necessarily aim to impair the positivist logic and the organisational apparatus 
of the separation of disciplines, but it might even deepen this separation 
through strengthening the borders of each category. After 1945, the area 
studies attempted to present a multidisciplinary approach but its practice only 
showed how artificial the institutional separations between the idiographic 
and nomothetic social sciences are, that a multidisciplinary perspective cannot 
overcome (Wallerstein 1996: 39). Therefore, the solution to this problem 
necessitates a rather profound methodological and epistemological stance 
which can concretise the social reality within its complex temporal/spatial 
specificities.  
The complexity of the social reality emanates from the fact that it is inherently 
subject to constant transformation and re-formation, thus, there is no general 
abstraction to be found that is not bounded by the limitations of time. The 
mainstream approaches that reify the social phenomena are unable to grasp 
the constantly changing nature of the social reality (Wallerstein 1984/2000: 
119). In that sense, focusing on space within its concreteness rather than the 
formal/institutional appearances of the territorial organisations emerges as 
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the key feature of the analysis of the ever transforming social reality  Wwhich is 
the capitalist space in Mexico and Turkey- in this work. As Marx argued, a thing 
should be understood in its motion (Nicolaus 1973: 30), and therefore, social 
reality needs to be comprehended in the movement of its becoming. 
Nevertheless, the ahistorical social science treats the social reality as self-
evident, fixed, a priori entity that exists independently and thus can be 
measured and compared as reified units of a prima facie totality (McMicheal 
1990: 385; Emirbayer: 1997: 287). 
During the last four decades, the absolutist separation of time and space and 
their definitions as static, fixed and self-evident categories has received serious 
criticisms. The (re)unification of time and space as an open-ended and dynamic 
social category appeared as the first crucial step for the analysis of the social 
totality and particularly for the conceptualisation of the configuration, 
ƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƌĞĐŽŶĨŝŐƵƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĂůŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?^ŽũĂ ? ? ? ? P
209; Wallerstein 1988: 292; Massey 1999: 263). As a result of the rejection of 
the Cartesian and Newtonian (and in a different way Kantian) theorisation of 
time and space; the complex and variable relational nature of time and space 
unity has received much attention, particularly to analyse the continually 
changing spatiotemporal relations between different social entities (Urry 1985: 
27; Hobson and Hobden 2002: 280). And as Soja argued, the only possible 
alternative that can grasp the inseparability and multiplicity of spatiotemporal 
processes is historical materialist analysis of the social reality, which could 
theorise the social production of the space through perceiving the spatiality 
simultaneously in terms of the substantial forms that it assumes and as the 
dynamically changing set of social relations (Soja 1985: 92).  
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Space and the social relations of production 
In dialectical materialism, the social space is theorised as a concrete 
abstraction, both material (hence, needless to say, social) production of the 
social relations and, at the same time, a relation itself (Gottdiener 1993: 130). 
Such a conceptualisation of space -in its abstract concreteness- puts an 
emphasis on the dialectical processes in which the social space has been 
constantly produced and reproduced. On these premises, the social 
phenomena can be analysed relationally in its motion and the theorisation of 
the territorial organisation on different scales can be built upon. In this way, 
the complexity of the social phenomena and its dialectical movement which 
does not permit any claim of autonomy or historic determinism can be 
identified and analysed through the specific spatiotemporal conditions 
expressed in the corresponding historical structures (Wallerstein 1974: 343; 
Wallerstein 1988: 293; Wallerstein 2000: 134; Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994: 
1414; Emirbayer 1997: 298).   
Therefore, in the analysis of the social-geographical organisations, it is an 
indispensable necessity to start from this dialectical point that neither 
perceives the space as an isolated neutral object nor a homogenous ideational 
aspect of human life. Space cannot be sealed off from ideology and politics and 
the production of the material life. Thus, the analysis of any spatial problem 
needs to focus on the spatial contradictions within the society and social 
practice in which the social space is conditioned, produced and contested 
(Lefebvre 1976: 30, 31). Needless to say, these contradictions stem from the 
material premises of the production of human life; in other words, from the 
dialectical relationship between the nature and human beings. Hence, the 
10 
 
relationship between man and nature was ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚ ĂƐ  ‘ŵĞƚĂďŽůŝĐ ? ďǇ DĂƌǆ ?
while man transcends himself in nature, he transcends the nature in himself 
(Lefebvre 2009: 106). This dialectical relationship is the abstract concreteness 
that the social space has been produced and reproduced. With positioning the 
nature as the integral element of the human subjectivity, the production of 
man by himself in and through nature becomes the principle of the production 
of space. This relationship between human beings and nature overdetermines
1
 
the relations between different spaces on different scales, and particularly on 
the national scale (Pijl 2007: 16).  
Thus, the social space as a social product and the expression of the social 
relations of production emerges as the most convincing unit of analysis in 
understanding the inter-spatial relations on the national scale rather than the 
mainstream state-centric approaches based on the Cartesian epistemology. 
Historicised and spatialised  Win dialectical terms- space can grasp the various 
configurations of state power and social relations of production that underpin 
these diverse socio-economic formations (Lefebvre 1964/2009: 53). The socio-
economic formation historically and spatially takes different forms and thereby 
cannot be conflated with the nation-state (Wallerstein 1974: 389, McMichael 
and Myhre 1991: 86, Wallerstein 1975/2000: 108, McMichael 2001: 203). The 
dialectical theorisation of the social space is the reliable alternative that avoids 
this conflation. Thus, the focus of this work moves away from the nation-state 
                                                          
1
 Pijl (2007) uses overdetermination in order to refer a deeper determination which functions 
behind a relation that is perceived as rather simple. Different from the multi-causal approach 
that focuses on the interconnectedness of empirically verified phenomenon, he states 
ŽǀĞƌĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽĂ ‘ĐŽŵƉůĞǆƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨĐĂƵƐĂůŝƚǇǁŚŝĐŚĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐŝŶĂĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚŽƌǇ
whole, composed of the multiplicty of distinct, but internally related and mutually 
constitutive, practices having a tendency  Wbecause of their spatio-temporal separation within 
complex social formations- ƚŽĚƌŝĨƚĂƉĂƌƚ ? ?Wŝũů ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?/ŶƚŚŝƐƐĞŶƐĞ ?ƚŚĞĚŝĂůĞĐƚŝĐĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ
that determines the production of space is a contradictory and open ended movement rather 
than a deterministic linear process.     
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as a self-evident, self-explanatory unit of analysis towards the (social) space as 
a (socially) specific configuration on the national scale which comprises a 
dynamic totality of the dialectical movement between the productive forces 
and the social relations of production. This dynamic totality is continually 
contested and transformed as it will be observed in the Mexican and Turkish 
cases. 
The establishment of the (social) space as the focal point of the analysis of the 
formation and transformation of the socio-spatial organisation inevitably 
necessitates the identification of its social and uneven processes of production, 
reproduction, consolidation, and its historical transformation, along the 
continual struggle between the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic spatial 
forces. The hierarchically stratified morphology of the space further expands 
these questions on an inter-related, interdependent multiscalar level, 
particularly in the context of contemporary neoliberal rescaling -i.e., 
reconfiguration, re- and de-territorialisation, reorganisation- of the capitalist 
space (Brenner 1997a: 273; Brenner 1997b: 136; Brenner 1999: 43; 
Swyngedouw 2000: 64).         
Lefebvre had substantially contributed to the conceptualisation of the social 
ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƐƉĂĐĞ ‘ŝŶĂŶĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ?ƚŚĞŚƵŵĂŶĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇĂŶĚĚĞĨŝŶĞĚthe social 
space in terms of the reproduction of social relations, thus, not as a fixed 
material entity but as an ensemble of social relations (Brenner 1997b: 140; 
Unwin 2000: 18). For Lefebvre, the continuous social production and 
reproduction of the capitalist spatiality is a truly dialectical process where each 
of the  ‘ƚŚƌĞĞŐƌĞĂƚŵŽŵĞŶƚƐ ?ŽĨDĂƌǆŝƐƚĚŝĂůĞĐƚŝĐƐ- expressed in the notion of 
 ‘ĚŝĂůĞĐƚŝƋƵĞ ĚĞ ƚƌŝƉůŝĐŝƚĠ ?- have a crucial role. According to Lefebvre, in the 
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Marxist dialectics, each dialectical moment needs to be comprehended as 
flowing, rhythmic, manifold and complex due to the deconstructing role of the 
third term on the previous two moments (Gottdiener 1993: 130; Unwin 2000: 
14; Elden 2001: 812). Therefore, the social space has not been mechanically 
determined by the mode of production but continuously produced through the 
dialectical movement between the productive forces (the economic element) 
and the social relations of production (the political element) (Lefebvre 
1964/2009: 59; Swyngedouw 1992: 418, 428). Any conceptualisation of the 
social space and the geographical institutions attached to that space as a 
specific scalar configuration must base itself on this notion of abstract 
concreteness that is subject to a multiscalar dialectical process of formation, 
stabilisation and transformation. Such a conceptualisation differs itself from 
the substantialist, instrumentalist, formalist/economist positions which 
perceive the state as a mere reflection of the economic sphere, composed of 
fixed elements and attributes that are determined by a specific mode of 
production (Poulantzas 1980: 15).  
Space in a multiscalar world and incorporated comparison 
For Lefebvre, this continual development of the space has been the crucial 
starting point for the theorisation of the notion of state space (ů ?ĞƐƉĂĐĞ
ĠƚĂƚŝƋƵĞ) as a historically specific scalar configuration where the different 
 ‘ǁĂǀĞƐ ? ŽĨ ĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐƚ ĂĐĐƵŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ďƵŝůƚ ƵƉŽŶ2(Brenner 1997b: 277; Brenner 
                                                          
2
 Ernest Mandel has successfully forecasted the inevitable dissolution of the post-war 
<ĞǇŶĞƐŝĂŶĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞŽŶƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐŽĨŚŝƐƚŚĞŽƌŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ůŽŶŐǁĂǀĞƐ ?ŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƚŚĞ
changes of the rate of profit and the rise in the organic composition of capital. He defined this 
process as the rise of neo-capitalist uneven growth as an organic development of monopoly 
ĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐŵ ?ƐƵƌĞůǇǁŝƚŚ ŝƚƐ ŝŶŶĞƌĐŽŶƚƌĂĚŝĐƚŝŽŶƐ  ? ‘ǁŚŝĐŚŚĂĚƐƵƉĞƌŝŵƉŽƐĞĚƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐŽŶƚŚĞ
general contradictions of capitalist mode of production that either have not had been 
ĞůŝŵŝŶĂƚĞĚ ? ) ŝŶ  ‘dŚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐŽĨEĞŽĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐŵ ? ?Socialist Register,  ? ? ? ? ? ) ?  ‘ǆƉůĂŝŶŝŶŐ ůŽŶŐ
ǁĂǀĞƐŽĨĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐƚĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ? ?Futures, (1981).    
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1998: 477). The contemporary crisis of the capitalist world economy has led to 
the dissolution of the post-war Keynesian socio-spatial structure and a 
worldwide process of restructuring (i.e., reconfiguration, rescaling, and re-
territorialisation) of the social and spatial relations of production (Soja et al. 
1983: 196, 199). Lefebvre captured and conceptualised this contemporary 
ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ŝŶ ŚŝƐ ŶŽƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ  ‘^ƚĂƚĞ DŽĚĞ ŽĨ WƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?  ?le mode de production 
ĠƚĂƚŝƋƵĞ -SMP) as a qualitative transformation of the state power (Lefebvre 
2001: 773). In the SMP, the weight of state  Wwhich is deeply contested in every 
scale of social reality- in the matter of the production and reproduction of 
capitalist space increases, particularly in three areas; the production and 
control of energy, the information sector, and the mediation of the relations 
between the domestic and world market (Lefebvre 2001: 777). The ever 
deepening uneven geographical development within and between national 
scale -Ă ůŽŶŐƵĞ ĚƵƌĠĞ ĚǇŶĂŵŝĐ ŽĨ ƌĞĐŽŶĨŝŐƵƌĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ĐŽŶĨŝŐƵƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ
capitalist spatiality- finds its contemporary expression in this recent re-
territorialisation (Brenner 1999: 42; Brenner 2001: 799). In this historically 
specific phase, the national scale becomes worldwide (le mondial; second 
nature) and covers the earth (la terre; first nature), without abolishing the 
local, but through strengthening the unevenness between scales, hence, at 
once homogenising, hierarchising and fragmenting them (Lefebvre 1978/2009: 
 ? ? ? ) ? dŚĞ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ŽĨ  ‘ŵŽŶĚŝĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? captures this current phase of the 
extension of the capitalist spatiality within the constantly transforming 
relationships between different scales, thereby highlights and links the present 
processes of capitalist transformation in Mexico and Turkey with the 
worldwide rescaling of the capitalist spatiality. It also captures the 
actualisation of the capitalist mode of production as a totality on the 
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ǁŽƌůĚǁŝĚĞƐĐĂůĞǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞůŽŶŐƵĞĚƵƌĠĞŽĨŚƵŵĂŶŚŝƐƚŽƌǇǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƚŚĞŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ
ŽĨ ‘ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĂůŵĂŬŝŶŐĂŶĚƌĞŵĂŬŝŶŐŽĨǁŽƌůĚǁŝĚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?ƌĞŶŶĞƌĂŶĚůĚĞŶ
2009: 23, 25).   
The second significant aspect embedded to these multiscalar worldwide 
ƌĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌŝŶŐ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐ  ‘ŝŶƚĞŶƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ĂŶĚ
 ‘ĞǆƚĞŶƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐƚ ƐƉĂƚŝĂůŝƚǇ  ?^ŽũĂ Ğƚ Ăů ?  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ).  While the 
organisation of capital-labour relations have been significantly restructured, 
the incorporation of the new markets  Wspatial expansion- through the 
production of the necessary conditions of the capitalist accumulation gave rise 
to many regional and sub-national scales of governance (Soja et al. 1983: 202; 
Swyngedouw 1992: 426; Brenner 1998: 427). The analysis of the regional 
integration projects of Mexico and Turkey will be identified within this 
contemporary neoliberal rescaling process. The spatiotemporal analysis of 
these two cases aids to locate, define and analyse the specific structural 
conditions which determine the specific socio-spatial forms of this neoliberal 
extension in the periphery that appeared as the regional integration projects.     
Therefore, the analysis of the contemporary regional economic integration 
projects of Mexico and Turkey necessitates a comprehensive investigation of 
the successive stages of formation, consolidation, transformation and 
expansion of the peripheral capitalist spatiality in terms of their historically and 
spatially specific conditions. It is worth noting that the comparison of those 
two cases is not a mere juxtaposition of cross-societal similarities/differences 
of two cumulative processes with a thin historical perspective in order to 
provide a Weberian ideal type that could constitute a middle ground to reach 
historically limited generalisations (Ragin 1981: 114; Ragin and Zaret 1983: 
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732). On the contrary, the aim of this thesis is to employ an enhanced 
incorporated comparison through analysing the processes of formation, 
consolidation, transformation and expansion of the peripheral capitalist spaces 
in Mexico and Turkey. Incorporated comparison aims to give substance to the 
historical process by comparing its parts without reifying an a priori totality or 
reifying the instances that dialectically comprise this totality. Therefore, the 
comparison becomes the substance of the inquiry rather than its framework 
(McMichael 1990: 386; McMichael 1992: 359). McMichael defined two 
requirements for such a strategy. First, the units of analysis are historical, 
therefore fluid, and second, the units of analysis that are employed 
comparatively are neither subordinated parts of the totality nor independent 
from it. The parts of the totality reveal and realise the changing whole, in that 
sense the whole cannot be seen as an empirical premise that can be 
discovered through the analysis of the mutually conditioning parts (McMichael 
1990: 391).    
In this type of comparison strategy, the units are not comparable units as such, 
but comparable as systemic units, thereby compared as the manifestations of 
systemic processes rather than a priori nation-states that can be applied in the 
cross-national analysis (McMichael 1992: 359). In that sense, incorporated 
comparison presents an alternative method of comparison since it recognises 
the comparable social phenomena as differentiated moments of a historically 
integrated process, thereby avoids treating the social phenomena as parallel 
cases (McMichael 1990: 392). From this point of view, the historicised and 
spatialised social reality can be analysed through its underlying structural 
conditions and processes that are interrelated in terms of social change 
(McMichael 2000: 671). 
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McMichael defined two forms of incorporated comparison. The multiple 
(diachronic) form of incorporated comƉĂƌŝƐŽŶ  ‘ĂŶĂůǇƐĞƐ Ă ĐƵŵƵůĂƚŝǀĞ- 
historical - process through time and space differentiated instances of a 
ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůƐŝŶŐƵůĂƌƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ?ǁŚŝůĞƚŚĞƐŝŶŐƵůĂƌ ?ƐǇŶĐŚƌŽŶŝĐ )ĨŽƌŵŽĨŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞĚ
ĐŽŵƉĂƌŝƐŽŶĂŶĂůǇƐĞƐ ‘ǀĂƌŝĂƚŝŽŶŝŶŽƌĂĐƌŽƐƐƐƉĂĐĞĂƚĂŶŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůĐŽŶũƵŶĐƚƵƌĞ ?
(McMichael 1990: 392-393; McMichael 1992: 360). The spatiotemporal 
conceptual framework employed in this thesis, which focuses on the particular 
processes of social transformation in two specific socio-spatial units in a 
multiscalar way, combines these two forms of incorporated comparison, and 
thereby presents an enhanced comparative method (McMichael 1990: 393).  
In that sense, this work argues that the formation of (or transition to) the 
ĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐƚ ƐƉĂĐĞ ŝŶ DĞǆŝĐŽ ĂŶĚ dƵƌŬĞǇ ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ůŽŶŐ ?  ? ?th century  Wwhich 
built upon the already existing uneven exchange relations with the centre 
during the mercantilist world economic development- positioned these 
countries within the periphery of the international division of labour. The 
peripheral positioning of these capitalist spaces refers to their dependent 
nature on the centre in terms of the emergence, maintenance and furthering 
of the capitalist productive forces. This process eventually culminated in a 
phase of revolution/restoration of the peripheral capitalist spatiality 
strengthening the peripheral position within the international division of 
labour through the passive revolutions. The weak national bourgeoisies took 
the responsibility of the dependent capital accumulation and development of 
productive forces when the developing capitalist social relations within the 
existing social formation led to the transcending of the existing socio-spatial 
form. The bourgeoisie-in-formation eliminated the old regime of uneven and 
combined development and established its hegemony by incorporating the 
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reactionary social forces and, thus, produced a new form of political authority 
(Gramsci 2007: 106, 107; Morton 2003: 632).  
With the institutionalisation of the passive revolution parallel to the 
consolidation of the peripheral capitalist space, the uneven relationship with 
the core has been deepened with the acceleration of the capitalist 
accumulation in the form of the Import Substitution Policies (ISI) within the 
post-World War context. This period of consolidation of the peripheral 
capitalist space was marked by a significant advance on the fixed capital as 
well as the considerable expansion of the productive forces with the intensive 
industrialisation as a result of the etatist policies. With the exhaustion of the 
foreign dependent ISI expansion of the capitalist productive forces starting in 
the 1970s, Mexico and Turkey reached to the limits of the capitalist 
accumulation via strong state presence in the economy. The economic 
stalemate determined the conditions of the transformation of the peripheral 
capitalist state to the neoliberal spatiality with the trade liberalisation and 
structural adjustment programmes during the 1980s. In this last period of 
worldwide capitalist reconfiguration, the Mexican and Turkish capitalist forces 
completed the integration with the centre. The North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and European Customs Union (ECU) marked the current 
stage of economic integration of Mexico and Turkey with the North American 
and European economic structures in which both countries incorporated their 
productive forces into the demand and production patterns of the centre. In 
this last stage, the peripheral capitalist spaces entered a phase of expansion 
towards their own periphery within their regions in order to reproduce uneven 
ĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ ŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ  ‘ŵĂƌŐŝŶĂů ? ƐƉĂĐĞƐ ŝŶƚŽ ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌůĚ ŵĂƌŬĞƚ
within the worldwide processes of the neoliberal re-territorialisation. 
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Therefore, the analysis of the contemporary positioning and inter-spatial 
relations of Mexico and Turkey within the neoliberal international division of 
labour should be defined on the basis of a spatiotemporal analysis of the 
ůŽŶŐƵĞ ĚƵƌĠĞ ŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ƚŚĂƚ ĐŽŵƉƌŝƐĞƐ ƚŚĞ ŵŽŵĞŶƚƐ ŽĨ ĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ?
consolidation, transformation, and expansion processes of the peripheral 
capitalist space where the unevenness has been perpetuated in these specific 
socio-spatial configurations. It should be noted that the perpetuation of the 
unevenness within the development of the capitalist spatiality and its 
constructive relation to the contemporary specific socio-spatial organisation of 
Mexico and Turkey receives the utmost emphasis throughout this work. 
The analysis of these dialectical processes of formation, consolidation, 
transformation and expansion of the peripheral capitalist space necessitates a 
profound conceptualisation of social space. In that sense, this work starts with 
the definition of the general abstractions that underpin the social space in 
general, which allow the further theorisation of the capitalist space and the 
peripheral capitalist space. With the establishment of this spatiotemporally 
specific conceptual framework, the particular analysis of the various processes 
that emerged within the capitalist spaces throughout history and geography 
could be identified. Therefore, a relational methodology that moves from the 
abstract to the concrete processes will be employed in the analysis of the 
regional integration projects of Mexico and Turkey where the two different 
cases that had been juxtaposed manifest the same specific socio-spatial 
patterns of formation and transformation since they are exposed to the similar 
spatiotemporal conditions that overdetermine these dialectical processes. In 
the analysis of the concrete processes of the formation and transformation of 
the peripheral capitalist space in Mexico and Turkey, historical and 
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contemporary economic and statistical figures will be used and, where it is 
necessary, will be calculated based on data ĚƌĂǁŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ ‘Instituto Nacional 
ĚĞ ƐƚĂĚşƐƚŝĐĂ Ǉ 'ĞŽŐƌĂĨşĂ ?(National Institute of Statistics and Geography  W
/E'/ )ĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘dƺƌŬŝǇĞ7ƐƚĂƚŝƐƚŝŬ<ƵƌƵŵƵ ?(Turkish Statistical Institute  Wdm7< ) ? 
Structure of Thesis 
This thesis has been organised in five interrelated chapters. Chapter one 
directly engages with the ontological and epistemological conundrums of the 
mainstream international relations and foreign policy studies. As it has been 
argued above, the mainstream understanding of foreign relations derived from 
the Cartesian logic which confines the social sciences into separated disciplines 
with clearly defined and institutionalised borders. The international relations 
and foreign policy studies had positioned the Cartesian perspectivalism as the 
normative and integral part of the analysis. The unquestioned acceptance and 
incorporation of the positivist ontology should be seen as the ƌĂŝƐŽŶĚ ?ġƚƌĞ of 
international relations and foreign policy analysis as separate, self-defined and 
institutionalised disciplines that would operate within a framework composed 
of objectively conceptualised themes and categories. The relations between 
different social entities have been exclusively comprehended from the 
standpoint of self-explanatory nation-state apparatuses even though it has 
been claimed that foreign policy needs to be understood as a multi-factorial, 
multi-level and multi-causal processes. However, this claim of multi-causality 
has found its response in the inclusion of empirically verified ahistoric 
categories and hence, did not change the picture in any substantial way, rather 
than enlarging the scope of the analysis by continually calling for an 
 ‘ŝŶƚĞƌĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĂƌǇ ?Ěialogue.   
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Therefore, it is important to engage with the mainstream conceptualisation of 
the nation-state and international relations to manifest its ahistoric and 
spaceless nature and inability to grasp the social space on the national scale 
and the interspatial relations between those social spaces. Without observing 
the positivist limitedness of the existing themes and borders of the 
international relations, an alternative historical materialist conceptual 
framework cannot be built. The engagement with the themes and categories 
of the mainstream international relations and foreign policy studies by no 
means refers to a re-conceptualisation or redefinition of those main concepts. 
It rather aims to deconstruct these themes and categories in order to manifest 
how the Cartesian epistemology has been systematically instilled into 
mainstream spatial thinking. /Ŷ tĂůůĞƌƐƚĞŝŶ ?Ɛ ǁŽƌĚƐ  ? ? ? ? ? ), this engagement 
ĂŝŵƐƚŽ ‘ƵŶƚŚŝŶŬ ?ƚŚĞƐĞŵŝƐůĞĂĚŝŶŐĂŶĚƐĞůĨ-evident assumptions. In that point, 
the contribution of the critical geography and critical geopolitics studies needs 
to be taken into account. Critical geography and critical geopolitics studies 
have been intensively focused on the processes where the geographical 
knowledge had been produced and established as a priori reality. The 
subjective fragmentation, hierarchical division and labelling of space which 
became the quasi-scientific basis of the ahistoric and spaceless geography and 
geopolitics has been significantly criticised and perceived as the integral part of 
the modern statecraft. In the genealogical investigation of the production of 
spatial knowledge it has been shown that the separation of time and space is 
directly linked with the ocularcentric epistemology that conceptualised by the 
intellectuals of statecraft in order to create a panoptic vision of the world and 
the subjects that populate it. In that sense, the critical geopolitics has 
successfully manifested the relationship between power and the spatial 
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representations and the inadequacy of the mainstream geography and 
geopolitics to locate and identify this social complexity.  
Nevertheless, these critiques have failed to differentiate the existence of 
physical, social and mental spaces and rather confined themselves within the 
discursive area. Furthermore, they underscored any possible theorisation 
efforts of the spatiality by arguing that any such aim of conceptualisation 
would collapse in the reproduction of the similarly fixed and taken for granted 
categories of the positivist thinking.  
Rejecting that, chapter two theorises an alternative conceptualisation for the 
analysis of world politics by defining inter-state relations as the inter-spatial 
relations on a national scale and by recognising the dialectical analysis of social 
space and spatiality as its crucial premise. As it has been stated above, the 
dialectical understanding of the production and transformation of the 
capitalist space in the periphery is the foundation of the analysis of the 
regional integration and economic development initiatives in Mexico and 
Turkey which links the continually transforming peripheral socio-spatial 
conditions with these regional integration projects. The dialectical analysis of 
the social space and its different forms on various scales should be established 
upon the Marxist dialectical materialist theorisation of the relationship 
between Man and Nature. Through defining the relationship between Man 
and Nature as metabolic, Marx recognised the production of the human 
consciousness as an integral part of the production of material life. Further 
treatment of this simultaneous process as a dialectical becoming -rather than 
Hegelian static perception of the unity of thought and reality which finally 
resolves in the Absolute Idea W necessitates this totality to be perceived as a 
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moving unity. In this conjuncture, it is important to note two points; first, 
although this dialectical totality predates capitalism, it corresponds with the 
historically and spatially specific configurations that became dominant during 
the unfurling -and the continual transformation- of the capitalist social 
relations since the industrial revolution. Secondly, the production of social 
space that configured upon uneven geographical development has been 
sharpened and appeared as the necessary condition of the reproduction of the 
capitalist spatiality where the state power emerged as its specific scalar 
configuration. This scalar configuration received much attention on the current 
ƌĞƐĐĂůŝŶŐ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ǁŚĞƌĞ ƚŚĞ ĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐƚ ƐƉĂƚŝĂůŝƚǇ ĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐĂůůǇ  ‘intensified ? ĂŶĚ
ƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůůǇ ‘ĞǆƚĞŶƐŝĨŝĞĚ ? ?Lefebvre, conceptualised these two points and hence, 
laid down the general and particular premises of the contemporary inter-
spatial relations.  
Following the establishment of the conceptual framework of the production of 
space and spatiality, chapter three focuses on the processes of the peripheral 
capitalist space formation in these two specific socio-spatial cases  WMexico and 
Turkey. The processes of the capitalist space formation in Mexico and Turkey 
started from the early 19
th
 century and shared the same structural dynamics 
which conditioned the peripheral capitalist spatiality in both countries. In the 
analysis of these processes, three concepts have been linked to each other to 
provide a spatiotemporal analytical tool for the analysis of the formation of 
ƉĞƌŝƉŚĞƌĂůĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐƚƐƉĂƚŝĂůŝƚǇ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨĐŽŵŵŽĚŝƚǇĞĐŽŶŽŵǇĂƐƚŚĞ
prerequisite of primitive accumulation and as a part of the enlarged 
reƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?  ?>ƵǆĞŵďƵƌŐ ) ?  ‘ƵŶĞǀĞŶ ĂŶĚ ĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ? (Trotsky), 
ĂŶĚ  ‘ƉĂƐƐŝǀĞ ƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ?  ?'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ) ? dŚĞ ĐŽŵŵŽŶ ĨĞĂƚƵƌĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞƐĞ ƚŚƌĞĞ
concepts is their spatiotemporally specific origin; analysing the transition to 
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capitalism in the periphery in a particular historical period. By focusing on 
different aspects and stages in the examples of Poland, Russia and Italy, 
Luxemburg, Trotsky and Gramsci conceptualised the socio-spatial conditions of 
the development of the capitalist productive forces in the periphery as a result 
of the expansion of the capitalism which transformed the existing social 
relations of production in these late-comer countries in the 19
th
 century. 
Therefore, linking these three theories provides a spatially and temporally 
specific conceptual framework in the analysis of the production of the 
peripheral capitalist spatiality in 19
th
 century Mexico and Turkey. As it has been 
stated above, defining the specific conditions of the production of the 
peripheral capitalist space in Mexico and Turkey is a crucial step in the analysis 
of the contemporary expansion of this peripheral spatiality towards the 
marginal spaces in the form of regional integration projects.   
The expanded reproduction of capitalist social relations in the industrialised 
capitalist world in the phase of enlarged reproduction necessitated the 
integration of the peripheral non-capitalist geographies in the early 19
th
 
century through replacing the local production structures by the introduction 
of cheaper consumer goods to the periphery. This incorporation into the 
international capitalist division of labour had started to dissolve the traditional 
spatial relations in Mexico and Turkey throughout the 19
th
 century and 
resulted in the liberal and constitutionalist movements in order to reform and 
catch up with the development of the capitalist production forces of the centre 
by establishing the necessary legal/institutional framework and physical 
infrastructure for the expansion of the capitalist productive forces. However, a 
meaningful expansion did not materialise until the dictatorships of General 
Porfirio şĂǌ  ? ? ? ? ?-1910) and Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1876-1909) which 
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brought political stability and unprecedented formation of a centralised state 
apparatus on the national scale. Under foreign economic and military pressure, 
both countries needed to undertake such a centralisation parallel to the 
uneven and combined development of the capitalist productive forces. While 
the foreign direct investment and international loans had significantly 
developed the capitalist productive forces and the necessary infrastructure 
(particularly railways, ports, manufacture for the domestic consumption and 
financial structures), the doomed to perish pre-capitalist forms of production 
existed side by side, thus, defining the modern underdevelopment within the 
capitalist spatiality. These processes of uneven and combined development 
ĐƵůŵŝŶĂƚĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƉĂƐƐŝǀĞ ƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐ ? ŽĨ DĞǆŝĐŽ  ? ? ? ? ?-1920) and Turkey 
(1908-1925) where the dependent peripheral capitalist spatiality had been 
strengthened with the establishment of the bourgeois hegemony as a result of 
the dialectical passive revolutionary process that laid down the conditions of 
consolidation during the post-passive revolutionary period. Passive 
revolutionary process combines the progressive and reactionary elements that 
end ǁŝƚŚ Ă  ‘ƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ-ƌĞƐƚŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? Žƌ  ‘ƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ? ǁŚĞƌĞ
ƚŚĞ ĞŵĞƌŐĞŶƚ ďŽƵƌŐĞŽŝƐ ĐŽƵůĚ ĂĐƚ ĂŶĚ ĚŝƐƐŽůǀĞ ƚŚĞ  ‘ďůŽĐŬĞĚ ĚŝĂůĞĐƚŝĐ ? ďǇ
mobilising the subaltern classes (Buci-Gluckmann 1980: 315; Morton 2007: 66 
Morton 2010: 319). These passive revolutions, directed by the weak national 
bourgeoisies of Mexico and Turkey, established the conditions for the 
industrial expansion which deepened the dependency on the developed 
capitalist spaces and strengthened the peripheral positioning of Mexico and 
Turkey within the international division of labour through furthering the 
dependent development of productive forces. 
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Chapter four and five continue from this specific development of the 
peripheral socio-spatiality in Mexico and Turkey with a closer look, aiming to 
reach a meaningful analysis of the contemporary processes of rescaling. In the 
case of Mexico, the consolidation of the peripheral capitalist spatiality was 
materialised after the Mexican passive revolution which ended the Porfiriato, 
i.e., Pax Porfiriana. Following the elimination of the old regime and its 
contradictions, the post-passive revolutionary period institutionalised the 
passive revolution through the consolidation of the peripheral capitalist 
spatiality in which the limited national bourgeois furthered its precarious 
hegemony. This period witnessed the expansion and deepening of a different 
form of capitalist unevenness through the strengthening of institutional and 
political framework which was the necessary condition for the dependent ISI 
based economic growth. The post-passive revolutionary period was marked by 
the demobilisation of the popular movements through certain compromises 
ƐƵĐŚĂƐ ‘ƚŚĞŐƌĞĂƚůĂŶĚƌĞĨŽƌŵ ?ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞcentralisation of the state power has 
ensured the control of every social scale and social mobilisation. Following the 
institutionalising wave of the Mexican passive revolution in the form of 
peripheral capitalist spatiality, the role of political organisation on the 
expansion of the capitalist forces of production became more crucial. In the 
post-World War context the ISI development policies emerged as the only 
viable strategy for the maintenance of the capitalist accumulation in the 
peripheral capitalist geographies. However, the ISI oriented capitalist 
development did rather deepen the dependency of Mexico on the capitalist 
centre  Wprimarily to the North American economic structure-  since it has been 
indirectly financed by foreign loans and investments regarding the limited 
capacity of agricultural exports to finance the imports of necessary machinery 
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and intermediate goods.  The ISI development had significantly expanded the 
Mexican manufacture industry particularly in the production of capital goods. 
However, the exhaustion of this first stage of ISI development and the 
necessary expansion of industrial production towards the production of 
durables led to the deeper problems in balance of payments. The continually 
deteriorating dependency on foreign financial sources during the 1970s both in 
the form of international loans and direct investment led to the stalemate of 
the economy and forced the Mexican economy to transform to the export-
oriented structure through undertaking series of structural adjustment 
prescriptions and trade liberalisation policies backed by the International 
DŽŶĞƚĂƌǇ &ƵŶĚ  ?/D& ) ĂŶĚ tŽƌůĚ ĂŶŬ  ?t ) ? DĞǆŝĐŽ ?Ɛ ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ
NAFTA in 1994 was a very significant point as the culmination of the long-
lasting uneven relationship between North American economic structure and 
marked the structural transformation that Mexico had undergone during the 
neoliberal rescaling period. It is not a coincidence that the first interests in the 
valorisation and commercialisation of the South and Southeast Mexico and the 
Central American region emerged during this period of transition.  
The first projects that aimed to integrate and incorporate those  ‘ŵĂƌŐŝŶĂů ?
regions were proposed during the Presidency of Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000). 
In this period, comprehensive plans were proposed for the construction of 
superhighways in order to facilitate the transit transportation of resources, 
goods and services, the creation of a unified energy market and, the 
establishment of a Central American Biological corridor in order to increase the 
agro-exports of the region and to encourage the introduction and cultivation 
of non-traditional, exotic, genetically engineered and medicinal agricultural 
products. However, the most consistent and, concrete plan for the integration 
27 
 
of the region was proposed during the presidency of Vicente Fox in 2001 as the 
Plan Puebla-WĂŶĂŵĄ  ?WWW ) ? WWW ŝŶŝƚŝĂůůǇ ĐŽǀĞƌĞĚ ŶŝŶĞ ^ŽƵƚŚ ĂŶĚ ^ŽƵƚŚĞĂƐƚ
states of Mexico
3
 and seven Central American States: Guatemala, Belize, 
Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Panama. The project had 
proposed several initiatives on a wide range of areas but in particular the 
attention has been paid to the construction and modernisation of the 
transportation facilities including highways, ports, railways, and airports; the 
expansion of maquila industry in order to fight with the unemployment; and 
unifying the energy market under one administration by construction of 
several interconnections between countries and hydroelectric dams which will 
build the channels for the extension of the neoliberal rescaling by establishing 
the necessary institutional frameworks and infrastructure for the development 
of the capitalist productive forces. 
The plan received significant opposition from different groups and particularly 
from the local communities and indigenous movements. After a long period of 
inertia, the plan has been re-launched with a new name;  ‘WƌŽǇĞĐƚŽ
DĞƐŽĂŵĠƌŝĐĂ ? (Mesoamerican Project -PM). Now including Colombia as well, 
the PM significantly adopted and incorporated the objectives of the PPP but in 
a more realistic and concrete way with a better institutional framework. 
In the case of Turkey, a similar socio-spatial formation, consolidation, 
transformation and expansion processes of the peripheral spatiality can be 
detected. The product of the institutionalisation of the Turkish revolution 
(1908-1925) was the centralised Turkish nation-state organisation where the 
peripheral capitalist spatiality has been consolidated.  The inevitable etatist 
                                                          
3
 Puebla, Veracruz, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Chiapas, Tabasco, Campeche, Quintana Roo, YucatĄn.  
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period following the Independence War followed by the years of ISI 
development until the balance of payment crisis reached an unsustainable 
ůĞǀĞů ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ  ? ? ? ? ĂŶĚ  ? ? ? ? ? ŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ƚŚĂŶ DĞǆŝĐĂŶ ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ? dƵƌŬĞǇ ?Ɛ 
transformation towards the neoliberal spatiality was achieved after two years 
of civil conflict ĨŽůůŽǁĞĚďǇƚŚĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĐŽƵƉĚ ?ĠƚĂƚŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?The military coup 
cleared the way for the structural adjustment and trade liberalisation of the 
Turkish economy and Turkey had been restructured towards the export-
ŽƌŝĞŶƚĞĚ ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂů ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ? KŶĐĞ ĂŐĂŝŶ ? dƵƌŬĞǇ ?Ɛ ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ
European Customs Union (ECU) marked a significant moment for the 
reproduction of the uneven relationship between European economic 
structure and dƵƌŬĞǇ ? ^ŝŵŝůĂƌ ƚŽ DĞǆŝĐŽ ? dƵƌŬĞǇ ?Ɛ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ƌĞŐŝŽŶĂů
integration and development projects had sprung simultaneously to the 
neoliberal rescaling and export orientation of the economy. In that sense, 
during the 1990s Turkey has initiated the establiƐŚŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ůĂĐŬ ^ĞĂ
ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ KƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?  ?^ ) ŝŶ ŽƌĚĞƌ ƚŽ ĂĐĐĞůĞƌĂƚĞ ĂŶĚ
facilitate the transition of the Black Sea region countries to free market 
economies. However, it can be argued that the most ambitious and concrete 
projects of infrastructure and economic integration projects took in place in 
the Caucasus region with Georgia and Azerbaijan, and in the Middle East with 
Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil and gas pipeline, 
Nabucco gas pipeline, and the Kars-Tbilisi-Baku railway construction had been 
planned or/and materialised during the 2000s. More recently, the East 
Mediterranean Four (EMF) had been initiated between Turkey, Syria, Jordan 
and Lebanon ƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞ ‘>ĞǀĂŶƚWƌŽũĞĐƚ ? in order to harmonise and standardise 
the interregional trade between these four countries
4
.  
                                                          
4
 This plan has been suspended due to the recent conflicts in Syria and as a result of Turkish 
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In both cases, the regional economic integration and development projects 
should be analysed in terms of the transformation and expansion of the 
capitalist space within the historically specific context of intensifying and 
extensifying neoliberal capitalist spatiality in the periphery. In that sense, this 
work defines a spatiotemporal framework to understand the specific 
conditions where the formation of the peripheral capitalist spatiality and 
spatial relations have been structured. By tracking the formation of the specific 
socio-spatial organisations and locating them within the structural conditions 
of uneven geographical development, the regional economic integration and 
development projects of Mexico and Turkey could be interpreted as the 
contemporary expression of the configuration and reconfiguration of the 
capitalist spatiality. 
Lefebvre (1964/2009) argued that the knowledge of state is a crucial point for 
the political action. And the knowledge of state can only be gained if the 
structural dynamics underpinning the capitalist space and its perceptions can 
be explained: 
 ‘/ƚ ŝƐ ŝŵƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ĨŽƌ ƐŽĐŝĂůŝƐƚ ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ ƚŽ ĂĐĐĞƉƚ ?  ? ? ?ŶŽƚ ŽŶůǇ ƚŚĞ
existence of this current society with its tendencies and its capitalistic 
orientation, but the sparkling appearance that it gives itself, which must 
be first destroyed to arrive at the underlying truth of relations of 
production...To understand the current reality we must depart from 
                                                                                                                                                                    
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞ^ǇƌŝĂŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚŝƚƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚ
that it would be re-initiated in the short term peƌŝŽĚ ? ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? dƵƌŬŝƐŚ ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ
willingness to criticise the Syrian government and encouragement of the regime change 
should be seen as an indicator of a long term tendency of the expansion of the peripheral 
capitalist spatiality.   
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Marxist thought and tear off a veil of appearances that is no less 
colourful, nor less coarse than a century ago (Lefebvre 1964/2009: 64) ?. 
Therefore, this work aims to provide a comprehensive spatiotemporal analysis 
of the regional economic integration and development projects of Mexico and 
Turkey which could explain the specific expressions and forms taken by the 
global restructuring process that can strengthen the production of the 
counter-hegemonic spatialities on different scales. Furthermore, this work 
provides empirical evidence for the conceptual framework of analysing the 
varied formation and transformation of the capitalist spatiality by comparing 
two spatiotemporally specific processes where the peripheral capitalist 
spatiality has been built upon the uneven geographical development. Linking 
the spatially and temporally specific concepts of Luxemburg, Trotsky and 
Gramsci for the explanation of the specific socio-spatial organisation of 
capitalism in the periphery should be perceived as a significant element of this 
theorisation. And, lastly, this work shows that it is possible  Wand necessary- to 
engage with the contemporary space formation strategies on the national 
scale without falling into the reproduction of the state-centric themes and 
categories but through establishing a spatiotemporal analysis of varied 
multiscalar formations and transformations of the social space. 
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Chapter 1: The problematic of analysing the inter-spatial relations on the 
national scale    
 ‘^ŝŶĐĞ ƚŚĞ zŽƵŶŐ ,ĞŐĞůŝĂŶƐ ĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐ ? ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƐ ? ŝĚĞĂƐ ? ŝŶ ĨĂĐƚ Ăůů ƚŚĞ
products of consciousness, to which they attribute an independent existence, it is 
evident that the Young Hegelians have to fight only against these illusions of 
consciousnesƐ ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞǇ ?ŝŶƐƉŝƚĞŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĂůůĞŐĞĚůǇ ‘ǁŽƌůĚ-ƐŚĂƚƚĞƌŝŶŐ ?ƉŚƌĂƐĞƐ ?ĂƌĞƚŚĞ
ƐƚĂƵŶĐŚĞƐƚĐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞƐ ? 
- <ĂƌůDĂƌǆĂŶĚ&ƌŝĞĚƌŝĐŚŶŐĞůƐ ? ‘dŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶ/ĚĞŽůŽŐǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ? ) ?
 
In the German Ideology, one of the issues that Marx and Engels focused on 
was the premises where the mainstream thoughts and ideas become given, 
objective, and a priori categories through the systematic and exclusive 
engagements of the philosophers with those concepts. This was an effort to 
demystify the German philosophy by locating and disclosing it as the product 
of the German petty-bourgeoisie conditions (Marx and Engels 1998: 473). In 
their assault on the Young Hegelian bastions, Marx and Engels directed their 
criticisms both to the pure idealistic understanding of the concepts which give 
an independent existence to those notions that delinked from their material 
premises, and the reproduction of those concepts upon an exclusively 
materialist understanding of the social reality -as in Feuerbach- which collapses 
in the same non-dialectical course. The solution that Marx provided was the 
dialectical materialist understanding of the social reality which will be 
evaluated in the chapter two. This chapter will be focusing on the concepts 
and categories that had been produced by the mainstream international 
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relations within the self-claimed discipline of foreign policy studies for the 
analysis of the inter-spatial relations on the national scale.  
This engagement with the mainstream concepts and categories is a necessary 
step in order to proceed with a dialectical materialist analysis of inter-spatial 
relations without aiming to simply reconceptualise or reproduce those 
ahistoric and spaceless notions of space from the political economy 
perspective ďƵƚ ŝŶƐƚĞĂĚ ĂŝŵŝŶŐ ƚŽ ƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐůǇ  ‘ƵŶƚŚŝŶŬ ? ƚŚŽƐĞ ŵŝƐůĞĂĚŝŶŐ
concepts and categories (Wallerstein 2001: 2). Therefore, it is very important 
to focus first on the mainstream foreign policy themes to show the inherent 
limits to their underlying Cartesian understanding with its ahistoric and 
spaceless ontological and epistemological nature. This engagement seeks to 
explain why it is necessary to reject their themes and concepts, and their 
epistemological and ontological foundation, in order to rule out any attempts 
of modification of these themes which would only reproduce different 
ahistoric and spaceless categories that confining the complex socio-spatial 
reality within the borders of formal/institutional appearances. In that sense, it 
is argued that the Cartesian perspectivalist paradigm, which the foreign policy 
and international relations themes and concepts had been built upon, needs to 
ďĞ “untaught ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĞǀĞƌƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵŝŶŐƐŽĐŝĂůƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶĂŶĞĞĚƚŽďĞůŽĐĂƚĞĚ
and analysed within the spatiotemporal processes of formation and 
transformation.  
Therefore, this chapter proceeds by taking two steps. Firstly, the concepts and 
categories that have been produced and reproduced within the international 
relations and foreign policy theorisation will be reviewed in order to clear the 
ground for the deconstruction of these ahistoric and spaceless themes which 
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limits the formation and transformation of the social phenomena within the 
borders of the nation-states and governmental institutions. By doing this, 
secondly, this chapter will be deconstructing those themes and concepts by 
problematising and rejecting the ontological foundations of the taken for 
granted categories. These two steps enable the theorisation of a 
spatiotemporal analysis that offers a dialectical materialist understanding of 
the inter-spatial relations which will be conceptualised in the next chapter.      
The critical geopolitics allows us to undertake the deconstruction of these 
mainstream foreign policy theories even though it does not conceptualise an 
alternative way of analysing the social phenomena. In that sense, this chapter 
aims to undertake the necessary process of unthinking of the mainstream 
foreign policy concepts and categories, and thus, firstly focuses on the 
conceptualisation of these themes and later the deconstruction of them 
through critical geopolitics studies in order to provide a historical materialist 
analysis based on the theorisation of the spatiotemporal processes of 
formation and transformation of the social space.   
 The conceptualisation of the spatiotemporal analysis of the regional 
integration projects in Mexico and Turkey will be based on this simultaneous 
attempt of unthinking of the mainstream concepts and the alternative 
examination of the processes of production and reproduction of the peripheral 
capitalist spatiality within the context of worldwide reconfiguration of 
neoliberal capitalism. The foreign policy theorisation quintessentially 
designated the scope of foreign policy research as the analysis of the short-
time span activities of the clearly defined entities (spaceless spaces) on the 
international scale. Therefore, from the institutionalist and systemic 
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approaches to the political psychology analyses, the epistemological 
progression had been articulated on the same trail of conceptualisation that 
takes the nation-state as the container or platform of the social phenomenon. 
In that sense, since a re-conceptualisation of these notions would be a futile 
reproduction, the crucial aim of this engagement is to manifest the organic 
relationship between the independent existence of the mainstream 
conceptualisation and the conditions in which the mainstream themes and 
ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝĞƐ ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚ ĂŶĚ ƌĞƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŝŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂůƐ ŽĨ
statecraft ? ?MdƵĂƚŚĂŝůĂŶĚŐŶĞǁ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ). 
Therefore, as stated above, the first section will directly focus on the 
mainstream theorisation of foreign policy by outlining its general features and 
limitations and disclosing its commitment to the Cartesian ontological and 
positivist epistemological premises. Critical geopolitics studies played a 
significant role in challenging the positivist knowledge produced within the 
mainstream foreign policy studies through deconstructing those themes and 
concepts, particularly space and geography itself, to unravel the relationship 
between the established Cartesian epistemology and the forms of authority 
and power relations. Thus, the second section will be evaluating these 
criticisms. Nevertheless, the critical geopolitics studies fail to go beyond this 
reflection and restrain itself to the critique of the language and phraseology of 
the oppression. The last section briefly builds on this point and provides the 
general abstractions for the dialectical materialist analysis of the inter-spatial 
relations which will be elaborated in the next chapter.  
 
35 
 
1.1. Engaging with the positivist foundation and the Cartesian theorisation of 
the foreign policy studies 
This section aims to engage with the theorisation of foreign policy studies as a 
mainstream and self-defined field and unravel its general ontological and 
epistemological foundations on which the existing themes, categories and 
notions have been produced and reproduced. It is important to note that it is 
not desired to regenerate or reconceptualise the main themes and central 
ƉƌŽďůĞŵƐŽĨƚŚĞŵĂŝŶƐƚƌĞĂŵĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇƐƚƵĚŝĞƐĨƌŽŵĂ ‘ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůŝƐƚ
ƉŽŝŶƚ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝŶ ĨĂĐƚ ŝƐ ŝŶĞƐĐĂƉĂďůǇ ĐŽŶĚĞŵŶĞĚ ƚŽ ƉƌŽduce a generic foreign 
policy conceptualisation with an economic concern. On the contrary, in this 
work it is aimed to deconstruct these taken-for-granted a priori themes and 
concepts in order to deny their relevance for the analysis of the inter-spatial 
relations.  
The unchanging problematical ontological foundations set by the prominent 
currents of international relations studies can be traced back to the tendency 
to model an a priori and objective knowledge of social reality which has been 
inscribed in the Western epistemology. The crude realist approaches that are 
mainly concerned with international security issues had been transformed 
towards a rather multi-factorial and multi-disciplinary foreign policy tradition 
since the 1960s, but the (nation)state-centric agency, themes and assumptions 
remained very much intact. Contemporary foreign policy studies have been 
shaped and limited by the same institutionalised ontological assumptions but 
varied in the emphasis on the different aspects of the foreign policy making 
process, in different epistemological stances or in using different 
methodologies. However, the majority of the mainstream work in the field 
shares the similar problematic perceptions, features and borders.  
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The general categories and themes of contemporary foreign policy studies are 
relatively systematised and indisputable. Although there is a certain level of 
discussion on the thematic limits of the study, the scope of foreign policy 
studies has been well deĨŝŶĞĚĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽĂ  ‘ĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůǁŝƐĚŽŵ ?ŽŶǁŚĂƚ
should and what should not be included in the analysis (Webber and Smith 
2002: 3). Therefore, from the very beginning the foreign policy studies locate 
themselves within the positivist ontology by recognising a normative position 
ĚƌĂǁŶďǇĂ ‘ĐŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůǁŝƐĚŽŵ ?ŽƌĂĐŽŵŵŽŶƐĞŶƐĞ ?
,ŝůůĚĞĨŝŶĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? )ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇĂƐ ‘ƚŚĞƐƵŵŽĨĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐĐŽŶĚƵĐƚĞĚďǇ
ĂŶ ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚ ĂĐƚŽƌ ŝŶ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽ ,ŝůů, foreign 
policy exists in a space which is created by states and their actions are 
(somehow) limited. State is functioning as a mediator between external and 
internal demands and the effectiveness of this mediation reflects the 
effectiveness of the foreign policy (Hill 2002: 31). It can be argued that one of 
the main concerns of foreign policy studies is to understand and to model the 
behaviour of nation-state in a multi-causal way that takes numerous factors 
into account at various levels of analysis (Breuring 2007: 163).   
Another definition made by Webber and Smith (2002) points out that foreign 
policy includes the goals, decisions and actions that had been sought and made 
by states on behalf of their people who organised themselves as national 
societies in terms of external relations. Whilst it has been argued that the 
contemporary state system should not be seen as monolithic, the main factor 
that creates the difference between the units of observation is considered as 
having a western style democracy or an autocratic regime. Thus, ideally a 
 ‘ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐ ?ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇǁŝůůďĂƐĞŝƚƐĨoreign policy in achieving economic growth 
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and stability which directly can be interpreted as the common good (Webber 
and Smith 2002: 10- ? ? ) ?tŚĞŶ ŝƚ ĐŽŵĞƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨ  ‘ŶŽŶ-western, less 
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉĞĚ ? ƐƚĂƚĞƐ ? ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ ƉŽůŝĐǇ ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ? Ă ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ĂŶĂůǇƚŝĐĂů ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ
should be adopted than analysing the foreign policies of the Western 
developed states (White 1989: 9). 
It can be argued that, particularly in the period following the Cold War, there 
was a transformation from the strictly state-centric realist analysis of foreign 
policy that was ŽƌŝĞŶƚĞĚ ďǇ  ‘ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐ ǁŝƚŚ Ă ďƌŽĂĚ
ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ  ‘ůŽǁ ĂŶĚ ŚŝŐŚ ? ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ ƉŽůŝĐǇ ŝƐƐƵĞƐ  ?ŽŽƉĞƌ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? )
towards a more complex and multidimensional study of state behaviour. 
Nevertheless, the main focus of foreign policy studies remained on three 
ĂƐƉĞĐƚƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞƐĞ ĞǆƚĞƌŶĂů ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?  ‘ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ? ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŵĂŬĞƌ ĂŶĚ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ
ŵĂŬŝŶŐ ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ ?  ?ƌĞƵƌŝŶŐ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ) ? dŚĞ ŽǀĞƌǁŚĞůŵŝŶŐ ŝŶĐ ŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ ƚŽ
perceive the nation-state as the machinery which processes the inputs and 
produces outputs that will subsequently feed the milieu back where the inputs 
had initially emerged. Inevitably, the main driving force of studying foreign 
policy is to describe the dynamic, constantly changing adapting system as a 
whole with its interdependent components to understand the foreign policy 
behaviour in a complex and multi-factorial manner (Clarke 1989: 29). This 
exclusive focus which defines the unchallenged borders of the research area 
straightforwardly declares the foreign policy studies as a study of short-time 
ƐƉĂŶ ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ ƚŚĞ ůŽŶŐƵĞ ĚƵƌĠĞ in which the nation-state appears as the 
non-problematic container of the social activity holding the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical power (Hobden 1999: 257; Hobson 2002: 27). This 
focus has been the driving force of the first, second and the third generation 
foreign policy studies. Nevertheless, while the former two aspects of foreign 
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policy relatively remained clearly defined and non-controversial, the question 
of how to understand the decision making process has been the main area of 
discussion in the theorisation of foreign policy studies. 
More recently, it has been acknowledged that the foreign policy of a nation-
state is a complex and multidimensional process which includes an open 
interplay between different factors (Cordell and Wolff 2005: 7). In that vein, it 
has been pointed out that there are six hallmarks of foreign policy analysis 
which are ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚ ĂƐ ďĞŝŶŐ  ‘ŵƵůƚŝ-factorial, multilevel, interdisciplinary, 
integrative, agent-oriented and actor-ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ ? ?,ƵĚƐŽŶ ? ? ? ? P ? ) ?^ŝŵŝůĂƌůǇ, Hill 
(2002) highlights the main points of foreign policy analysis as being 
 ‘ĐŽŵƉĂƌĂƚŝǀĞ ? ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂů ? ŝŶƚĞƌĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĂƌǇ ĂŶĚ ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝǀĞ ? ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚƵƐ ? ŝƚ ĐĂŶ
encompass the decision making process as a whole multi-factorial system.  
In that sense, three broad focuses can be located within the contemporary 
foreign policy studies which directly emanate from its positivist 
epistemological foundations that separates, fixes and immobilises time and 
space. The first focus is in identifying the multiple factors that influence the 
process of decision making in the domestic and international arenas. Despite 
the argument that a ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ ƉŽůŝĐǇ ƐĐŚŽůĂƌ ƐŚŽƵůĚ  ‘ƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞ ƚŚĞ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ
ŵĂŬŝŶŐƐǇƐƚĞŵĂƐĂǁŚŽůĞ ?, in fact, foreign policy studies are inherently based 
on several superficial separations such as domestic and foreign, national and 
international or political and economic. These separations are essential to 
maintain the research of foreign policy as a meaningful and coherent 
discipline. Hill (2002) defined the nation-state as a self-maximising mediator of 
the external influences and flows on the domestic sphere in the pursuit of the 
national interest. While the nation-state is the main entity that provides 
39 
 
ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ƚŽ ŝƚƐ ŽǁŶ ƐƵďũĞĐƚƐ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŶŐ ĂŶĂƌĐŚŝĐ  ‘ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ ? Ĩƌom the 
ŽƌĚĞƌůǇ  ‘ŝŶƐŝĚĞ ? ? ƚŚĞ ďŽƌĚĞƌƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĞǆƚĞŶƚ ƚŚĂƚ ŶĂƚŝŽŶ-state allows the 
 ‘ĞǆƚĞƌŶĂů ? ƚŽ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂů ? ƌĞŵĂŝŶĞĚ as an unidentified subject for 
foreign policy studies (Hill 2002: 31). 
/ŶĂŶ ‘ŝĚĞĂů ?ǁĞƐƚĞƌŶƐƚǇůĞĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ?ƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐŽĨĨoreign policy decision 
making have ďĞĞŶ ƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚ ĂƐ Ă  ‘ƚǁŽ-ůĞǀĞů ŐĂŵĞ ? ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
governments to maximise the interests of its nation while minimising the 
adverse threats to the ability of the nation-state to satisfy those needs 
(Putnam 1988: 434; Webber and Smith 2002: 45). Nevertheless, the second 
generation foreign policy studies started to recognise that there are different 
non-state actors and concerns emanating from both domestic and 
international arenas influencing foreign policy behaviour even though the 
ontological dogma that locates the nation-state as the central concern of the 
analysis have been preserved. Foreign policy studies claimed that those 
influences had to be channelled through a political structure or a government 
ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞƐ ? ĚĞĐŝĚĞƐ ĂŶĚ ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? ƚŚĞ ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ ƉŽůŝĐǇ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ĂƐ ĂŶ
 ‘ƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƵŶŝƚ ? ?,ĞƌŵĂŶŶĂŶĚ,ĞƌŵĂŶŶ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? )ǁŚŝůĞƚŚĞĞǆƚĞƌŶal 
factors and agents within these processes needed to be incorporated. 
Therefore, the contemporary foreign policy theorisation attempts to identify 
those external factors and agencies that have been involved, sources of 
influences and the decision-makers themselves within the process of decision 
making (Bicchi et al. 2006: 3). 
It is important to note that the third generation foreign policy studies claim 
that the traditional separation of national and international spheres or the 
common neglect of the domestic factors are not valid anymore, and 
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contemporarily, foreign policy is perceived as a two-level game (Starr 2006: 4-
 ? ? 'ƌŽǀĞ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ) ? <ĞŶŶĞƚŚ tĂůƚǌ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ƉƌŽŵŝŶĞŶƚ ŶĞŽƌĞĂůŝƐƚ ƚŚĞŽƌŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ
drew much of the criticisms in this matter. Indeed, Waltz conceptualised a 
clear distinction between the hierarchically ordered domestic political 
structures and intrinsically anarchic  Wand conflict prone- international political 
system where all the units had been positioned with a specifiable relation to 
others (Waltz 1979: 81, 99-101; Waltz 2000: 10). While in the anarchic realm 
these units tend to increase their capabilities by seeking clear ends, they 
meanwhile create interdependence within the hierarchical domestic realm 
where the agents are integrated for a common good (Waltz 1979: 104-105). 
Another point that Waltz received criticism over was his underscoring of the 
economic factors by arguing that the economic aspects should be 
conceptualised as pure factors distinct from the social and political realms 
(Waltz 1990: 22). The third generation realist approaches alongside the other 
foreign policy perspectives had criticised this notion of the nation-state as a 
 ‘ďůĂĐŬďŽǆ ?ǁŚŝĐŚďůƵƌƐƚŚĞĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐĨĂĐƚŽƌƐĂŶĚĐůĂŝŵĞĚ that the foreign policy 
ƚŚĞŽƌŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ƐŚŽƵůĚ ĚƌŝǀĞ ĨŽƌ Ă  ‘ŐƌĞĂƚĞƌ ŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ƐŽƉŚŝƐƚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?
(Taliaferro et al. 2009: 18-19).  
What, in fact, the contemporary foreign policy theorisation aims to achieve is a 
refining of the crude version of the positivist understanding of the social reality 
into a research area that focuses on the construction of complex and multi-
causative models that can explain different factors in issue areas (Starr 2006: 
2). WhilĞ  ‘ŶĞŽĐůĂƐƐŝĐĂů ƌĞĂůŝƐƚƐ ? ƉƵƚ ŵŽƌĞ ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐ on the domestic area by 
taking the social group formation as their starting point on the basis of metus 
hostilis principle, the constructivist and political psychological perspectives 
incorporated the international norms and human rights as a product of 
41 
 
cognitive process of political practice, and hence, as a part of the national-
interest (Brown 2001: 22; Macdonald and Patman 2007: 2; Brysk 2009: 31). 
In the same vein, neo-institutionalist/neo-functionalist perspectives focused 
on the links between those two spheres by claiming that there is a link 
between micro level developments and macro level transformations which 
should be processed and incorporated into foreign policy conceptualisation 
and analysis. Rosenau (2006) argued that following the unprecedented 
progress of the communicational and informational technologies, the capacity 
and talents of the individuals considerably increased. He defined this 
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƐŬŝůů ƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ? ? ƉĞŽƉůĞ ĂƌĞ ŵŽƌĞŵŽďŝůĞ ĂŶĚ ǁĞůů
equipped, therefore, they compose a more active and effective civil society in 
influencing the foreign policy decision making (Rosenau 2006: 12). Rosenau 
argued that the widespread use of the internet promoted several social 
initiatives which led to an increase in the number of social activities or in the 
ĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ Đŝǀŝů ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? dŚĞ  ‘ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĞǆƉůŽƐŝ Ŷ ? ŶĞĞĚƐ ƚŽ ďe 
seriously taken into account in order to grasp the new international realities. 
Subsequently, he argued that the traditional authority of the nation-state has 
been disaggregated after those informational and organisational revolutions. 
The authority in the national society has been dispersed and it is not 
concentrated in large hierarchical organisations such as the nation-state 
anymore. The disaggregation of the authority led to a multi-centric world 
system and foreign policy studies need to focus on the links, channels and 
interaction between those units comprising this multi-centric system (Rosenau 
2006: 18). Within the same neo-realist institutionalist spectrum one can find 
the perspectives that give more importance to the rational choices of the 
nation-state organisational frameworks and sociological institutionalist 
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perspective where the states and national/transnational institutions have been 
perceived mutually constitutive (Larsen 2005: 15).   
Another issue area, or level of analysis, that the foreign policy studies have 
been increasingly focusing on is the factors that influence foreign policy 
decision making in terms of the environmental conditioning of the decision 
maker himself. In their seminal work, the Sprouts have emphasised that the 
setting (i.e., stage, arena or environment) is a determining factor of the 
ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌ ŽĨ ŚƵŵĂŶ ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ŵĂŬĞƌƐ ? ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ  ‘ŚƵŵĂŶ ĞĐŽůŽŐǇ ?
ĂŶĚ  ‘ĐŽŐŶŝƚŝǀĞ ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌĂůŝƐƚ ? ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ ?a human being, perceived as a 
unified entity with his/her environment who consciously reacts to his/her 
surroundings (Sprout and Sprout 1965: 118).  
dŚĞĐĞŶƚƌĂůĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞ^ƉƌŽƵƚƐ ?ƚŚĞƐŝƐǁĂƐƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞĚďǇƚŚĞŝĚĞĂƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐ
possible to locate, evaluate and explain the human and non-human 
environmental factors which play a significant role in human decision making 
process. These conditionings have been perceived, sensed and taken into 
account by the individuals unconsciously. The milieu is able to influence, affect 
and shape the human values and preferences, moods and attitudes, choices 
and decisions (Drury 2005: 3; Grove 2007: 4; Stein 2008: 104-105). On the 
other hand, the links between environmental factors and outcomes of the 
undertakings may have different dimensions. Environmental factors are able to 
limit the execution of undertakings cognitively in terms of both material and 
ideational perceptions. Therefore, the psychological perceptions of individuals 
are not necessarily the resource of the limitative power of human ecology. 
According to the Sprouts, human ecology has been influential in human 
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decision making process even when they have not been perceived 
simultaneously by the individuals (Sprout and Sprout 1965: 12). 
The Sprouts further problematised the role of human perception in decision 
making process by emphasising the subjective characteristic of the perception 
of the environment; a person never fully perceives everything present in the 
milieu.  However, unperceived factors can possibly effect the outcomes of the 
decisions. They argued that values, taboos, and other norms can be 
determinative factors on individuals for being more alert and responsive to 
certain features of the milieu than other individuals (Sprout and Sprout 1965: 
131, 133). 
According to ƚŚĞ ^ƉƌŽƵƚƐ ? ecological perspective5 in foreign policy draws 
attention to (1) the psychological behaviour of individuals; (2) undertakings 
which mean planning the best ways to be advantageous or successful; and (3) 
the outcomes or the results of applied undertakings. They claimed that the 
ecological perspective contributed to a better understanding of the link 
between the human decisions and outcomes (intended or not intended 
behaviours and outcomes) and the milieu (Sprout and Sprout 1965: 8).  
However, the Sprouts also argued that there must be a clear explanation of the 
relationship between the determinism of the structure and free will. At the 
same time, the terms of being multi-disciplinary should be outlined. Therefore, 
they suggested a categorisation of concepts through a differentiation of the 
notions and terms of foreign policy analytically; as cognitive and non-cognitive. 
                                                          
5
 Sprouts define the human ecology as the relationship between individuals, groups and 
organisation and also with the nonhuman settings. In human ecology the reference of analysis 
is the relationship between the human and his surrounding nonhuman conditions (Sprout and 
Sprout 1965). 
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This distinction involves further analytical differentiations between individual 
behaviour and state affairs and between undertaking and achievement (Sprout 
and Sprout 1965: 10). Nevertheless, behaviouralist approaches do not question 
ontological fixities but attempt to explain them through reproducing them 
from a different perspective. According to the ^ƉƌŽƵƚƐ ?ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ, while human 
beings are seen as individuals acting within a formal/institutional structure, 
their material and ideational environment is perceived as external to them by 
ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝŶŐŝƚĂƐĂƐǇƐƚĞŵƚŚĂƚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐ ‘ŝŶƉƵƚƐ ? ?ŶĚŝƚŚĂƐďĞĞŶĐůĂŝŵĞĚƚŚĂƚ
this machinery can be objectively modelled in terms of political rationality.   
On the other hand, the relationship between the human decision maker and 
ŚŝƐ ?ŚĞƌĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚŝƐĂůĞƐƐƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƚŝĐĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨ^ŶǇĚĞƌĞƚĂů ? ?ƐǁŽƌŬǁŚŝĐŚ
represents another strand within the foreign policy studies theorisation. This 
perspective places an emphasis on the clearly defined decision making process 
itself. The structure is ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĞĚĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ƐĞƚƚŝŶŐ ?ŽƌƚŚĞ ‘ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ?
in the analysis of foreign policy and defined as a cluster of values that possess 
a potential to affect state behaviour (Snyder et al. 2002: 60, 76). Therefore, the 
unit of observation is exclusively the organisational system which the decision 
ŵĂŬĞƌƐĂĐƚǁŝƚŚŝŶĂŶĚĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐůǇ ?ŶĚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ? ŝƚƐĞůĨ ŝƐĂŶ ŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶŽĨ
creating a particular state of affairs which motivates the decision makers by a 
perception of an outcome or an achievement. The motivation may be 
generated by both internal and external setting and the decision making 
process combines this motivation with a process of selection of one scheme 
from a limited number of alternative projects (Snyder et al. 2002: 78). 
While the different levels of analysis had been taken by the institutionalist, 
political psychological and the rationalist choice theorisation of the foreign 
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policy, it is possible to argue that, in reality, they bring different aspects of the 
rationalist modelling of the foreign policy together. Hudson argued that 
moving from a strict state-centric focus towards to a foreign policy analysis 
that can incorporate different aspects of the decision making process, and 
particularly the incorporation of the human decision maker into the study, is 
important in three ways. Firstly, the recognition of the human decision makers, 
as a point of theoretical intersection between the decision and the decision 
making process, allows the analysis to adopt a more complex and realistic 
conceptualisation of the nation-state. In addition, it makes it possible to take 
the cultural and social factors into account. Secondly, by positing the human 
decision maker as the representative of the nation-state, it has been argued 
that foreign policy theories have clarified the agent of the foreign policy 
analysis. Consequently, it reinforced more satisfactory explanations than the 
traditional, natural law-like generalisations since it anticipates a psychological 
and cognitive approach (Hudson 2002: 6-7). 
These different stances on various units of analyses and levels on diverse issue 
areas do not draw a conflicting picture in foreign policy studies but on the 
contrary, a complementary one. Foreign policy is perceived as an objective 
that sought by a Janus-faced foreign policy decision maker who is located on 
the intersection between the international and national spheres (Lobell 2009: 
43), and whose capacity to take rational choices and efficient decisions was 
affected  Wlimited or enhanced- by numerous factors and causes at various 
levels
6
 (White and Clarke 1989; Hill 2002; Smith et al. 2008). While some 
                                                          
6
 Breuring (2007) summariseĚ ƐŽŵĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞƐĞ ĨĂĐƚŽƌƐ ĂƐ  ‘ůĞĂĚĞƌ ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ĂŶĚ ǁŽƌůĚǀŝĞǁ ?
perceptions, problem representations, the use of analogies, and reasoning; the role of 
advisors, group decision making, and the impact of institutional arrangements; domestic 
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variables are considered to be independent (culture, resources or idiosyncratic 
leaders etc), some others have been considered as intertwined (economic 
wealth, psychology of decision makers, etc). Additionally, within the decision 
making process, the interplay between cognition and emotion; personal 
relations and trust; the role of speeches and policy entrepreneurs in the policy 
process; perceiving opportunities; and the role of time constraints in policy 
making should be considered in the analysis (Chollet and Goldgeier 2002: 165). 
The task of the foreign policy theorisation is defining this complex multi-
factorial and multi-ĐĂƵƐĂů ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚ ǁŝƚŚ ĂŶ  ‘ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ ĂŶĚ ĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚ ?
conceptualisation of the system and clarifying the methodology to approach it 
(Hay 2002: 60). This conceptualisation must be based on easily replicable, 
testable and clear analytical tools, models, and sets of data which will ensure 
that the foreign policy studies will meet the  ‘ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ? ƉƌĞĚŝĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ĂŶĚ
ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇ ?ĐƌŝƚĞƌŝĂ ?^ŶǇĚĞƌĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? ? P ? ?-29).  
As has been argued before, the ontological and epistemological progression 
within foreign policy studies followed this positivist track. The homogenised, 
neutralised and separated understandings of time and space have been 
inscribed in the themes, concepts and categories produced by the 
conceptualisation of foreign policy studies. Foreign policy theories 
conceptualised a multi-factories model that focuses on the decision, decision 
making process and the decision makers to analyse short-span activities of the 
ahistoric and spaceless Cartesian space. Simultaneously, these central ahistoric 
and spaceless concepts and themes which are defined as the foundation of the 
discipline such as state and states system perceived as static, homogenous and 
                                                                                                                                                                    
ĂƵĚŝĞŶĐĞƐ ?ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ?ĐƵůƚƵƌĞĂŶĚƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĐĂƉĂďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ ?ƐŝǌĞĂŶĚ
geographic locations (Breuring 2007: 163).  
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non-problematic, thus, remained under-theorised and unable to explain social 
change (Hobden 1998: 4; Hobden 1999: 268; Hobson et al. 2010: 11). 
Therefore, foreign policy study could be seen as the organic extension of the 
bourgeois ideology, hence, its self-claimed borders, levels of analysis and the 
issue areas need to be unravelled and rejected.  
Among numerous mainstream international relations and foreign policy 
studies journals, think tank working papers and various other publications, 
ƐƵĐŚ ĂŶ  ‘ŽƌŐĂŶŝĐ ? ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ĨŽƌĞign policy knowledge on Mexico and 
dƵƌŬĞǇĐĂŶďĞůŽĐĂƚĞĚŝŶƚǁŽƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚũŽƵƌŶĂůƐ ? ‘ZĞǀŝƐƚĂDĞǆŝĐĂŶĂĚĞWŽůşƚŝĐĂ
Exterior ?(Mexican Journal of Foreign Policy) and  ‘WĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐ ?. Funded and 
published by the foreign ministries of Mexico and Turkey, these two journals 
provide an important ideational space for the mainstream academics mainly 
working on the foreign policy issues of Mexico and Turkey, and were later 
followed and emulated by several other journals published by the  think tank 
ĂŶĚ ‘ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĐĞŶƚƌĞƐ ? ?One of the most salient features shared by the 
publications in these journals is their ahistoric focus on the short-term span 
issues. Another significant characteristic of these works is the strong 
commitment to the positivist conceptualisations of nation-state, national 
interest and security and states system that takes short-span bilateral relations 
between homogenous agencies as its central focus.  
These works strongly argued that, thanks to the processes of economic 
integration and market liberalisation of the 1990s, more open and export-
oriented Mexico and Turkey were promoted from the developing countries 
ůĞĂŐƵĞƚŽƚŚĞŐƌŽƵƉŽĨ ‘ĞŵĞƌŐĞŶƚĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ? and thus became more vocal and 
proactive in the international politics. These works have claimed that the 
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membership of Mexico to NAFTA and OECD in 1994 -and its seceding from the 
G77 same year- signalled the changing international role of Mexico. While the 
 ‘ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ĨŽƌ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ? ďĞcame a central objective for 
Mexican foreign policy, the transformation of economic institutions to achieve 
more comprehensive integration with the global markets emerged as a 
significant process that shaped ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐ ?^ĄŶĐŚĞǌ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?Ɛ
ƚŚĞ  ‘>ĞǇ ƉĂƌĂ ůĂ ŽŽƉĞƌĂĐŝſŶ /ŶƚĞƌŶĂĐŝŽŶĂů ƉĂƌĂ Ğů ĞƐĂƌƌŽůůŽ ? (the act of 
International Cooperation for Development) was enacted in 2010, it has been 
argued that Mexico increased its influence in the international arena on the 
issues of narco-ƚƌĂĨĨŝĐŬŝŶŐĂŶĚŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĞĚĐƌŝŵĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ ‘DĞƌŝĚĂ/ŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞ ? ?ŽŶ
climate change with its constructive role in ƚŚĞ ‘ůŝŵĂƚĞŚĂŶŐĞ&ŽƌƵŵ ? ?United 
Nations and on the regional development through the  ‘WƌŽǇĞĐƚŽDĞƐŽĂŵĠƌŝĐĂ ? 
(Mesoamerican Project  WPM)  ?^ĄŶĐŚĞǌ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?dŚĞƐĞǁŽƌŬƐĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
Plan Puebla Panama (PPP) which transformed to PM in 2007 is one of the main 
columns of these international cooperation for development strategies giving a 
strong foreign policy instrument to Mexico in maintaining the privileged 
relationship with Central America and Colombia (Ascencio 2008: 16). The 
mainstream works praise the increasing multilateralism in Mexican foreign 
policy in various areas such as prevention of illegal migration and human 
ƚƌĂĨĨŝĐŬŝŶŐĂƐĂŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ŝƐƐƵĞ  ?ůĂƌĐſŶ ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ) ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ the 
regional and international mechanisms for the development of the strategic 
ĂĞƌŽƐƉĂĐĞ ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĞƐ  ?sĄǌƋƵĞǌ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ) ? ĞǆƉĂŶĚŝŶŐ ĂŶ ĚĞĞƉĞŶŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ
bilateral economic and strategic relations with the countries that possess great 
potential like Brazil, Russia, China and European Union  ?&ĞƌŶĄŶĚĞǌ  ? ? ? ? ?
ůǀĂƌĞǌ ? ? ? ? ?,ŝũƵĞůŽƐ ? ? ? ? ) ?/ƚŝƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŽŶŽƚĞƚŚĂƚǁŚŝůĞƚŚĞŵĂŝŶƐƚƌĞĂŵ
ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ ƉŽůŝĐǇ ǁŽƌŬƐ ƉƌĂŝƐĞĚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŶĞǁ ? ŵƵůƚŝůĂƚĞƌĂůŝƐƚ ƚƵƌŶ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ DĞǆŝĐĂŶ
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foreign policy, they defended that the main axis of the Mexican foreign policy 
should be maintained as expanding and deepening the regional integration 
and cooperation with the two other NAFTA countries, United States and 
Canada (Studer 2009: 18-19) 
Not surprisingly, the mainstream works in Turkish foreign policy analysis have 
been reaching strikingly similar conclusions. These works also identified a new 
era in the Turkish foreign policy starting in the 1990s when Turkey started to 
play a more prominent and proactive role in regional and global politics with 
ƚŚĞŚĞůƉŽĨdƵƌŬĞǇ ?ƐƵƌŽƉĞĂŶhŶŝŽŶŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉĐĂŶĚŝĚĂĐǇƚŚĂƚǁĂƐŐƌĂŶƚĞĚ
in 1999. Keyman (2010) argued that in the new global context, Turkey, as a 
consolidated democracy and multicultural modern country with a large Muslim 
population, ƐŚŽƵůĚ ŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂůůǇ ? ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůǇ ? ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůůǇ ĂŶĚ
ŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐĂůůǇ ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ĚĞĞƉ ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
hŶŝŽŶ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ŵĂŝŶ ĂǆŝƐ ŽĨ ŝƚƐ  ‘ƉƌŽĂĐƚive, constructive and multi-ĚŝŵĞŶƐŝŽŶĂů ?
foreign policy (Keyman 2010: 15). In a ƐŝŵŝůĂƌ ǀĞŝŶ ? ŝŶĕ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ĐůĂŝŵĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ
Turkey increased its regional power significantly in the last ten years through 
strengthening its relationship with Syria, Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and other 
countries in the region. It has been argued that the democratisation process 
and the growth in the economy that was significantly taken forward under the 
government of  ‘ĚĂůĞƚǀĞ<ĂůŬŦŶŵĂWĂƌƚŝƐŝ ? (Justice and Development Party  W
AKP) are the two dynamics behind this new formulation of Turkish foreign 
policy, moving the foreign policy making from the security-orientated 
strategies to the constructive foreign policy on the basis of regional economic 
cooperation and international multilatĞƌĂů ŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞƐ  ?mŶĂǇ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ŝŶĕ
2011: 63). These works univocally claimed that during AKP rule, Turkey has 
repositioned itself within the new world order by putting an emphasis on 
50 
 
interdependency, regional integration, economic cooperation and proactive 
foreign policy. These works also argued that Turkey not only tried to deepen 
the relations with the countries in its region such as Syria, Iraq -and more 
strongly with the Kurdish Regional Authority-, Georgia, Azerbaijan, but also 
sought to establish relations with the countries located in the traditionally 
neglected regions like Africa and East Asia or to normalise relations with 
ƌŵĞŶŝĂ ?PǌĐĂŶ ? ? ? ? ?ƌĂƐĂŶĚŬƉŦŶĂƌ ? ? ? ? ?PǌŬĂŶ ? ? ? ? ) ? 
As it has been mentioned before, this work argues that mainstream foreign 
policy studies are unable to present any meaningful insight on the 
international politics in general and spatial relations of Mexico and Turkey, in 
particular. It will be shown in the next section of this chapter that the 
ontological foundations of these works cause the constant production and 
reproduction of the ahistoricism that perceive the society as a static, discrete 
and homogenous entity and lead to the unquestioned use of vague and 
superficial concepts such as national interest, national security and national 
economic growth, etc. As a result of this, almost in a journalistic way, these 
works have been focusing on the short-time span developments that are 
unable to identify or analyse the processes in which the social reality 
dynamically transformed. It will be observed in the fourth and fifth chapters of 
this work that only a spatiotemporal analysis of the social change that focuses 
on the historical processes of formation and transformation of the social 
reality can identify and explain the underpinning conditions of social change, 
and thereby provide a meaningful analysis of the contemporary capitalist 
space and spatial relations in Mexico and Turkey on different scales. 
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1.2. Reconsidering the ahistoric and spaceless notion of geography 
In order to analyse the inter-spatial relations between different spaces on the 
national scale, it is essential to define the specific conditions in which the 
multiscalar and dialectical processes of the production and transformation of 
social space emerge. The definition of these conditions also signals the 
production of the hegemonic representations of space where the dominant 
spatial conceptualisation formed and transformed accordingly. In mainstream 
foreign policy studies, it has been argued that the nation-state officially and 
institutionally materialises and formalises sets of aims and actions based on 
vague, subjective, and an informal and simultaneously widely unchallenged 
appreciation of the supposedly objective geographical conditions. In that 
sense, geopolitics can be seen as the content of the foreign policy studies or, in 
other words, as the hegemonic content of the relations between different 
spaces which shape the behaviours of the nation-states in international 
politics. Foreign policy theorisation aims to model the space and spatial 
relations exclusively on the homogenous, fixed, and self-defined spatial scales 
within the short-time span (therefore, timelessly, ahistorically) through the 
geopolitics which is based on Cartesian geographical knowledge. Appealing to 
Marx and Engels in the German Ideology once again, it is possible to locate this 
hegemonic content as the product of the capitalist spatiality.   
However, a historical materialist account of the inter-spatial relations on the 
national scale cannot be built on those ontological foundations of the 
mainstream conceptualisation of the spaceless geography and geopolitics. 
Furthermore, any attempt that aims to develop an alternative Marxist 
theoretical framework to understand inter-spatial relations on the national 
scale needs to be aware of the possibility to reiterate and reproduce neo-
52 
 
Weberian notions of geography. Reinstating the Marxist dialectics in the 
analysis plays a crucial role in this point. The absolute historicist approach of 
Gramsci offers a robust appreciation of dialectics which is beyond a simple 
emphasis on the material conditions that the ideas were generated within 
(Morton 2007: 29). The dialectical relationship between the object and subject, 
between the form and content, is the key point that has to be reinvigorated in 
the analysis of the social phenomena, and inevitably in the analysis of the 
social space and the geographical notions. From a Gramscian point of view, the 
 ‘ŝĚĞĂƚŝŽŶĂů ?ŚĂƐĂĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝǀĞƌŽůĞŝŶƚŚe construction of hegemony which was 
produced by the intellectuals of the statecraft. In that vein, Cox (1985) argued 
that institutions and conceptualisation of the other social phenomena might 
be seen as a collective response of human beings to a particular material 
condition in a particular time and space. In this matter, Cox appealed to Vico in 
formulating how objective realities were constituted by inter-subjective ideas 
(Cox 1985: 52). According to Cox, historical structures are simple 
representations of a certain social practice and an expression of a tendency. 
They provide a logically coherent form (a concept) to understand complex 
ƐŽĐŝĂůƌĞĂůŝƚŝĞƐĂŶĚƚĞŶĚĞŶĐŝĞƐ ?dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?Žǆ ?ƐŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐŚĂƌĞƐƚŚĞ
ƐĂŵĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐǁŝƚŚsŝĐŽ ?Ɛ ‘ŽƐĂ ?.  ‘ŽƐĂ ? generates a material character of the 
social phenomena which shows a coherency and persistency in a particular 
time and space. It is significant to note that  ‘ĐŽƐĂ ? or historical structure cover 
both ideational and material aspects of the social reality (Cox 1995: 29). 
Therefore, state, national and international institutions and other trans-
national organisations perceived to be composing and maintaining their 
existence both on a material and ideational base that subject of a continual 
transformation. Within this transformation, persistent patterns of the inter-
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subjectively constituted entities can be detected, deconstructed and 
conceptually fixed but an analyst has to acknowledge its limitedness in the 
particular time and space with its normative nature (Sinclair 1995: 10).   
Critical geopolitics studies give a strong account of the ideational base of the 
mainstream geographical knowledge in this dialectical production process. 
From the critical geopolitics perspective, the production of geopolitical 
representations is significant in understanding the production of the 
hegemonic geographical knowledge and this function is mainly performed by 
the Western intellectuals and scholars. Therefore, this section argues that the 
evaluation of the challenges posed by the critical geopolitics to the dominant 
conceptualisation of the social phenomena is a necessary step in the dialectical 
materialist understanding of the inter-spatial relations. It is a better way to 
start to the conceptualisation of the historical materialist space rather than 
following the uneasy path suggested by Callinicos (2007) which was infamously 
ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚĂƐ ƚŚĞŶĞĐĞƐƐŝƚǇŽĨĂ  ‘ƌĞĂůŝƐƚŵŽŵĞŶƚ ? ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ƚŚĞ
geopolitical logic into the historical materialist understanding of social 
phenomena. ŶĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŚĂƚĂŝŵƐƚŽ ‘ƌĞƚŚŝŶŬ ? the mainstream issues, such as 
 ‘ŐĞŽƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇŝŶƚĞƌ-ƐƚĂƚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?, as Callinicos 
tried to conceptualise, through incorporating realist themes within the Marxist 
categories, would intrinsically limit the analysis within the ahistoric and 
spaceless borders of the social inquiry. However, with the simultaneous 
unthinking of the mainstream themes and categories and the reinvigoration of 
the dialectical materialist understanding of the social space, the non-historical 
materialist tendency towards positivism within the analysis of the inter-spatial 
relations disappears without falling to the neo-Weberian multi-causality trap 
or to the crude materialist interpretations of Marxism.  
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For the ones who engage with the notion of geography from a critical point of 
view, the term of geopolitics expresses more than a set of political evaluations 
based on certain heuristic values of terrestrial morphology. Geographical 
notions have been perceived neither as a simple objective abstraction of the 
 ‘ƌĞĂů ?, nor an ingenuous representation of nature in general, or in a particular 
landscape. On the contrary, its borders or its resources -the sum of 
unquestioned content of the foreign policy studies that are usually taken for 
granted- are questioned and deconstructed. For critical geopolitics, modern 
geographical knowledge and geopolitics are rather systems of imagination, 
structures of the (mis)representation of the real, sets of signifiers and signified 
that were generated within the discourse. It has been argued that mainstream 
geopolitics is dividing, labelling and spatialising the terrestrial space on the 
basis of a quasi-scientific hierarchical interpretation of knowledge. In order to 
see and govern the world as a totality, this endeavour  Wrepresenting the space 
and the place purged from the reality- was seen as a crucial necessity for the 
modern statecraft (Agnew 1998: 2). Thus, mainstream geopolitics is an 
engagement with geography which ultimately works against the genuine 
geographical knowledge. 
MdƵĂƚŚĂŝů, and other leading critical geopolitics scholars, located the modern 
geographical knowledge within the 16
th
 century European imperialist 
expansionism which had required new forms of geographical 
power/knowledge structures to govern, delimit and discipline the space as 
homogenous, one-dimensional and uni-ĐƵůƚƵƌĂů ?MdƵĂƚŚĂŝů ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ? ) ?tŝƚŚ
the Enlightenment, the Western world emerged as the universal model and 
gauge for social progress and ĐŝǀŝůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?  ‘dŚĞ KƚŚĞƌ ? ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ƵƐĞĚ ĂƐ Ă
cement-like element in the production of the Western identity which is based 
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on a dichotomy of civilised-uncivilised or modern-traditional in an antagonistic 
way (Slater 1993: 421).  
This production of modern geographical knowledge claimed to comprise three 
ĂƐƉĞĐƚƐ ? dŚĞ ĨŝƌƐƚ ĂƐƉĞĐƚ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƐƵƌĨĂĐĞƐ ŽĨ ĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ ƌĞĨĞƌƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ
spaces that the geographical knowledge has been produced. The second 
aspect is the intellectuals of the statecraft who produce that knowledge in 
order to aid and facilitate the operation of the modern state machinery. And 
lastly, the systems of specifications that the geographical representations 
become a part of the geopolŝƚŝĐĂů ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ  ?M dƵĂƚŚĂŝů  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ) ? ƌŝƚŝĐĂů
geopolitics studies challenged all these geographical representations by 
focusing on the spaces of (re)production of the geopolitical reasoning in 
particular and geographical knowledge in general and by questioning how 
these discourses are dispersing and permeating from aspects of the everyday 
life to world politics. In order to do that, critical geopolitics disclosed the 
relationship between the universalist and objectivist understanding of 
knowledge and its ontological foundations within the Cartesian 
Perspectivalism (Agnew 2007: 138). 
The state understood in the critical geopolitics as a specification, a boundary 
drawing geopolitical act which reduces the plurality of space by drawing on a 
dichotomy of secƵƌĞ ‘ŝŶ ?ĂŶĚĂŶĂƌĐŚŝĐ ‘ŽƵƚ ? ?MdƵĂƚŚĂŝůĂŶĚĂůďǇ ? ? ? ? P ? ) ?dŚŝƐ
spatial division lies in the core of the Western thought and ultimately conveys 
Ă ŵŽƌĂů ĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ  ‘ŐŽŽĚ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ďĂĚ ? ?  ‘civilised ? and  ‘civilised-to-be ?. 
However, these dichotomies share the same psych-space and this condition 
makes the geographical representation fragile (Sparke 1998: 205). Therefore, 
the struggle over the hegemonic geographic representations are seen not only 
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as a matter of material resistance to the Western Cartesian imaginary of the 
physical topographies but also a matter of resistance to the discursive 
ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞďĞŶŝŐŶ^ĞůĨĂŶĚƚŚĞŵĂůŝŐŶKƚŚĞƌ ?MdƵĂƚŚĂŝů ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ? 
Critical geopolitics questions and deconstructs the mainstream deviation of the 
genuine geographical knowledge and has posed fundamental ontological and 
epistemological challenges for almost two decades. Furthermore, it aims to 
deconstruct everyday practices of geopolitical representations (re)produced by 
politicians, state officials, academicians and media. For critical geopolitics, the 
objectivist and the reductionist (mis)representation of the geography as an 
ĂůůĞŐĞĚůǇƚƌĂŶƐŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůĂďƐƚƌĂĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƌĞĂů ?ŝƐƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƚŝĐĂŶĚŶĞĞĚƐƚŽďĞ
challenged. 
In fact, it is not critical geopolitics which challenged the Cartesian 
ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĂůŝƐŵĨŝƌƐƚ ?,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?ƐƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨďĞŝŶŐǁĂƐŽŶĞ
of the very first challenges to the foundations of the traditional philosophical 
ƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƌĞůĂƚĞĚ ƉƌŽĨŽƵŶĚůǇ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƐŝƚĞ ? ? ,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ƉƌŽĐůĂŝŵĞd a 
 ‘ĐƌŝƐŝƐ ŽĨ ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ? ĐĂƵƐĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ĨĂŝůƵƌĞ ŽĨ ŐƌĂƐƉŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŝĂƚĞĚ
presencing of being (Radloff 2007: 4). Therefore, he rejected a universally 
ĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚ  ‘ƉůĂŶĞƚĂƌǇ ? ƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ? ƚŚĞ ƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂů ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ĞǆƉůŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ
the world which found its essence in the Western thought (Radloff 2007: 36). 
In his elaboration of  ‘ƉůĂŶĞƚĂƌǇ ƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ? ,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ŐĂǀĞ ĂŶ ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ of the 
period which he calls the planetary epoch. In this particular era, the positivist 
perspective that takes the globe monolithically and as a homogenised entity 
that has been prevailed and promoted an undifferentiated dimension (Radloff 
2007: 40). This uniformed dimension generated the dominant Western 
ontology and epistemology which underpinned universal, nature-like scientific 
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laws and conformity of the technical norms of productivity. The being of beings 
in this epoch is ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚ ŝŶ ƚĞƌŵƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ? ?
hŶŝĨŽƌŵŝƚǇ ŝŶĞǀŝƚĂďůǇ ƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞƐ  ‘ƚŚĞ ƐƚĂƚĞĐƌĂĨƚ ?ǁŝƚŚ ŝƚƐ ĚĞǀ ůŽƉĞĚ ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐ
for the management of the resources and the structures of coordination 
(Radloff 2007: 47). The significant observation that Heidegger made was the 
fact that during the capitalist modernity the hegemonic ideology of modern 
capitalist statecraft universally and uniformly triumphs over the different 
forms of social space.    
With a similar concern, Foucault puts a special emphasis on space in the 
development of the Western epistemology. Foucault (1986) claimed that the 
ƚĞŶĚĞŶĐǇƚŽ ‘ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĂŶĞŶƐĞŵďůĞŽĨƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?through space has a particular 
history in Western thought. The hierarchical categorisation of places during 
the middle ages, based on conflicting dichotomies between sacred and 
profane or protected and open-exposed places, created the medieval space as 
Ă  ‘ƐƉĂĐĞ ŽĨ ĞŵƉůĂĐĞŵĞŶƚ ?  ?&ŽƵĐĂƵůƚ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ) ? ,Ğ ĂƌŐƵĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ŐŝǀŝŶŐ
significance to the contemporary space is still valid; however, contrary to the 
medieval space, it is highly desanctified as a result of the new technologies 
that had been developed in the appropriation of space. Furthermore, parallel 
to this desanctification, ƚŚĞĐĞŶƚƌĂůŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƉƌŝŶĐĞ ?ǁŚŽƚĂŬĞƐŚŝƐƉŽǁĞƌĨƌŽŵ
God in the art of government transformed into the material conditions since 
the emergence of  ‘the ƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ĚŝƐĐĂƌĚĞĚ ƚŚĞ ŵŽĚĞů ŽĨ  ‘ĨĂŵŝůǇ ? ĂŶĚ
replaced it ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ?MdƵĂƚŚĂŝů ? ? ? ? P ? ) ? 
dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ? &ŽƵĐĂƵůƚ ĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ  ‘ƐŝƚŝŶŐ ?ŝŶ ƚĞƌŵƐ ŽĨ
demography. He argued that demography should not be understood as a 
simple projection of counting  Wcounting individuals in a certain space- but as 
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the classification and distribution of human elements for achieving a given aim 
(Foucault 1986: 23). Thus, the relationship between the population in a certain 
space and the authority can be identified in terms of the concurrency of that 
population to the norms of being productive and being obedient to norms of 
the technology.  
In that sense, the sovereignty, discipline and governing are the aspects that 
ĨŽƌŵƚŚĞ ‘ƚƌŝĂŶŐůĞ ?ŽĨƚŚĞŵŽĚĞƌn state authority with its primary focus on the 
population on a certain space. State institutions such as the security 
apparatuses that generalised at a certain moment of time are very significant 
for the enforcement of this triangle (Foucault 1980/2007: 178; Agnew 2005: 
439). However, it is important to note that it has been argued that the use of 
territory for political authority has developed throughout history. Thus, 
territoriality does not appear always as the necessary condition for the 
existence of political authority (Agnew 2005: 441). Therefore, for critical 
geopolitics, the relationship between the modern authority and space should 
be further explained in order to understand the development of the Western 
epistemology and territorialisation of spacĞĂƐ ‘ƐƚĂƚĞ ? ? 
M dƵĂƚŚĂŝů ŶĞĂƚůǇ ƵŶĚĞƌƚŽŽŬ Ă ŐĞŶĞĂůŽŐŝĐĂů ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƐƉĂĐĞ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ Ă
problematisation of the Cartesian division nested in Western thought. He 
argued that since Plato, the active sense of seeing was replaced by the passive 
recording of the external world. Descartes codified this Cartesian separation of 
the subject from the object and the positivist insulation of the knowledge from 
ƚŚĞŝŵƉĂĐƚŽĨĂŶǇƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ?MdƵĂƚŚĂŝů ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ? 
The separation of the subject and object leads to a perception of knowledge as 
a commodity which is independent from any cultural or sociological  Wor 
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spatiotemporal- constraints or effects (Agnew 2007: 139). In particular, 
geographical knowledge has not been perceived within a different paradigm; 
moreover, it became central in the positivist understanding of the social 
ƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶĂ ? WƌŝǀŝůĞŐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƐĞŶƐĞ ŽĨ ƐŝŐŚƚ ƉƌŽŵŽƚĞĚ ƚŚĞ ‘ƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐ ĂŶĚ
ƐǇŶĐŚƌŽŶŝĐŽǀĞƌƚŚĞŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůĂŶĚĚŝĂĐŚƌŽŶŝĐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚŝƐƚĞŶĚĞŶĐǇŝŶƚŚĞtĞƐƚĞƌŶ
epistemology subordinated the history ƚŽƚŚĞƐƉĂĐĞ ?MdƵĂƚŚĂŝů ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ? ) ?
Ocularcentrism had flattened the time and privileged the (spaceless) space 
alongside the short-time span. This has a teleological characteristic and finds 
its best expression in the production of the geographical knowledge. The 
criticism of the generalising Platonic tendencies can be fouŶĚ ŝŶ ,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?Ɛ
ŶŽƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ  ‘ƉůĂŶĞƚĂƌǇ ƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ĐƌĞĂƚĞƐ a postmodern 
ŝŵĂŐĞŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚĂƐĂƉŝĐƚƵƌĞŽƌĂƐĂ ‘ƐŝŵƵůĂĐƌƵŵŽĨƚŚĞĞĂƌƚŚ ?, as Baudrillard 
ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚ ?MTuathail 1996: 71; Radloff 2007: 41).  
In a Foucauldian sense, the modern geography is an effort to create a panoptic 
vision of the world. World has been enframed and spatialised into a quasi-
totality where the complexities and heterogeneity melt down through an 
institutional gaze on the subject populations (Foucault 1980/2007: 178- ? ? ? ?M
Tuathail 1996: 27, 50, 79). Monocular eye which has been used for the 
universalisation of space is not a simple and passive visualisation of the world 
but an objective and active seeing which includes the division of space into 
ƉůĂĐĞƐ ŝŶ Ă ŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞ ĂŶĚ ŚŝĞƌĂƌĐŚŝĐĂů ƐĞŶƐĞ  ?M dƵĂƚŚĂŝů  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ) ? Ŷ
inherently fluctuating and transhistorical feature is attributed to the 
geographical knowledge due to the perception of the world as a Euclidean 
surface (Agnew 2007: 140). 
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Therefore, locating and understanding the production of geographical 
knowledge parallel to the development of Cartesian perspectivalism can be the 
starting point for challenging the ocularcentric production and separation of 
time and space as the unchallenged base of Western epistemology. In this 
dominant thinking, the specifications of the political world are taken for 
granted (Dalby 2008: 415). The notion of primordial, fixed and homogenous 
national culture(s) is one of these taken for granted specifications (Rygiel 1998: 
107). Particular geographies have been territorialised and fixed in time and 
different identities have been eliminated in order to maintain a legitimate 
authority of the sovereign that concentrated in the official identity (Rygiel 
 ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ?/ƚŝƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŽŶŽƚĞƚŚĂƚ ‘ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ?ĐƵůƚƵƌĞŚĂƐďĞĞŶ ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚĂŶĚ
received a meaning in the context of political culture. It is the political culture 
that draws the boundaries of the national culture by ignoring different 
localities within the limits of a certain territory occupied by the modern nation-
state (Bonura 1998: 87).  
Dalby (2009) argues that the creation of an ideological space in accordance 
ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞĐůĂŝŵƐŽĨ ‘ƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇ ?Ěepends on a series of state security 
discourses which tries to exclude and delegitimise other security discourses; in 
other words, security discourses are produced as a result of competing claims 
ŽĨƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇŽǀĞƌƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĂůŝƐĞĚƐƉĂĐĞƐ ?MdƵĂƚŚĂŝů ?  ? ? P 179). In fact, those 
security discourses are very inadequate, contradictory and fragile due to their 
leaning on the narrow liberal understanding of the state as a rational and static 
actor (Dalby 2009: 405). By tracing the functionality of the discourse of 
security, Dalby exposes the power structure in the development of those 
perceptions and knowledge that has been generated by security discourses 
(Dodds and Sideway 1994: 518). 
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Cartesian perspectivalist thinking posited the geographical and geopolitical 
knowledge as purely scientific and objective form of knowledge that cannot be 
challenged. In fact the studies of geography and contemporary geopolitics are 
rather discursive practices; thus, permanently receptive to change and 
criticism. The modern mainstream geographical knowledge is an abstraction of 
the reality which rejects the diversity and complexity of the space and place; 
and in fact it is anti-ŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐĂů ?MdƵĂƚŚĂŝůĂŶĚŐŶĞǁ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ?dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?
as was stated before, the mainstream geography and geopolitics works against 
the genuine geographical knowledge. As any kind of subjective knowledge, 
knowledge of world politics cannot be seen as a commodity which does not 
possess any sociological and cultural elements and, thus, any claim of 
universally commensurable and intelligible geographical representation is 
invalid since the values and norms cannot be separated from the historical and 
cultural circumstances (Dalby 1991: 267; Agnew 2007: 140). By rejecting the 
Western logocentrism that separates the visual from the textual, and, 
dismissing the relationship between the sight, site and cite and between the 
subject, object and the text led the critical geopolitics to assign an irreducible 
textuality to all concepts and terms and claimed that the social themes are 
meaningful in the systems of concepts which make concepts in general 
ƉĂƌĂĚŽǆŝĐĂů ĞŶƚŝƚŝĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ ĐĂŶ ŽŶůǇ ďĞ ƵƐĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞŝƌ ŽǁŶ ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚƵĂůŝƚǇ  ?M
Tuathail 1996: 66). 
In the study where they have proposed a re-conceptualisation of geographical 
knowledge and geopolitics in terms of discourse, MdƵĂƚŚĂŝůĂŶĚŐŶĞǁ ? ? ? ? ? )
draw a categorical distinction between practical and formal geographical 
ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ?WƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐĂůŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŵĂŝŶůǇďĂƐĞĚŽŶ ‘ĐŽŵŵŽŶƐĞŶƐĞ
ĂŶĚ ƵŶƌĞŵĂƌŬĂďůĞ ? ƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞspace. On the other hand, formal 
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ŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐĂů ƌĞĂƐŽŶŝŶŐ ĚĞƉĞŶĚƐ ŵŽƌĞ ŽŶ ŚŝŐŚůǇ ĨŽƌŵĂůŝƐĞĚ ĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶƐ  ?M
Tuathail and Agnew 1992: 194). However, it should be noted that both of 
these geographical elements are not exclusive concepts but are, rather, 
overlapping. This theorisation resonates with the distinction drawn by Foucault 
between the juridico-political (such as territory and domain) and economic-
ũƵƌŝĚŝĐĂůŶŽƚŝŽŶƐǁŚŝĐŚŚĞĚĞĨŝŶĞĚĂƐ ‘ŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐĂůŵĞƚĂƉŚŽƌƐ ?ĂŶĚǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞ
archipelago appears as the only true geographical notion (Foucault 1980/2007: 
176). Dodds (2007) sketched a tripartite schema which has another third form 
of geopolitics; popular geopolitics. While practical geopolitics included policy-
oriented geographical representations and formal geopolitics derived from the 
self conscious efforts of intellectuals, popular geopolitics is a product of media 
and popular culture (Dodds 2007: 45).  
Critical geopolitics also argued that the study of geopolitics conducted by the 
 ‘ŝŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂůƐŽĨƐƚĂƚĞĐƌĂĨƚ ?ǁŚŽƵƐĞĂŶĚƉƌŽĚƵĐĞŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐĂůĂŶĚŐĞŽƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů
ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞƚŽĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚĞĂŶĚŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶƚŚĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞŵĂĐŚŝŶĞƌǇ ?M
Tuathail and Agnew 1992: 193). In that sense, the dominant geopolitical 
discourses are based on the geographical representations created and 
promoted by the intellectuals of the core western countries. These dominant 
geopolitical discourses shape and determine the key issues and themes of 
international politics. Like geographical knowledge, geopolitical knowledge 
was also disseminated from economically, politically and culturally powerful 
and privileged locations of the globe (Routledge 1998a: 245), and critical 
geopolitics had claimed to deconstruct these representational practices of 
foreign policy elites (Dodds and Sideway 1994: 518). Therefore, the effort of 
critical geopolitics is post-colonial; which is also gender-sensitive, since it 
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directly attacks white patriarchal heterosexist representations of space (Dalby 
1998: 297).   
Since the geographical notions produced on the basis of an antagonistic binary 
thinking, the contemporary geopolitical reasoning of the Western thought 
constantly drew a line between the space of the Self and the space of the 
Other. The territorialisation and the discourses of the Cold War can be seen as 
a very typical ĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨƚŚŝƐďŝŶĂƌǇƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ?dŚĞƚĞƌŵŽĨ ‘/ƌŽŶƵƌƚĂŝŶ ?ŝƚƐĞůĨ
created a sense of material barrier between the Western liberal democracies 
and the Eastern autocratic and controlled societies (Dodds 2007: 6). Kaldor 
(1989) argues that the language that we use to describe the space shapes our 
decisions to act; therefore, the Cold War -based on this kind of exclusion-, was 
always an overwhelmingly discursive process. She argues that Atlanticism and 
post-Stalinism were actually not two conflicting ideologies of the organisation 
of production but rather they were complementary or necessary for each 
ŽƚŚĞƌ ?Ɛ ĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ  ?<ĂůĚŽƌ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ^ŝĚĞĂǁĂǇ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ) ? dŚĞ ĚŝǀŝƐion of the 
ƐƉĂĐĞ ŝŶƚŽ  ‘ŽƵƌ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ƚŚĞŝƌ ? ƉůĂĐĞ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂů ŵŽŵĞŶƚŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŐĞŽƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů
discourse (Dalby 1991: 275). It has been argued that those dichotomies belong 
to each other; it is impossible to understand the normal without extreme since 
the norm(al) is saturated in the extremity (Doel and Clarke 1998: 41).   
In this conceptual context, it is not surprising that the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union created a vertigo among the Western elite in defining the Self and the 
Other and opened a gap within the discursive legitimisation (Kaldor 1989: 35, 
M dƵĂƚŚĂŝů  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ) ? dŚŝƐ ǀĞƌƚŝŐŽ ŵĞĂŶƚ Ă Đƌŝsis particularly for the U.S. in 
defining and maintaining the ideational integrity of its own geographical 
borders and a crisis for the Western security community
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1998: 300). The strength of the Cold War geopolitics was coming from its 
simplicity in the creation of a noncomplex antagonism and from its ability to 
ƌĞĚƵĐĞ ƚŚĞ ĞǆĐůƵƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ KƚŚĞƌ ŝŶ Ă ƉĞƌƉĞƚƵĂů ǁĂǇ  ?M dƵĂƚŚĂŝů ĂŶĚ ĂůďǇ
1998: 1). When this pervasive political rhetoric was diminished a new 
geographical representation has needed to give a meaning to the 
contemporary geopolitics. In the post-Cold War period, alternative sources 
became crucial in drawing boundaries and for giving coherence to series of 
traditional geographical representations (Sharp 1998: 152).  
dŚĞ ŐĞŽƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ǀĞƌƚŝŐŽ ĂůƐŽ  ‘ĐŽŝŶĐŝĚĞĚ ? ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƉŽƐƚ-
modernity where the traditional state structures were eroded parallel to the 
transformation of the national Fordist production structures that became 
increasingly redundant. The intellectuals of the statecraft responded to these 
de-territorialising tendencies with an attempt to re-territorialise ƚŚĞƐƉĂĐĞ  ?M
Tuathail 1996: 227). In this vein, Stephenson (1998) argued that the Cold War 
was actually a geographical representation of the West, particularly the 
imagination produced within the United States. When this superfluous 
antagonism was challenged by the deconstruction of its main components, it 
appears that it was not a determining periodisation but a process that evolved 
and reshaped around the relations between two similar blocs (Stephenson 
1998: 64, 65).  
In that sense deconstructing the modern geographical knowledge to disclose 
the relationship between the political power and geographical notions and 
themes emerges as the focal point in the critical geopolitics. Geography is not 
produced by nature itself but it has been produced by an active occupation, 
division and subjugation of space by an authority. The expansion of the 
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political authority created a necessity to visualise the population in terms of 
regions and districts. In Foucauldian terms, governing the space required 
permanent  Wand dynamic- bureaucratic technologies. Therefore, the forms of 
power/knowledge structures operate geographically; and the production of 
geographical knowledge are bounded with those power/knowledge structures 
 ?ŽĚĚƐĂŶĚ^ŝĚĞǁĂǇ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ?MdƵĂƚŚĂŝůĂŶĚŐŶĞǁ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ?ŽŶƵƌĂ ? ? ? ? P
93). The growing dependency on surveying the subjects created a need for 
 ‘ŵĂƉƉŝŶŐ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨĂn ideology which is based on the unity of 
ĐĞŶƚƌĂůŝƐĞĚ ƐƉĂĐĞ ĂŶĚ ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ  ?,ćŬůŝ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ) ? dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ? ŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐĂů
knowledge is not an innocent and objective ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ďƵƚ ĂŶ  ‘ĞŶƐĞŵďůĞ ŽĨ
tĞĐŚŶŝƋƵĞƐ ŽĨ ƉŽǁĞƌ ?which concerned the ŐŽǀĞƌŶŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ  ‘ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ
ƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĂůƐƉĂĐĞ ?MdƵĂƚŚĂŝů ? ? ? ? P ? ) ?The map is a subjective abstraction of the 
real, a subjugation of the thin superficial description over the thick analysis 
(Der Derian 1998: 263; Lacoste 1973: 620). 
To sum up, it is appropriate to claim that the post-structuralist perspectives 
provide a significant critique of the mainstream analysis of the social 
phenomena and particularly of the foreign policy studies where the spatial 
concepts and notions seen as a priori categories and unanimously taken for 
granted. However, at the same time, an exclusive focus on the discourse leads 
to the failure to address the relationship between these notions and the 
conditions in which these concepts have been produced. In other words, the 
development of the material life separated from the formation of the socio-
spatial organisation (Bieler and Morton 2008: 106). The next section will be 
demonstrating why the non-positivist/non-dialectical approaches cannot 
provide a viable foundation for the analysis of the interspatial relations, and 
hence, why a dialectical materialist framework is needed.            
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1.3. Towards a dialectical materialist understanding of the inter-spatial 
relations on the national scale  
As it has been noted before, the post-structuralist critical geopolitics 
theorisation can expand spatial understanding by further exploring the 
discoursive realm with the exclusive focus on language. Banura (1998) 
demonstrated how the spatial practices and representations of space are 
contingent through an exclusive focus on the political culture studies which 
aimed to provide objective and analytical accounts of the adaptation of the 
political forms and norms by the modern nation states. Sovereignty of the 
state is not an overarching, transcendental and transhistorical phenomena but 
a product of the linking narratives of the constitutive and perceptional aspects 
ŽĨƚŚĞƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇ  ?ĂŶƵƌĂ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ) ?,Ğ ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞƐ  ‘ĂŶ ŝƌƌĞducible ontological 
ĐŽƌĞ ? ŝŶ political culture studies which is located at the centre of national 
sovereignty within a particular spatial entity (Banura 1998: 92). State 
sovereignty implies an exclusive jurisdiction claim of a central political 
authority which has strictly settled in a fiǆĞĚ ƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇ  ?ŐŶĞǁ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ) ? M
Tuathail (1998) argued that it is necessary ƚŽ ĂĚŽƉƚ  ‘ŐĞŽƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ĨƌŽŵ ďĞůŽǁ ?
and resist to the  ‘ŐĞŽƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐĨƌŽŵĂďŽǀĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝŵƉŽƐĞƐƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌŐĞŽƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů
representations in order to maintain the prevailing order. In this resistance, it 
is very important to locate and problematise the sources of the hegemonic 
geographical representations and the articulations of the dominant 
geopolitical discourses to be able to create alternative non-fixed diverse 
notions of space and place.  
In that sense, Dalby even locates (1991) an emancipatory function of critical 
geopolitics, underlining how it shows the limits of the certain modes of 
production of knowledge which leads to think different ways to deconstruct 
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the hegemonic discourses. The intellectuals of statecraft both in hegemonic 
core and in peripheral social formations play an important role to ensure the 
ĐŽŶƐĞŶƐƵĂů ĂƐƉĞĐƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŚĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ  ?M dƵĂƚŚĂŝů  ? ? ? ? P  ? ?-20). Besides the 
intellectuals of statecraft, the media and film industry are also significant 
means for the dissemination of the dominant geographical representations 
and geopolitical reasoning. In an industrial society, certain geopolitical 
discourses derive from existing thought and social practices and prevail by 
using various means. In different contexts, the same binaries have been 
constantly produced and reproduced (Sharp 1998:155). Dodds (1998) argues 
that media does not read the visual material passively but creates an 
iconography that the icons and symbols use to represent world politics. Mass 
media represents the world in a certain ideological way by projecting the 
ŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐĂů ĐůŝĐŚĠƐ ĂŶĚ ĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚ ŝŵĂŐĞƐ  ?>ĂĐŽƐƚĞ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ) ?And these 
geographical imaginations that are constantly (re)produced become crucial 
components of the foreign policy discourses. Through the means of mass 
culture industry a Western narrative is disseminated and permeated all over 
the globe is based on several dichotomies. These dichotomies tended to create 
a sense of belonging and an identity based on the binaries of masculine, moral 
and orderly home and feminine, immoral and chaotic outside (Sharp 1998: 
160).  
It is also important to note that the informational revolution shaped an 
 ‘ŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƐƵƉĞƌŚŝŐŚǁĂǇ ? (Infobahn) where an alternative space and 
virtual life are created and in which the mobility of the atom was replaced by 
the mobility of information (Luke 1998: 274). The emergence of Infobahn 
brought the question of who will be responsible for the boundary making 
practices in this post-atomic virtual life (Luke 1998: 276). Luke claimed (1998) 
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that a new wired elite has emerged which controls and articulates a sense of 
info-power which he defines as info-graphy. While the info-graphic societies 
are still bounded strongly with the physical infrastructure, it can also be a 
battleground for challenging the dominant geographical representations (Luke 
1998: 280). The critical geopolitics draws attention to these developments and 
alternative means of resistance in the virtual space and media alongside the 
occupation and resistance in the physical space such as in the EZLN movement 
(Routledge 1998b: 254) which become an important element of international 
politics. 
However, even though the critical geopolitics studies disclose those links 
between the modern geographical knowledge and geographical thinking which 
comprises the unchallenged foundation of the international relations and the 
Cartesian epistemology, it does not appear as the viable theoretical basis for 
the analysis of the multiscalar inter-spatial relations. While critical geopolitics 
present a very detailed genealogical account of the production and functioning 
of the geographical knowledge, it fails to locate the dialectical relationship 
between the modern geopolitical thinking and the material life itself. While the 
transformation of the spatial representations had been successfully located by 
post-modernists like Foucault, they failed to define the material conditionings 
behind this majestic spatial transformation in its totality -such as the 
transformation from the sacred space (feudal) to the desanctfied (capitalist) 
space. Therefore, critical geopolitics could not go beyond the deconstruction of 
the mainstream framework where the knowledge of space has been produced 
and reproduced by the intellectuals of statecraft; neither did present a 
meaningful explanation of the changing mainstream representations of space. 
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It is important to express those weaknesses before the dialectical materialist 
theorisation of the inter-spatial relations in the next chapter (chapter two).   
It is possible to locate an almost static stance and ahistoricism within the 
critical geopolitics. For instance in his engagement with the notions of the 
territoriality and sovereignty, Agnew (2005) identified four heuristic -and 
loosely descriptive- types of sovereignty systems. The first one is the classical 
sovereignty which state territoriality consolidated and the centralised state 
authority became stronger. This regime has been in place since the Treaty of 
Westphalia until the 19
th
 century and was followed by the second type; the 
globalist sovereign system where the state centrality still remained strong but 
the territoriality became more open. The third type of the sovereignty is the 
integrative sovereignty in which the state was territoriality consolidated but 
the central state authority became weaker. Lastly, in the imperialist system of 
sovereignty, the use of territory by the state for the political, social and 
economic ends became more influential and the central state authority 
evolved to a less powerful entity (Agnew 446: 2005). The problem of this type 
of typology is not only its inability to give a strong and detailed periodisation of 
the transformation of the representations of space but its failure to locate the 
spatiotemporal processes that are produced, transformed and rescaled the 
socio-political organisations transformation of the notion of territoriality. The 
failure to grasp the dialectical nature of the formation and transformation of 
the social phenomena led critical geopolitics to collapse to the separation of 
time and space through a static understanding of a passive space and its 
almost contingent dynamic representations in the language. In that sense, it 
can be argued that while a critical geopolitics perspective could detect the 
superficial, isomorphic and ahistoric character of the mainstream analyses that 
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ƉƌĂŝƐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŶĞǁ ƉƌŽĂĐƚŝǀĞ ĂŶĚ ƉƌŽŵŝŶĞŶƚ ŵƵůƚŝůĂƚĞƌĂůŝƐŵ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ
contemporary Mexican and Turkish foreign relations, it would fail firstly to 
conceptualise the material structure that conditions these ideas and, secondly, 
would retain itself by presenting an alternative theorisation and analysis that 
would focus on the spatiotemporal processes in which these spatial relations 
can only be unravelled.      
Agnew (2007) argued that one of the central focuses of critical geopolitics is 
exposing how certain geographical representations and geopolitical discourses 
of the hegemony are spatially diffused and became universally powerful. 
,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞƐĞŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůůǇƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐ ‘ĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌŝĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ
new blank space(s) can only be fully understood through the expansion and 
the development of the capitalist spatiality through the 19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries. 
Understanding the production of space cannot be separated from the analysis 
of the production of the material life, the development of the dominant mode 
of production and the formation of the capitalist productive forces. At the 
same time, any explanation of this capitalist development which is not aware 
of the dialectical creation of the structures of discourse and exclusionary 
representations are based on Cartesian perspectivalism would lack a 
ƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂů ĚŝĂůĞĐƚŝĐĂů  ‘ŵŽŵĞŶƚ ? ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŝĚĞĂƚŝŽŶĂů ? ĂŶĚ ‘ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂů ? ĂŶĚ
would continue to (re)produce the similar binaries in a different phraseology 
with a drive for objective scientificism from a Western ocularcentric 
standpoint.  
The ontological cul-de-sac of the critical geopolitics is derived from its post-
modern stance that rejects any claims of universality or limited 
conceptualisation. In that sense, while the positivist treatment of time and 
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space can be detected, a dialectical spatiotemporal analysis of the social 
phenomena is undesired or not even ŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚ Ăƚ Ăůů ? M dƵĂƚŚĂŝů  ? ? ? ? ? )
argued that since the critical geopolitics cannot transcend the 
power/knowledge networks as well; it is a part of the relations of power itself. 
However, he argues that this limitation should not allow the critical geopolitics 
to problematise the occularcentric system of knowing based on Cartesian 
perspectivalism and take the contextuality of the geographical knowledge as 
ĂŶŽǀĞƌĂƌĐŚŝŶŐĂƐƉĞĐƚ ?MdƵĂƚŚĂŝů ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ?dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?ŝƚŚĂƐďĞĞŶŶŽƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ
there is a possibility to take geopolitics in both material and discursive terms 
(Dalby 1991: 273) without underestimating the fact that the socio-spatial and 
techno-territorial circumstances of development create different variations 
and uses of geopolitics and geopolitical knowledge  ?MdƵĂƚŚĂŝůĂŶĚĂůďǇ ? ? ? ? P
7).  
It has also been argued that the discourse-centred understanding of 
geopolitics blurred the geographical knowledge due to its treatment of 
geopolitics both as a specific foreign policy discourse and as the geopolitical 
reasoning of the statecraft. Secondly, the functioning of this discursive practice 
ŚĂƐ ŶŽƚ ďĞĞŶ ƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĞĚ ǇĞƚ  ?M dƵĂƚŚĂŝů  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ) ? dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ? Ă ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ
conceptualisation of spatiality is based on a non-excluding and non-universalist 
theorisation of space without any claims of commensurability or modelling 
perceived highly necessary but at the same time unlikely. Furthermore, some 
rejected any kind of attempt to develop a comprehensive account of 
geopolitics from the very beginning. It has been argued that the simultaneous 
deconstruction and re-conceptualisation of the geopolitical discourses should 
rather be seen as an open-ended project (Dodds and Sideway 1994: 515, 520). 
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The way forward in the analysis of the continually produced and reproduced, 
contested and consolidated space, spatiality and the multiscalar inter-spatial 
relations reinstate the dialectical materialist understanding of the social 
reality. Dialectical materialist analysis can first present a better understanding 
of the hegemonic representations of the space by manifesting the dialectical 
link between the simultaneously transforming representations of space and 
the spatial practices without reducing any of them to one another. Secondly, 
and more significantly, only dialectical materialist understanding can provide a 
spatiotemporal analysis of the production and reproduction of the social 
space, which has been claimed and presented in this work in the particular 
case of peripheral capitalist space.     
In the first matter, Lefebvre pointed out that the Cartesian logic gave a divine 
attribution to space and takes it as absolute and within the Kantian thought 
which turned the space into a part of a priori realm and isotropic (Lefebvre 
1991: 14). However, this Cartesian logic cannot be challenged without 
exploring the links between mental and social realms. Therefore, Lefebvre 
suggested a unified theory of logico-epistemological space which does not 
separate the physical, mental and social fields, similar to the call of Braudel, 
mentioned in the very beginning of this work. The knowledge of the material 
world applies to the theories of energy, space and time which cannot be 
treated as isolated categories (Lefebvre 1991: 12). The concept of hegemony 
plays a significant role in understanding this relation. The knowledge of space 
is produced dialectically by the dominant class through its organic intellectuals, 
establishing wider frameworks of thought in conformity with the conditions of 
the material structure (Bieler and Morton 2008: 117-122). This type of 
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knowledge/savoir is a direct manifestation of the involvement of the 
hegemonic class in the production of the knowledge (Lefebvre 1991: 10).          
Therefore, the existing space can be read and decoded but its development 
and production cannot be exclusively limited to the conceptual level. The 
formation, transformation or alteration of certain formal/informal code 
systems can be explained by exposing the dialectical relationship between the 
subject and its material conditions (Lefebvre 1991: 18). The inability of the 
critical geopolitics to grasp this dialectical relationship led to a language 
fetishism that inevitably collapsed into a reductionist and ahistoric  Wthus 
spaceless- analysis of space. Therefore, any analysis of the relations between 
different spaces has to start from the dialectical relationship between human 
beings and nature in terms of the processes of the production of space and the 
production of a multiscalar inter-spatial system with a particular emphasis on 
the national scale.  
The relationship between human beings and nature can be transferred to the 
direct relationship between human beings and geography in terms of 
formaƚŝŽŶŽĨĚǁĞůůŝŶŐ ?>ĞĨĞďǀƌĞ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ƌĞĨĞƌƐƚŽ,ĞŝĚĞŐŐĞƌ ?ƐĐŽŵŵĞŶƚ ŝŶ ƚŚŝƐ
underemphasised aspect: 
  ‘Heidegger cleared the way to a restoration of the term when he 
commented on the forgotten (or misunderstood) words spoken by 
,ƂůĚĞƌůŝŶ P ‘ ?WŽĞƚŝĐĂůůǇŵĂŶĚǁĞůůƐ ? ? ? This means that the relation of the 
 ‘ŚƵŵĂŶďĞŝŶŐ ?ƚŽŶĂƚƵƌĞĂŶĚŝƚƐŽǁŶŶĂƚƵƌĞ ?ƚŽ ‘ďĞŝŶŐ ?Ă ĚŝƚƐŽǁŶďĞŝŶŐ ?
is situated in habiting, is realised and read there (Lefebvre 2003: 82) ? ? 
The relation of human beings with the imaginary, that is to say, the relation 
between his sensuous world and his intuition, is the precondition of habiting 
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and dwelling. Locating this relation in transcendence or immanence rather 
ƚŚĂŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƌĞĂů ? ƉƌĞŵŝƐĞƐŽĨ ŚƵŵĂŶ ůŝĨĞ ŝƐ a futile attempt that reminiscent of 
the Young Hegelianism as will be shown in the next chapter. Lefebvre correctly 
locates this crucial relation in action and concreteness,  ‘ƚŚĞ ĚŝĂůĞĐƚŝĐĂů
ŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ŚĂďŝƚĂƚ ĂŶĚ ŚĂďŝƚŝŶŐ ?  ?>ĞĨĞďǀƌĞ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ) ? dŚŝƐ
concreteness will be the starting point of the dialectical analysis of the social 
space which will allow an articulation of the specific spatiotemporal processes 
that have been formed and transformed the peripheral capitalist spatiality in 
Mexico and Turkey and conditioned their current regional inter-spatial 
relations.    
1.4. Conclusion  
The Cartesian separation of time and space into homogenised, fixed and 
definable categories laid the ontological principles of the contemporary 
geographic/spatial knowledge. This contemporary geographical knowledge 
became the foundations of the mainstream foreign policy studies within the 
international relations and has been challenged by the critical geopolitics 
studies through the disclosure of the links between geographical knowledge 
and state power. In this respect, critical geopolitics was successful in delivering 
a process of unthinking of the mainstream categories and themes in 
international relations.       
However, in terms of understanding these links and relations between the 
geographical knowledge and state power, what has been defined as a 
ĐŽŝŶĐŝĚĞŶĐĞ  ?M dƵĂƚŚĂŝů  ? ? ?6: 227) for the critical geopolitics is, in fact, a 
structural condition that determines the capitalist spatiality in its totality with 
the ideational and material elements. The critical geopolitics almost gives a 
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perfect Young Hegelian theorisation where the idea (or geographical notion) 
assumes an independent existence within the realm of consciousness rather 
than representing a dialectical becoming based on the dynamic relationship 
between the form and content.  
&ŽƵĐĂƵůƚ ?Ɛ ĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐĂů ŵĞƚĂƉŚŽƌƐ ? ƐŚŽǁƐ ƚŚŝƐ zŽƵŶŐ
Hegelian resemblance.  He rightly pointed out that the individual is not a pre-
existing entity seized by the exercise of power. However, rather than defining 
the human being in his dialectically emerging material and ideational 
conditions, he positioned the human consciousness as a product of a relation 
of power that is exercised over bodies, desires and forces (Foucault 
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ) ? /Ŷ ƚŚŝƐ ƐĞŶƐĞ ?  ‘ƉŽǁĞƌ ? ĞŵĞƌŐĞƐ ĂƐ ĂŶŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚ ŶŽƚŝŽŶ
which pre-exist the human being itself, and pre-conditions the identity and 
characteristics possessed by him. However, on the contrary, a dialectical 
materialist understanding would posit the production of the material life as the 
source of the human subjectivity; and would argue that the ethnologic, 
linguistic and cultural aspects are all derived from the various types of 
relationships between Human and Nature which culminates in the totality of 
the continually changing social space. This allows a historically and spatially 
specific analysis of the social reality which positions the dynamic processes of 
production and reproduction of the social phenomenon on the centre of the 
inquiry. In that sense the spatiotemporal analysis aims to unravel the general 
and particular processes which constantly condition and transform social 
structures. The next chapter will be defining these dialectical processes in 
order to lay the foundations of the conceptualisation of the specific 
spatiotemporal analysis of peripheral capitalist spatiality of Mexico and Turkey. 
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Chapter 2: Dialectical understanding of space and the conceptual foundations 
of the peripheral capitalist spatiality  
 ‘ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĂůƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨůŝĨĞĂƉƉĞĂƌƐ ?ŝŶƚŚĞŝĚĞĂůŝƐƚĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ )ĂƐŶŽŶ-
historical, while the historical appears as something separated from ordinary life, 
something extra-super terrestrial. With this the relation of man to nature is 
excluded from history and hence the antithesis of ŶĂƚƵƌĞĂŶĚŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ŝƐĐƌĞĂƚĞĚ ?
[The idealists] have consequently only been able to see in history the spectacular 
political events and religious and other theological struggles, and in particular with 
regard to each historical epoch they were compelled to share the illusion of that 
ĞƉŽĐŚ ? ? 
- <ĂƌůDĂƌǆĂŶĚ&ƌŝĞĚƌŝĐŚŶŐĞůƐ ? ‘dŚĞ'ĞƌŵĂŶ/ĚĞŽůŽŐǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ). 
    
The central contention of this thesis is that the regional integration projects in 
Mexico and Turkey should be analysed through a spatiotemporal analysis 
which examines the dialectical processes of production and reproduction of 
the capitalist peripheral spatiality. In keeping with the previous chapter, this 
focus will now be extended in the current chapter by defining the general and 
specific conditions of the processes in which the social space has been 
dialectically conditioned and transformed. As has been argued previously, the 
contemporary geographical knowledge is based on the Cartesian separation of 
time ĂŶĚ ƐƉĂĐĞ ƚŚĂƚ ƉƌŝǀŝůĞŐĞĚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƐŝŵƵůƚĂŶĞŽƵƐ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ƐǇŶĐŚƌŽŶŝĐ ? ŽǀĞƌ ƚŚĞ
 ‘ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂů ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ĚŝĂĐŚƌŽŶŝĐ ? ? dŚŝƐ ůĞĂĚƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŝŵŵŽďŝůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƐƉĂĐĞ ĂƐ Ă
neutral and objective entity which passively contains the social activity and de-
socialise time by eliminating multiplicity of the social time. On the other hand, 
Marxist dialectical thought overcomes this separation through defining the 
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subject and object  Whuman consciousness and being- as a unity which is in 
constant motion, in other words in the infinite dialectical process of becoming. 
Hegel did overcome the Kantian dualism permanently where consciousness 
and being are opposed to each other by formulating the contradiction 
between the thought and being as a moving unity (Jakubowski 1976: 16). 
Therefore, for Feuerbach Hegel was the only sober one among the 
philosophers of nature. However, as Feuerbach pointed out, ,ĞŐĞů ?Ɛ ƵŶŝƚǇŽĨ
thought and being was flawed, since it was Ă ‘ĨŽƌŵĂů ?Žƌ ‘ĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚ ?ƵŶŝƚǇƌĂƚŚĞƌ
than real and, ƐŝŶĐĞ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ ŽĨ  ‘ƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ƐƉŝƌŝƚ ? ƚŚĞ ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂů
element  Wnamely being- was perceived as secondary, while the secondary 
element  Wthought- was posited as the principal one (Feuerbach 1991a: 33, 35). 
For several reasons which will be briefly explained later on, Feuerbach failed in 
establishing the real unity of thought and being but laid down the foundations 
that Marx and Engels built their dialectical logic on where the Hegelian 
dialectics have been demystified and revolutionised (Jakubowski 1976: 21; 
Stern 2009: 2).       
This chapter focuses on this Marxist critique of Hegelian and Feuerbachian 
dialectics and claims that the dialectical materialism provides the most 
convenient formula to analyse the social space in a spatiotemporal way. It is 
possible to argue that the dialectical materialist unity of thought and being (or 
in other words the form and content, subject and object, nature and man)  
conceptualised by Marx and Engels is the most important and continual 
principle in the conceptualisation of space by Lefebvre even though his later 
works got much attention regarding his comprehensive theorisation of space. 
Furthermore, his solid engagement with Marxist dialectics should be seen as 
the unshakeable foundation of his later conceptualisation of the social space. 
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The multiscalar production of the social space corresponds to the dialectical 
production of human life and its recreation on different social levels generating 
different social relations. This chapter puts an emphasis on LefĞďǀƌĞ ?Ɛ ĞĂƌůǇ
work  ‘ŝĂůĞĐƚŝĐĂůDĂƚĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵ ? and his later work  ‘The Sociology of Marx ? where 
he reclaimed Marxist dialectics by positing the crude materialist 
interpretations as antithetical to the dialectical materialism.
7
  
In that sense, while the first section of this chapter will be examining the main 
features of the dialectical processes that conditions and transforms the social 
reality in general, the second section focuses on the theorisation of the 
dialectical production of the social space in particular. Identifying the 
dialectical materialist movement as the transhistorical principle of the 
continually transforming multiscalar social space is a crucial step for the 
further focus on the conceptualisation of the peripheral capitalist spatiality in 
particular. With the establishment of this principle in the second section, it 
becomes possible to form the specific spatiotemporal theory of the peripheral 
capitalist space and spatial relations in particular contexts of transformation. 
Thereby, in the third section this chapter concludes with linking three 
spatiotemporally specific theories of Luxemburg, Trotsky and Gramsci and 
                                                          
7
 It should be noted that, reclaiming dialectical materialism by putting an emphasis on the 
critique of Hegelian and Feuerbachian dialectics by Marx and Engels has two theoretical 
results. Firstly, it eliminates the erroneous claims of economic determinism or crude 
ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵ ďǇ ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĞƋƵŝƚǇ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŚƵŵĂŶĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐ ĂŶĚ ďĞŝŶŐ ? ŝŶ Ă
truly dialectical way. Secondly, it makes redundant the questions on how to make historical 
materialist account of the international politics. Some Marxists argued that historical 
materialism has difficulties to explain the horizontal fragmentation of the state system; thus, 
superimpose the intra-societal categories to inter-societal phenomena (Callinicos and 
Rosenberg 2008: 79). In order to overcome this problem some even suggested to reach a 
 ‘ƉĂƌƚŝĂůƌĞĐŽŶĐŝůŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŝth realism to formulate a neo-Weberian-proof of Marxist geopolitics 
which avoids both economic reductionism and multi-causal analysis of state (Callinicos 2007: 
542). However, these claims of quasi-necessity of a geographical emphasis or liberation from 
the crude materialist interpretations of Marxism which supposedly dissolves the differences 
between national and international become meaningless if the dialectical relationship 
between the production of human consciousness and the nature for itself would be 
reasserted in the analysis of space.  
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claims that these theories provide a profound theoretical and conceptual 
framework in understanding the peripheral formation, consolidation, 
transformation through the integration to the centre and finally expansion 
towards the periphery through the regional integration projects of the 
capitalist space in Mexico and Turkey.  
2.1. Dialectical relationship between human consciousness and nature  
From the Platonic/Aristotelian rationalism to the realist empiricism of Locke 
and Hume, the relationship between human intuition and sensation, the 
process of gaining the knowledge of matter and understanding the conditions 
of the relationship between subject and object had been interlinked problems 
of philosophy. While Plato located the being within the intuition that 
transcends the sensual world, Aristotle attempted to link form and content on 
an epistemic level (Agar 2006: 9).     
It was first
8
 Kant who reversed the Cartesian logic which assumes that the 
human representations of the object follow the object-in-itself and who 
revolutionised the overall perception of this long lasting antimony (Agar 2006: 
73). Instead, he was inspired by the Copernican revolution in the explanation 
of the planetary motion that differs from the traditional understanding of the 
problem of the unidentifiable movements of the planets. 
                                                          
8
 The separation of the human intuition and sensation has been rejected by Spinoza who 
ĂƌŐƵĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ŚƵŵĂŶ ŵŝŶĚ ĂŶĚ ďŽĚǇ ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞ Ă ƵŶŝƚǇ ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ ĂŶƚŝŵŽŶǇ ? ^ƉŝŶŽǌĂ ?Ɛ
conception of nature based on this assumption should be seen as a prefiguration of Marxist 
conception of nature. Spinoza effectively perceived the nature and the human beings 
identical and dismissed pre-human questions of space (Balibar 2008: 69). He rejected the idea 
that the human beings are cut off from the rest of nature and while he recognised its reflexive 
power  Whuman mind- he argued that the human mind is also a product of the nature. In his 
metaphysics the human perception defined as a psycho-physical activity and not a passive 
ƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ  ‘ůŝĨĞůĞƐƐ ŝŵĂŐĞƐ ? ?Therefore, human nature and human mind cannot be 
separated (Hampshire 2005: 62). 
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Similarly to that, for Kant, the cognition of mind-independent objects was, in 
fact, the cognition of appearance of matter or, in other words, the cognition of 
the object-for-us rather than object-in-itself (Agar 2006: 73). The mind does 
not passively receive the object which exists independently of our perception 
as Locke and Hume put it (Ayer 1980: 16). Kant defended that the mind is 
actively involved in the construction of reality; in other words, in the process of 
knowing. 
However, Kantian dualism established a concrete distinction between the 
internal and external nature, and hence, separated the human consciousness 
from being. Therefore, according to Kant, the being that exists independently 
from the human consciousness can be perceived objectively and the nature 
was positioned as an external entity which needs to be confronted and 
mastered (Smith 2008: 12, 17). Being can either be absolutely true or 
absolutely false and the Reason can be found outside the real, in the realm of 
human thought (Lefebvre 2009: 13). This Kantian formal logic shaped the 
traditional conceptualisation of nature in terms of an internal/external dualism 
and dissolved the human history within the nature (Smith 2008: 12).  
The refutation of Kantian dualism by Hegel was the refutation of defining the 
synthetic a priori judgements as objective forms uprooted from their contents.  
According to Hegel, the course that synthesis follows is not an immobilised 
process but a sequence of opposition and resolution between the Being and 
Nothingness (Lefebvre 2009: 18-19). Contrary to formal logic, the finite-
negative object and the infinite-ideal subject are not disconnected; they are 
intrinsically related opposites (Agar 2006: 120).  
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/ŶŚŝƐ/ŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞ ‘^ĐŝĞŶĐĞŽĨ>ŽŐŝĐ ?, Hegel systematically criticised the 
Kantian transcendental logic where the content existed in and for itself 
independently and outside of the realm of thinking. The form coming from 
outside gains a content and, in that way, becomes a real knowledge. Kantian 
logic assumed that this abstraction is sufficient to presuppose that the thought 
and subject matter are related components. However, Hegel argued that in 
this logic ƐŝŶĐĞ ƚŚĞ ƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ŝƐ ŽŶůǇ  ‘ŝŶĨŽƌŵŝŶŐ ? ƚŚĞ ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂů ? ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ ŝƐ ŶŽƚ
transcending it as its opposite and remains possessed by it which confines the 
Being within the thing in itself, that beyond the human consciousness (Hegel 
2010: 25, 41). Instead, Hegel defined the relationship between the two 
through the positive negation, the negation of a particular content not to a 
nullity or abstract nothingness, but a negation that creates a new concept 
(third term) which is higher and richer than the preceding since the new 
concept contains the unity of itself and its opposite (Hegel 2010: 33). In that 
sense, the opposition between the being subjectively existing for itself and the 
being objectively existing as such has been overcome as a true being. Hegel 
located those two moments within the transcending movement of Becoming; 
as distinct but inseparable moments that create a concrete unity (Hegel 2010: 
39).  
As Lefebvre put it, Hegelian dialectics did not abolish the Kantian logic but 
transcended it through furnishing the identity with a content (Lefebvre 2009: 
25-26). And with this Hegelian revolution, the Becoming -which is in a 
continuous, not indefinitely rectilinear development- was recognised as the 
unity of multiple and contradictory moments (Lefebvre 2009: 32).              
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However, while Hegel eliminated the Kantian dualism and defended the unity 
of thought and Being in a dialectical manner, he posited the nature as a 
deviation against the Idea. For him the Absolute Idea had an a priori 
superiority. Thus, man turned into an aspect of self-consciousness rather than 
ƉŽƐƐĞƐƐŝŶŐ ŝƚ  ?:ĂŬƵďŽǁƐŬŝ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ) ? ,ĞŐĞů ?Ɛ DŝŶĚ ƐƵƉĞƌƐĞĚĞƐ ƚŚĞ ĞŝŶŐ ?
transcends the immediate, modifies the object, and thus his metaphysics 
enclosed and limited the content and reduced it to thought or human 
consciousness (Lefebvre 2009: 36-39). Therefore, defining the contradictory 
unity of thought and being was failed and the Becoming enclosed in a circle as 
a fulfilment of Mind (Lefebvre 2009: 45).  
Feuerbach discovered that the essence of the Hegelian logic was 
transcendental thinking which can be defined as human thinking which is 
located outside the human being (Feuerbach 1991b: 63). He rejected the 
speculative philosophy and reduced it to the level of theology and argued that 
Hegelian philosophy was the last shelter of theology. Feuerbach argued that 
the beginning of philosophy needed to be the being while the being cannot be 
separated from the consciousness. Thereby, the only real becoming for 
Feuerbach was the becoming within the time and space (Feuerbach 1991b: 
67). In that sense, FeuerbaĐŚ ?Ɛ ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵ ǁĞŶƚ ďĞǇŽŶĚ Hegelian 
metaphysical logic through discarding the mystical part of it; through linking 
the Absolute spirit to the human quality (Schmidt 1971: 25).  
Feuerbach argued that nature and human being belong to each other and the 
only distinction between the two is that the human being can distinguish 
himself from the nature through his consciousness which is also determined by 
nature (Feuerbach 1991b: 73). Therefore, for him the new philosophy needed 
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to be re-linked to the natural sciences and, the anthropology needed to be 
established as a universal science including physiology where man  Wand 
nature- becomes the unique, universal and highest object of philosophy 
(Feuerbach 1991b: 75; Feuerbach 1991c: 136). It is important to note that 
Feuerbach clearly based this new philosophy on the critique of the Hegelian 
philosophy by claiming that the new philosophy would be the simultaneous 
realisation and refutation of the Hegelian philosophy (Feuerbach 1991c: 101).   
Marx and Engels built the dialectical materialism on these two great 
foundations; ƚŚĞĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞŽĨ,ĞŐĞůŝĂŶ/ĚĞĂůŝƐŵĂŶĚƚŚĞĐƌŝƚŝƋƵĞŽĨ&ĞƵĞƌďĂĐŚ ?Ɛ
materialism. As Engels stated in  ‘Ludwig Feuerbach ?, they were Hegelians that 
became Feuerbachians at once. In the  ‘Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts ?, Marx stated that one of the great achievements of Feuerbach 
was the discovery of the Hegelian reduction of philosophy to the level of 
religion through the confinement of the Being within the bounds of thinking 
or, in other words, positing man and human life as the self-consciousness 
(Marx 1969: 171, 178). Even though Hegel recognised ůĂďŽƵƌ ĂƐ ŵĂŶ ?Ɛ ƐĞůĨ-
creating act this conception remains abstract and formal since the human 
nature was ƚƌĞĂƚĞĚ ĂƐ ŵĞƌĞůǇ  ‘ĂďƐƚƌĂĐƚ ? ƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ?  ?>ĞĨĞďǀƌĞ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ?
Marx 1969: 189). Nevertheless, Feuerbach failed in defining the concrete 
conditions of human consciousness; therefore, his conceptualisation of man 
was abstractly philosophical (Jakubowski 1976: 24). Very similar to Hegel, he 
understood nature as an ahistorical substratum.  
&ĞƵĞƌďĂĐŚ ?ƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨŶĂƚƵƌĞǁĂƐĐŽŶĨŝŶĞĚƚŽƚŚĞŵĞƌĞĂƉƉĞĂƌĂŶĐĞŽĨ
the sensuous world or sensuous reality rather than conceiving it as practical, 
human-sensuous activity (Marx 1998: 573). He subordinated man to the 
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natural conditionings of life by positing man within the sensuous world which 
he perceived as a pre-given thing (Marx and Engels 1998: 45). Thereby 
&ĞƵĞƌďĂĐŚ ?ƐŵĂŶŝƐĂŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůĂŶĚĂŶ ŝƐŽůĂƚĞĚŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů  ?ŝŶŽƚŚĞƌǁŽƌĚƐ, not 
social), and the unity of man and nature that he established his theory upon is 
in fact an under-defined presupposition (Lefebvre 2009: 55).  
DĂƌǆ ?ƐƌƵƉƚƵƌĞĨƌŽŵ&ĞƵĞƌďĂĐŚ ?ƐŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůŝƐƚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨŵĂŶŝƐĐůĞĂƌ ŝŶ
the  ‘German Ideology ? and in the  ‘Theses on Feuerbach ? where man is strictly 
posited as historical and social rather than an abstraction and individual. For 
him, man can be confined neither to world of thought nor to the sensuous 
world, as he noted in the Manuscripts;  
 QŵĂŶŝƐŶŽƚŵĞƌĞůǇĂŶĂƚƵƌĂůďĞŝŶŐ ?ŚĞŝƐĂhuman natural being. He 
is a being for himself, and therefore a species-being; and as such he has to 
express and authenticate himself in being as well as in thought. 
Consequently, human objects are not natural objects as they present 
themselves directly, nor is human sense, as it is immediately and objectively 
ŐŝǀĞŶ QĂƐĞǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐŶĂƚƵƌĂůŵƵƐƚŚĂǀĞŝƚƐorigin so man has his process of 
genesis, history, which is for him, however, a conscious process and thus 
which is consciously self-transcending (1969: 183).   
In that sense, dialectical materialism takes first the content  Wthe real Being 
which determines thought -  ‘ƚŽĂŶĂůǇƐĞŝƚs various forms of development and 
ƚŽ ĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌ ŝƚƐ ŝŶŶĞƌ ůĂǁƐ ? ĂŶĚ ĂŶĂůǇƐĞ ƚŚĞ ƚŽƚĂů ŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ƚŚŝƐ ĐŽŶƚĞŶƚ
(Lefebvre 2009: 74, 90). From this analysis of the given reality, it is possible to 
ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůŝƐĞ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ĂďƐƚƌĂĐƚ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ? ƚŚĞ ĂďƐƚƌĂĐƚ ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ
enable us to recover the concrete totality (Lefebvre 2009: 75). The dialectical 
unity of thought and Being achieved through the equalisation of the nature 
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and consciousness which have not been reduced to an idea but realised 
concretely (Lefebvre 2009: 98).  Lefebvre summarises this by saying for 
dialectical materialism,  ‘ƚŚĞ ƚƌƵĞ ƐƵďũĞĐƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĞĐŽŵŝŶŐ ŝƐ ůŝǀŝŶŐ ŵĂŶ ? ǇĞƚ
around and above him the abstractions acquire a strange existence and a 
ŵǇƐƚĞƌŝŽƵƐĞĨĨŝĐĂĐǇ ? ?>ĞĨĞďǀƌĞ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ? 
dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?DĂƌǆ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨŵĂŶǁŚŝĐŚŝƐŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůĂŶĚƐŽĐŝĂůŶĞǀĞƌĐĞĂƐĞĚƚŽ
belong to the Nature even though its true existence comes with the formation 
of his consciousness that alienates the human being from the rest of  nature. In 
this way Marx inseparably united the crude material existence (the Hegelian 
first nature that comprises the world outside the man) and the objective Spirit 
(the second nature that includes the state, law and society). The second nature 
should be considered within the first nature since the former still is in the same 
stage with the latter within the movement of transcending it (Smith 2008: 33).  
In the Manuscripts of 1844, Marx concentrated on the links between the 
human consciousness and the production of the physical human life and 
defined ŶĂƚƵƌĞ ĂƐ ŵĂŶ ?Ɛ ŝŶŽƌŐĂŶŝĐ ďŽĚǇ ĂŶĚposited ƚŚĞ ůŝŶŬ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ŵĂŶ ?Ɛ
spiritual and physical life to Nature as the link of Man to itself. The 
appropriation of matter by human beings is the general and universal 
condition even its concrete form changes and transforms through history from 
different mode of productions to one another (Smith 2008: 35). The 
production of human life is a socio-historical process; it is a continual 
dialectical movement of the transcending of Being by the human Mind. 
Therefore, the Hegelian assumption of the human mediation of things-in-itself 
by Subject through synthetic a priori categories created by a superior power 
(Absolute knowledge) has been replaced by defining human beings in terms of 
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their productive force and as a component of the real Becoming (Schmidt 
1971: 28, 31). In other words, the production of material life and its recreation 
is a socio-historical act and the beginning of the formation of all social 
relations; primarily, the creation of family (Marx and Engels 1998: 46-48). This 
principle is the premise where the production of social space as a multiscalar 
and relational totality is conceptualised and analysed within particular 
spatiotemporal processes.  
To sum up, it is sufficient to claim that the historical materialist understanding 
of Being is a relation between nature and human consciousness rather than a 
focus on the sensuous world itself (Smith 2008: 32). However, it is not a simple 
relationship; it is a dialectical relationship of becoming of the social reality 
 ?^ĐŚŵŝĚƚ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?DĂƌǆ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨŶĂƚƵƌĞŝƐŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůƚŽƐŽĐiety; it is the 
mediation of nature through the society. Nevertheless, nature and society are 
not identical; they are mediated through each other (Smith 2008: 33). In that 
ƐĞŶƐĞ ? DĂƌǆ ?Ɛ ŵĞƚĂďŽůŝĐ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ƚŽ ŶĂƚƵƌĞwent beyond the mainstream 
conception of nature produced by the Enlightenment and presented a new 
philosophy in understanding the social reality, its formation, its relations with 
the other social entities and its inner dynamics (Stanley 1991: 652).
9
 This 
formulation paves the way to a vast field for the sociological analysis to 
historicise various dynamic spatiotemporal processes of formation and 
transformation of the social reality on different scales and, in particular, socio-
spatial conditions which will be detailed in the next section.          
                                                          
9
 Similar to Lefebvre, Schmidt (1971) ĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚDĂƌǆ ?ƐŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůŝƐƚĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨŶĂƚƵƌĞŚĂƐ
not been dealt with or simply misinterpreted almost in a neo-Kantian sense by dividing his 
theory into two parts, philosophical and historical part rather, than locating the continual 
dialectic relationship between the two. Therefore, the Second International Marxism failed to 
grasp the connectivity between his conception of history and philosophical materialism 
(Schmidt 1971: 19). 
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2.2. The multiscalar production of the capitalist social space and interspatial 
relations 
As has been argued above, in the German Ideology, Marx defined the real 
premises of human life as the foundation of the materialist conception of 
history. These real premises are the material activity of man, its physical 
organisation and the development of the means of human existence which are 
consequently and directly interwoven with the production of conceptions, 
ideas and consciousness (Marx and Engels 1998: 42). Neither the human 
consciousness has a super-terrestrial quality nor the creation of the human 
material life is a crude material process but it is the production of history 
which depicts the relation of man to man and man to nature in its totality 
(Marx and Engels 1998: 61); and the mode of production of the material life 
conditions and determines ƚŚĞŚƵŵĂŶ ‘ƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?  ?DĂƌǆ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ) ?dŚĞƌĞĂů
cannot be seen as the pure product of thought, and thus, can only be grasped 
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨĂŶĂďƐƚƌĂĐƚĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇǁŚŝĐŚǁŝůůĞŶĚĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ĐŽŶĐƌĞƚĞ ?
in Mind. The Hegelian illusion that realises the real by deducing it from the 
thought failed to locate the real act of production of human life as the crucial 
source of the conceptual thinking (Marx 1973: 101). Therefore, the nature that 
is taken as abstractly for itself and is separated from the human subject, does 
not mean anything for the human and, hence, for human history (Marx 1969: 
193). On the contrary, it needs to be perceived as a concrete abstraction which 
is a complementary, distinct and contradictory unity of the content and form 
(Lefebvre 1968: 22; Kipfer 2009: 19).  
This problem can be identified as the difficulty of descending from the world of 
thoughts to the actual world of things. For instance, for the Young Hegelians, 
the real basis of all concepts and ideas is the property relations; even their 
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expressions in the immediate language appear to have an independent 
existence (Marx and Engels 1998: 385, 473). Similar to that, the concept of 
nation-state is also perceived to have an independent existence over the real 
social premises which in fact needs to be analysed and defined through the 
simultaneous production of actual life and consciousness; the social space. 
Therefore, international relations and its sub-fields took the timeless and 
spaceless morphological immediate as the starting point of their investigation. 
However, that kind of analysis of the immediate morphology which appears as 
the concrete and objective beginning is unable to explain social relations 
structuring the historical processes of formation and transformation of the 
social reality but only masks the underpinning dynamics (Lefebvre 2003: 47).  
Production of man (in terms of his physical and spiritual existence) and the 
production of the social space is a simultaneous process during which the 
physical and spiritual, objective and subjective dimensions of the existence 
have been created at the same time. Although human labour determines the 
human consciousness, consciousness is not a mechanical reflection of the 
material conditions but an inherent part of the human-nature metabolism 
(Kipfer 2009: 23). It is important to note that the dialectical becoming of 
human and nature -which creates the social space- is a moving unity; rather 
than a Hegelian static and contradictory unity of thought and reality which is 
resolved in an Absolute Idea. Its existence is historical and relational; thus, its 
becoming needs to be understood within this dialectical movement, in its 
motion of transcending (Fromm 1969: 12).   
While the Cartesian notion of space perceived the space as an objective 
container that can be grasped with a simple intuition, Marx demonstrated that 
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space is a social practice; it is a social product. Thus, since the act of producing 
has a certain abstract universality, the social space created by labour has a 
universal existence as a concrete abstraction. Social space is not an abstraction 
that confronts the individual; it is the space that human beings realise 
themselves as social beings by the power of their own labour. The human 
existence is directly linked to this social condition even in the cases that the 
social life does not manifest itself directly (Marx 1969: 130). And the 
organisation and the division of labour becomes the eventual outcome of the 
production of social space.  These are the social relations that lay the 
foundations of the social space as the set of social relations that emanate from 
production (Lefebvre 1991: 83).  
>ĞĨĞďǀƌĞƉŽŝŶƚĞĚŽƵƚƚŚĂƚƉĞƌĐĞŝǀŝŶŐƐƉĂĐĞ ‘ŝŶŝƚƐĞůĨ ? ?ĂƐĂĐŽŶƚĂŝŶĞƌŽƌĂĨƌĂŵĞ ?
rather than as a social morphology that lives in experience and is bound up 
with function and structure is a common error which fetishises the space. 
Instead, the social relationships that are inscribed in a certain form of space 
need to be elaborated to understand the becoming of space (Lefebvre 1991: 
90, 94). Thus, the production of the (social) space as the (social) product is the 
starting point in understanding the spatiality and the relations between 
different social spaces. Once the social space has been identified according to 
its production
10
 through the development of its productive forces, then it 
would be possible to locate its role in the international division of labour and 
                                                          
10
 It is important to note that this identification is not mechanical. As Lefebvre pointed out 
although each mode of production has its own political form where the social relations of 
production have been systemised and perpetuated, the characteristics of space cannot simply 
be reduced neither from the general characteristics of the mode of production and its social 
relations nor from the ideologies, forms of knowledge and culture as Gramsci put it (Lefebvre 
1978/2009: 234). In other words each mode of production corresponds to a certain space but 
it is a complex and spatiotemporally specific corresponding rather than a general 
identification.    
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the nature of its relationships between other social spaces in the inter-national 
level. 
It is important to note that space does not refer to a closed totality or system 
in stasis but it is always dynamic and open (Massey 1999: 264; Brenner 1997a: 
276, 299; Brenner 1997b: 140) since it is structured by the dialectical unity of 
the social relationships and forces of production and the development of these 
productive forces is both embedded in the space but it also proceeds through 
the transformation and re-territorialisation of space (Swyngedouw 1992: 416, 
419; Gottdiener 1993: 130).  
Lefebvre (1991) pointed out that the forms of relationship between social 
spaces are subject to change in association with their specific functions and 
structures. The function of a certain social space manifests itself as a 
contradiction between different geographies that are positioned differently 
within the division of labour of capitalist production. With the emergence of 
capitalism, the changing structure of production brought the division of labour 
that subsequently created the contradiction between the town and country. It 
is this division of labour which can be defined as the historical expression of 
geography in the historical materialist conception of human development. The 
division of labour breaks up the material and intellectual production and the 
city tŚĂƚ ‘ƉĂƌĂƐŝƚŝĐĂůůǇ ?ĚĞƉĞŶĚƐŽŶƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇƚŽŽŶůǇƚŚĞŶďĞĐŽŵĞƚŚĞƐŽƵƌĐĞ
of production itself (Lefebvre 1968: 43). The contradiction between these two 
different social spaces could have only been existed within the framework of 
private property and the ownership of productive forces which divides the 
population into two great classes (Marx 1998: 73).  
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The further extension of division of labour brought the separation of 
production from the intercourse, and formed a class of merchants. As much as 
the commerce flourished, the accumulation of movable capital in the town 
increased so the manufacture within the town could broken the chains of the 
guild system. Marx pointed out that the most extensive division of labour in 
the era of capitalism was materialised when the large-scale industry started to 
enjoy a unified world market and structured uneven growth (Marx and Engels 
1998: 81). Civil society emerged from these property relations and gradually 
organised itself as a state domestically and a nation-state externally. The 
evolvement of social organisation was directly shaped by the production and 
the intercourse which formed the basis of the capitalist state (Marx and Engels 
1998: 98).        
As Lefebvre mentioned, the creation of the market economy on the basis of 
exchange-value was followed by commercial capitalism, industrial capitalism 
and financial capitalism and these three epochs correspond to a concrete 
totality where each of these linked together and transcended (Lefebvre 2009: 
83). He continues by saying that each of these categories are identified by a 
new degree of economic objectivity where the capitalist social relations 
become more real and apparent while simultaneously masking the 
underpinning conditions.   
The capitalist social space had superimposed itself upon the pre-capitalist 
forms of social spaces such as the town that penetrated and subordinated the 
country on the national level. When commerce transforms from the exchange 
of excess to being an inherent part of the production, the social space of the 
town organises itself on the national level domestically (Marx 1973: 408). 
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Although the geographical barrier could be overcome through the organisation 
of the nation-state it is only the first step in the expansion of capital. Every 
other geographical limit is a barrier to overcome for capital, hence the 
tendency to create a world market is inscribed into capital itself by its nature. 
Thus, the spatial barriers in front of the circulation necessitate the annihilation 
of space by time with the creation of the physical conditions of exchange 
(Marx 1973: 524, 539)
11
. And this tendency unfurls on all spatial scales and 
conditions them in different forms (Smith 1992: 74). In the  ‘Grundrisse ? ? Marx 
ĂĨĨŝƌŵĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞprocesses of capitalist production, 
ĐŝƌĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ĐŽŶƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ  ‘ƚŚĞ ƵŶŽďƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚ Ănd fluid transition of 
ǀĂůƵĞ ?ĂƌĞ much more fundamental for the capitalist mode of production than 
the previous forms of production (Marx 1973: 535).   
The political form of modern state is the inevitable and necessary product of 
the capitalist economic accumulation in which the nation-state becomes the 
institutional mediator of uneven geographical development (Lefebvre 
1964/2009a: 57; Brenner 1998: 459), though this political form is not static 
since it is subject to constant transformation. Therefore, it is possible to argue 
that the capitalist social space (and its political form) and capitalist spatial 
relations are significantly different from the pre-capitalist social spaces and 
spatial relations. The international division of labour which trans-historically 
springs from the geographical differences and conditions the structure of the 
material and ideational exchange, takes its most structured and exploitative 
form in the era of capitalism (Polanyi 1945: 51). The contrast and the 
                                                          
11
 However, the word of annihilation should not be taken in its literal meaning. Massey (2005) 
ŵŝƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚƐƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚĂŶĚĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚĐŽŶƚƌĂƌǇƚŽƚŚĞDĂƌǆ ?Ɛ ‘ƉƌŽƉŚĞĐǇ ?ƐƉĂĐĞĐĂŶŶŽƚ
be annihilated by time (2005: 90- ? ? ) ? DĂƌǆ ?Ɛ ƵƐĞ ŽĨ ĂŶŶŝŚŝůĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƐƉĂĐĞ ďǇ ƚŝŵĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ
Grundrisse is in fact represents a contradiction, rather than defining an outcome, which 
continually drives capitalism to lay down the necessary spatial foundations of the circulation. 
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unevenness that are created by the capitalist space and the social and spatial 
organisation are sharper and more pervasive in the capitalist space while 
simultaneously the underpinning conditions of this relationship has been 
veiled (Soja et al 1983: 198). It has to be noted that the uneven geographical 
development is an essential condition of the capitalist space (Soja 1980: 211; 
Soja 1985: 95) due to the contradiction of equalisation and differentiation in 
the organisation of the capitalist space (Hadjimichalis 1984: 337)
12
. In that 
sense, since the contradictions within the capitalist space under the global 
capitalism are stronger, the spatial forms such as nation-states, regions and 
sub-regions are constantly in a process of reconfiguration, rescaling and re-
territorialisation (Brenner 1997a: 275). Therefore, while capitalist development 
expands towards the marginal spaces, ŝƚ ĚŽĞƐ ŶŽƚ ƵŶŝĨǇ ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌůĚ ŝŶƚŽ  ‘Ă
homogenous capitalŝƐƚ ŵŝůŝĞƵ ?  ?DĂŶĚĞů  ? ? ? ? P  ? ?). Different social spaces 
overlap and condition each other but the multiplicity of these socio-spatial 
ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬƐĚŽĞƐŶŽƚĚŝƐĂƉƉĞĂƌ ?  ‘ƚŚĞŐůŽďĂůĚŽĞƐŶŽƚĂďŽůŝƐŚƚ Ğ ůŽĐĂů ?  ?ƌĞŶŶĞƌ
1997a: 278). Rather than eliminating the periphery, the dominant space, 
naŵĞůǇ ĐŽƌĞ Žƌ ĐĞŶƚƌĞ ? ŚŝĞƌĂƌĐŚŝƐĞ ƚŚĞ ŐůŽďĂů ƐƉĂĐĞ ďǇ  ‘ĨĂƐŚŝŽŶŝŶŐ ? ƚŚĞ
peripheral space (Lefebvre 1979/2009: 190; Lefebvre 1980/2009: 215).     
It has been argued above that the constant reorganisation of the social space 
through the reproduction of the uneven geographical development in different 
forms is one of the characteristics of the capitalist spatiality. The term of 
                                                          
12
 /Ŷ ŚŝƐ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ŽĨ  ‘ŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐĂů ƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌ ŽĨ ǀĂůƵĞ ?  ?'ds ) ,ĂĚũŝŵŝĐŚĂůŝƐ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞĚ
that the simultaneous and opposing capitalist tendencies to equalise the profits and spatial 
homogenisation on the one hand and the counterbalancing tendency of differentiating the 
rate of profit on the other explains the uneven regional development of capitalism. These 
contradicting tendencies operate throughout the unevenly structured spaces and condition 
the reproduction of dominant social relations at different scales. He also argued that the GTV 
takes place in the sphere of circulation and exchange but determined in the sphere of 
production. Thus, while the production posited as the determinant sphere, it had been 
located within the dialectical unity with the circulation (Hadjimichalis 1984: 342).      
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globalisation corresponds to a new sociospatial reconfiguration process as a 
response to the global capitalist crisis where the relationships between centre 
and periphery have been reformulated (Brenner 1999: 44; Swyngedouw 2000: 
65). The modern state is the political form assumed by the capitalist social 
relations, a historic resolution of the contradictions of the capitalist society 
(Lefebvre 1964/2009b: 84). Thereby, the neoliberal form assumed by the 
modern state corresponds to a periodic crisis and a qualitative transformation 
in the capitalist spatiality (Lefebvre 1979/2001: 773; Brenner 1999: 58). Since 
the dissolution of the post-war Keynesian capitalist accumulation, the 
neoliberal capitalism brought a new era of restructuring which now 
domestically intensifies the neoliberal capitalist social relations and extensifies 
outwardly towards the marginal spaces (Soja et al 1983: 199; Brenner and 
Elden 2009: 21). The regional integration projects of Mexico and Turkey will be 
elaborated within this spatiotemporal context of neoliberal reconfiguration of 
the capitalist spatiality in chapters four and five and will be defined as the 
reproduction of the uneven processes of peripheral capitalist space formation 
in different socio-spatial forms; thus, presenting a better understanding of the 
particular aspects of the capitalist spatial relations.  
Therefore, the modern capitalist space needs to be analysed in terms of the 
contradictions -and the transcending of these contradictions- that has been 
produced in the neoliberal capitalist society. These contradictions manifest 
themselves on every social scale as transformation and restructuring following 
interrelated but distinct socio-spatial tracks. Referring to Lefebvre, Brenner 
argued that all geographical scales needs to be conceptualised in terms of 
three intertwined conditions that determine its historical formation, its 
provisional stabilisation and its possible rupture or transformation (Brenner 
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1998: 466). In that sense, the next section constructs a dynamic and 
spatiotemporally specific theory of the formation and transformation of the 
peripheral capitalist space in order to provide key conceptual themes in 
understanding the conditions that have determined the formation of capitalist 
peripheral spatiality in Mexico and Turkey, its consolidation and 
transformation, and finally its expansion towards the marginal spaces as a part 
of worldwide neoliberal restructuring of capitalist spatiality in the form of 
regional integration projects.             
2.3. Linking Luxemburg, Trotsky and Gramsci: the spatiotemporal 
conceptualisation of the peripheral capitalist space   
As Wallerstein (1974b) argued, the central and peripheral economies do not 
correspond to two separate social spheres but identify two complementary 
units of the capitalist economic system. Therefore, the formation of the 
peripheral capitalist space is in fact a necessary process of the development 
and expansion of the capitalist space on a worldwide scale. In that sense, the 
spatiotemporal movement of the peripheral capitalist space and spatiality 
needs to be located within the constantly transforming international division 
of labour.   
As it has been argued before, the spatiotemporal analysis of the capitalist 
space identifies specific historical periods to define the development of 
different socio-spatial organisations on different scales. Therefore, the historic 
conditions that produced the peripheral capitalist space in 19
th
 Mexico and 
Turkey require a specific conceptual framework. This work claims that linking 
the three conceptual frameworks established by Luxemburg, Trotsky and 
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Gramsci provides a spatiotemporally particular theory to analyse the formation 
of the 19
th
 century peripheral capitalist space in Mexico and Turkey.  
It is possible to argue that these three theories coalesce in their attempt to 
conceptualise the historical conditions of the capitalist accumulation in the 
peripheral capitalist geographies in the 19
th
 century. Luxemburg, in her 
doctoral thesis, analysed the industrial development in Poland and in her later 
work, the  ‘Accumulation of Capital ?, she linked the processes of enlarged 
reproduction in the central capitalist countries with the introduction of the 
commodity economy and primitive accumulation in the periphery. Similarly, 
Trotsky theorised the uneven and combined development by taking the case of 
the late industrial development of Russia. Uneven and combined development 
outlined the spatiotemporally specific conditions that transformed the 
agriculture-dominated Russian economy into one of the prominent industrial 
powers. Finally, 'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ?Ɛ concept of passive revolution which was applied to 
another late-developer industrial power, Italy, presents a theory of provisional 
stabilisation of the peripheral capitalist space through a late bourgeois 
revolution based on the mobilisation of the subaltern classes in eliminating the 
old regime. Additionally, this thesis defines a post-passive revolutionary period 
where the fragile bourgeois rule was institutionalised and structured. 
Throughout the 19
th
 century, the bourgeoise-in-formation in Mexico and 
Turkey gradually got the upper hand within the traditional society parallel to 
the exogenous and rapid development of the capitalist social relations of 
production. The post-passive revolutionary period can be seen as the climax of 
the exogenous process of the adaptation and consolidation of the  ‘bourgeois 
mode of production ? which started with the extinction of the old-established 
industries with the expansion of the capitalist market conditions, furthered by 
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integrating it with the world market as the new zones of commodity and raw 
material production and laid the physical and legal foundations of its constant 
development and improvement (Marx and Engels 2008: 38-39).        
It is important to note that these three examples  WPoland, Russia and Italy- 
could differ significantly in terms of their subsequent socio-spatial evolutions. 
However, the general features of their exogenous late capitalist development 
manifested that there are substantial structural conditions which determined 
the historical formation of the peripheral capitalist spaces even though these 
three cases further differ from Mexico and Turkey in terms of the geographical 
proximity to the centre. Therefore, these concepts will be linked to each other 
in order to provide a spatiotemporally specific conceptual framework in the 
analysis of the formation and consolidation of the peripheral capitalist space in 
Mexico and Turkey. In Mexico the spatiotemporal analysis will be starting from 
the Bourbon Reforms to the liberal and constitutionalist movements during 
ƚŚĞZĞƐƚŽƌĞĚZĞƉƵďůŝĐƉĞƌŝŽĚ ?ƚŽƚŚĞĚŝĐƚĂƚŽƌƐŚŝƉŽĨƚŚĞ'ĞŶĞƌĂůWŽƌĨŝƌŝŽşĂǌ
and the 1910 Revolution. And in Turkey, it will be starting from the Sultan 
Selim III and Sultan Mahmud II Reforms, to the Islahat and Tazminat regimes 
with the 1876 Constitution and to the authoritarian Sultan Abdul Hamid II 
period that ended with the Young Turk Revolution in 1908. This analysis will 
define the historic conditions of the formation of capitalism in Mexico and 
Turkey which positioned these two spaces within the periphery of the 
international capitalist division of labour.             
In the analysis of the formation of the peripheral capitalist spatiality, one of 
ƚŚĞ ŵŽƐƚ ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ >ƵǆĞŵďƵƌŐ ?Ɛ ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ŽĨ ĞŶůĂƌŐĞĚ
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reproduction is its emphasis on the inevitable and necessary
13
 stage of the 
surplus-value realisation in the capitalist centre  Wits expansion towards the 
periphery- and its relation to the production of the material (and ideological) 
elements of constant capital in the periphery through the circulation, namely 
international trade (Wallerstein 1974a: 393). With the advances of the 
technology and labour productivity, the capitalist production assumes a 
decisive universal domination. This means an enormous expansion of the 
consumer goods production where the products mainly consumed in the non-
ĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐƚ ƐƚƌĂƚĂ ǁŽƵůĚ ƌĞƉůĂĐĞ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŶĂƚƵƌĂů ? ĞĐŽŶŽŵǇ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵŽĚŝƚǇ
economy and the commodity exchange (Luxemburg 1951: 349, 352, 363). The 
conditions and concessions created by the free trade or favourable tariff 
systems during the mercantilist era were the foundations for the structured 
uneven exchange relations between the centre and the periphery in the 19
th
 
century.  The enforced transformation  of the periphery towards the capitalist 
moĚĞƌŶŝƚǇǁĂƐ  ‘ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶĂŶĚƉŽŝƐŽŶŽƵƐ ?and lacked the social connection with 
the natural development of the economy and brought an acute necessity of 
reorganisation and restructuring of the traditional state and state-society 
relationship (Luxemburg 1977: 87). 
Thus, capitalism expanding from Europe to its immediate periphery in the 19
th
 
century had a difficult task to annihilate every kind of historical form of natural 
economy which obstructed its development (Luxemburg 1951: 369). In Poland, 
Luxemburg argues that the introduction of the ŽĚĞEĂƉŽůĠŽŶ in 1808 was a 
legal structural requirement of the bourgeois economy which did not abolish 
the property relations of the feudal economy (that is mainly in the land 
                                                          
13
 It is important to note that the necessity of the expansion of the capitalist social relations is 
not an absolute necessity since there is no absolute necessity in the dialectical materialist 
understanding of history.  
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ownership) at once but hurried its disintegration and laid down the legal 
standards for the commerce and commercial courts (Luxemburg 1977: 85, 86). 
This political change is in fact a product of the introduction of the commodity 
economy which restricts the agriculture to a single sphere while 
simultaneously forces it to mechanise, to cultivate the agro-industrial 
commodities and to be oriented by the export demands (Luxemburg 1951: 
396).    
This expansion in the industry through the introduction of commodity 
economy towards the non-capitalist strata had two significant impacts. Firstly, 
the capitalist industries in the centre supplied the materials and finance for the 
construction of the railways which was one of the first conditions for the 
inauguration of capitalist production (Luxemburg 1951: 353). Secondly, within 
the course of capitalist development, an international division of labour would 
be created where the developed capitalist economies would be concentrating 
more on the production of machinery while gradually leaving the manufacture 
of consumer goods to the late developing countries (Luxemburg 1951: 319-
320). 
Luxemburg states that public loans and railway construction accompany all 
stages of the accumulation of capital in the peripheral capitalist space. Public 
loans, firstly, converted the non-capitalist forms of wealth into the money form 
and provided funds for the consumption; secondly, financed the railway 
construction; and finally, diverted the capital to the newly industrialising 
countries (Luxemburg 1951: 420). It is important to note that the foreign 
financed railway construction helped the industrialisation of the agriculture by 
connecting the inner lands to the coast and, thus, integrated with the world 
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markets and brought the formation of heavy industry such as iron, steel and 
coal production which also provided physical stimulation for the other 
manufacturing industries, either foreign or state owned.   
The theory of uneven and combined development conceptualised by Trotsky 
to provide an explanation to the different paths and levels of economic and 
social development processes of the Russian society and Western European 
ŶĂƚŝŽŶƐŽǀĞƌůĂƉƐƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇǁŝƚŚ>ƵǆĞŵďƵƌŐ ?ƐƚŚĞƐŝƐŝŶŵĂŶǇĂƐƉĞĐƚƐ ?Trotsky 
first defined the historic and spatial conditions which retained Russian people 
to develop their productive forces (Trotsky 1936: 26). The natural environment 
that the Russian people were habituated on and the powerful external 
pressure coming from the Crimean and Nogai Tatars in the east and from 
Lithuania, Poland and Sweden in the west accelerated the formation of an 
organised system of estates as an economic formation (Trotsky 1970a: 40).  
Therefore, he claims like the Russian economy, the Russian thought, science, 
state absolutism, rules and regulations etc. have all been artificially formed 
through an uneven relation with the societies which had already developed a 
higher level of economic and social organisation (Trotsky 1970b: 42).  
Two significant aspects particƵůĂƌůǇ ĚĞƐĞƌǀĞ ƚŽ ďĞ ĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐĞĚ ŝŶ dƌŽƚƐŬǇ ?Ɛ
theory in terms of defining the historic-spatial conditions of the formation of 
the peripheral capitalist space. Firstly, Trotsky claimed that the geographical 
conditioning of the Russian people  Wgigantic and austere plains which are open 
to winds bringing short and dry summers and cold and long winter, etc- played 
an important role in the development of the social relations of production and 
its subsequent contradictions that suppose to establish the foundations of the 
social progress. Therefore, during the Middle Ages when the western towns 
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developed their productive forces at an unprecedented velocity, the Russian 
town stayed dependent on the country where the manufacture and 
craftsmanship remained attached to agricultural production (Trotsky 1970a: 
47). In that sense, Trotsky clearly linked the geographical conditions with the 
historical conditions of the development of the socio-spatial organisation. 
Secondly, the unevenly developed Russian economy was forced to skip stages 
in the 19
th
 century in order to resist the external pressures coming from the 
industrialised countries. Skipping stages in economic development through 
external pressure rests entirely on the uneven development of the productive 
forces (Trotsky 1970a: 241).         
It is important to note that Trotsky distinguished the pre-capitalist and 
ĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐƚ ƵŶĞǀĞŶ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ďǇ ƉŽŝŶƚŝŶŐ ŽƵƚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ƚŚĞ ĞŶƚŝƌĞŚŝƐƚŽƌǇ ŽĨ
ŵĂŶŬŝŶĚ ŝƐ ŐŽǀĞƌŶĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ůĂǁ ŽĨ ƵŶĞǀĞŶ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ? ĂŶĚ ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇ
capitalism manifests the sharpest version of this law in human history in an 
unprecedented way while every nation perceives capitalism in a different stage 
of development (Trotsky 1970b: 19). The process of uneven and combined 
development brings the industrialization and urbanisation which transforms 
the backward country from its pre-existing mode of production to the 
conditions of the modern capitalist economy (Davidson 2009: 15).  
Therefore, the uneven relationship does not necessitate a passive submission 
but on the contrary forces the underdeveloped space to skip stages and 
develop its own productive forces. However, in the backward countries  Wwho 
have a slower tempo in terms of developing their productive forces due to the 
spatial conditioning- the proletarianisation of the whole population and the 
complete domination of the large enterprises in the economy cannot be 
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envisaged because of the combined nature of the capitalist development in a 
peripheral country (Trotsky 1970: 87). In that sense it is hard to argue that the 
uneven relationship between capitalist and pre-capitalist societies is similar to 
the uneven relationship between town and country (which is universal and 
transhistorical) since the unevenness and combinedness of the development of 
capitalism in peripheral geographies are inseparable aspects for a historically 
specific period that continue until the capitalist mode of production sweeps all 
the previous forms of the pre-capitalist forces and social relations of 
production and the corresponding socio-economic formations. Although the 
backward mode of production was compelled to be annihilated and to be 
assimilated by the capitalist productive forces, the development of the 
productive forces concentrates regionally in an uneven way and, thus, created 
an amalgam where some segments of society put pressure on the marginal 
regions to integrate with the capitalist economy (Trotsky 1936: 31). Therefore, 
in the processes of uneven and combined development of the capitalist forces 
the domination of the capitalist social relations of production does not 
manifest itself as vividly as in an industrially developed country but it gradually 
and irrevocably constructs the legal and physical conditions of its decisive 
domination.  
The uneven and combined development of the capitalist productive forces and 
social relations starkly resembles the period of the Italian Risorgimento which 
was defined by Gramsci as the progressive modification of social forces that 
was linked to economic development (Gramsci 2007: 109). This process of 
 ‘ƚƌĂƐĨŽƌŵŝƐŵŽ ? can be read as the summary of the late 19th century social and 
ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ĐŚĂŶŐĞƐ ŝŶ DĞǆŝĐŽ ĂŶĚ dƵƌŬĞǇ ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇ ĂĨƚĞƌ ƚŚĞ ƌƵůŝŶŐ ĐůĂƐƐĞƐ ?
determination to bring progress and development during the period of 
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Restored Republic and Tanzimat Regime in order to respond to foreign 
economic and militaristic pressures. These liberal political programmes were 
materialised during the authoritarian and highly centralised regimes of General 
WŽƌĨŝƌŝŽşĂǌ ? ? ? ?6-1910) and Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1876-1908) -similar to the 
'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ?Ɛ ĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞ ĂĞƐĂƌŝƐŵƐ  ?ƵĐŝ-Glucksmann 1980: 
311-312). Therefore, the uneven and combined development of capitalist 
space appears as the structural condition of the passive revolution where 
ƚŚĞƐĞ ƐŽĐŝĂů ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ  ‘either instituted and/or expanded, resulting in both a 
 ‘ƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶĂƌǇ ? ƌƵƉƚƵƌĞ ĂŶĚ  ‘ƌĞƐƚŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ŽĨ ƐŽĐŝĂů ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?(Morton 2010: 
316). 
/Ŷ ƚŚĂƚ ƐĞŶƐĞ ? 'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ?Ɛ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ŽĨ ƉĂƐƐŝǀĞ ƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ŐŝǀĞƐ Ă ƐŝŐŶŝĨicant 
explanation in understanding the spatiotemporal formation of the modern 
capitalist state structures of Mexico and Turkey. Gramsci argued that the 
French revolution was the only example of an active reaction in the European 
history where one system of social relations was eliminated by the other one 
at the end of a violent intervention. Following the French Revolution, the other 
old systems corresponding to the pre-capitalist social relations underwent the 
processes of passive revolution through a regiŵĞ ŽĨ  ‘ƌĞĨŽƌŵŝƐƚ ĐŽƌƌŽƐŝŽŶ ?
conducted by the traditional classes (Gramsci 2007: 119). 
Gramsci presented two significant principles that the concept was built upon; 
firstly, a social formation will be changed with a progressive movement 
created by the productive forces that developed within the existing social 
formation and secondly, those progressive relations of production will never 
appear before they have been matured enough (Gramsci 2007: 106-107). This 
means that when the capitalist social relations face a moment of crisis, it might 
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overcome the crisis through incorporating the reactionary elements to further 
consolidate its power by reproducing itself in a new form of authority (Morton 
2003: 632).   
The dialectical combination of the progressive and reactionary elements within 
ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ƉĂƐƐŝǀĞ ƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ŝŶ Ă  ‘ƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ-ƌĞƐƚŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? Žƌ
 ‘ƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƐŽĐieties which could not develop the 
progressive bourgeois forces in a more natural exercise of hegemony over the 
whole society to constitute an organic equilibrium (Morton 2007: 66). In a 
moment of such equilibrium the emergent bourgeois could act and dissolve 
ƚŚĞ  ‘ďůŽĐŬĞĚ ĚŝĂůĞĐƚŝĐ ? ďǇ ŵŽďŝůŝƐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƐƵďĂůƚĞƌŶ ĐůĂƐƐĞƐ  ?ƵĐŝ-Gluckmann 
1980: 315; Morton 2010: 319).  
In conclusion, it is possible to argue that these three concepts comprise a 
spatiotemporally specific theorisation of the dialectical processes of formation 
of the peripheral capitalist spatiality. The enlarged reproduction which is an 
inherent process of the capitalist accumulation that creates and resolves the 
inner contradictions of the development of the capitalist space in the centre, 
structures the uneven and combined development of the capitalist social 
forces in the periphery that culminated in the passive revolutions that 
consolidated the peripheral socio-spatial organisation in a different political 
form, in a particular spatiotemporal context. Luxemburg, Trotsky, Gramsci 
highlight and unravel the interlinked and overlapping processes without 
establishing an ahistoric, spaceless and deterministic conceptualisation of the 
changing social reality. As it will be shown in chapter three, the dialectical 
processes of spatial formation in Mexico and Turkey depended on the same 
characteristics of being exogenous, uneven and continually contested. And 
105 
 
these three concepts directly point out the underpinning dynamics of this 
movement and change in the social relations by showing how the industrial 
production and financial investment from the developed industrialised centre 
has fashioned the peripheral capitalist space, initiating a dialectical process of 
becoming.   
In the theorisation of the conditions of the formation, consolidation and the 
transformation of the peripheral capitalist spaces this work adds a post-passive 
revolutionary period where the revolution becomes institutionalised and the 
political hegemony of the bourgeoisie established significantly. Following the 
violent passive revolutions of Mexico (1910-1920) and Turkey (1908-1925), the 
political and institutional framework had been established where nationalism 
appeared as the common denominator underpinning the legitimacy of the 
newly established hegemony of the limited national bourgeoisie. Therefore, 
the bourgeoisie found a stable ground to build its ideological hegemony by 
ƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŶŐ Ă ĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚůǇ ƌĞƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚ ŵǇƚŚ ŽĨ  ‘ŐůŽƌŝŽƵƐ ƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ
accomplished to unite the whole society through annihilating and transcending 
the differences of class, ethnicity or gender, hence creating a completely equal 
society.
14
 In other words, while the bourgeois hegemony resolved the 
contradictions of the uneven and combined development within the nation-
state, it laid down the foundations of new contradictions within the course of 
peripheral industrialisation. It is important to emphasise that the post-passive 
revolutionary periods in Mexico and Turkey were marked by a historically 
                                                          
14
 It can be observed that these ideological aspects of the passive and post-passive 
revolutionary periods are engraved and reflected in the art, literature and in the public 
ŵŽŶƵŵĞŶƚƐ ? dŚĞ  ‘DŽŶƵŵĞŶƚŽ Ă ůĂ ZĞǀŽůƵĐŝſŶ ? (Monument for the revolution) and the 
hED ?Ɛ ĐĞŶƚƌĂů ůŝďƌĂƌǇ ŵƵƌĂůƐ ƚŚĂƚ ŵĂĚĞ ďǇ ŝĞŐŽ ZŝǀŝĞƌĂ ŝŶ DĞǆŝĐŽ ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ  ‘DĞŵŽƌŝĂů
dŽŵď ?  ?AnŦtkabir ) Žƌ ƚŚĞ  ‘DŽŶƵŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ZĞƉƵďůŝĐ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ dĂŬƐŝŵ ^ƋƵĂƌĞ dƵƌŬĞǇ ĂƌĞ
ŝŵƉƌĞƐƐŝǀĞĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞ ‘ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƐƉĂĐĞ ?ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůůǇĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚƚŚĞŝĚĞŽůŽŐǇ
and knowledge within a socio-spatial practice, within the monument (Lefebvre 1991: 45).  
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conditioned form of peripheral capitalist accumulation which is the import 
substitution based industrial development (ISI). Wallerstein defines (1974b) 
the ISI development as a response from the periphery to the balance-of-
payments problems caused by the global economic crisis of the 1930s. During 
these economic contractions the prices of the primary goods  Wmainly raw 
material and agricultural products- decreases more rapidly than the prices of 
the technology intensive products (Wallerstein 1974b: 10). Therefore, the 
peripheral economies faced significant balance-of-payment difficulties due to 
the exhaustion of the capabilities of the raw material and agricultural exports 
in producing a surplus-value which in return would be expected to compensate 
the import of the machinery and manufactured goods. In that sense, with the 
Great Depression in 1929 and the Second World War, some of the peripheral 
economies responded to the economic contraction by using industrial planning 
and protective tariff systems (Baer 1972: 96-97; Alavi 1996: 3; Bruton 1998: 
910-911). As a result of this situation, in the peripheral capitalist economies 
the ISI policies initiated a period of industrialisation which ushered an 
expansion particularly in the manufacture of the consumer products and in the 
production of the intermediary and capital goods.   
Therefore, the ISI policies of Mexico and Turkey which started in the 1930s 
should be analysed as the structural response to the 1929 depression 
corresponding to their socio-spatial positioning within the international 
division of labour. As will be showed in chapters four and chapter five of this 
work, the ISI development of Mexico and Turkey did, in fact, reproduce the 
uneven relations with the centre by expanding and deepening them and 
thereby laid the new contradictions of the peripheral capitalist spatiality which 
culminated in the 1980s ? neoliberal restructuring and reorientation of the 
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economy. The ISI dominated industrial production became the basis of the 
export-oriented industrial (EOI) development which more closely integrated 
those two peripheral spaces with the capitalist centre. Both Mexico and Turkey 
liberalised their capital accounts and international trades, standardised and 
harmonised their industrial production with the North American and European 
economic systems through NAFTA and European Customs Union (ECU), and 
their nationally oriented capital became highly internationalised. While this 
wholesale restructuring transformed the capitalist spatiality of Mexico and 
Turkey significantly it hardly changed their peripheral positioning in terms of 
their uneven relations with the centre. Having established this, the two most 
apparent characteristics of the transformation of the peripheral capitalist 
space can be recognised as first, the domestic intensification of the neoliberal 
capitalist social relations and, secondly, the outward expansion towards the 
 ‘ŵĂƌŐŝŶĂů ƐƉĂĐĞƐ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞŝƌ ŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞ ŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĞƐ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ
the necessary legal and physical conditions of the expansion of the capitalist 
productive forces. These two characteristics of the neoliberal transformation 
of the peripheral capitalist space appears as the structural dynamic behind the 
regional integration projects of Mexico and Turkey that have been formulated 
and undertaken parallel to the neoliberal structuring in the last thirty years in 
which the uneven relations between central and peripheral capitalist spaces 
have been reproduced in different socio-spatial forms.     
2.4. Conclusion 
As Lefebvre put it, Marxist dialectics enable an elaborate analysis of the socio-
economic formation of mankind in all its historicity (Lefebvre 1968: 31). By 
going beyond the Hegelian system, Marx took the abstract representations of 
the social and political entities and unravelled them through explaining their 
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relation with the concrete human beings (Lefebvre 1968: 137). Therefore, the 
abstract philosophical thought became meaningful when their historic 
conditions were clearly established.  
In that sense, this chapter defined the social space through the dialectical 
processes of its production and reproduction and identified the spatiotemporal 
conditions and features of the specific processes of production and 
reproduction of the peripheral capitalist space. It has focused on the 
conceptualisation of these historical conditions, starting from the ontological 
foundations of dialectical materialism and the general principles of the 
formation of the capitalist space and ended defining the specific 
spatiotemporal conditions of the peripheral capitalist space and spatiality. 
Firstly, it has been argued that dialectical materialism gives the most 
comprehensive method in the relational analysis of the social reality  Wthe 
conditions of its material existing and its realisation through human 
consciousness. The contradictory relationship between the form and content 
that built upon the sensuous world explains the conditions which dialectically 
determine the historical formation and transformation of the social space.  
From this point of view, it becomes possible to analyse the specific features of 
a particular social space on different scales through focusing on the main 
determinants of the corresponding mode of production which is also subject to 
the rules of dialectical formation. Thereby, capitalist social space appears as 
the spatiotemporal product of the capitalist social relations and the nation-
state ceases to be a meaningful unit of analysis in understanding the long 
ĚƵƌĠĞ movements and relations between different social spaces on different 
scales. In that sense, international relations and the international state system 
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stand as self-limited, self-identified and void conceptual frameworks that are 
insufficient for a meaningful social inquiry.  
Finally, this chapter has conceptualised a spatially and temporally specific 
theory of peripheral capitalist space formation. It is claimed that the historic 
conditions which determined the peripheral capitalist spatiality in Mexico and 
Turkey can be analysed through examining the spatiotemporal interlinks 
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ ƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐ ŽĨ  ‘ĞŶůĂƌŐĞĚreƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?  ‘ƵŶĞǀĞŶ ĂŶĚ ĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚ
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚ  ‘ƉĂƐƐŝǀĞ ƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ? ?dŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂů ƚŽŽ ƐǁŚŝĐŚĚĞĨŝŶĞĚ
the 19
th
 century expansion of the capitalist social relations towards the non-
capitalist periphery can also be employed for the analysis of the historic 
movement  Wformation and transformation- of the peripheral capitalist spaces 
in Mexico and Turkey which will be dealt with in the next chapter (chapter 
three) of this work. With the aid of this conceptual framework, six 
spatiotemporally specific characteristics can be identified in these dialectical 
processes. First, as it was explicitly identified by both Luxemburg and Trotsky, 
the formation of the peripheral capitalist forces was an exogenous process 
since it was dependent on the foreign financial and foreign direct investment 
(Luxemburg 1951, 1997; Trotsky 1970b; Bukharin 1976). This uneven and 
dependent feature is continually reproduced throughout the consolidation and 
transformation processes of the peripheral capitalist spatiality and finally 
emerged as one of the crucial components of the expansion of the peripheral 
capitalist space in the form of international financing of the regional 
integration projects in the periphery of Mexico and Turkey.  
Second, strongly related to the previous feature, the establishment of the 
necessary physical conditions for the capitalist accumulation by the foreign 
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investment appeared as another significant component of the formation of the 
peripheral capitalist space. Both Luxemburg and Trotsky emphasised the vital 
role of railway construction in the development of the capitalist forces in the 
periphery. As will be observed in chapters four and five, the regional 
integration projects of Mexico and Turkey prioritised the construction of the 
physical infrastructure  W construction of superhighways and motorways, 
renovation of ports and docks, rehabilitation and construction of railways- 
which would be financed by international financial sources.  
Third, it can be observed that the expansion of the raw material production in 
the periphery is another characteristic of the formation of the peripheral 
capitalist space. Throughout the 19
th
 century, foreign capital heavily invested 
in the raw material extraction in the periphery which, in return, partially 
financed the foreign dependent development of the peripheral capitalist 
forces. In that sense, the effective utilisation of the natural resources in these 
reserved geographies appears as a necessary condition of the peripheral 
capitalist space formation.  
The fourth characteristic captured by this conceptual framework is the export-
orientation of agriculture for the international markets that moved away the 
traditional agricultural production from the self-subsistence oriented 
production.
15
 Within these regional integration projects, the limited finance of 
the development of the capitalist forces and capitalist accumulation through 
the mass agricultural production for the international markets was 
                                                          
15
 In this point, Luxemburg (1951) gave the example of the transformation of agricultural production 
in Egypt in the late 19
th
 century through unprecedented mass cotton production for the world 
markets and its subsequent collapse. Luxemburg showed the interlinked processes of uneven and 
combined of productive forces, the development of the physical infrastructure, international loans 
and raw material and agricultural production for the world markets which appear as the 
underpinning processes of the peripheral capitalist spatiality (Luxemburg 1951: 429-438).   
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reconstituted where the agro-product exportation transformed to the export-
oriented cultivation of the non-traditional agro-products, seed production, and 
genetic engineering in the reserved social spaces.  
Fifthly, the foreign direct investment in the 19
th
 century initiated the 
production of manufactured goods particularly in the production of consumer 
goods for the domestic market, thereby further dissolving the traditional guild 
system in the periphery. Contemporarily, the industrial production in Mexico 
and Turkey -which was expanded through the production of the capital 
intensive goods with the ISI policies and transformed by the EOI strategies 
during the neoliberal restructuring- extended the labour intensive export-
oriented manufacture industry towards their peripheral geographies, taking 
advantage of the cheap labour costs.  
Since the formation of the peripheral capitalist space is a dialectical process, 
the contestations within these processes should be noted as the final 
characteristic of the formation of the peripheral capitalist spatiality. One of the 
main sources of the contestation in the 19
th
 century was the existing social 
relations of the pre-capitalist mode of production which was threatened and 
dissolved by the unfolding social relations of the capitalist modernity. While 
the conditions of the formation of the peripheral capitalist space have been 
reproduced in different socio-spatial forms within the processes of the 
worldwide neoliberal restructuring of the capitalist spatiality, the reactionary 
or counter-hegemonic spatial contestations to these processes of re-
territorialisation would also perpetuate on multiple-scales.   
To sum up, these key features will be operationalised in the spatiotemporal 
analysis of regional integration projects in Mexico and Turkey. While in the 
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next chapter the processes of formation and consolidation will be elaborated, 
in chapters four and five where the regional integration projects of Mexico and 
Turkey are being investigated, it will be pointed out that these key 
characteristics of the formation of the peripheral capitalist space are being 
reproduced by these projects in order to establish the necessary conditions of 
the capitalist accumulation in the reserved social spaces. Furthermore, it will 
be argued that these key characteristics of the formation of the peripheral 
ĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐƚƐƉĂƚŝĂůŝƚǇĂƌĞďĞŝŶŐƌĞĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĚĂƐĂƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŝŶƚĞŶƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚ
 ‘extension ? ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŶĞŽůŝďĞƌĂů ĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐƚ ƐƉĂƚŝĂůŝƚǇ ? ŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ
marginal spaces into the international capitalist division of labour through the 
expanding Mexican and Turkish peripheral capitalist spaces in the form of 
regional integration projects.           
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Chapter 3: A tale of Two Spaces: The production of the peripheral capitalist 
spatiality and the nation-state formation in Mexico and Turkey 
 ‘>ĞƐƉŽĚƌĄƌĞƐƵůƚĂƌĞǆƚƌĂŹŽĞůĞŵƉůĞŽĚĞĚŽƐgobernantes tan diferentes como el 
ƐƵůƚĄŶ ďďĚƵů ,ĂŵŝĚ Ǉ Ğů ƉƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚĞ WŽƌĨŝƌŝŽ şĂǌ ƉĂƌĂ ĞƐƚĂďůĞĐĞƌ ƵŶ ƉĂƌĂůĞůŽ
ŚŝƐƚſƌŝĐŽ ĞŶƚƌĞ ƐƵƐ ŵĠƚŽĚŽƐ ĚĞ ŐŽďŝĞƌŶŽ Ǉ ? ĐŽŵŽ ďŝĞŶ ĞƐĐƌŝďŝſ ƵŶ ƚĂůĞŶƚŽƐŽ
ƉĞƌŝŽĚŝƐƚĂ ?ĞŶƚƌĞƐƵƐƚĠĐŶŝĐĂƐĚĞĚŽŵŝŶŝŽ ?^ŝŶĞŵďĂƌŐŽ ?ƐŝŵĞƉƌĞƐƚĂŶĂƚĞŶĐŝſŶŶŽ
ƐſůŽůĞƐŵŽƐƚƌĂƌĠĐſŵŽĞƐƋƵĞƐƵƐƐŝƐƚĞŵĂƐƐŽŶĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůŵĞŶƚĞůŽŵŝƐŵŽ ?ƐŝŶŽ
ƋƵĞ ƚĂŵďŝĠŶ ƐƵƐ ƚƌƵĐŽƐ ? ƐƵƐ ĞŶŐĂŹŽƐ ? ƐƵ ĚŝƉůŽŵĂĐŝĂ ŝŶŶĂƚĂ Ǉ ŚĂƐƚĂ ƐƵƐ
ĐĂƌĞĐƚĞƌşƐƚŝĐĂƐƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůĞƐ ? ?16 
-ĂƌůŽĚĞ&ŽƌŶĂƌŽ ? ‘ďĚƵů,ĂŵŝĚǇWŽƌĨŝƌŝŽşĂǌ ? ? ? ? ? ? /2010: 251). 
 
This chapter aims to provide a brief analysis of the historical conditions in 
which the social spaces in Mexico and Turkey have been transformed from the 
pre-capitalist backwardness to the modern peripheral underdevelopment 
during the 19
th
 century -the  ‘longest ? century in the entire history of Mexico 
and Turkey. Having established the conceptual framework in the previous 
chapter (chapter two), this section will demonstrate how the capitalist social 
relations had unfurled and altered within the existing space and spatial 
relations, and determined the political forms that have been assumed 
throughout the course of modern nation-state building processes of Mexico 
and Turkey which present a striking similarity to each other. 
                                                          
16
  ‘dŚĞ ƵƐĞ ŽĨ ƚǁŽ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ƌƵůĞƌƐ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ ^ƵůƚĂŶ ďĚƵů,ĂŵŝĚ ĂŶĚ WƌĞƐŝĚent Porfirio Dşaz 
might be strange for you to establish a historical parallel between their methods of ruling and 
between their techniques of control, as a talented journalist wrote it properly. However, if 
you give me attention, I would not only show how their systems are fundamentally the same, 
alongside their tricks, their deceptions, their innate diplomacies and even their personal 
ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐƐ ? ?ĂƌůŽĚĞ&ŽƌŶĂƌŽƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚƚŚŝƐƚĞǆƚŝŶ:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ?ŝŶEĞǁzŽƌŬĂŶĚƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚ
on a newspaper in the US. Reprinted by Antonio Saborit in  ‘şaz, zar de MĠǆŝĐŽ ? ?(2010) 
MĠxico D.F.: Debolsillo.   
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As has been argued before, the main dynamic behind this rapid transformation 
was the expansion of the capitalist modernity from the industrialised capitalist 
countries towards their immediate geographical vicinities. This dynamic should 
be recognised as the key specific spatiotemporal condition and aspect of the 
capitalist development and peripheral positioning of Mexico and Turkey within 
the capitalist international division of labour. In the 19
th
 century, the backward 
economies of Mexico and Turkey, which were mainly based on the production 
of agricultural goods for the domestic consumption and limited production of 
raw materials for the world market, had become exposed to the conditions of 
the changing international world market via the introduction of capitalist social 
relations expanding from the developed capitalist economies. During the last 
quarter of the century, weak, unsettled, conflictual state structures were 
replaced by stronger, centralised, stable and modern nation-state systems 
imitating the examples of the core capitalist countries in the North. More 
interestingly, both of the new nation-states achieved this while they were 
lacking an essential component of the modern nation-state, a meaningful 
presence of the national bourgeoisies that would be the flag-bearer of the 
state formation processes. 
There are two important contradictive aspects that did condition the uneven 
and combined development of the peripheral capitalist space. Firstly, as it has 
been argued before, the expansion of capitalism required the incorporation of 
the non-capitalist spaces in to the capitalist international division of labour by 
penetrating those markets through replacing the local production with the 
cheap consumer commodities (Luxemburg 1951: 416). The integration of those 
pre-capitalist spaces with the capitalist international division of labour 
dissolved the traditional structure of property relations and initiated the 
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primitive accumulation which later gradually became strong enough to 
proceed with a coerced but limited and dependent industrial development. 
Thereby, secondly, this uneven relationship initiated the primitive 
accumulation of capital, created an incipient national bourgeois, and started 
the formation of a modern, strong, centralised nation-state as the political 
articulation of the limited bourgeois class. 
This work analyses this process under three historical periods. In the first 
stage, both countries simultaneously became more exposed to the economic 
pressures and military aggressions from the developed capitalist countries. 
These pressures led to an era of economic and political instability and a series 
of reform attempts as a response to the disintegration of the traditional 
property relations and aiming to increase the revenue from the rent of the 
land in order to meet the expanding state expenditure. In this period, as 
Luxemburg defined, the natural economy came under attack from the 
 ‘ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨĐŽŵŵŽĚŝƚǇĞĐŽŶŽŵǇ ?ĂƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨƚŚĞĞŶůĂƌŐĞĚreproduction 
in the capitalist centre (Luxemburg 1951: 349, 352, 363). While the traditional 
forms of property relations  Wparticularly landed property- gradually eroded, a 
liberal legal framework was created such as the Civil Code and commercial 
courts which would facilitate the primitive capital accumulation while 
establishing and recognising the capitalist social property relations. These 
processes could be identified as the periods of the liberal and constitutionalist 
movements with the independence and during the  ‘Restored Republic ? period 
(1810-1876) in Mexico, and the  ‘Islahat and Tanzimat Regimes ? and the 
Constitutionalist movement (1838-1876) in the Ottoman Turkey. 
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During this stage, it is possible to argue that the uneven and combined 
relations of capitalist development between the core and the periphery 
emerged and expanded. As both Luxemburg (1951) and Trotsky (1970a) 
argued, the replacement of the natural economy by the commodity economy 
brought primitive accumulation to the periphery and significant developments 
were initiated in the manufacturing industry. However, for the sake of a 
healthy development of the capitalist economy, an authoritarian regime has 
needed to ensure the political stability by defeating both progressive and 
reactionary forces through gaining the conditional support of different 
segments of the society. This situation  Win which both the progressive and 
reactionary forces failed to construct an organic equilibrium and were heading 
for a catastrophe, and thus defeated by a  ‘ŐƌĞĂƚ ?ŚĞƌŽŝĐƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůŝƚǇ - described 
as Caesarism where an authoritarian force either leads the progressive forces 
or the reactionary forces to political power (Gramsci 2007: 219-223). It 
expresses a particular solution to a political impasse which can take either 
progressive or reactionary form. If this intervention brings the progressive 
forces to power with some compromises to reactionary forces, it takes a 
progressive form where the capitalist social relations will further predominate 
the reactionary aspects (Gramsci 2007: 219). During the Caesarist period in 
Mexico and Turkey, the rate of economic development increased in an 
unprecedented level and the modern centralised state structure was formed. 
This economic and political advance could have only been possible through the 
influx of external capital particularly in the construction of the infrastructure 
like railways and in the production of capital goods. In that sense, the 
ƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞ ĂĞƐĂƌŝƐŵƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚĂƌŝĂŶ ƌĞŐŝŵĞƐ ƵŶĚĞƌ ƚŚĞ WŽƌĨŝƌŝŽ şĂǌ
(1876-1910) and Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1876-1908) could be identified as this 
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second historic stage of the formation of the peripheral capitalist space in 
Mexico and Turkey. Both Profirian Mexico and Hamidian Turkey sought to 
ensure a balance in their relations with the competing capitalist powers in 
order to maintain political stability to avoid further territorial dissolution and 
to sustain the continuity of the foreign capital investment.  
Finally, the third period marks the consolidation of the peripheral capitalist 
spatiality and the uneven capitalist development by the replacement of the 
authoritarian regime when it becomes an obstacle to the economic 
development itself. This period can be defined as the passive revolutionary 
period during the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920) and the Young Turk 
Revolution (1908-1925) in which the ancien regime had been eliminated and 
the peripheral positioning of the capitalist space was provisionally stabilised. 
The main characteristic of this period is the support of the subaltern classes 
and particularly the support of the peasantry in the formation of the bourgeois 
hegemony. Thereby, passive revolution laid the foundations of the 
institutionalisation of the political power which fundamentally changed the 
social and political structure of the peripheral capitalist space in order to 
maintain and further the accumulation of capital through the uneven 
development of productive forces.   
In June 1909, Carlo de Fornaro  Wan Italian-Swiss descendant American 
caricaturist and writer- organised a conference in New zŽƌŬ ĐĂůůĞĚ  ‘ďĚƵů
,ĂŵŝĚ Ǉ WŽƌĨŝƌŝŽ şĂǌ ? ĂƐ Ă ƉĂƌƚ ŽĨ Ă ĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ƚŚĞ şĂǌƌĞŐŝŵĞ ĂŶĚ
claimed that the characteristics of his political system is the same with another 
hated political figure of the time, the Sultan of the Ottoman Turkey Abdul 
Hamid II. In his speech, Fornaro argued that both Sultan Hamid and Don 
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Porfirio created a dictatorship of fear by using massacres and reforms at the 
same time and controlling the whole society through the gendarmerie or 
rurales. While Sultan Hamid thought there would be calamity after him, 
Porfirio thought it would be the Yanqui (Fornaro 1910/2010: 255). Both 
increased the external debt to Western powers (France in Turkish, England in 
Mexican case); while increasing the incomes of the treasury due to the heavy 
taxation, both suspended the constitution, both suppressed the press, both 
created a very developed system of espionage (Fornaro 1910/2010: 256). 
Furthermore, Fornaro predicted the fall of Don Porfirio in his speech by stating 
that as all efforts of Sultan Hamid could not stop the liberal Young Turks to 
terminate his thirty-two years old oppressive rule, the Mexican liberals will 
also succeed to topple the şĂǌ ƌĞŐŝŵĞ sooner or later (Fornaro 1910/2010: 
258).  
While it should be acknowledged that Fornaro presented an impressive 
comparison between these two distinct cases, this comparison was based on a 
thin conceptualisation and a superficial description of the historical facts in 
both countries and it does not give any insights on the spatiotemporal 
conditiŽŶƐ ŝŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ WŽƌĨŝƌŝŽ ĂŶĚ ďĚƵů ,ĂŵŝĚ ?Ɛ ŽƉƉƌĞƐƐŝǀĞ ƌĞŐŝŵĞƐ ǁĞƌĞ
structured. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to provide a meaningful 
analysis of the similarity between these two periods by defining the 
spatiotemporally specific conditions in which the peripheral capitalist social 
relations have emerged and the specific political and social forms assumed by 
those relations correspondingly. Hence, the historical movement of the space 
will be linked and located in the 19
th
 century history of Mexico and Turkey. 
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 ‘ůƐƵůƚĄŶǇĞůĚŝĐƚĂĚŽƌ ?17 (1909). This work by Mexican artist Marius de Zayas on 
carbon and graphite was illustrated in the conference on Sultan Abdul Hamid and 
WŽƌĨŝƌŝŽşĂǌŝŶ:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ?EĞǁzŽƌŬĂŶĚƌĞƉƌŝŶƚĞĚŝŶŶƚŽŶŝŽ^ĂďŽƌŝƚŝŶ ‘şĂǌ ?ǌĂƌ
ĚĞDĠǆŝĐŽ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? )DĠǆŝĐŽ ?& ? PĞďŽůƐŝůůŽ ? 
 
 
 
                                                          
17
  ‘dŚĞƐƵůƚĂŶĂŶĚƚŚĞĚŝĐƚĂƚŽƌ ? ? 
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3.1. The enlarged reproduction and the introduction of the commodity 
economy in the periphery: the reforms, the replacement of the natural 
economy and the 19
th
 century liberalism in Mexico and Turkey 
This section will examine the reform periods in Mexico and Turkey which laid 
the conditions of the primitive accumulation and uneven and combined 
development of Porfirian Mexico and Hamidian Turkey. In this period, the 
enlarged reproduction in the capitalist centre gradually increased the pressure 
on the natural economies of Mexico and Turkey which eventually dissolved it 
with its corresponding social relations. This evolvement of the peripheral social 
space is reflected in the simultaneous processes of the formation of the 
capitalist productive forces and the rise of liberal programmes and 
constitutionalist movements in both countries. 
It is very significant to engage with these historical processes in order to 
unravel the spatiotemporal conditions in which the peripheral capitalist spaces 
in Mexico and Turkey have been structured. As it has been argued before, the 
continually transforming capitalist spatiality can only be analysed through 
investigating the historic and structural dynamics which progresses within a 
dialectical process. Therefore, the dialectical formation of the capitalist space 
is a resolution of a previous social contradiction, a product of a dialectical 
process itself. In that sense, this chapter analyses first the spatiotemporal 
conditions of the formation of the peripheral capitalist space and then 
proceeds with the dialectical processes of formation of these capitalist 
peripheral capitalist spaces.     
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3.1.1. The Bourbon reforms, liberal and constitutionalist movements and the 
Restored Republic 
The Spanish Empire and its colonial rule in New Spain entered into the 18
th
 
century in a state of crisis. The economic structure established by the Spanish 
conquistadores had a dual character based on the despotic-tributary and 
feudal-mercantilist socio-economic organisation. While the agrarian 
indigenous communities were subjected to the despotic-tributary structure, 
the royal bureaucracy and Church on the centre and the estate owners 
(estancia), hacendados, artesans, workers and mine owners on the periphery 
comprised the latter (Semo 1973; Semo 1982a: 29 ?ĚĞ ůĂ WĞŹĂ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ?-26). 
The surplus that produced by the indigenous communities was extracted 
through the tributes, thus, in fact, the Spanish rule was simply replacing the 
role of Aztec Empire
18
 in the despotic-tributary system and conserving the old 
indigenous community structure while simultaneously constructing the 
essential foundations of a feudal system through establishing encomienda and 
repartimiento
19
 as the basis of the landlord/aristocratic form of rent (Semo 
1982b: 49; Knight 2002a: 183). In that sense, Semo claimed that the feudalism 
in New Spain was rather a superstructure than a mode of production (Semo 
1982b: 50). In the early 1600s, the repartimiento system came under the direct 
                                                          
18
 During the Aztec period (1200-1500) the Valley of Mexico was developed very significantly 
in terms of population and agricultural production and a warrior aristocracy was evolved 
simultaneously to this development. While the population of the Valley was reaching to one 
million, a highly developed bureaucratic structure was developed in the central city 
dĞŶŽĐŚƚŝƚůĄŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ ǁĂƐ ĂďůĞ ƚŽ ƵŶĚĞrtake considerable hydraulic works, flood barriers and 
causeway projects that linking the fertile chinampas (mud gardens) to the mainland. This 
developed political and economic structure in the Valley became gradually very prominent in 
the whole Mesoamerican region in the 15
th
 century subordinated these communities to a 
tributary system not through heavy military presence or imperial administrative organs but 
with the extremely developed network of pochtecas (merchants) and calpixtlis (tax collectors) 
(Knight 2002a: 165-169, 176).     
19
 Colonial grant of land and native inhabitants to the Spanish settler, and the system that was 
granting a land to the conquerors where the indigenous labourer was forced to work but not 
owned directly by the fief holder.  
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pressure of the town, mine and hacienda which were dependent on voluntary 
wage labour rather than forced labour (Knight 2002b: 90-93). With the further 
consolidation of the colonisation, the mining sector became the most 
significant source of economic surplus for the Crown and dominated the socio-
economic development until its stagnation in the 17
th
 century (Semo 1982a: 
31; Semo 1982b: 50). Hacienda remained as one of the main pillars of the New 
^ƉĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ĞĐŽŶŽŵǇ ƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐ Ă ůĞƐƐ ƌŝƐŬǇ ĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞoutlet for investment but 
with considerably low annual returns (Knight 2002b: 159, 163). Following the 
conquista, with the discovery of silver and mercury mainly in the north of 
Mexico City, the ĐŝƚŝĞƐƐƵĐŚĂƐĂĐĂƚĞĐĂƐ ?'ƵĂŶĂũƵĂƚŽĂŶĚ^ĂŶ>ƵŝƐWŽƚŽƐşŚĂĚ
been founded where the population had progressively increased parallel to the 
growing economic activity created by the establishment of new mining areas 
(Lira and Muro 1988: 420). 
In the final phase of its exhaustion, the despotic-tributary/feudal mode of 
production and its pre-capitalist social relations were in plain recession (Semo 
1987: 68). The capacity of the despotic-tributary mode of production to 
generate surplus for the Crown was significantly reduced while its previously 
vital role in the organisation and administraƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ EĞǁ ^ƉĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ
ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ ŚĂĚ ďĞĞŶ ĞƌŽĚĞĚ  ?ĚĞ ůĂ WĞŹĂ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ) ?This meant an end for a 
period of economic growth that was defined as introverted development 
(desarrollo hacia adentro) which was stimulated by the endogenous factors 
such as population growth, rising demand, falling wages and expanding towns 
and trade. However, the exogenous factors, mainly global demand for Mexican 
exports such as silver, leather, cochineal and certain foodstuff began to put 
ƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞŽŶƚŚĞEĞǁ^ƉĂŝŶ ?Ɛeconomic development (desarrollo hacia afuera) 
especially during the 18
th
 century (Knight 2002b: 204).  
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&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ? ĂƐƚŝůŝĂŶ ^ƉĂŝŶ ?Ɛ ŵŽŶŽƉŽůǇ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ŽĨƚŚĞ ŽůŽŶŝĂů
territories in America had been challenged, starting in the late 16
th
 century by 
the English, French and Dutch tradesmen who were interested in the Atlantic 
trade and gradually became more involved in the silver trade and later on in 
the smuggling of leather, tobacco, cotton and, most importantly, sugar and its 
side products (Izard 1984: 162). On the other hand, the Colonial economic 
organisation and administration of the New Spain established strict controls on 
the production through the private and royal monopolies, prohibited the 
commercial activities with the international markets and also inhibited the 
interchange between different Colonies in America -a leading factor in 
increasing smuggling and piracy- and imposed multiple taxes on commerce, 
ƚƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨŐŽŽĚƐ ?ĚĞůĞWĞŹĂ ? ? ? ? P  ? ) ?dŚĞŚĂŵďĞƌŽĨ
Commerce in Mexico City was even prohibited the cultivation of some 
agricultural goods since it was importing them from the Peninsular Spain 
(Semo 1982b: 48). The Colonial exploitation of the New Spain was in fact 
strengthening the obstacles in front of the capitalist development by 
sustaining the feudal and rentier character of the Spanish bourgeoisie (Semo 
1982a: 31).  
These external pressures led to an expansion in the military expenditure of the 
Bourbon Spain which increased the significance of the already waning 
revenues from the Colonies. Initially, Bourbons aimed to reorganise the 
ĂƐƚŝůŝĂŶŚĂĐŝĞŶĚĂŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽ ‘ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐĞ ?ƚŚĞƚƌŝďƵƚĂƌǇƐǇƐƚĞŵƚŽŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞƚŚĞ
rent on the land (Garcia-ƵŹŝŐĂ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ) ? dŚŝƐwas followed by a series of 
more comprehensive reforms in the administration and organisation of the 
socio-economic structure of the New Spain which Pietschmann called the 
proto-liberalist era, led by the principles of European Enlightenment 
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(Pietschmann 1991: 199). Without sharing that enthusiasm, it is possible to 
define the Bourbon reforms as a structural response to the administrative and 
economic decadence of the New Spain  Wand the Spanish Colonial rule in the 
rest of America- on the eve of the wholesale assault of the capitalist social 
relations during the 19
th
 century.         
The administrative reforms of the Bourbons  WCarlos III, in particular- aimed to 
restructure and simplify the administrative organisation of the New Spain and 
clearly define the division of labour and the hierarchical framework between 
the administrative and judicial offices in order to make it more effective 
(Pietschmann 1991: 185). The reforms initiated under the visitador :ŽƐĠ ĚĞ
'ĄůǀĞǌĂĨƚĞƌŚŝƐĂƌƌŝǀĂů ƚŽEĞǁDĞǆŝĐŽ ŝŶ  ? ? ? ?ǁĞƌĞĚĞƐƚŝŶĞĚƚŽĂĐŚŝĞǀĞƚŚŝƐ
administrative reorganisation and centralisation of the Colonial authority, 
thereby, ƌĞŝŶƐƚĂůůŝŶŐĂŶĚĐŽŶƐŽůŝĚĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƌŽǁŶ ?ƐĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽǀĞƌƚŚĞĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ
and political mechanisms (Garner 1978: 571; Izard 1984: 156; Pietschmann 
 ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ?tŝƚŚŚŝƐƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌŽĨ/ŶĚŝĞƐ ? ĂŶĞǁƉƌŽǀŝŶĐĞĐŽĚĞ
accepted in 1786 (La Real Ordenanza de Intendentes  W the Royal Provincial 
Law) that created 46 intendentes (province) and a Super-intendente General, a 
court of audit (Tribunal de Cuentas), the Superior Committee of the Royal 
Hacienda besides the provincial committees (Junta Superior de Real Hacienda, 
Juntas Provinciales), general and local treasuries (caja real) (Mansilla 1985: 68; 
Pietschmann 1991: 182). The hierarchical relationship between the newly 
established institutions was also clearly defined. 
These administrative reforms were followed by the reorganisation of the 
economic life in order to increase the Colonial revenue. The economic reforms 
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under the Bourbon rule can be divided into reforms and reorganisation 
attempts in mining, agriculture and reforms in commercial and fiscal areas.  
In the second half of the 18
th
 century, silver production in the New Spain 
witnessed an unprecedented expansion from 5 million pesos in 1702 to 26 
million pesos in 1804 (Brading 1970: 665; Brading 1985: 61). The discoveries of 
new mines and increasing demand on silver have been dismissed as the 
possible causes of this expansion (Brading 1970: 666). Before the reforms of 
'ĄůǀĞǌ, ƚŚĞƌŽǁŶ ?ƐĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽĨƚŚĞŵŝŶŝŶŐŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇwas recognised as the main 
cause of the stagnation of the production of the precious metals. Firstly, the 
Colonial authorities had been levying a heavy tax on silver production. 
Secondly, the distribution and production of mercury which is a significant 
element in the refining process of silver was heavily monopolised by the Crown 
(Brading and Cross 1972: 561). Bourbons reduced the price of mercury from 
187 pesos (for a quintal which is 50 kilos) first to 82 pesos in 1750 and then to 
62, and finally to 41 pesos in 1778 (Semo 1982b: 53). This reduction in the 
price of mercury  Wand also the price of gunpowder- was a great stimulus for 
the mining sector since both the production and refinement processes of silver 
necessitated significant amounts of capital investment (Brading 1970: 668; 
Brading and Cross 1972: 550). A new mining code was also introduced in 1783 
(Brading 1970: 668; Brading and Cross 1972: 562) and miners sporadically 
received extraordinary fiscal assistances, tax rebates and reductions in 
drainage duties from the Colonial officials (Brading 1970: 671). 
The Bourbon reforms in the mining sector increasingly drove the mercantile 
capital into direct investment in mining which led to a sharp increase in the 
production of silver during the 1770s (Brading and Cross 1972: 577). The 
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mining bonanza also had a great impact on the other sectors of the economy 
in the mining regions. During this period only in Guanajuato, the mining centre 
ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĂũşŽ ƌĞŐŝŽŶ ? fourteen hundred mules were employed for the 
transportation of silver which created a huge demand for grain and maize to 
support the workforce which developed an intensive and mercantile 
agricultural production in the region (Semo 1982b: 56; Brading 1985: 61).  
During the 16
th
 and 17
th
 centuries agriculture in the colonial Mexico was 
ŚĞƚĞƌŽŐĞŶĞŽƵƐďŽƚŚĐŽŵƉƌŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĞĞƐƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚ ‘ŐĂŶĂĚĞƌĂƐ ?that were given to 
Spaniards by the Crown as a fief, using the indigenous labour as the main 
source of workforce and the self-substituting indigenous communities owning 
and using the communal land. By the 18
th
 century, this heterogeneous 
structure became gradually dominated by the haciendas -due to the decay of 
the silver mining in the 17
th
 century and the inevitable contraction of the New 
SƉĂŝŶ ?ƐĐŽŵŵĞƌĐĞĐĂƵƐĞĚďǇƚŚĞůĂĐŬŽĨƐŝůǀĞƌ- where the land was completely 
owned by the Lord (hacendado) and the workers of the hacienda were direct 
subjects of him (Semo 1982c: 73). In some cases, hacendado held such powers 
de jure through occupying a formal office but generally enjoyed a de facto 
socio-economic power over his people (Knight 2002b: 97-98). Hacienda and its 
ƉĞŽŶƐǁĞƌĞĐŽŶƚƌŽůůĞĚďǇƚŚĞŚĂĐĞŶĚĂĚŽ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ  ‘tienda de ƌĂǇĂ ? which 
was able to provide all sorts of necessities for living of its peons including food 
and clothing, available even during times of famine or crop failure. In the 
distant geographies where the relation between town and country was not 
existent, the hacienda became the only source of security to maintain the life 
of indigenous communities (Semo 1982c: 78). In that sense, especially for 
central Mexico, a dynamic relationship was established between the hacienda 
and the indigenous communities (Bornemann 1989: 204). 
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During the reign of Carlos III, the Bourbons aimed to increase agricultural 
production and helped the producers to obtain the necessary equipment and 
instruments. The authorities also encouraged the cultivation of agricultural 
products which were not cultivated in Europe and on high demand in the 
international markets  ?/ǌĂƌĚ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ? &ůŽƌĞƐĐĂŶŽ ĂŶĚ ^ĄŶĐŚĞǌ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ) ?
Furthermore, the colonial officials sought to maintain a balance between the 
Creole domination in the central Mexico with haciendas, particularly in cereal 
production and the mestizo access to the land possession for the production of 
grain, cotton and cattle graze (Hamnett 1970: 56). As a result of these reforms, 
the volume of agricultural production in the New Spain was tripled in the last 
quarter of the 18
th
 century (Bornemann 1989: 203).  
Bourbon reforms also eliminated the prohibition of the inter-colonial trade in 
1789 which led to a significant increase in commercial activities (Semo 1982b: 
52). Among the new commercial policies of the Bourbons there was the 
elimination of the monopoly of thĞ ƉŽƌƚ ŽĨ ĄĚŝǌ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĞǆƚƌĂ-economic 
privileges that had been given to some of the tradesmen (Semo 1982b: 53). In 
order to reorganise the real caja, the personnel of these local treasuries had 
been significantly increased and a rather complex administrative mechanism 
was created after 1782 (Garner 1978: 545; Mansilla 1985: 73). Therefore, the 
annual revenues of the local treasuries steadily grew during the period (Garner 
1978: 553). The Bourbons were very keen on orderly taxation which created a 
conflict with the Church when the Crown wanted to install a royal accountant 
ǁŚŽǁŽƵůĚďĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞĨŽƌƚŚĞĐŽůůĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƌŽǇĂůŶŝŶƚŚ ? ?dos novenas) 
tax on the Church tithe in 1774. While the Church strongly opposed any 
intervention from the Crown bureaucrats in the administration of tithes, the 
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main aim of raising additional revenue from this source remained (Brading 
1994: 214).     
Bourbon reforms were successful in increasing the Colonial revenues by 
significantly eliminating the despotic-tributary and feudal elements from the 
economy and by loosening the extra-economic control of the Crown. These 
reforms allowed the formation of mercantilist capital and the creation of a 
new ĐůĂƐƐŽĨ ‘ďourgeoisie-in-ĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ďĞůŽǁƚŚĞƌƵůŝŶŐĐůĂƐƐĂƚƚĂĐŚĞĚƚŽƚŚŝƐ
processes of accumulation (Guardino and Walker 1992: 19). These economic 
conditions in the New Spain started to change when the transition to 
capitalism began, through being exposed to the first effects of the industrial 
revolution in the beginning of the 19
th
 century (Izard 1984: 165; Semo 1987: 
60). The industrial revolution in Europe did ruin the artisan industry of Puebla 
ĂŶĚ YƵĞƌĠƚĂƌŽ ƐŝŶĐĞ ƚŚĞ  ‘Mexican weavers were simply unable to compete 
with the power driven machines of Lancashire ? (Brading 1973: 179). As was 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the arrival of these products to Mexico 
initiated the long process of the peripheral capitalist accumulation, which was 
defined by Luxemburg, where the natural economy producing for the self-
subsistence has been replaced by the commodity economy producing for the 
market (Izard 1984: 165). As a result of this, the traditional guild structure in 
the production of silk, canvas, linen and other textile products rapidly entered 
into a phase of decadence. Simultaneously, the production and commerce of 
raw materials such as cotton expanded on an unprecedented scale with the 
help of the increasing investments of the commercial capital (Bazant 1964: 
505-506). While the woollen products that had been imported from Britain 
were cheaper, the price of the raw material was increasing (Bazant 1964: 508).   
129 
 
DĞǆŝĐĂŶ  ‘ďŽƵƌŐĞŽŝƐŝĞ-in-ĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ?  Wmainly Creole- and the artisanal, 
agricultural, and commercial little bourgeoisie became the flag-bearers of the 
Mexican liberalism formed a progressive force that determined to eliminate 
the remaining feudal elements and obstacles in front of the economic 
activities. This force adopted a bourgeois economic programme and positioned 
itself against the high clergy, Crown bureaucracy and the merchants of Mexico 
City (Bazant 1960: 228; Semo 1987: 69). In that sense, it was not surprising to 
see that the Independence movement first appeared in the highly 
commercialised BajşŽ ƌĞŐŝŽŶ ǁŚĞƌĞ ƚŚĞ ŵŝŶŝŶŐ ? ƚĞǆƚŝůĞ ĂŶĚ ĂŐƌŝĐƵůƚƵƌĂů
production was intensive and the hacendados were very strong (Guardino and 
Walker 1992: 26). Bazant (1960) and Semo (1979; 1987; 2012) argued that the 
revolution of Independence in 1810 headed by Hidalgo against the Colonial 
rule and the following insurgency was in fact a conflict between the Mexican 
 ‘ďŽƵƌŐĞŽŝƐ-in-ĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞalliance of the little bourgeoisie, the Colonial 
and Peninsular bourgeoisie and the high bureaucracy of the Crown. Lacking a 
unified industrial bourgeoisie, tŚĞ  ‘ďŽƵƌŐĞŽŝƐŝĞ-in-ĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ůĞĚ the liberal 
front with broad alliances of diverse groups in order to destroy the pre-
capitalist obstacles in front of the capitalist development which was a 
continuously unfolding process (Semo 1979: 140; Guardino and Walker 1992: 
13, 18, 27). After Independence, it can be said that the Catholic Church, 
hacienda and indigenous communal land were the remaining obstacles in front 
of the capitalist development. The Church was a significant economic player, 
having accumulated vast amounts of property, enjoying extra-economic legal 
privileges and controlling education and, thereby, it was at the centre of the 
struggle during the Reform period. Hacienda was already doomed since the 
end of the 18
th
 century with the replacement of the natural economy with a 
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commodity economy. Nevertheless, following the fall of the colonial rule, 
hacienda witnessed its golden age during the 19
th
 century by uniting two 
contradictory systems; a modern economic entity within the capitalist market 
and a semi-feudal form of production inside (Semo 1982c: 79, Semo 1988: 3-
4). The expansion of hacienda meant an assault on the Indian communal land 
which reached its climax during the Porfiriato when the hacienda became the 
central figure of the uneven and combined development of the capitalist 
agricultural production by incorporating 82 percent of the agrarian population 
inƚŽƚŚŝƐƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ ?ĂƌďſĂŶĚ^ĄŶĐŚĞǌ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?  
/ƚŝƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚǁŚŝůĞƚŚĞ ‘ƉƌŽƚŽ-ůŝďĞƌĂůŝƐŵ ?ŽĨƚŚĞŽƵƌďŽŶZĞĨŽƌŵƐ
initiated the peripheral process of the capitalist space formation by eliminating 
the monopolistic economic structure, the Independence from the Crown and 
the following liberal reforms laid the foundations of its further development 
through uneven and combined development during the last quarter of the 19
th
 
century. However, immediately after Independence, the Bourbonist 
mercantilist interventionism assumed the political form of reactionary 
conservatism, allied itself with the Church and threatened the liberal 
programme (Brading 1973: 160; Gracida and Fujigaki 1983: 74). The  ‘WůĂŶ ĚĞ
/ŐƵĂůĂ ?in 1821 which established the independent Mexico was a compromise 
between the 1810 independence and the conservative block and, thus, 
secured the old property relations (Gracida and Fujigaki 1983: 77). Therefore, 
the post-independence politics remained as a struggle between the social 
groups that confronted each other during the 1810-1821 insurgency. 
Conservatives consisted the formal centres of power; high clergy, former 
officers of the colonial army and the merchants of the Mexico City against the 
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liberal block of peripheral hacienda owners, provincial merchants, and the 
professionals (Guardino and Walker 1992: 33).  
The economic programme of the conservatives was not significantly different 
from the liberal economic programme in terms of industrial development. The 
conservatives defended a strong government structure to establish a modern 
industry without transforming the existing traditional agricultural structure 
 ?ƌŐƺĞůůŽ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ?/ŶƚŚĂƚƐĞŶƐĞ ? during the conservative rule, the  ‘ĂŶĐŽĚĞ
ǀşŽ ?was founded in 1830, aiming to create public funds to import necessary 
machinery for the investments in manufacturing, particularly for a mechanised 
textile production (Potash 1953: 268; Bazant 1964: 509; Brading 1973: 160).  
In this period of power struggle between the liberals and conservatives Mexico 
could hardly be seen as a modern state establishment, able to react against 
foreign military interventions as a unified political entity. One of the most 
traumatic losses of the newly independent Mexico was the independence of 
Texas which was backed by the United States in 1836. This was followed by the 
war with France in 1838 and finally two years of conflict with the United States 
between 1846 and 1848. During the conflict with the U.S., only seven federal 
states had contributed to the national defence while Indian tribes were 
revolting and the cast war was raging intensively in Yucatan. The cost of the 
conflict with the U.S. to Mexico was losing the half of its territories including 
Alta California and New Mexico, and 15 million pesos of ƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?sĄǌƋƵĞǌ
1994: 816).  In 1853, during the first months of the presidency of Santa Anna, 
Mexico was practically forced to sell the southern part of Arizona to its 
northern neighbour when it became clear that Mexico would not be able to 
repel the U.S. agression (Bazant 1991: 29).  
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The reaction of the liberal elite to these territorial losses was a common belief 
in an urgent need to reform and restructure the state. The conservative 
reactionary incursions of Santa Anna in a sense helped the radical and 
moderate liberals to reach a level of cohesion after the 1850s (Brading 1973: 
144; Guardino and Walker 1992: 33). The liberal elite believed that if the 
sources of backwardness of the Mexican economy could not be eliminated the 
administrative structure and political authority would never be consolidated. 
They also believed that, without a modern administrative system, it would be 
impossible to bring economic growth and progress; hence, the very future of 
Mexico as a nation state would be in danger (Katz 1991: 49).  
/ŶƚŚĂƚƐĞŶƐĞ ?ŝƚŝƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘ZĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶŽĨǇƵƚůĂ ? ? ? ? ? ?-1855) 
which started the liberal reform era in Mexico was a response to the 
reactionary conservatism that was trying to reinstall the extra-economic 
measures of the Colonial era such as alcabala
20
, or the ĐĂƉŝƚĂĐŝſŶ (head tax). 
This period of liberal reforms laid the foundations for the consolidation of the 
liberal Mexican state (Guardino and Walker 1992: 35). 
Knight (1985) argues that from the Plan of Ayutla (1854) to the end of 
Porfiriato, three different streams can be differentiated within the Mexican 
liberalism. The first group consisted of the constitutionalist liberals who were 
the flag-bearers of establishing the universal civil rights and democracy in 
Mexico. The second group was the institutionalists who held a strict anticlerical 
position and who defended the implementation of more radical changes. Ley 
:ƵĄƌĞǌ (1855) which ended the ecclesiastical privileges and Ley Lerdo (1856) 
that declared the ecclesiastical and communal lands illegal were the major 
                                                          
20
 The internal custom system which puts a duty tax on the commodities that transported 
between different regions within the country.    
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attacks of institutionalist/radical liberals on the obstacles in front of private 
property which was seen as detrimental to economic progress (Brading 1973: 
149; Knight 1985: 60). The appropriated ecclesiastical properties with the Ley 
Lerdo later had been sold which strengthened the landowner elite (Bazant 
1966: 209). The last group of liberal stream was based on the idea that for the 
sake of stability and development, the violation of civil rights and 
constitutional practices should be permitted. This strand of liberalism which 
envisaged a strong government and authoritarian regime was seen as the only 
way that the Mexican nation could use its rich resources and progress (Knight 
1985: 60, 61). Nevertheless, all three groups were determined to implement a 
strong liberal political reformation of state power which would lay the 
foundations of the economic development. The main obstacle that they 
needed to confront was the conservative reactionism which would be resolved 
during the Porfiriato.  
3.1.2. The early reforms of the Sublime Port, the Islahat and Tanzimat regimes 
A common feature of the Marxist assumptions about KƚƚŽŵĂŶ dƵƌŬĞǇ ?Ɛ
economic structure is its so-ĐĂůůĞĚ ‘KƌŝĞŶƚĂůĚĞƐƉŽƚŝĐ ?ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌĐƌĞĂƚĞĚďǇ the 
 ‘ƐŝĂƚŝĐDŽĚĞŽĨWƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?ŶĚƚŚĞŵĂũŽƌƉƌŽďůĞŵŽĨƚŚŝƐĨŽƌŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ
Asiatic Mode of Production is its ahistorical character which dismisses 
specificity by taking an essentialist position towards the Ottoman society and 
economy rather than analysing its ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ?7ƐůĂŵŽŒůƵ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?
Therefore, it is crucial to analyse the spatiotemporal conditions of the 
development of the Ottoman economy more closely in understanding the 
formation of the peripheral capitalist spatiality in Turkey.       
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The pre-capitalist economic activities in the Ottoman Empire can be 
characterised by its concentration on commerce due to its dependency on the 
constant flow of ǁĞƐƚĞƌŶ ƐŝůǀĞƌ  ?7ŶĂůĐŦŬ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ) ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƉĞƌƐŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ
ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚ ƉĞĂƐĂŶƚƌǇ  ?7ƐůĂŵŽŒůƵ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ) ? WĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇ ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĞƌĂ ƚŚĂƚ
the Ottoman Empire reached to its largest territorial strength, the local and 
foreign merchants enjoyed a privileged position in the Ottoman economy over 
the agricultural producers and craftsman and became subjected to a distinct 
code of regulations which was far more favourable than the regulations for the 
manufacturing sector. Merchants were assigned to maintain a constant flow of 
ƚŚĞƌĂǁŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůƐƚŽƚŚĞƚŽǁŶ ?7ŶĂůĐŦŬ ? ? ? ? ? )ĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞůŽŐŝĐďĞŚŝŶĚƚŚŝƐ
economic structure was a principle that gives priority to the steady stream of 
goods within the domestic market in order to ensure that the people and 
craftsman in the cities would not suffer from a shortage of consuming goods 
and raw materials. In that sense, the domestic trade and manufacture were 
strictly controlled and regulated to eliminate speculators and avoid scarcity
21
 
 ?7ŶĂůĐŦŬ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ) ? dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ? ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ the 15th and 16th centuries, the 
Ottoman authorities sought to discourage exports  Win some cases through 
banning export of an item completely- and welcomed importation which 
consequently resulted in a gradually growing trade deficit and retained the 
local ŵĂŶƵĨĂĐƚƵƌŝŶŐĂŶĚƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ?7ŶĂůĐŦŬ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?
Therefore, similar to the Russian town described by Trotsky, the Ottoman city 
                                                          
21
 However, some cities like Istanbul, Bursa, Edirne, Thessaloniki, Aleppo and Alexandria need 
to be seen as exceptions of this situation. Those cities especially during the 15
th
 and 16
th
 
century became commercial centres of the international silk production and trade alongside 
the trade of species, silver, iron, timber, indigo etc. In these cities the development of the 
international trade transformed the traditional guild system and eventually paved the way to 
a limited manufacture system backed with a large-scale financial speculative capital created 
by the external demand and interregional raw material trade (7ŶĂůĐŦŬ 1969: 116).   
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developed as an urban centre of commerce and consumption but not a centre 
of production.  
The classical Ottoman economic structure was based on the tributary 
agricultural production to which the military organisation was linked strongly. 
Ottoman land regime, in theory manifested patrimonial characteristics by 
recognising all cultivated lands as the property of the state and by controlling 
its ownership very strictly (Heper 1980: 83). However, in practice the Ottoman 
administration was respectful to the local property relations even though the 
land ownership was continuously supervised in order to prevent the formation 
of large estates and the development of feudal rights while simultaneously 
discouraging the further division of the ŝĨƚůŝŬ22 units into very small units. In 
the classical period, the liberty of the peasantry on the land was almost 
nonexistent. In the cases of leaving land uncultivated for 3 years, the peasant 
faced either loƐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ůĂŶĚ Žƌ ŶĞĞĚĞĚ ƚŽ ƉĂǇ Ă ŚŝŐŚ ĐŽŵƉĞŶƐĂƚŝŽŶ  ?7ŶĂůĐŦŬ
1955: 224). The Ottoman fief system (ƚŦŵĂƌ) gave the responsibility to fief-
holder to control the peasants to keep cultivating their lands and paying the 
taxes. However, the fief-holders were never allowed to possess or inherit the 
land nor assume any administrative or political powers on the peasantry 
(Heper 1980: 84). Therefore, the land system did not allowed the emergence 
of a landed aristocracy. Even though with the decline of the fief system, the 
numbers of the private ownership of bigger ĕŝĨƚůŝŬƐwere increased particularly 
in Western Anatolia and the Balkans, these plots were not large-scale export-
oriented farms until the end of the 18
th
 ĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ ?ƺƌĐŚĞƌ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?
                                                          
22
 A plot of land that does not exceed approximately 1000 square meters.  
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There are two important developments that have to be considered in the late 
17
th
 and 18
th
 century transformation of the traditional structure of the 
Ottoman society. Firstly, starting from the 17
th
 century, the volume of trade 
between Ottoman Turkey and Austria and the other West European countries 
grew considerably with the gradual penetration of the development of the 
already existing French, Venetian and Genoese trade dominating the Levantine 
trade in the eastern Mediterranean (Eldem 2006: 284). Secondly, the Ottoman 
treasury was facing financial difficulties that were rapidly deteriorating with 
the wars and territorial losses. In order to overcome these financial difficulties, 
the Ottoman authorities considerably increased the taxes on the peasantry 
which led to the notorious Ğůąůŝ peasant revolts both in Anatolia and the 
Balkans, thus decreasing the power of the central government and leading to 
the emergence of the feudal Lords (ďĞǇůĞƌďĞǇŝ Žƌ ąǇĂŶ ) ĂŶĚ ŶŽƚĂďůĞƐ  ?ŬĚĂŒ
1970: 244- ? ? ? ?ŚŵĂĚ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?ƺƌĐŚĞƌ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?tŚŝůĞƚŚĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĚĞĨĞĂƚ
in Vienna in 1683 and the increasing role of the French, Dutch and English 
merchants in the Mediterranean was initially compensated through the 
monopolistic control of the commerce and shipping in the Black Sea, opening 
ƚŚŝƐ ŵĂũŽƌ ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ďĂƐĞ ƚŽ ZƵƐƐŝĂ ?Ɛ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ĂĨƚĞƌ ƚŚĞ  ? ? ? ?-1774 Russo-
dƵƌŬŝƐŚtĂƌǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ  ‘<ƺĕƺŬ<ĂǇŶĂƌĐĂƚƌĞĂƚǇ ? ŝŶ  ? ? ? ?ĚĞƉƌŝǀĚƚŚĞĞŵƉŝƌĞof 
one of its major incomes (Quataert 2005: 41). The territorial losses of the 
Ottoman Empire continued with the Russian takeover of Georgia and Dniester 
 ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ĂŶĚ ŐǇƉƚ ǁĂƐ ŝŶǀĂĚĞĚ ďǇ EĂƉŽůĞŽŶ ?Ɛ ĂƌŵŝĞƐ ŝŶ  ? ? ? ?  ƺƌĐŚĞƌ  ? ? ? ? P
20). 
The predominance of Western Europe in the Levant trade during the 17
th
 and 
18
th
 century became the foundations of a rather stronger and more profound 
unequal exchange after the maturation of the industrial revolution in Western 
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Europe (Eldem 2006: 285). As much as the Ottoman economy was 
incorporated to the world economy through Western penetration, the local 
textile production faced competition from the cloth imports while the prices of 
raw silk mainly provided from Iran was increasing by growing English and 
Italian demand (Faroqhi 2006: 359; Eldem 2006: 306). Similarly, the woollen 
cloth industry in Thessaloniki collapsed due to the increase in wool prices 
created by Western demand (Faroqhi 2006: 360). The silk and cloth production 
in the Bursa region rapidly declined due to the broadcloth import from Britain. 
Inevitably, the production pattern in these textile producing urban areas have 
changed from producing silk-cloth for the European markets to the production 
ŽĨ ƌĂǁ ƐŝůŬ ĨŽƌ ĞǆƉŽƌƚ  ?7ƐůĂŵŽŒůƵ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ) ? dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ? ƚŚĞ KƚƚŽŵĂŶ ĞǆƉŽƌƚƐ
were reduced to agricultural commodities and raw materials and the domestic 
manufacture faced fierce competition with the cheap European consumer 
goods. In the other textile centres such as ^ŚŬŽĚģƌ (Albania), Tarnovo 
(Bulgaria), Baghdad and Aleppo the weaving activities were almost collapsed 
due to this trade (Karal 2004b: 239-240). This can be seen as a continuous 
trend from 1850 to 1914, when the trade balance of the empire deteriorated 
considerably and became greatly favourable to Europe (Karpat 1972: 246). 
Similar to the Bourbon reformers in Mexico, the response of the Ottoman 
administration to these military and economic pressures was to implement a 
series of administrative and military reforms which started during the reign of 
Sultan Selim III (1789-1807) and Mahmud II (1808-1839) that can be periodised 
as the first phase of the reforms (Findley 2006: 79; Findley 2008: 12). These 
initial administrative reforms were concentrated in the reorganisation of the 
failing military system and restructuration of the central government. The key 
accomplishment of these reforms implemented under Sultan Selim III was the 
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ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ Ă ŶĞǁ ĂƌŵǇ ŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ĐĂůůĞĚ  ‘Eŝǌąŵ-Ŧ ĞĚŠĚ ?(the new order) 
outside the existing failing army structure which was based on the Janissaries 
and Sipahis (feudal cavalry), and the reorganisation of the navy. The new 
system of training and education of the new army was handed over to foreign 
ŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐ ?ŝŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŽƌƐĂŶĚĂĚǀŝƐĞƌƐǁŚŽǁĞƌĞŵĂŝŶůǇ&ƌĞŶĐŚ ?ƺƌĐŚĞƌ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?
The increasing military expenses led to attempts to increase the tax revenues 
by reforming the inefficient taxation system which left the tax increases, 
debasing the coinage and confiscation as the only sources of increasing 
revenues. The reorganisation of the central administrative institutions by 
eliminating the chronic overstaffing, favouritism and corruption within the 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ŽĨĨŝĐĞƐ ĂůƐŽ ĨĂŝůĞĚ  ?ƺƌĐŚĞƌ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ) ? dŚĞ ŶĂǀĂů ĂĐĂĚĞŵǇ was 
established with the engineering academy which introduced the western 
technological innovations in shipbuilding such as copper-sheathing, new 
navigational instruments, mast machines and the first steam engines were 
commissioned from Britain for the evacuation of water from the dry-docks 
(Zorlu 2008: 45). The reorganisation of the navy furthered the shipbuilding 
technology, with the help of Western shipbuilders and engineers, the Ottoman 
engineers succeeded in producing  ‘ŚĂŶĚŝĞƌ ĂŶĚ ƐƵƉĞƌŝŽƌ ? ƐƚĞĞů and, 
constructed new ground gun-stocks by imitating the English-made mechanical 
cranes (Zorlu 2008: 48).    
However, similar to the high clergy, high bureaucracy and royal army alliance 
in 18
th
 century Mexico, a conservative reactionary alliance between the 
:ĂŶŝƐƐĂƌŝĞƐ ĂŶĚ  ‘ƺůĞŵĂ ?  ? ‘ŚŝŐŚ ĐůĞƌŐǇ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ KƚƚŽŵĂŶ ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ǁŚŝĐŚ ǁĂƐ ŝŶ
charge of judicial affairs and education and enjoyed a privileged social and 
economic status) was formed against the implementation of these reforms and 
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culminated in the 1807 rebellion that deposed Sultan Selim III (Hourani 1968: 
47; Ahmad 2003: 26; Zilfi 2006: 210).  
While the new army was disbanded and Selim III was murdered, the local 
ŶŽƚĂďůĞƐ  ?ąǇĂŶƐ ) ŚĞĂĚĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ ąǇĂŶ ŽĨ ZƵƐĞ  ?ZƵƐĕƵŬ  WBulgaria) Alemdar 
Mustafa Pasha marched to Istanbul, suppressed the revolt and installed Sultan 
Mahmud II  W ĂŬŶŽǁŶƉĂƌƚŝƐĂŶŽĨƚŚĞ ‘EĞǁKƌĚĞƌ ? ?ƺƌĐŚĞƌ ? ?04: 28). The new 
Sultan was forced to sign a charter called  ‘Senedi-i Ittifak ? (Charter of Alliance) 
in 1808 in ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚŚĞ ƐƚĂƚƵƐŽĨąǇĂŶƐ was recognised and their relations with 
the central government were regulated  ?7ŶĂůĐŦŬ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ) ? dŚŝƐ ĐŚĂƌƚĞƌwas 
acĐĞƉƚĞĚĂƐƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚůŝŵŝƚŝŶŐĂŶĚĚĞĨŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞ ?ƐĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ 
in Ottoman Turkey  ?PǌďƵĚƵŶĂŶĚ'ĞŶĕŬĂǇĂ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ) ?dŚĞĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞĂŶĚ
military reforms continued during the reign of Sultan Mahmud II, particularly 
after the violent eliminatioŶŽĨƚŚĞ:ĂŶŝƐƐĂƌǇĐŽƌƉƐŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ‘Vaka-Ŧ,ĂǇƌŝǇĞ ? W
ƚŚĞƵƐƉŝĐŝŽƵƐ/ŶĐŝĚĞŶƚ ) ?dŚĞĞůŝŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ:ĂŶŝƐƐĂƌŝĞƐůĞĨƚƚŚĞƺůĞŵĂĂŶĚ
the other powerful sources of the conservative reactionary alliance without 
military power which paved way for the triumph of Ottoman liberalism that 
reached its climax during the Tanzimat regime (Shaw 1968: 32). Furthermore, 
the religious holdings of the religious foundations called evkaf were brought 
under the administration of the state by the establishment of a separate 
directorate which stripped the ƺůĞŵĂ of ŝƚƐĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ƉŽǁĞƌƐ  ?ƺƌĐŚĞƌ  ? ? ? ? P
40).  
Following the elimination of the conservative opposition, Sultan Mahmud II 
was focused on the restructuring of the central administration. The key 
features that would shape all the 19
th
 century Ottoman reforms were laid in 
this period; aiming to achieve an agricultural revolution that would give a 
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purchasing power to compensate the imports from Europe; a fiscal revolution 
by establishing a fair and efficient tax system that would eliminate the 
arbitrary and uncertain tax-farming; and the elimination of the extra-economic 
limitations on the non-Muslim population (Cunningham 1968: 254). The 
foundation of the  ‘DĞĐůŝƐ-ŝ sƺŬĞůą ? (the Assembly of Representatives) as a 
modern cabinet and executive body had established the ministerial 
government system and defined the division of labour between these 
ministries (Karal 2004a: 117, 123- ? ? ? ) ? dŚĞ ŚĞĂĚ ŽĨ ƺůĞŵĂ ? ƚŚĞ  ‘ŚŝĞĨ DƵĨƚŝ ?
was given a bureau within this system; thereby his activities were limited to 
advisory and consultative functions (Ahmad 1993: 25). The establishment of 
ƚŚĞ ‘Meclis-ŝsĂůĂǇŦŚŬąŵ-ŦĚůŝǇĞ ?(Supreme Council for Judicial Regulations) 
in 1837 was a significant step in terms of the formation of a legislative body 
that could provide the necessary codes and regulations for the implementation 
ŽĨƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌŵƐ ?<ĂƌĂů ? ? ? ?ď P ? ? ? ?ƺƌĐŚĞƌ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ? 
The most significant outcome of these reforms was the establishment of the 
new administrative and legal structures which then enabled the liberal 
bureaucracy  Wservants of the state, not of the Sultan- to launch the reform and 
reorganisation programmes during the regime of Tanzimat (Cunningham 1968: 
 ? ? ? ? ŚŵĂĚ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ƺƌĐŚĞƌ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ) ? dŚĞ 'ƌĂŶĚ sŝǌŝĞƌƐ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ DƵƐƚĂĨĂ
ZĞƔŝƚ ? <ĞĕĞĐŝǌąĚĞ &ƵĂƚ ĂŶĚ ŵŝŶ ůŝ WĂƐŚĂƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞŝƌ ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞƐ ĨŽƌŵĞĚ Ă
 ‘revolving inter-ŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌŝĂů ĞůŝƚĞ ? ƚŚĂƚ ĚŽŵŝŶĂƚĞĚ ƚŚĞ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ
ƌĞĨŽƌŵƐ ?&ŝŶĚůĞǇ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?dŚĞ ‘firman23 ŽĨdĂŶǌŝŵĂƚ ? (literally; the decree of 
Re-organisation) was declared in 1839, ƌĞĂĚďǇƚŚĞ'ƌĂŶĚsŝǌŝĞƌDƵƐƚĂĨĂZĞƔŝƚ
Pasha. The political ideology underpinning the decree was mainly derived from 
                                                          
23
 Firman means governmental edict. The firman of Tanzimat was read by the Grand Vizier 
DƵƐƚĂĨĂZĞƔŝƚWĂƐŚĂŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƌŬŽĨ'ƺůŚĂŶĞŝŶ/ƐƚĂŶďƵů ?ƚŚƵƐ ?ŝƚǁĂƐĂůƐŽĐĂůůĞĚĂƐƚŚĞ ‘'ƺůŚĂŶĞ
Hatt-Ŧ,ƺŵĂǇƵŶƵ ? ?
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the Western positivist tradition which enshrines the individual rights as the 
only path towards the general wellbeing of the society. Naturally, this can be 
best achieved by a state which respects to ŝƚƐĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ ?ƌŝŐŚƚƐĂŶĚĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚƐĂ
direct and identical relationship with them as individuals (Heper 1980: 92). The 
decree was explicitly related the decay of the Ottoman Empire with the 
administrative deficiencies and then defined ƚŚĞ ‘ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŽĨůŝĨĞ ?ƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇĂŶĚ
ŚŽŶŽƵƌ ? ? ũƵƐƚ ĂŶĚ ĞƋƵĂů ƚĂǆĂƚŝŽŶ ? ĂŶĚ ƌĞŐƵůĂƌŝƐĞĚ ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇƌĞĐƌƵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ
indispensable aspects of a strong, prosperous and peaceful society (Kili and 
'ƂǌƺďƺǇƺŬ ? ? ? ? P ? ?-22).  
The decree envisaged strong measures to protect the peasantry against the 
landowners among the other economic measures to bring economic 
development and progress. The French land code had been translated and 
codified, and several amendments had been made. The rigidity and complexity 
of the land legislation had been seen as the one of the major obstacles in the 
way of the liberalisation and ƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ KƚƚŽŵĂŶ ĞĐŽŶŽŵǇ ? dŚĞ ĐŽƌǀĞĠ
had been abolished, the tax-ĨĂƌŵĞƌƐ ? ĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ ŚĂd been eliminated and the 
taking of fees and remunerations by state officials under different titles had 
been forbidden. In the capital cities of the sancaks
24
, upper councils, and in the 
counties, ůŽĐĂů ĐŽƵŶĐŝůƐ ŚĂĚ ďĞĞŶ ĨŽƌŵĞĚ  ?7ŶĂůĐŦŬ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ) ? &ŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ
suggestion of the edict, the Ottoman Bank was founded and owned by foreign 
interests in order to protect the value of the newly established paper currency 
which failed quickly (Karpat 1972: 258). After the Crimean War in 1856, a more 
liberal land code had been legislated in 1858; the inheritance rights and the 
private ownership of land had been extended although eventually the main 
beneficiaries of this new cŽĚĞ ďĞĐĂŵĞ ƚŚĞ ůĂŶĚŽǁŶĞƌƐ ƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ  ?7ŶĂůĐŦŬ
                                                          
24
 Ottoman administrative division.    
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1955: 227).  Aytekin (2009) argued that the 1856 Land Code was a product of 
the uneven development of the social relations of production in the Ottoman 
Empire and, therefore, an expression of the 19
th
 century developments in the 
Ottoman agriculture which brought the agricultural production more in line 
ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐƚƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?dŚĞŶĞǁůĂŶĚůĂǁ ?ƐƉƌŽŚŝďŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƌĞŐŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ
land to any collective body was directly connected with the process of 
constituting the individual as the sole subject of law which eliminated the non-
bourgeois and altruistic forms of property ownership (Aytekin 2009: 937).  
dŚĞ ‘decree of Islahat ? ?ƚŚĞĚĞĐƌĞĞŽĨZĞĨŽƌŵ )ǁĂƐĚĞĐůĂƌĞĚŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌŝŶŐ
the liberal legislation of the Tanzimat and proposed a financial reform 
programme which expected to complete the modernisation and liberalisation 
of the Ottoman economy through opening particular sectors like mining and 
agriculture to the Western investors and encouraging foreign direct 
ŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚƐ ?KƌƚĂǇůŦ2006: 114). Although the decree recognised the progress 
made by the Tanzimat reforms, it was stated that there was a need to take 
further steps. The Islahat decree particularly focused on the minority issues 
and explicitly stated the equality of all Ottoman citizens regardless of their 
ƌĞůŝŐŝŽŶ ?ƐĞĐƚ ?ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞĂŶĚŐĞŶĚĞƌ ?<ŝůŝĂŶĚ'ƂǌƺďƺǇƺŬ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?&ŝŶĚůĞǇ ? ? ? ? P
18). As a result of this, the decree eliminated all the limitations for the non-
Muslim population in acquiring governmental positions and conducting 
commercial activities while the compulsory military conscription also became 
compulsory for the non-DƵƐůŝŵĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ ?<ŝůŝĂŶĚ'ƂǌƺďƺǇƺŬ ? ? ? ? P ? ?-27).    
In that line, a modern Civil Code (Mecelle) was prepared in 1869 (though only 
ĨŝŶŝƐŚĞĚ ŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ) ǁŚŝĐŚ ǁŽƵůĚ ďĞ ĂŶ ĞƋƵŝǀĂůĞŶƚ ƚŽ ŽĚĞEĂƉŽůĞſŶ, covering 
the most areas of the civil law. This was replacing the French origin Penal Code 
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of 1858 which was a replacement for an initial Penal Code of 1840 (Findley 
2008: 20). Although the substance of the code was based on the Hanefist Islam 
tradition this type of Code was non-existent in Islam and, furthermore, it also 
incorporated the other legal opinions of the time and applied to all citizens of 
the Empire regardless of their religious and ethnic origin  ?bŝŵƔŝƌůŝŐŝůĂŶĚŬŝŶĐŝ
2008: 50- ? ? ?  ? ? ) ?dŚĞ  ‘ŽŵŵĞƌĐĞ>Ăǁ ?ǁĂƐĂůƐŽ ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚĞĚ ŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ?ďĂƐĞĚŽŶ
the 1807 French Code, regulating the relations between firms and companies 
and between their members. This was followed by the establishment of the 
DŝŶŝƐƚƌǇŽĨŽŵŵĞƌĐĞ ŝŶ  ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŽŵŵĞƌĐĞ^ƚĂƚƵƚĞ ? ŝŶ  ? ? ? ?  ?ƌŐƺĚĞƌ
2011: 98).   
The Ottoman Imperial Land Code of 1858 was the most radical step in terms of 
the relations of landholding by establishing individual ownership on land 
 ?7ƐůĂŵŽŒůƵ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ?-280; Aytekin 2009: 936). The obstacles to the free 
circulation of the land had been eliminated through the facilitation of the 
sales, mortgages and other commercial activities related to the land (Aytekin 
2009: 938). In 1861, the ŶĞǁ  ‘DŝŶŝŶŐ ŽĚĞ ?  ?Maadin Nizamnamesi) was 
accepted, liberating mine searching, allowing the landowners to freely 
establish and operate mines on their land, and enabling both individuals and 
companies to apply for mining licences (Karal 2004b: 247). The domestic 
customs for the agricultural products were abolished and with the 1867 
adjustment to the Land Code, foreigners were allowed to buy and sell land. 
Following these legal changes, numerous English and French companies 
established cotton and tobacco plantations and vineyards particularly in the 
/ǌŵŝƌĂŶĚĚĂŶĂƌĞŐŝŽŶƐ ?ĂƐŬŦĐŦ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?This increasing foreign investment 
in the agricultural production intensified the mechanisation of agriculture 
during the 1880s. As discussed in the previous chapter, foreign financial flow 
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created the conditions for an export-oriented agricultural production. 
Although the small peasantry was far from being able to buy and bear the 
costs of maintaining the modern machinery, the Ottoman government, from 
time to time, bought the necessary machinery and distributed it to the 
villages
25
 ĨŽƌ ĐŽŵŵƵŶĂů ƵƐĞ  ?ĂƐŬŦĐŦ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ) ? ƚ ƚŚĞ ƐĂŵĞ ƚŝŵĞ, the Land 
ŽĚĞƉƌŽƚĞĐƚĞĚƚŚĞƉĞĂƐĂŶƚƌǇďǇďĂŶŶŝŶŐƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĕŝĨƚůŝŬƐŽŶland used 
communally by the peasantry (Karal 2004: 225; Pamuk 2009: 66). 
Both the Civil Code of 1876 and the Land Code of 1858 manifested that the 
introduction and deepening of the capitalist social space in the periphery is an 
uneven and combined process, as it was defined by Luxemburg and Trotsky. As 
a result of the enlarged reproduction, the natural economy in the periphery 
transforms and simultaneously, the capitalist social relations dissolve the 
traditional social relations and gradually become dominant. However, at the 
same time, it does incorporate the local or customary practice for a period of 
time. This incorporation poses a peripheral contradiction which can finally be 
resolved through passive revolution with the further dialectical development 
of the capitalist peripheral spatiality.   
/ŶƚŚĂƚƐĞŶƐĞ ?ƚŚĞ  ‘ŶŐůŽ-TurkŝƐŚŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂůŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨ  ? ? ? ?ǁĂƐ ŝŶ ůŝŶĞ
with the Tanzimat liberalism and was a further step in the process of what 
>ƵǆĞŵďƵƌŐ ƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞĚ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĞŶůĂƌŐĞĚreƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ? ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐƚ ĐĞŶƚƌĞ
replacing the natural economy in the periphery. The convention permitted  the 
foreign merchants to engage directly with the internal market (Ahmad 1993: 
27). It gave an unprecedented advantage and superiority to Great Britain 
                                                          
25
 Following the increasing use of the machinery in the Ottoman agricultural production the 
Western agricultural machinery companies had started to open their branches in Ottoman 
Turkey particularly in the beginning of the 20
th
 ĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ ?ĂƐŬŦĐŦ ? ? ? ? P ? ?).  
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against domestic manufacturers and led to the collapse of the cloth 
manufacturing industry throughout the Empire. Similar agreements and 
concessions had been signed with other West European countries between 
1838 and 1841 which turned the Ottoman Empire into an exclusively raw 
material exporter country. The convention reduced the export taxes to 5 
percent for the English exports while there were still regional duties up to 8 
percent for the domestic producers (Karal 2004b: 215- ? ? ? ?ƺƌĐŚĞƌ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?
As a result of this, the volume of trade between Ottoman Turkey and Europe 
rose to 12.2 million in 1845 from 2.9 million in 1829, to 54 million in 1876 and 
69.1 million in 1911 (Karpat 1972: 246). While the Ottoman trade deficit was 8 
million sterling in favour of England in 1825, it gradually increased to 42 million 
sterling in 1835 and 44 millioŶ ƐƚĞƌůŝŶŐ ŝŶ  ? ? ? ?  ?KƌƚĂǇůŦ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ) ? dŚĞ
Commercial Convention of 1838 had secured the uneven trade relationship 
between England and Turkey which was already the case since the beginning 
of the 19
th
 century until being challenged by the German-Austrian economic 
forces.  
One of the outcomes of this constantly increasing trade rate was the regional 
differences. Some regions of the Ottoman Empire became economically more 
incorporated to global capitalism  Wparticularly in the Balkans, Western Anatolia 
and the eastern Mediterranean cities such as Aleppo and Beirut- than the 
other regions of the Empire and created the local bourgeois which was mainly 
composed of the non-Muslim citizens. This newly emerging class became the 
flag-bearers of nationalism and regime change in those regions (Karpat 1972: 
247). Thus, the regions which had not been open to the influence of the world 
economic system kept the pre-capitalist form of production and exchange 
while the cities in Western Anatolia and the Balkans transformed into the 
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centres of urban production (Pamuk 1984: 35). In the regions that were 
geographically closer to the European economic and military pressure, the 
classical guild system was dissolved, particularly in textiles, tawery, porcelain, 
paper and brick production in the 19
th
 ĐĞŶƚƵƌǇ ?KƌƚĂǇůŦ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ?DĞĂŶǁŚŝůĞ ?
even rather underdeveloped the Ottoman town was linked to the central 
bureaucratic system with the construction of the governorship buildings, 
schools, courts, modern police and mail-telegraph offices (Findley 2008: 24). In 
that sense, similar to Mexico, the liberal programme triumphed in Ottoman 
Turkey but eventually failed to further the economic and institutional 
development due to its precarious rule which was only stabilised during the 
reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid II.  
3.2. The uneven and combined development in Mexico and Turkey: the 
ƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞĂĞƐĂƌƐ'ĞŶĞƌĂůWŽƌĨŝƌŝŽşĂǌĂŶĚ^ƵůƚĂŶďĚƵů,ĂŵŝĚ// 
Even though the liberal programme was triumphed within these interrelated 
processes of enlarged reproduction in the centre and the introduction of the 
commodity economy and uneven and combined development of the capitalist 
forces in the periphery, political instability prevented a meaningful deepening 
in the uneven and combined development of the peripheral capitalist 
spatiality. In Mexico and Turkey, this stalemate was dialectically resolved 
during the oppressive regimes ŽĨWŽƌĨŝƌŝŽşĂǌĂŶĚ^ƵůƚĂŶďĚƵů,ĂŵŝĚ//, in a 
similar way to what was defined by Gramsci as progressive Caesarism. This 
section will examine these dialectical processes in which the formation of the 
peripheral capitalist space reached its highest stage. 
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3.2.1. Porfiriato: Uneven and combined development and building a 
centralised nation-state in Mexico 
dŚĞ ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ ŽĨ :ƵĄƌĞǌ  Wthe father of Mexican liberalism- was 
based on the modernisation of the Mexican society through the capitalist 
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ  ‘ǁŝƚŚ ŝƚƐ ƌĂŝůǁĂǇƐ ? ŵĂĐŚŝŶĞƐ ĂŶĚ ďĂŶŬƐ ?  ?ĂǌĂŶƚ  ? ? ?  P  ? ? ? ) ?
Porfiriato can be identified with this developmentalist ideology; a pyrrhic 
triumph for the 19
th
 century Mexican liberalism, which drove its legitimacy 
from the economic development and from the rapid progress in the 
administrative structure that achieved through the integration of the Mexican 
economy into the international markets (Knight 1985: 67). The legal and 
material conditions of the development of a peripheral capitalist industry had 
been created during the period of restored republic under the presidency of 
:ƵĄƌĞǌ but ƚŚĞ ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂů ĞǆƉĂŶƐŝŽŶ ƌĞŵĂŝŶĞĚ ůŝŵŝƚĞĚ  ?ƌŐƺĞůůŽ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ?
KƌƚĞŐĂ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ) ? dŚĞ  ‘ŽŶƐƚŝƚƵĞŶƚ ŽŶŐƌĞƐƐ ?, aspiring significantly from the 
bourgeois ideals of the French revolution, established the liberal principles 
within the 1857 Constitution which separated the state and church, restricted 
the ĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞ ?ƐĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇĂŶĚĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĚƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůĂƐƚŚĞĐŝƚŝǌĞŶǁŚŽŝƐ
a member of the Mexican nation, who possesses undeniable civil rights and 
who are equal in front of the rule of law (GonzĄůĞǌ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?-105; Covo 1988: 
 ? ? ? 'ƵƚŝĠƌƌĞǌ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ) ? dŚĞ ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ǁĂƐ ĨŽƌŵĞĚ ƚŽ ĞŶƐƵƌĞ ƚŚĞ
implementation of both politically and economically progressive measures 
which would make the elite able to realise the liberalisation of the economy. 
The 1857 constitution paved way to the division of communal lands, to the 
dismantling of non-productive properties, reform the tributary system through 
the abolition of alcabalas, and implementation of policies to decrease the 
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major grievances within the society  ?şĂǌ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ) ? However, the biggest 
advance in the formation of a bourgeois society materialised during the 
Porfiriato with an unprecedented industrial expansion and economic growth 
which doubled the national income by a 2.3 percent annual growth rate 
 ?ŽĂƚƐǁŽƌƚŚ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?'ŽŶǌĄůĞǌ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ? 
The uneven and combined development of the Mexican industry and capitalist 
economy was based on this liberal programme which drew support from the 
Mexican bourgeois comprised of textile manufacturers, agiotistas and the 
foreign entrepreneurs as well as from the popular middle classes like 
rancheros, local merchants and low-level government employees (Katz 1991: 
52). The implementation of the liberal programme and reforms depended on 
the political stability which had finally materialised with the pacification period 
ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĚŝĐƚĂƚŽƌƐŚŝƉ ŽĨ 'ĞŶĞƌĂů WŽƌĨŝƌŝŽ şĂǌ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ  ? ? ? ? ĂŶĚ  ? ? ? ?
 ?'ŽŶǌĄůĞǌ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?-  ?'ŽŶǌĄůĞǌ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ? 
dŚĞ  ‘ƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞ ĂĞƐĂƌŝƐŵ ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ 'ĞŶĞƌĂů WŽƌĨŝƌŝŽ şĂǌ  ? ? ? ? ?-1910) was an 
era of consolidation of the capitalist social relations both in terms of economic 
growth and the concretisation of the capitalist social relations within the legal 
establishment. Although Porfirio suspended the constitution, important 
administrative regulations were ĐƌĞĂƚĞĚƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ŽĚĞŽĨWĞŶĂůWƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐ ?
 ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ‘ŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂůŽĚĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ‘DŝŶŝŶŐŽĚĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ‘ŽĚĞŽĨŽůŽŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ
ĂŶĚsĂĐĂŶƚ >ĂŶĚ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ) ?  ‘DŝůŝƚĂƌǇŽĚĞ ?  ? ? ? ? ? )and   ‘^ƚĂŵƉZĞǀĞŶƵĞ ?  ? ? ? ? ? )
alongside the other legal institutions (Villegas  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ) ? dŚĞ  ‘ŝǀŝů ŽĚĞ ? ŽĨ
 ? ? ? ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ǁĂƐ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĚ ďǇ ŽĚĞ EĂƉŽůĞſŶ ĂŶĚ ƐĞĐƵƌĞĚ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ
property and individual rights was consolidated with the legislation of the new 
 ‘ŝǀŝů ŽĚĞ ? ŝŶ  ? ? ? ?  ?WƌĂƚŝ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ) ?The Porfirian strategy  Wwhich was 
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pracƚŝĐĂůůǇ ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚ ŝŶƚĂĐƚ ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ 'ŽŶǌĄůĞǌ ŝŶƚĞƌƌĞŐŶƵŵ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ  ? ? ? ?
and 1884- is significant in demonstrating the essential role of foreign capital 
investment in terms of the production of the modern capitalist space in the 
periphery. Three important principles can be located in this strategy. Firstly, 
generous concessions were given to the foreigners to maintain the foreign 
investment which was the primary driving force of the economic growth. 
Secondly, the Porfirian administration made an enormous effort to end 
DĞǆŝĐŽ ?Ɛ ŝƐŽůĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƌĞ-establishing the relations with the European 
countries in order to end the monogamous relationship between Mexico and 
U.S and, thus, balance the heavy presence of the United States in the Mexican 
ĞĐŽŶŽŵǇ  ?'ŽŶǌĄůĞǌ  ? ? ?4: 939). In order to achieve that, the Porfirian 
administration re-established diplomatic relations and signed commercial 
agreements with Germany, Portugal and Britain, followed by France in 1880, 
ĂĨƚĞƌ ďĞŝŶŐ ĐƵƚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ :ƷĂƌĞǌ ĂŶĚ dĞũĞĚĂ ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ Ɛŝnce 1867 (Riguzzi 
1988: 139). Thirdly, the political stability  WPax-Porfiriana- had to be maintained 
at any price (Katz 1991: 70). To ensure this political stability, Don Porfirio used 
different tendencies and took advantage of divisions between cliques and 
factions, and did not show any mercy to any kind of insurgency (Meyer 2010: 
 ? ? ) ?şĂǌƐŝůĞŶĐĞĚƚŚĞůŽŶŐƌƵŶŶŝŶŐĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞĐŚƵƌĐŚĂŶĚƐƚĂƚĞĂŶĚ
between the liberals and conservatives which had been hindering the 
economic development since Independence (Knight 1985: 61).         
As it has been observed in the previous chapter (chapter two), the foreign 
capital either in the form of international loans and financial speculation or in 
the form of direct investment in the infrastructure or manufacture is 
paramount in the exogenous processes of the peripheral capitalist space 
formation. And during the Porfiriato, the generous concessions given by the 
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Porfirian administration to the foreign entrepreneurs were the indispensible 
source of the development of the capitalist productive forces in Mexico. In 
1910, the total foreign investment was reaching to 1.200 million dollars, of 
which 750 million dollars was invested in mines and petrol, 200 million in 
railroads, 150 million in electricity production and 100 million in agriculture 
and livestock (Ortega 2011: 28). The foreign financial capital became very 
dominant during the Porfiriato. After the foundation of the  ‘ĂŶĐŽ EĂĐŝŽŶĂů
DĞǆŝĐĂŶŽ ? (Mexican National Bank) through a joint venture of French and 
Mexican capital
26
, it received the concession of minting the silver money and 
became the unique bank of emission (Ludlow 1990: 985). The bank received 
significant attention from the international capital in its establishment, 
including the directors of the  ‘ĂŶƋƵĞ ĚĞ WĂƌŝƐ Ğƚ WĂǇƐ ĂǇƐ ? and  ‘ŽŵƉƚŽŝƌ
Ě ?ƐĐŽŵƉƚĞ ? ?who invested in the initial capital with the Ottoman securities 
(Ludlow 1990: 985). dŚĞ ‘ĂƌĐĞůŽŶĞƚƚĞ ?ŐƌŽƵƉǁŚŽĐĂŵĞƚŽDĞǆŝĐŽŝŶƚŚĞ ? ?th 
century from the Barcelonette province of France was particularly active in the 
creation of the financial sources. In 1900, Banque de Paris et Pays Bays and a 
consortium of Swiss Banks established the  ‘^ŽĐŝĞƚĠ&ŝŶĂŶĐŝĞƌĞƉŽƵƌ ů ?/ŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĞ
                                                          
26
 At this point, it is important to rĞĐĂůůƵŬŚĂƌŝŶ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? )ǁŽƌŬŽŶƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ
concentration of the finance capital in the hands of trusts which then had to be invested in 
ƚŚĞ  ‘ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĞƐ ?ĂƐƚŚĞŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƌ ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐŽĨ
concentration and centralisation of the capital on a world scale in the 19
th
 century. He noticed 
the role of Banque de Paris et Pays Bays within the multinational finance trust which invested 
in enterprises in the periphery, both in South America and in Ottoman Turkey. It was the 
ƐĂŵĞĂŶƋƵĞĚĞWĂƌŝƐǁŚŽǁĂƐƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŽŶƐŽƌƚŝƵŵŽŶƐƚĂŶƚŝŶŽƉĞů ?ƚŚĂƚĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ
in Brussels for the purpose of financing the enterprises in Istanbul with the participation of 
German, French and Swiss capital (Bukharin 1976: 59). The foundation of the Banco Nacional 
DĞǆŝĐĂŶŽǁĂƐŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůŝƐĞĚĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚWƌŝŵĞDŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ :ƵůĞƐ&ĞƌƌǇ ?ƐĞĨĨŽƌƚƐ ƚŽĞǆƉĂŶĚ
ƚŚĞ&ƌĞŶĐŚĐĂƉŝƚĂů ?s role in the world market which was successfully invested in the railway 
and banking operations in Italy and Turkey (Ludlow 1990: 983). Even though the majority of 
the capital invested in the establishment of the Banco Nacional Mexicano was owned by 
French investors, the representatives of other strong international banking institutions such 
ĂƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĂŶƋƵĞ &ƌĂŶĕĂŝƐĞ ĚĞ ŽŵŵĞƌĐĞ Ğƚ /ŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĞ ? ?  ‘&ƌĂŶĐŽ-ŐǇƉƚŝĞŶŶĞ ? ?  ‘,ĠůůĞŶŝƋƵĞ ĚĞ
ƌĠĚŝƚ 'ĞŶĞƌĂů ? ?  ‘^ŽĐŝĠƚĠ 'ĠŶĠƌĂůĞ ĚĞ ƌĠĚŝƚ /ŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĞůůĞ Ğƚ ŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂůĞ ?and prominent 
ŵƵůƚŝŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ‘ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůŚŽƵƐĞƐ ?ǁŚŽĚŝĚĨŝŶĂŶĐĞĚƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞWĂŶĂŵĂĂŶĂů were 
also among the investors (Ludlow 1990: 986-987).         
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ĚƵ DĞǆŝƋƵĞ ? in collaboration with the Barcelonette group which invested in 
ŵĂŶǇŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůĞŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ ‘ĞƌǀĞĐĞƌşĂDŽĐƚĞǌƵŵĂ ? (brewery) and  ‘la 
ŽŵƉĂŹĂ WĂƉĞůĞƌĂ ^ĂŶ ZĂĨĞů ? (paper) and many textile companies (Hamilton 
1998: 56). Following the establishment of the Nacional Mexicano, a 
 ‘ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůǇŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůďĂŶŬ ?,  ‘Banco DĞƌĐĂŶƚŝůDĞǆŝĐĂŶŽ ?, (Mexican Commercial 
Bank) was established which eventually fused with the former (Ludlow 1990: 
1007).    
With the aid and stimulation of foreign capital investment, it is possible to say, 
the exogenous uneven and combined development of the capitalist economy 
during the Porfiriato can be observed with the unprecedented growth in four 
main interrelated sectors; railway construction, raw material extraction, 
export-oriented agricultural production and the manufacture of consumer 
goods as it was outlined in the conceptualisation of the formation of peripheral 
capitalist space.   
As both Luxemburg and Trotsky put an emphasis on the railways in a backward 
economy, the construction of railways had significant impact on the capitalist 
development of Mexico, both in terms of unit savings in transport costs and 
the quantity of passengers and freight that could be carried (Coatsworth 1979: 
943, 947). Gilly (2007) stated that the vertiginous development of the railways 
in Mexico during the last quarter of the 19
th
 century was the most salient 
aspect of the capitalist expansion in the periphery (Gilly 2007: 30-31). In 1877, 
Mexico had 640km of railway track, of which 114km employed mules rather 
than steam engines. The boom started after 1880 although the first concession 
for the railway construction was issued in 1837 due to the political instability 
(Coatshworth 1979: 940). By 1910, at the end of the Porfiriato, the total length 
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of the railway tracks comprised 19.204km (Coatsworth 1981: 37). The Mexican 
railways had created an increase in demand but this demand was directly 
derived from the expansion of the world market towards Mexico. Thus, the 
construction of the railways in Mexico should be seen as the product of the 
industrial development rather than its initiator (Coatsworth 1981: 77-78). The 
railway development induced a massive foreign investment in the production 
of export goods which made possible the rapid economic growth during the 
Porfiriato. Between 1877 and 1910, the exports of Mexico increased nine-fold 
(Knight 1985: 68). Export-oriented production was encouraged, and even less 
freight fares were charged by the rail companies if the goods were designated 
for exportation (Coatsworth 1979: 959; Coatsworth 1981: 124). Briefly, the 
impact of railway construction funded by foreign capital on the development 
of capitalist forces was enormous, stimulating other sectors, primarily mining 
and agriculture (Coatsworth 1979: 940). With the railways, developed urban 
areas  W particularly Mexico City- emerged and expanded where the 
metropolitan areas linked with the other districts through railways and 
electrified trams (Garza 2006: 112). 
While the construction of railways during the Porfiriato had a significant 
impact on the export boom by connecting MĞǆŝĐŽ ?Ɛ ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝǀĞ ƌĞŐŝŽŶƐ ǁŝƚŚ
the world market, the impact was not exclusively on this aspect; it also had a 
very crucial function in the formation and consolidation of the internal 
productive and commercial activities by integrating certain regions in the 
country more strongly into a unified market (Ficker 1995: 40, 64). Although, 
principally the railway freight was dominated by the transportation of raw 
materials for export, with the further development of the capitalist social 
forces it has been observed that the goods for domestic consumption  Wsuch as 
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food products and construction material- did gradually become an important 
part of the total shipments (Ficker 1995: 49). Ludlow also argued that the 
construction of the railways increased the confidence of the foreign investors 
 ?ƉƌŝŵĂƌŝůǇ EŽƌƚŚ ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ) ŝŶ ƚŚĞ DĞǆŝĐĂŶ ĞĐŽŶŽŵǇ ůĞĂĚŝŶŐ ƚŽ  ‘Ă ĞƵƉŚŽƌŝĐ
ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚƚŽŵĂŬĞďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ? ?>ƵĚůŽǁ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ? 
Besides railway construction, oil production, refinery industry, textile and 
other small industries had became the other main sectors which received the 
massive surge of foreign investment. Until the end of the century, the majority 
of the factories were producing consumer goods for the domestic market; 
liquor, beer, food products, soap, oil, matches and textileƐ ?ĄƌďŽĂŶĚ^ĄŶĐŚĞǌ
1983: 218). These sectors were mainly located in Mexico, Puebla, Guanajuato, 
Jalisco and Veracruz and mining was located in the Northern Mexico where the 
number of industrial proletariat reached to 800.000 workers in the beginning 
of the 20
th
 century (Katz 1991: 105). While the number of people working in 
textile was 8.000 in 1877, in 1910 there were 150 factories with 82.000 
workers (Ortega 2010: 42).   
Among the proletariat, the highest income was in the mining sector which was 
reaching approximately to 100.000 men at the end of the Porfiriato. The main 
reason for that was the considerable concessions given to the mining 
ĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞǀĞƌǇůŽǁƚĂǆƌĂƚĞƐ ?dŚĞ ‘ ? ? ? ?DŝŶŝŶŐŽĚĞ ?ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚƚŚĞ
maximum tax rate as 2 percent while the State was renouncing its rights on the 
mines ĂĨƚĞƌƐĞůůŝŶŐƚŚĞ ůĂŶĚǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞŵŝŶĞǁĂƐ ůŽĐĂƚĞĚ  ?ĄƌďŽĂŶĚ^ĄŶĐŚĞǌ
1983: 223). Within the total foreign investment in this sector, the United States 
was dominant with 61.7 percent of the investments followed by French and 
English capital with 21.8 and 14 percent respectively while 77 percent of the 
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exports were destined for the U.S. in ƚŚĞ ƐĂŵĞ ƉĞƌŝŽĚ  ?ĄƌďŽ ĂŶĚ ^ĄŶĐŚĞǌ
1983: 224). 
As it has been mentioned before, the 19
th
 century was the golden age for the 
haciendas and the Porfiriato was the climax of this golden age. However, the 
traditional paternalistic hacienda ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞŚĂĐĞŶĚĂĚŽĨŽƌŵƐĂ ‘ĨŝĐƚŝǀĞŬŝŶƐŚŝƉ ?
(compadrazgo) with peasant families (Knight 2002b: 97) was replaced by the 
modern hacienda (Meyer 1986: 484). Starting in the early 18
th
 century, the 
increase in the international demand on the agricultural products had a 
significant impact on the cultivation of tropical goods such as sugar and 
henequen which led haciendas especially in the costal tierra caliente -in 
Guerrero, at the Pacific coast of Jalisco and Colima, tropical Veracruz and in the 
south of Mexico, ƐƵĐŚĂƐzƵĐĂƚĄŶ- to extend their lands in order to increase the 
ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ  ?ĄƌďŽ ĂŶĚ ^ĄŶĐŚĞǌ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ) ?Combination of high demand, 
increasing population, rising land values and falling real wages increased the 
incentives to invest in profitable agricultural production and the capital from 
mining and commerce flowed to haciendas. This led to the expansion of the 
hacienda, not only in terms of cultivated land, but also in rights to wood, water 
and pasture as well (Knight 2002b: 222). The sharp increase in the demand of 
agro-products can be explained first by the increase in the population during 
the Porfiriato, and secondly, by the development of railways which had 
connected the international markets with the plantation regions located in 
distant geographies. In central Mexico, mainly maize, wheat, pulque and sugar 
cane production had increased significantly. The construction of the railway 
between the American South West region and Mexico was completed in 1884 
and increased the demand for cattle and industrial metals in the Northern 
Mexico (Katz 1974: 32). The economic boom in the South of Mexico was 
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almost completely dependent on the exports of agro-ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚƐ ? /Ŷ zƵĐĂƚĄŶ, 
production of henequen and sisal, in Tabasco and Chiapas rubber and coffee 
underwent an unprecedented expansion. However, production in those 
plantations was completely dependent upon world market conditions (Katz 
1991: 80). Thus, it can be said that the agricultural production was significantly 
transformed though integrating with the world markets, becoming one of the 
significant financing sources of the peripheral capitalist development.       
The extension of the hacienda accelerated the process of the dispossession of 
the indigenous villagers from their lands and dissolution of the communal 
lands in the benefit of private ownership. During the Porfiriato, the assault on 
the communal land reached its peak since the colonisation of Mexico by 
^ƉĂŶŝĂƌĚƐ  ?ŽĂƚƐǁŽƌƚŚ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? <Ăƚǌ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ) ? şĂǌ ƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞĚ ƚŚĞ ůŽĐĂů
governors to implement the regulations -which were legislated during the 
liberal Reform- to divide the communal lands between the individual owners 
 ?:ŝŵĠŶĞǌ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ?1). The usurpation of free village lands created a workless 
labour force which was ready to migrate to cities or to work in the other 
haciendas who dearly needed workforce, such as the cotton plantations in the 
Laguna region of Northern Mexico as they were facing fierce competition from 
the mines and other industries which were also demanding labour (Coatsworth 
1981: 179).    
It can be claimed that the economic boom during the Porfiriato created the 
conditions for the emergence of the effective and powerful Mexican state and 
ŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ſƌĚŽǀĂ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?Public spending in the metropolitan cities in health-
care, sewage and water infrastructures and the number of positions in the 
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state bureaucracy had substantially increased (Garza 2006: 113). Rurales
27
 as 
the local police force had become an important mechanism for the 
maintenance of order and the authority of the central government in the 
country (Katz 1991: 85). Before şĂǌ ?ƚŚĞůŝďĞƌĂůƐŽĨƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌŵĚŝĚĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽ
eliminate one of the most profound threats to the public order  Wthe 
widespread insecurity of human life and private property- by establishing a 
police force which consisted of 800 men in 1861. Gradually, this police force 
was expanded to 3000 men and became an integral part of the government 
which widened the central authority to the rural areas (Vanderwood 1972: 39). 
/Ŷ ƚŚĞ ĂƌĞĂ ŽĨ ĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?  ‘ĞƐĐƵĞůĂƐ ŶŽƌŵĂůĞƐ ?for the professional training of 
the primary school teachers were founded while the free and secular primary 
ĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶďĞĐĂŵĞŽďůŝŐĂƚŽƌǇĨŽƌĂůů&ĞĚĞƌĂůŝƐƚƌŝĐƚƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚƐŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?:ŝŵĠŶĞǌ
1973: 525). The influence of the central government on the education system 
ŚĂĚďĞĞŶƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĞŶĞĚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞĨĞĚĞƌĂůŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ ?:ŝŵĠŶĞǌ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ? 
However, this centralised and strengthening nation-ƐƚĂƚĞ ?Ɛ ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ
development was dependent on the foreign capital in an unprecedented level. 
Firstly, almost all non-agricultural sectors of the Mexican economy, such as 
banking, mining, textile and other industrial production and transportation
28
 
was in the hands of foreigners and therefore the development of the capitalist 
forces was an exogenous process. This characteristic of the formation of the 
peripheral capitalist space was conditioning another characteristic as it has 
been agued in the previous chapter; secondly, the economy was mainly 
                                                          
27
  ‘>ĂƉŽůŝĐşĂŵŽŶƚĂĚĂZƵƌĂůĚĞDĠǆŝĐŽ ? ?ƚŚĞƌƵƌĂůŵŽƵŶƚĞĚƉŽůŝĐĞŽĨDĞǆŝĐŽ ) ? 
28
 Although the railways had gradually nationalised after 1900, the major beneficiaries of the 
 ‘DĞǆŝĐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƌĂŝůǁĂǇƐ ďǇ ƚŚĞ EĂƚŝŽŶĂů ZĂŝůǁĂǇƐ ǁĞƌ ƚŚĞ ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶĞƌƐ ǁŚŽ ŽǁŶĞĚ
railway bonds that now been secured by the government. Furthermore, the low freight tariff 
for the exported goods had been maintained thus, the expropriation of the railways did not 
have a negative impact on the foreign investments (Coatsworth 1981: 175).  
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oriented towards the production of raw materials to satisfy the needs of North 
American industrial markets (Katz 1991: 81). It is possible to argue that the 
Porfiriato was an ĞƌĂŽĨ ‘ƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞĂĞƐĂƌŝƐŵ ?ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚthe Mexican economy 
more strongly integrated into the world markets, positioned in the periphery 
within the international division of labour and furthered the development of 
the capitalist forces of production which transformed Mexico from the pre-
capitalist backwardness to a modern underdeveloped capitalist nation-state.   
3.2.2. Sultan Abdul Hamid II: uneven and combined development of the 
peripheral economy and the Ottoman foundations of the modern Turkey  
Karpat (1968) points out that the Tanzimat reform attempts of the 
bureaucratic elite in order to reorganise the state were actually evidence of 
the modernisation of Ottoman Turkey since those attempts were not the 
initiators of a certain social transformation but the result of it. As it was 
highlighted above, the disintegration of the traditional state land system after 
the middle of the 16
th
 century which was caused by the growing uneven 
commercial exchange with Europe brought decentralisation of the Empire 
when the capitalist development necessitated a strong central government 
and a modern administrative system. This led the Tanzimat liberalism that 
culminated in the Constitution of 1876 (Karpat 1968: 71). The Ottoman 
ƌĞĨŽƌŵĞƌƐůĞĚďǇDŝĚŚĂƚWĂƐĂĚĞƉŽƐĞĚƚŚĞ^ƵůƚĂŶďĚƵůǌŝǌŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?ǁŚŽǁĂƐ 
a pro-reform sultan but resistant to the declaration of the constitution and 
installed Sultan Murad V, who was also deposed in the same year to install 
Sultan Abdul Hamid II who had promised to promulgate the constitution. The 
First Constitution, declared in December 1876 was based on the Belgian 
constitution of 1830 but included authoritarian traits which were modelled on 
the Prussian constitƵƚŝŽŶŽĨ ? ? ? ? ?ƺƌĐŚĞƌ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?
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In the official modern Turkish historiography, while the Tanzimat (1839-76), 
the Young Ottoman constitutionalist movement (1876-78) and the Young Turk 
(1908-18) movements had been praised as modernist and progressive, the 
reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1876-1908) was defined as despotic and 
regressive. However, it was actually in this period when the Tanzimat attempts 
at the reorganisation of the empire as a centralised state could finally reach its 
fulfilment. Thus, ^ƵůƚĂŶ ďĚƵů ,ĂŵŝĚ // ?Ɛ ƌĞŝŐŶ ŶĞĞĚƐ ƚŽ ďĞĞŶ ƐĞĞŶ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ
equivalent of the Porfiriato in Mexico, an era of progressive Caesarism which 
was the natural product of the Tanzimat reforms that aimed to centralise the 
state and foreign dependent uneven and combined development of the 
capitalist forces through the establishment of political stability.  
Unable to pay its debts in 1875, the Empire was financially bankrupt when 
Abdul Hamid II ascended to power in 1876, and, a year later, Russia declared 
war against the Ottoman Empire which ended with the Russian victory in 1878. 
During the war with Russia, Abdul Hamid II indefinitely dismissed the 
parliament after its members accused him of mismanagement of the war 
(Fortna 2008: 47). By dismissing the parliament and signing the peace treaty 
with Russia, Abdul Hamid II turned his attention to the reorganisation and 
ĐĞŶƚƌĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŵƉŝƌĞ ?>ŝŬĞWŽƌĨŝƌŝŽşĂǌ ?ďĚƵů,ĂŵŝĚ//ŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶĞĚƚŚĞ
political stability at any price and, therefore, the parliament and the free press 
needed to be suppressed.  
The most urgent problem in front of the Empire was the debt payments. 
Starting from the Crimean War, the Ottoman government appealed to the 
foreign loans in order to materialise the reforms in the economy, the 
reorganisation of the administration and the modernisation of the army and 
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the education system. However, while the total amount of the foreign loan 
between 1854 and 1874 commissioned was 5.3 million francs, the actual 
amount that entered to the treasury was 2.3 million francs since the average 
interest rate for Ottoman Turkey was between 15 and  ? ? ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚ  ?ƌŐƺĚĞƌ
2011: 109). Foreign loans were expanded with the rapid expansion in the 
foreign trade and were facilitated by the establishment of the Imperial 
Ottoman Bank in 1863 which created an additional channel of integration into 
the European financial markets (Eldem 2005: 437). While in the period 
between 1854 and 1865, the Ottoman government took 40.470.000 lira loan, 
in the period between 1865 and 1874 the foreign loan of Ottoman Turkey 
ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚ ƚŽ  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ůŝƌĂƐ  ?zŦůĚŦƌŦŵ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ) ? ǀĞŶƚƵĂůůǇ ŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ? the 
Ottoman treasury was forced to declare that it could not pay more than half of 
the foreign loans which led to the establishment ŽĨƚŚĞ ‘KƚƚŽŵĂŶWƵďůŝĐĞďƚ
AdmŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĞĐƌĞĞ ŽĨ DŽƵŚĂƌƌĞŵ ? ŝŶ  ? ? ? ?handing the 
administration of the Ottoman loans to the foreign lenders (Landen 2006: 585; 
ƌŐƺŶ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ?
While the modern Turkish historiography marks the establishment of this 
institution as one of the most tragic events in the Ottoman history, the 
foundation of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration played a significant role 
in the modernisation of the Ottoman financial system and in the increasing 
state revenues. The foreign-dominated administration employed thousands
29
 
of locals and trained them in line with the modern financial regulations. 
Furthermore, due to the successful conduct of the Administration, European 
capital found it easy, secure and very profitable to invest in the construction of 
                                                          
29
 The staff of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration was reaching to 5.633 people in 1906 
(Landen 2006: 593).   
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railways, public utility companies and banks in Ottoman Turkey (Landen 2006: 
585-586). When the administration unified all the foreign debt of the Ottoman 
government the remaining debt decreased from 239.5 million liras to 125.5 
million liras and the annual interest rate fell from 3.9 percent to 1.4 percent 
ŵĂŬŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŶĞǁ ůŽĂŶƐ ůĞƐƐ ďƵƌĚĞŶŝŶŐ  ?zŦůĚŦƌŦŵ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? )  &ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ, the 
Administration encouraged and financed the modernisation of the textile 
production in some regions, introduced steam-powered mills and organised 
large-ƐĐĂůĞƌĞĞůŝŶŐĨĂĐƚŽƌŝĞƐŝŶƵƌƐĂ ?7ƐůĂŵŽŒůƵ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?
In that sense, especially after 1881, it can be claimed that all the sectors in the 
Ottoman economy were significantly integrated into the European capitalism 
 ?ƌŐƺŶ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ) ?Similar to the formation of the capitalist space and its 
positioning in the periphery of the international division of labour in Mexico, 
alongside the state loans, another important foreign source of the uneven and 
combined development of the capitalist forces that had reached to its golden 
age during the Hamidian era was the construction of railways. The share of the 
railroads in the total foreign investment (excluding the foreign debt) was 
increased from 41.1 percent in 1890 to 63.1 in 1914 (Pamuk 1982: 143).  
The first railway constructions in the Ottoman Turkey were dominated by 
French and British companies aiming to connect the main ports with the 
hinterland of the country where the agricultural products had been produced. 
The first railroad construction concession was given to a British company in 
1856, for a track to be constructed between Izmir and Aydin which was 
completed in 1866. In the same year, another line was completed between 
Izmir and Kasaba, again with the British capital (Ozturk 2009: 53-54). This line 
was later purchased by the Ottoman government in 1890 under the Anatolian 
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ZĂŝůǁĂǇ ŽŵƉĂŶǇ ? dŚĞ ůŝŶĞ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ /ǌŵŝƚ ĂŶĚ ,ĂǇĚĂƌƉĂƔĂ  ?ůŽĐĂƚĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ
Asian side of Istanbul) was opened in 1873 as the Bursa-Mudanya line. In the 
1880s and 1890s, these first few hundred miles railway tracks which 
connecting the fertile inlands with the ports were increased to thousands of 
miles. The French and British companies constructed the railways connecting 
the inlands with the Syrian and Palestinian coasts after 1888, Macedonia 
ĐŽŶŶĞĐƚĞĚǁŝƚŚ /ƐƚĂŶďƵů ?ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ,ĂǇĚĂƌƉĂƔĂ-Izmit line reached to Ankara in 
1892, to KoŶǇĂ ŝŶ  ? ? ? ?  ?ƺƌĐŚĞƌ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ) ?This line of the Anatolian railway 
expanded to Baghdad and Basra with the construction of the Baghdad Railway 
by German capital when Deutsche Bank gained the concession in 1903 (Pzen 
2008: 83). In 1911, Ottoman railways were transporting 16 million passengers 
and 2.6 million tonnes of freight on 6.485km tracks employing 13.000 persons 
(Quataert 2005: 123-125). In total, the total railroad tracks that had been 
constructed under the Ottoman Turkey reached to 8.619km in 1922 (Onur 
1953: 122).   
The rapid development of the modern transportation in the Hamidian era was 
not limited with the railway construction. The sea transportation significantly 
transformed both in quantitative and qualitative terms by the increase in the 
numbers of the steamed vessels. During the 1860s, the numbers of the 
steamed vessels visited the port of Istanbul was outnumbered four times by 
the sailing vessels while by 1900, 95 percent of the vessels visiting the port of 
Istanbul were powered by steam engines. At the same time, this five percent 
of sailing vessels were representing more sailing vessels than in any preceding 
year which shows the unprecedented expansion in the volume of shipping 
(Quataert 2005: 120). It is important to note that similar to the railway 
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companies, 90 percent of the total tonnage was owned by the foreign 
ƐƚĞĂŵƐŚŝƉĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞƐ ?ƺƌĐŚĞƌ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?
The increasing connectivity and the reduction in the transportation costs had a 
great impact on the agricultural production for the international markets 
 ?ƌŐƺŶ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ?By linking the inner parts of the country to the coast, many 
cultivators moved to produce export-oriented agricultural goods (Quataert 
1977: 158). When the railways were built in such areas, market agriculture 
rapidly developed, producing in unprecedented quantities because the 
products -mainly cereals- could be sold at competitive prices (Quataert 2005: 
122). The agricultural revolution imagined by the Tanzimat reformers which 
expected to finance the industrial development was partially accomplished in 
this period. Furthermore, with the supportive policies sought by the 
government in the agricultural sector the volume of agricultural production 
increased significantly. By 1900, tens of thousands of iron ploughs, reapers and 
combines were in use throughout the country (Quataert 2005: 134). Thus, 
between 1888 and 1911, the cereal production increased by 51 percent, 
tobacco production increased by 191, fig production increased by 122, 
hazelnut production increased by 217, floss production increased by 122, and 
the cotton production have increased by 472 percent. It is important to note 
that this increase in the agricultural production was oriented by importation to 
the international markets. The share of the agricultural products in the total 
exports of Ottoman Turkey increased from 18 percent in 1889 to 22 percent in 
1907 and reached to  ? ?ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?zŦůĚŦƌŦŵ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ? 
There was also limited but growing development in the manufacturing 
industries for the domestic consumption. Although during the 1830s and 
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1840s, the Ottoman government did already start to import significant 
amounts of machinery to establish factories mainly in Istanbul, Izmir and 
Adana in order to meet the needs of the Ottoman army, the significant 
increase in the volume of manufactured goods was achieved during the 1880s. 
During the years between 1888 and 1896, the foreign direct investment 
increased unprecedentedly, one-third of it was in the manufacturing sector. 
The main production areas included woollen and silk cloths, garment, yarn, 
food, oil, cement, brick and other construction materials (Pamuk 2005: 225). 
The electricity production, breweries, and carpet production were among the 
ŽƚŚĞƌŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĞƐƚŚĂƚǁĞƌĞĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ ?ƺƌĐŚĞƌ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) 
During the reign of Abdul Hamid II, importance was also given to the education 
and the administration was keen on the implementation of the French inspired 
 ‘WƵďůŝĐ ĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶ ZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶ ? ŽĨ  ? ? ? ? ďǇ ďƵŝůĚŝŶŐ ĂŶ ŝŵƉĞƌŝĂů ŝŶĨƌĂƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ
(Fortna 2008: 51). The number of secular elementary and lower secondary 
schools and students doubled throughout the Empire in this period and, the 
schools of Finance, Law, Fine Arts, Languages, Commerce and Engineering 
were opened in Istanbul between 1879 and 1884. Moreover, some reforms 
involved direct implementation of the European systems to ensure the 
harmony to facilitate the trade relations. For instance the decimal system of 
ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞŵĞŶƚ ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞĚ ŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŚĂŵďĞƌ ŽĨ ŽŵŵĞƌĐ  ? ǁĂƐ
established in Istanbul in 1882 to give necessary help and education to the 
Ottoman trade and businessmen (Kuran 1970: 129).  
To sum up, the Hamidian Ottoman Turkey in 1908 represented a modern 
underdeveloped capitalist space where the conditions of the centralised 
nation-state were materialised, but yet to be institutionalised and the 
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contradictions that were created by this uneven and combined development 
would be resolved by a social explosion  Wby the passive revolution of the 
Young Turks. Understanding this dialectical process of the formation of the 
peripheral capitalist space unravels the spatiotemporally specific conditions 
that underpin the peripheral capitalist spatiality in Mexico and Turkey as it was 
conceptualised previously.  
3.3. Passive revolutions of Mexico and Turkey: The consolidation of the 
modern peripheral capitalist space 
It would be useful to briefly recall here the key features of the concept of 
passive revolution which were outlined in the previous chapter (chapter two) 
and linked with the other spatiotemporally specific concepts of Luxemburg and 
Trotsky. These three concepts were linked to each other in order to explain the 
peripheral capitalist state formations in Poland and Russia as a result of the 
uneven development of the capitalist productive forces. Passive revolution is a 
dialectical process that combines the progressive and reactionary elements in 
the society ĂŶĚ ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐ Ă  ‘ƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ-ƌĞƐƚŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? Žƌ  ‘ƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ
ƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ?where the ĞŵĞƌŐĞŶƚďŽƵƌŐĞŽŝƐĐŽƵůĚĂĐƚĂŶĚĚŝƐƐŽůǀĞƚŚĞ ‘ďůŽĐŬĞĚ
ĚŝĂůĞĐƚŝĐ ?ďǇŵŽďŝůŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĞƐƵďĂůƚĞƌŶĐůĂƐƐĞƐ rather than being able to build an 
organic hegemony (Buci-Gluckmann 1980: 315; Morton 2007: 66 Morton 2010: 
319). 
It is important to underline two key principles that had been presented as 
fundamental by Gramsci in which the concept of passive revolution was 
derived. Firstly, Gramsci argued that a social formation would not disappear if 
it did not exhaust the conditions of furthering the productive forces. And, 
secondly, a new social formation does not appear sporadically, but it arises 
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from the same historical conditions of the social formations which it arises to 
eliminate (Gramsci 2007: 106). These two principles in which Gramsci derived 
the spatiotemporally specific concept of passive revolution, are in fact, general 
ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞƐ ŽĨ ƐŽĐŝĂů ĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ƚĂŬĞŶ ĨƌŽŵ DĂƌǆ ?Ɛ ‘Preface to The Critique of 
Political Economy ? where Marx stated: 
 ‘ƚ Ă ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶ ůĞǀĞů ŽĨ ƚŚĞŝƌ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ƚŚĞ ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂů ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝǀĞ
forces of society come into contradiction with the already existing 
relations of production, or in what is merely a legal expression for this, 
ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƉƌŽƉĞƌƚǇƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞǇŚĂĚƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇ ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶĞĚ ?dŚĞŶ
an epoch of social revolution commences.  
 ?ƐŽĐŝĂůĨormation never comes to an end before all the forces of 
production which it can accommodate are developed, and new, higher 
relations of production never come into place before the material 
conditions their existence have gestated in the womb of the old society. 
Hence humanity only sets itself such problems it can solve, for on careful 
consideration one always finds that the problems themselves arise where 
the material conditions of their solution are known to be on hand or at 
least in the process of developŵĞŶƚ ? (Marx 1859/1996: 160). 
There are two implications of these principles in the understanding of the 
concept of passive revolution. Firstly, these two general principles show that 
the transformation of the social formations is a dialectical process. Thus, 
passive revolution is a dialectical process in which the capitalist social relations 
consolidate its hegemony by reproducing itself in new forms of authority 
(Morton 2003: 632).   
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In that sense, the passive revolution does not initiate or precondition the 
establishment of capitalism but is a product of that process; representing a 
spatiotemporal process of resolution of the contradictions that had been 
created by the uneven and combined development of capitalism in the 
periphery. This leads to the second implication; while it is conditioned by the 
uneven and combined development of capitalism, it also produces a new social 
formation which would consolidate and further this dependent development.  
The continuity between the reform and reorganisation periods and the rapid 
industrial development during the authoritarian regimes of General Porfirio 
şĂǌ ĂŶĚ ^ƵůƚĂŶ ďĚƵů Hamid II is crucial in the analysis of the dialectical 
processes of formation of the peripheral capitalist space and the 
transformation of Mexico and Turkey from the pre-capitalist backwardness to 
a modern capitalist underdevelopment. As it was explained before, the 
ŽƉƉƌĞƐƐŝǀĞ ƌĞŐŝŵĞƐ ŽĨ şĂǌ ĂŶĚ ^ƵůƚĂŶ ,ĂŵŝĚ ǁĞƌĞ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚƐ ŽĨ ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ
dialectical process defined as  ‘Caesarism ? by Gramsci. Gramsci defined the 
modern Caesarist regimes as the social forms that achieve further 
development and organisational development by the domination of the  W
mostly- progressive forces within an authoritarian regime that end the 
catastrophic political equilibrium between the progressive and reactionary 
forces (Gramsci 2007: 222). Certainly, while the oppressive regime resolves a 
dialectical contradiction and furthers the particular socio-spatial form, it 
proceeds on a dialectical track, laying down the foundations of a different 
contradiction. The dynamic underpinning this formation was the uneven and 
combined development of the productive forces which emanated from the 
material conditions created by the enlarged reproduction in the core capitalist 
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countries and structured the passive revolutions in early 20
th
 century Mexico 
and Turkey. 
This section analyses the passive revolutions of Mexico (1910-1920) and 
Turkey (1908-1925) that had completed the formation of the modern nation-
states where the limited bourgeoisie assumed power with a vanguard state 
party that institutionalised ƚŚĞƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶďǇƵƐŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƐƚŚĞcommon 
denominator to incorporate the masses. They inherited a fully-developed state 
structure and bureaucracy besides the liberal ideology of reform and progress 
from the previous ruling classes. In both countries, the modern Leviathan 
strengthened and perfected by the process of political centralisation and 
furthered the capitalist development which had already begun under the 
previous regimes. Therefore, it is important to focus on these dialectical 
processes in which the old regimes have been eliminated for the sake of the 
development of the peripheral capitalist forces which structured the other 
dialectical process of transformation of the peripheral capitalist spatiality by 
reproducing the uneven relations with the industrialised capitalist spaces but 
in different political forms.    
3.3.1. The Mexican passive revolution (1910-1920) and the consolidation of the 
peripheral capitalist space in the form of revolutionary Mexican state 
The Mexican Revolution posed great difficulties in terms of analysing the 
actual processes of the political mobilisation as well as its outcomes (Morton 
2011 P ? ? ) ?DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ ?ŝŶƚŚĞǁŽƌĚƐŽĨĂŵşŶ, ƚŚĞDĞǆŝĐĂŶZĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ‘ŚĂƐďĞĞŶ
a powerful ideological instrument of domination, a uniting fetish of meanings 
and rhetoric, a continually dividing and continually inaccurate phantom that 
ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞƐŝƚƐŽǁŶĐŽŶĨƵƐŝŽŶĂŶĚŝƚƐŝŶĞǆŚĂƵƐƚŝďůĞŚĞƌŵĞŶĞƵƚŝĐƐ ? ?ĂŵşŶ ? ? ? ? P
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11). This continual reproduction of the revolutionary heritage adds more 
controversy to the analysis. Semo (1979) argues that the Mexican bourgeois is 
sui generis in Latin America and takes its legitimacy from a revolutionary 
origin. According to Gilbert and Nugent (1994), there are three different 
currents which can be located in the historiography of the Mexican Revolution: 
the orthodox, revisionist and the neo-populist/post-revisionist accounts. The 
revisionist accounts of the Mexican Revolution challenged the initial orthodox 
understanding of the Mexican Revolution which defined it as the heroic 
struggle of the agrarian masses who eventually overthrew the despotic 
Porfirian regime along with the local caciques and broke with the feudal past 
(Miller 1985: 77; Gilbert and Nugent 1994: 5).  This interpretation, that was 
codified by the ruling elite, was challenged by the revisionist and post-
revisionist accounts which proposed a class based analysis of the revolutionary 
process by underlying the role of different groups and popular movements 
both in the political mobilisation and in its institutionalisation (Gilbert and 
Nugent 1994: 6-9). Womack (1991) pointed out that the Mexican revolution 
was actually a struggle between the same elements within the middle and 
upper classes which derived from the frustration of unfavoured middle and 
upper class elements. The involvement of the masses to this struggle was a 
natural result of the dissatisfaction amongst the general population caused by 
the economic burden of the capitalist development during the Porifirian 
regime (Womack 1991: 128).  
Nevertheless, as Gilly (1979) noted, the central motor of the political 
mobilisation during the revolution was the gigantic fight of the peasantry for 
land. The social base of the three major revolutionary armies of lvaro 
KďƌĞŐſŶ ? &ƌĂŶĐŝƐĐŽ sŝůůĂ ĂŶĚ ŵŝůůŝĂŶŽ ĂƉĂƚĂ ǁĂƐ ƉĞĂƐĂŶƚƌǇ ? ,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ƚŚŝƐ
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physical presence of the peasantry did not automatically turn the outcome of 
the uprising to a popular revolt of the masses or to a social revolution of the 
ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?'ŝůůǇ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?tŚŝůĞƚŚĞ ‘KďƌĞŐĂŶŝƐŵŽ ?ǁĂƐĚĞƐŝƌŝŶŐƚŽƚƌĂŶƐĨŽrm the 
ƐƚĂƚĞ ?  ‘ĂƉĂƚŝƐŵŽ ?aspired to an irreducible autonomy for the peasantry from 
ƚŚĞďŽƵƌŐĞŽŝƐƐƚĂƚĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘sŝůůŝƐŵŽ ?ǁĂƐƐŝƚƵĂƚĞĚďĞƚǁĞĞŶDĂĚĞƌŽĂŶĚĂƉĂƚĂ ?
his aim was  ‘ƚŝĞƌƌĂǇůŝďĞƌƚĂĚ ? but within the limits of the capitalist relations of 
ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?'ŝůůǇ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?K ?DĂůůĞǇ1986: 87).  
As was observed before, the rapid economic development during the Porfiriato 
combined two different modes of economic development in the same era 
which, actually, in the early industrialised countries emerged during different 
centuries; the intensive accumulation of land and the intensive accumulation 
of capital. The main beneficiaries of this accumulation were the foreign direct 
investors and the limited Mexican bourgeoisie-in-formation while the 
peasantry who were extremely pauperised and lost its traditionally owned land 
were the net loser of this uneven and combined development of capitalist 
social relations (Rosado 1963: 362-363; Gilly 1979: 24-25).  The urban petty 
bourgeoisie was also affected by the exogenous character of the peripheral 
capitalist development and added it to the joint front of dissidents breaking 
from the former cooptation with the Porfirian regime (Gilly 1983a: 47).    
The economic burden of the rapid and foreign directed capitalist development 
which strongly linked to the fluctuating international markets gradually 
culminated to a point of explosion in the last years of Porfiriato, particularly 
during the years of 1907-1908 ?Ɛ global capitalist crisis (Gilly 1983b: 306). 
Meyer (2010) stated that during the last 15 years of the Porfiriato regime, the 
living conditions among the general population had deteriorated significantly 
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(Vanderwood 1987: 428; Meyer 2010: 25). Between 1895 and 1910 the 
salaries of the agricultural workers had dropped by 17 percent. The real wages 
of the industrial workers fell considerably as well and the industrial 
unemployment had risen, particularly in the textile sector where the numbers 
of the textile workers fell to 20.000. The deterioration of the purchase power 
of the workers accounted for the cause of half of the strikes and above all in 
the textile industry, railway workers and tobacco producers, the strikes 
increased sharply after 1905 (Navarro 1956: 202). As a result of the global 
economic contraction between 1900 and 1907 the agricultural production in 
Sonora, Sinaloa and Chihuahua dropped by 40 percent while thousands of 
industrial workers were laid off (Gilly 1983a: 58; Meyer 2010: 26-27). 
In 1910, Francisco I. Madero, a member of the landowner family from San Luis 
WŽƚŽƐş ŝŶ ƚŚĞ EŽƌƚŚ ŽĨ DĞxico became the head of this dissident movement 
opposing the re-election of General WŽƌĨŝƌŝŽşĂǌ ?DĂĚĞƌŽǁĂƐƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶŐĂ
faction of the bourgeoisie  Wthe urban petty bourgeoisie- who in fact did not 
pose any realistic threat to the mighty Porifirian army at that time. At that 
point, the peasantry was called to ĂƌŵƐŝŶƚŚĞ ‘WůĂŶŽĨ^ĂŶ>ƵŝƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚ
a clause stating that all of the arbitrary usurpation of the peasant and 
indigenous land will be revised (Gilly 1983b: 307; Womack 1991: 130). This 
promise attracted the peasantry headed by Zapata in Morelos and Francisco 
Villa in Chihuahua, joining the broad and heterogeneous movement around 
DĂĚĞƌŽ  ?'ŝůůǇ  ? ? ? ?Ă P  ? ? ? K ?DĂůůĞǇ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ?  ? ? ) ? Ǉ ĞĂƌůǇ  ? ? ? ? ? ƚŚĞ
insurrection was already spread around the ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇǁŚŝĐŚĨŽƌĐĞĚ'ĞŶĞƌĂůşĂǌ
to step down and go into exile (Meyer 2010: 55). Up to this point, it is possible 
to argue that the revolution was not consumed yet; the old regime and the 
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social contradictions that were represented with this regime had been 
eliminated.  
After an interim government, ůĞĚďǇWŽƌĨŝƌŝƐƚĂ>ĞſŶĚĞ ůĂĂƌƌĂ ?DĂĚĞƌŽƚŽŽŬ
office and shelved the peasant demands for revising the hacienda usurpations 
which led to the Zapatista insurgency. Meanwhile the economy started to 
show signs of improvement particularly, in oil and steel production and exports 
(Womack 1991: 136). IŶEŽǀĞŵďĞƌ  ? ? ? ? ?ĂƉĂƚĂĚĞĐůĂƌĞĚ ƚŚĞ  ‘WůĂŶŽĨǇĂůĂ ? 
and denounced President Madero for being a traitor of the revolutionary 
movement. The plan aimed to retrieve the land, forestry and waters that had 
been usurped by the big landowners and haciendas (Gilly 1983b: 321; Meyer 
2010: 59). Madero could not suppress the Zapatista insurgency and, he was 
deposed and murdered in 1913 and replaced by General Huerta. However, the 
constitutionalist army headed by another Northern landowner Venustiano 
Carranza, included Villa and his army, the  ‘ŝǀŝƐŝſŶĚĞůEŽƌƚĞ ?and the army of 
KďƌĞŐſŶ ĚĞĨĞĂƚĞĚ ƚŚĞ ,ƵĞƌƚŝƐƚĂƐ and retrieved political power (Gilly 1983b: 
346).  
However, at this point, the peasantry under Zapata and Villa  appeared 
incapable to articulate its military power in the state structure on a national 
level, thus enabling the bourgeois and petty bourgeois to organise its 
ŚĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ  ? ? ? ? ?  ?'ŝůůǇ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ?; Meyer 2010: 85). 
Finally, once necessary mobilisation of the agrarian masses was terminated, 
the bourgeois hegemony was established after uniting the reactionary and 
progressive elements in the society. The masses were converted into a 
significant factor of power in disintegrating the old regime but lacked sufficient 
172 
 
material elements to determine the modern reorganisation of Mexico 
 ?ſƌĚŽǀĂ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ? 
In that sense, the Mexican revolution represents a perfect example of a 
passive revolution that was defined by Gramsci, a significant process in the 
formation of the peripheral capitalist spatiality (Gramsci 2007: 106-107; 
Morton 2011: 34). This work argues that the passive revolution is the concrete 
historical process where the bourgeoisie-in-formation established its 
hegemony through institutionalising a legitimate political power on the basis 
of national identity and the compromises that were given to the subaltern 
classes. It is not a precondition of the formation of the capitalist space or the 
bourgeois hegemony but a direct product of the dialectical process of uneven 
and combined development of the capitalist social forces, namely the capitalist 
productive forces and the bourgeoisie-in-formation striving to take control of 
the capitalist accumulation and to eliminate the obstacles in front of it. For this 
reason, the Mexican revolution did not derail the peripheral capitalist 
development even though it was mainly materialised through the mobilisation 
of the subaltern classes, did not proceed with a comprehensive agrarian 
reform
30
 or share the political power through the meaningful representation of 
the interests of peasantry or the working classes, and did not take a critical 
stance against the foreign capital. However, it was in the post-passive 
revolutionary period -which will be examined in the first section of chapter 
four- that the main borders of the bourgeois hegemony were drawn with the 
consolidation of the peripheral capitalist social relations.  
                                                          
30
 The land distribution with the Constitution of 1917 and its meaning will be discussed in the next 
chapter.  
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With the establishment of the hegemony of the limited Mexican bourgeoisie-
in-formation, the national bourgeoisie assumed the responsibility of the 
capitalist accumulation which changed the course of the uneven and combined 
development. The main difference between the uneven and combined 
development of the capitalist space and the post-passive revolutionary 
dependent capitalist development lays in this point; in the former, the main 
agents of the capitalist accumulation were the great foreign monopolies and a 
small group of enriched Mexican men of commerce while, in the second, the 
limited national bourgeois was transformed to dominate the state and 
reoriented it (Semo 1979: 141). Therefore, it is possible to say that observing 
this process where the blocked dialectic was resolved by the consolidation of 
the existing social relations does explain a very significant stage in the 
formation of the peripheral capitalist space.  
3.3.2. The Kemalist revolution or the Young Turk passive revolution (1908-
1925)? The consolidation of the peripheral capitalist space in the form of 
Turkish nation-state 
The difficulties posited in the analysis of the Mexican Revolution also emerge 
in the scholarly analysis of the Turkish Revolution. It is important to highlight 
the reasons behind this common distorted way of interpretation of these two 
revolutions. Both Mexican and Turkish revolutions were used (and, to a 
degree, are still being used) as a point of legitimisation of the political 
authority and an instrument of domination by the bourgeois hegemony.  After 
the foundation of the republic, the ruling elite that organised under the 
 ‘Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi ? ?ZĞƉƵďůŝĐĂŶWĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐWĂƌƚǇ WCHP) assumed the role of 
a vanguard party which became an integral part of the state structure and 
limited the interpretation of the revolution to the Independence War (1919-
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1922), thus the revolution has been defined as exclusively Kemalist, post-
Ottoman and Republican which confined the national identity within the 
existing state structure and eliminated any other referrals to Pan-Turkism or 
Islamism (Tachau 1963: 175; Heper 2000: 72- ? ? ) ? ƺƌĐŚĞƌ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ƵŶĚĞƌůŝŶĞĚ
ƚŚĞ ƌŽůĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘^ƉĞĞĐŚ ?  ?EƵƚƵŬ ) ŐŝǀĞŶ ďǇ DƵƐƚĂĨĂ <ĞŵĂů ŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ
first party Congress of the CHP in the production of this orthodoxy which was 
ůĂƚĞƌŽŶƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚďǇƚŚĞ ‘dƺƌŬĞǀƌŝŵdĂƌŝŚŝŶƐƚŝƚƺƐƺ ? ?/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĨŽƌƚŚĞ^ƚƵĚǇ
of the Turkish Revolution) for the Ministry of Education and millions of copies 
had been published and translated to different languages ever since. In his 
 ‘Speech ? AtatƺƌŬĐůĂŝŵs ƚŽ ‘explain how a great nation, which was thought to 
have come to the end of its national existence, had gained its independence 
and had founded a national and modern state based on the latest principles of 
ƐĐŝĞŶĐĞĂŶĚƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ ? and starts his explanation from 1919, the year when 
he joined to the national resistance in Asia Minor ? ƺƌĐŚĞƌ ĂƌŐƵĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ
ƚĂƚƺƌŬ ?ƐŽǁŶ ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŚĂƐďĞĞŶĂĐĐĞƉƚĞĚĂƐ ƚŚĞŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ƚƌƵƚŚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ
Turkish historiography which was inevitable in a country where he is still 
perceived as the liberator and the founder of the Republic and a law banning 
ĚĞĨĂŵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚĂƚƺƌŬŝƐƐƚŝůůŝŶĨŽƌĐĞ ?ƺƌĐŚĞƌ ? ? ? ? P ? ? )  
The orthodox interpretation of the formation of the modern Turkish state has 
been produced and reproduced by the official state history writing efforts 
which immediately started after the foundation of the republic as an essential 
part of the nation building process. This orthodox version has been rarely 
challenged within the mainstream historiography while in all levels of the 
primary, secondary and higher education became a compulsory subject under 
ƚŚĞ ƚŝƚůĞŽĨ  ‘/ŶŬŠůĂƉdĂƌŝŚŝ ? (history of the revolution).  This powerful ahistoric 
orthodoxy bounded with the paradigms of the Kemalist establishment and as 
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an integral part of the bourgeois ideology dates the economic, political and 
social modernisation of Turkey to the foundation of the Republic in 1923, 
ignoring the economic and social changes within Ottoman Turkey which had a 
profound impact on the formation of the modern Turkish state (Karpat 1972: 
243; Kansu 1997: 5). 
Nevertheless, this distorted definition of the revolution by the Kemalist 
historiography as the phoenix that rises from its ashes, leaving behind its 
oriental and backward past and being an example of the other oppressed 
nations of the world was became rapidly a crucial part of the national identity. 
These interpretations need to be seen as part of the hegemony of the 
bourgeoisie-in-formation to create a collective identity where the nation 
appears as the common denominator in a society that overcomes the class 
differences. This project also paved way to the  ‘dƵƌŬŝƐŚ,ŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůdŚĞƐŝƐ ?ĂŶĚ
ƚŚĞ  ‘^ƵŶ >ĂŶŐƵĂŐĞ dŚĞŽƌǇ ? ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƐĞĐŽŶĚ ĚĞĐĂĚĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƉƵďůŝĐ that 
claimed the Turkish race and the Turkish language as the father of all 
civilisations which had been discarded quickly by the Kemalists themselves 
(Hrischler 2001: 147-148). The main reason for the swift trivialisation of these 
theories but the constant reproduction of the Turkish revolution mythology 
signals the effective use of the revolution within the bourgeois project.    
Even though the orthodox historiography in the Turkish revolution has been 
challenged, a spatiotemporal analysis and theorisation of it is yet to be done. 
One of the main problems in the analysis of the Turkish revolution is the 
separation of the Young Turk revolution from the national resistance which 
obscures the structural dynamics underpinning this particular process that was 
conditioned by the uneven and combined development of the capitalist forces 
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during the old regime. Understanding how the Young Turks were successful in 
mobilising Turkish masses against the throne and subsequently became the 
dominant political power in 1913, and later take the form of Kemalism during 
the national resistance necessitates a class based analysis which would locate 
this political mobilisation of subaltern classes within a framework of the social 
and economic transformation in the 19
th
 century Ottoman Turkey as a 
spatiotemporal process rather than a single historical event. 
The periodisation of The Young Turk revolution differs significantly regarding 
to the various paradigms reinforced in the analysis of the process. The 
dominant orthodox view defines one historical event and one revolution; the 
Young Turk uprising of 1908-1909 that overthrew Sultan Abdul Hamid II and 
ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ ƚŚĞ  ‘^ĞĐŽŶĚ ŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů WĞƌŝŽĚ ? ƚŚŽƵŐŚ ƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇ ĨĂŝůĞĚ ƚŽ
rescue the Empire from disintegration. The real revolution was the Kemalist 
revolution, covers the Independence War of Turkey, when the nation rose up 
against and defeated the occupying forces, deposed the Sultan and abolished 
the Sultanate, and established the modern Turkish Republic. This orthodoxy 
had first appeared in the thirties, further strengthened during the forties and 
fifties and became recognised and popular in the Western mainstream 
ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝŽŐƌĂƉŚǇ ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƐĂŵĞ ƉĞƌŝŽĚ  ?ƺƌĐŚĞƌ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ) The revisionist 
perspectives abandoned the Kemalist romanticism, but failed to link those two 
events under one dialectical process that was conditioned by specific 
spatiotemporal dynamics.  Yalman pointed out that the main source of these 
interpretations is the theorisation of the Ottoman/Turkish state in terms of 
contrasts with ideal-typical forms. These concepts neither problematise the 
state nor provide a specific explanatory tool, thereby attest a superficial 
particularity to the Turkish state formation (Yalman 2009: 119).  
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However, a close analysis of the structural conditions, processes and outcomes 
shows that the Turkish revolution is a passive revolution, where the limited 
national bourgeoisie-in-formation successfully mobilised the masses to 
ĚŝƐŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚĞ ƚŚĞ ĂŶĐŝĞŶ ƌĠŐŝŵĞ  Win which the capitalist development was 
dominated and controlled by the foreign capital- and established its contested 
hegemony by reaching the highest degree of its cohesion under a one-party 
regime and reorganising and reorienting the state. As it was in the Mexican 
passive revolution, this dialectical process signals a significant step in the 
consolidation of the peripheral capitalist spatiality.     
The Young Turk movement can be traced back to 1889 when a group of 
students of the military medical college in Istanbul founded the Ottoman Unity 
Society (Ittihadi Osmani Cemiyeti) which later on attracted many political exiles 
and dissidents against Sultan Abdul Hamid II and turned to an underground 
resistance network under the name of Ottoman Committee of Union and 
WƌŽŐƌĞƐƐ ŝŶ  ? ? ? ?  ?ZĂŵƐĂƵƌ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ƺƌĐŚĞƌ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ) ? /Ŷ  ? ?   ? ƚŚĞ  ‘&ŝƌƐƚ
CongƌĞƐƐ ŽĨ KƚƚŽŵĂŶ KƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ WĂƌƚŝĞƐ ? ŚĞůĚ ŝn Paris, to unite all different 
factions in order to overthrow the Hamidian regime and reinstall the 
ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƉĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ  ?,ĂŶŝŽŒůƵ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ƺƌĐŚĞƌ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ) ?
However, the congress further divided the oƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ŝŶƚŽƚǁŽďůŽĐŬƐĂƐ  ‘Les 
Jeunes-dƵƌĐƐ ƌĠƉƵďůŝĐĂŝŶƐ and Les Jeunes-dƵƌĐƐ ŵŝĚŚĂƚŝƐƚĞƐ ? ? ƚŚĞ  ‘^ŽĐŝĞƚǇ ŽĨ
KƚƚŽŵĂŶ >ŝďĞƌĂůƐ ? ůĞĚ ďǇ WƌŝŶĐĞ ^ĂďĂŚĂĚĚŝŶ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ  ‘7ƚƚŝŚĂĚ ǀĞ dĞƌĂŬŬŝ
ĞŵŝǇĞƚŝ ? (Committee of Union and Progress  WhW ) ůĞĚ ďǇ ŚŵĞĚ ZŦǌĂ
 ?,ĂŶŝŽŒlu 2001: 9-10). In 1907, CUP merged with an underground organisation 
ĨŽƵŶĚĞĚ ŝŶ dŚĞƐƐĂůŽŶŝŬŝ ŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ƚŚĞ  ‘KƐŵĂŶůŦ ,ƺƌƌŝǇĞƚ ĞŵŝǇĞƚŝ ?(Ottoman 
Freedom Society -OFS) which allowed the CUP to expand its membership base 
ĂŵŽŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĂƌŵǇ ĂŶĚ ďƵƌĞĂƵĐƌĂĐǇ ŝŶ DĂĐĞĚŽŶŝĂ  ?,ĂŶŝŽŒůƵ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ) ? dŚĞ
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ethnic and geographic origins of the revolutionary leaders was similar to the 
 ‘EŽƌƚŚĞƌŶĞƌƐ ? ŽĨ ƚŚĞ DĞǆŝĐan Revolution; they were from Ottoman Balkans, 
the capital Istanbul, and from the north-western Anatolia  Wthe regions where 
the industry and commerce developed on a much higher degree than the 
ŽƚŚĞƌƌĞŐŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞĞŵƉŝƌĞ ?ƺƌĐŚĞƌ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ? 
Although MardŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ? dƌŝŵďĞƌŐĞƌ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ĂŶĚ ,ĂŶŝŽŒůƵ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ŚĂĚ ĂƌŐƵĞĚ
that the Young Turk revolution did not have a popular support it is difficult to 
defend this position when the pre-revolutionary socio-economic situation has 
been analysed closely. The general dissatisfaction among the peasantry in the 
country and also the frustration of the artisans and shopkeepers in the town 
due to the increasing burden of taxes caused series of local uprisings in 
different regions of Anatolia between 1906 and 1907. The purchasing power of 
the workers deteriorated with the worldwide economic crisis in 1907 which 
affected most of the countries that were dependent on foreign capital 
investment and agricultural exports. Preceding July 1908, the increase in the 
prices of all consumer goods and the widespread food shortages led to the 
protests in both the urban and rural areas of the country (Quataert 1979: 
1149, 1161). In the town, the real wages of the labourers fell dramatically 
because of the periodic depression that was hitting the Ottoman agriculture 
during this period, that led to hundreds of strikes by workers who believed the 
constitution would ameliorate their situation (Ahmad 2003: 50). In 1905, and 
later in 1906 the Muslim and non-Muslim inhabitants and the guild wardens in 
the province of Kastamonu revolted, refusing to pay the poll tax and 
demanding the change of the local governor. The first demonstrations in the 
province of Trabzon started in 1906 and continued until 1908 where the 
population refused to be enlisted to army regiments destined for Yemen. The 
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ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ƚŚĞ ůŽĐĂů <ƵƌĚŝƐŚ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŽƌ ŝŶ ŝǇĂƌďĂŬŦƌ ƐƚĂƌƚĞĚ ŝŶ
1905 and in Van in 1907. The most important rebellion in the Eastern Anatolia 
was in the city of Erzurum and started against the poll tax and the tax on 
domestic animals. The local governor lost control of the city to the Muslim and 
non-Muslim dissidents in 1906 who formed a de facto local government. This 
local committee was finally dispersed in 1907 with the help of the additional 
government forcĞƐ ?,ĂŶŝŽŒůƵ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?-114).  
Those local revolts were widely used as a means of propaganda by the CUP 
members and the popular grievances articulated into the political programme 
of the restoration of the constitutional order (Kansu 1997: 53). This pre-
revolutionary resistance period eventually was transformed into a popular 
uprising via agitation by the Unionists who also achieved to mobilise the army 
through eliminating the rank and file order through the Young Turk officers 
(Kansu 1997: 73).  
The continual unrest in Anatolia and Macedonia severely damaged the 
ƌĞŐŝŵĞ ?Ɛ ƉŽǁĞƌ ŝŶ ƚĂĐŬůŝŶŐ ĂŶǇ ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů ƌĞƉƌĞƐƐŝǀĞ
measures, and soon Istanbul joined the centres of protests showing the 
ĚŝƐƐĂƚŝƐĨĂĐƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞ^ƵůƚĂŶ ?ƐĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ?ůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞ liberals were organised 
ƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐŝŶĂƌŝǀĂůŐƌŽƵƉƚŽhWƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞ ‘^ŽĐŝĞƚǇĨŽƌĞĐĞŶƚƌĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ
WƌŝǀĂƚĞ /ŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞ ?, they also joined to the unrest actively, but the main 
ƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶĂƌǇ ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ǁĞƌĞ ƚŚĞ ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƚ hW ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƌŵĞŶŝĂŶ
RevoluƚŝŽŶĂƌǇ&ĞĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?<ĂŶƐƵ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?/ŶƚŚĂƚƐĞŶƐĞ, it is possible to claim 
that while the revolution in 1908 was generated by the military officers, they 
were dependent on the dissident urban and rural masses, and the middle-class 
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civilian bureaucrats who were formed and maintained the constitutional 
regime at least until 1914 (Ahmad 1966: 305). 
In July 1908, several Young Turk officers from the Second (Thracian) and Third 
(Macedonian) Army took all other troops in the Empire under their command, 
demanding the immediate reinstatement of the constitutional order. Sultan 
Abdul Hamid II, who was left without any military power, restored the 
constitution regime which received great popular backing in Macedonia and 
Anatolia. Following the counter-revolutionary movement in 1909, the Young 
dƵƌŬŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞdŚŝƌĚĂŶĚ^ĞĐŽŶĚƌŵŝĞƐĨŽƌŵĞĚĂĨŽƌĐĞĐĂůůĞĚ  ‘ĐƚŝŽŶ
ƌŵǇ ? ?Hareket ordusu )ůĞĚďǇDĂŚŵƵĚbĞǀŬĞƚWĂƐŚĂĂŶĚŽĐĐƵƉŝĞĚƚŚĞĐĂƉŝƚĂů; 
meanwhile, ƚŚĞ ^ĞŶĂƚĞ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ŚĂŵďĞƌ ŽĨ ĞƉƵƚŝĞƐ ĨŽƌŵĞĚ Ă  ‘EĂƚŝŽŶĂů
AsseŵďůǇ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĚĞƉŽƐĞĚĂŶĚĞǆŝůĞĚ^ƵůƚĂŶďĚƵů,ĂŵŝĚ//ƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞďĂŶŶĞƌ
ŽĨ ‘>ŝďĞƌƚǇ ?ƋƵĂůŝƚǇ ?&ƌĂƚĞƌŶŝƚǇĂŶĚ:ƵƐƚŝĐĞ ? ?ŚŵĂĚ ? ? ? ? P   ƺƌĐŚĞƌ ? ? ? ? P ? ?-
 ? ? ?,ĂŶŝŽŒůƵ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?
In the following period, although lacking a strong party discipline, the CUP 
dominated the chamber and tried to consolidate the constitutional regime by 
codifying the necessary legislation and eliminating the restrictions on the social 
movements that were legislated during the Hamidian regime. This led to a 
proliferation of political activities, demonstrations, strikes and boycotts, 
feminist movements and, most importantly, publishing of the numerous 
newspapers and magazines  ?,ĂŶŝŽŒůƵ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ) ? ĞƐƉŝƚĞthe grim political 
strife, the revolutionaries managed to undertake administrative reforms that 
increased the revenues of the treasury by almost 30 percent which were even 
praised by the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (Ahmad 2003: 56). Liberals 
ƌĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĞĚƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞ ‘,ƺƌƌŝǇĞƚǀĞ7ƚŝůąĨ&ŦƌŬĂƐŦ ? ?WĂƌƚǇŽĨ&ƌĞĞĚŽŵĂŶĚĐĐŽƌĚ )
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in 1911 uniting all other anti-hW ŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ  ?ƺƌĐŚĞƌ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ) ? ĨƚĞƌ ƚŚĞ
fraudulent elections of 1912 -which was named as  ‘the elections with the 
stick ?- the CUP once again dominated the chamber but could not form the 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ  ?ŬƔŝŶ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ) ? dŚŝƐ ůĞĚ ƚŽ Ă ĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ Ă ĞƵƚƌĂů  ‘'ƌĞĂƚ
ĂďŝŶĞƚ ?ƉƵƐŚŝŶŐhWƚŽƚŚĞŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ and out of the political authority. The 
defeat in the Balkan Wars aided the CUP in organising ĂĐŽƵƉĚ ?ĠƚĂƚ ŝŶ  ? ? ? ?
and they returned to power which they retained until the end of the World 
tĂƌ ?ƺƌĐŚĞƌ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?-110). 
While during this period CUP started to institutionalise the Young Turk 
revolution, by practically eliminating the opposition, joining the World War I 
and the defeat interrupted this process. During the World War the CUP 
abolished all capitulations and economic privileges that had been given before 
to the Western countries and increased the duty fees accordingly. However, 
following the KƚƚŽŵĂŶƌŵǇ ?Ɛdefeat and surrender at the end of the World 
War, the main figures went into exile and the party cadres were dissolved or 
arrested and put on trial in Malta during the Allied Forces occupation. This led 
to a re-emergence of the political opposition even though the CUPist 
nationalism was quickly marginalised. The re-emergence of the opposition 
during the national resistance following the occupation of Turkey by the Allied 
Forces could only be eliminated by 1925, with the re-organisation of the CUPist 
cadres in a different political form but defending the same nationalist 
bourgeois project. 
Therefore, similar to the Mexican revolution the Turkish revolution which was 
started with the Young Turk revolution and ended with the establishment of 
the hegemony of the bourgeoisie-in-formation by the Kemalist administration 
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in 1925, should be defined as a passive revolution where the old regime was 
eliminated alongside its contradictions that have been produced within the 
dialectical process of uneven and combined development of the peripheral 
capitalist social relations. The establishment of the bourgeois hegemony did 
secure and consolidate the peripheral capitalist spatiality and paved way to its 
deepening throughout the post-passive revolutionary period where the 
uneven relations were reproduced in different political forms. This period, in 
which the exogenous and dependent capitalist social relations have been 
expanded and furthered by the ISI strategies, will be analysed in chapter five 
which will allow a better understanding of the dynamics behind the 
contemporary peripheral positioning of the capitalist space in Turkey and its 
expansion towards its geographies within the worldwide neoliberal re-
territorialisation processes. 
3.4. Conclusion 
This chapter provides the historical background of the peripheral capitalist 
spatiality of Mexico and Turkey by redefining the material conditions of their 
transition processes to capitalism. It is possible to claim that the conceptual 
framework provided by Luxemburg, Trotsky and Gramsci presents a significant 
analytical tool in understanding this spatiotemporally specific process of 
peripheral capitalist transformation of Mexico and Turkey from the pre-
capitalist backwardness to the modern capitalist underdevelopment. The main 
reason for that is the power of this conceptual framework in analysing the 
complex dialectical process of the formation of the peripheral capitalist 
spatiality by unravelling the interrelated spatiotemporal features of it. Each of 
these three theories that have been operationalised in the previous chapter 
(chapter two)  Wenlarged reproduction, uneven and combined development 
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and passive revolution- reveal different but overlapping historical conditions 
that structure the other aspects of this dialectical process. 
The pre-capitalist social relations in Mexico and Turkey were rapidly dissolved 
during the 19
th
 ĐĞŶƚƵƌǇĚƵĞƚŽ ‘ĞŶůĂƌŐĞĚreƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶƚŚĞĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐƚĐĞŶƚƌĞ
and led to the capitalist expansion towards the pre-capitalist periphery 
replacing the natural economy. Therefore, it should not be surprising to see 
that the economic programmes of the Bourbon reformers and the Sultan Selim 
III and Sultan Mahmud II were not substantially different to the political aims 
ŽĨƚŚĞDĞǆŝĐĂŶůŝďĞƌĂůƐŽĨƚŚĞZĞƐƚŽƌĞĚZĞƉƵďůŝĐůŝŬĞ:ƷĂƌĞǌŽƌKĐĂŵƉŽĂŶd the 
KƚƚŽŵĂŶ ƐƚĂƚĞƐŵĞŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ dĂŶǌŝŵĂƚ ůŝŬĞ &ƵĂĚ ĂŶĚ ůŝ WĂƐŚĂƐ were not 
different, since neither the cotton weavers of Guanajuato and Queretaro nor 
the silk producers of Bursa and Aleppo were able to compete with the modern 
machines in the mills of Lancashire (Brading 1973: 179). In other words, the 
assault of the capitalist economy on the natural economy and its replacement 
with the primitive capitalist accumulation were the historic conditions in which 
the capitalist social relations were unfurled and determined the peripheral 
capitalist spatiality.  
As Trotsky argued, the uneven and combined development of the capitalist 
ĨŽƌĐĞƐ ŶĞĐĞƐƐŝƚĂƚĞĚ Ă ƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞ ĂĞƐĂƌ ?Ɛ ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚĂƌŝĂŶ ƌĞŐŝŵĞ ǁŚŝĐŚ ǁĂƐ
ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůŝƐĞĚ ƵŶĚĞƌ ƚŚĞ ƌĞŐŝŵĞƐ ŽĨ 'ĞŶĞƌĂů WŽƌĨŝƌŝŽ şĂǌ ĂŶĚ Sultan Abdul 
Hamid II. During this period, the peripheral capitalist space reached a different 
stage, where the capitalist forces developed very rapidly through the 
unprecedented involvement of the foreign capital transforming the society and 
setting new contradictions. These contradictions were resolved by the passive 
revolutions that established the hegemony of the limited national bourgeois 
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yet to be consolidated and institutionalised. The next two chapters will 
elaborate the processes of post-consolidation and transformation of the 
peripheral capitalist spaces in Mexico and Turkey which will provide a 
meaningful analysis of their current phase of expansion towards the marginal 
spaces in the form of regional economic integration projects.      
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Chapter 4: Peripheral forms of the worldwide restructuring/rescaling of 
capitalist spatiality: the regional economic integration projects of Mexico  
 ‘WůĂĐĞƐ ĂƌĞ ĂƌƌĂŶŐĞĚ ƵŶĞƋƵĂůůǇ ŝŶ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŽ ĐĞŶƚƌĞƐ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ĂƌĞ ƚhemselves 
unequal...Space regulates and perpetuates the relations of domination. It 
accomplishes this by subordinating simple reproduction (of the labour force) to the 
more complex reproduction of the relations of production, and by subordinating 
the latteƌ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨĚŽŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞĚ ŝŶƚŽƐƉĂĐĞ ?ƐƉĂĐĞ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƐ
ĚŽŵŝŶĂƚĞĚŵĂǇŝƚƐĞůĨďĞĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚŽǀĞƌĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƐƉĂĐĞ ?. 
-,ĞŶƌŝ>ĞĨĞďǀƌĞ ? ‘Ğů ?ƚĂƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?: 243-245).31  
 
This chapter aims to locate and define the contemporary regional economic 
integration projects of Mexico with the Central American states through 
analysing the interlinked processes that the peripheral capitalist space in 
Mexico was transformed and expanded. In that sense, the regional projects of 
Mexico are recognised as the structurally conditioned initiatives aiming to 
establish the physical and social conditions of the capitalist development. 
Furthermore, these projects will be located within the contemporary processes 
of the neoliberal rescaling of the capitalist spatiality where the social relations 
of capitalism globally intensify on the national scale while simultaneously 
extending towards the marginal spaces. It will be observed that within this 
neoliberal re-territorialisation process, the uneven relationship between the 
centre and the periphery is reproduced and extended in different regional and 
sub-regional forms. Peripheral capitalist spaces like Mexico and Turkey that 
already integrated with the centre assume a spatiotemporally specific role 
                                                          
31
 dƌĂŶƐůĂƚŝŽŶ ƚĂŬĞŶ ĨƌŽŵ  ‘^ƚĂƚĞ ? ^ƉĂĐĞ tŽƌůĚ P ƐĞůĞĐƚĞĚ ĞƐƐĂǇƐ ?,ĞŶƌŝ >ĞĨĞďǀƌĞ ?, (ed) Neil 
Brenner and Stuart Elden (2009).  
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within this global process of neoliberal rescaling by channelling and 
establishing the material and social conditions of capitalist accumulation.  
Previously (chapter two), the social space has been defined and established as 
the totality of the social relations of production without conflating these 
relations with a particular dominant mode of production and the key features 
of the formation of the peripheral capitalist spatiality have been 
conceptualised through the spatiotemporally specific theories of Luxemburg, 
Trotsky and Gramsci. It was also explained that the relationship between the 
social formation and the general material conditions in which this social 
formation being produced, consolidated and transformed, is not a mechanic 
relationship; therefore, while each mode of production has its space, the 
characteristics of a social space cannot be directly reduced from this mode of 
production (Lefebvre 1976: 32; Lefebvre 1978/2009: 234). This point enables 
us to identify various specific spatiotemporal processes of formation, 
consolidation and transformation of capitalist spaces on multiple scales 
without delinking these processes from the continual production and 
reproduction of the uneven relations underpinning the global capitalist 
spatiality. Therefore, the configuration of the contemporary capitalist social 
relations on the national scale which has been continually contested, 
transformed and consolidated within a dialectical process is directly linked 
with the production of the capitalist spatiality on the global level. As a result of 
this continually transformed and reproduced relationship, the social space on 
the national scale has been positioned within the international division of 
labour. Thus, the inter-spatial relations on the national scale are conditioned 
by the position of the social space within this international division of labour.  
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Thus, it has been argued in the previous chapter (chapter three) that the 
modern peripheral capitalist space in Mexico and Turkey is direct product of 
this process of uneven and combined production, consolidation and 
transformation of the peripheral capitalist spatiality. The centralised and the 
institutionalised social formation in the peripheral geographies was 
preconditioned by the uneven unfurling of the capitalist development which 
gradually dissolved the traditional social relations of production and property 
relations and ultimately consolidated by the passive revolutions in the 
beginning of the 20
th
 century. Therefore, the specific spatiotemporal formation 
of the capitalist spatiality had been determined by the geographical positioning 
of Mexico as it had been well captured in the words that are attributed to 
'ĞŶĞƌĂů WŽƌĨŝƌŝŽ şĂǌ ? “ OWŽďƌĞ DĠǆŝĐŽ ?  OdĂŶ ůĞũŽƐ ĚĞ ŝŽƐ Ǉ ƚĂŶ ĐĞƌĐĂ ĚĞ ůŽƐ
Estados Unidos!"
32
. 
The consolidation process of the peripheral capitalist space was commenced in 
Mexico and Turkey during the post-passive revolutionary period after the 
national bourgeois-in-formation -which itself, in fact, is the direct product of 
the uneven capitalist accumulation- overthrew the ĂŶĐŝĞŶƌĠŐŝŵĞ. This limited 
national bourgeoisie established a precarious hegemony which was dependent 
on the national consensus where the nationalism appeared as the common 
ĚĞŶŽŵŝŶĂƚŽƌƐ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĠƚĂƚŝƐŵ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ŵĂŝŶ ŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚ of the political 
legitimacy. Through the passive revolution the national bourgeois assumed the 
responsibility for the capitalist accumulation and the economic growth taking 
only a step further from the previous pattern of capitalist development 
(Morton 2011: 63). In that sense, the passive revolution in the periphery 
became the mobilisation directed by the national bourgeois as an intermediary 
                                                          
32
  ‘Poor Mexico! So far from God and so close to the United States ? (Garner 2001: 137).  
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of the process of the capitalist accumulation through a social-democratic 
compromise (Lefebvre 1964/2009: 59-60).  
Therefore, in the first section, the post-passive revolutionary period of 
institutionalisation and economic growth which has consolidated the 
peripheral capitalist space will be analysed as the second and more complex 
stage of the uneven development of the productive forces. As Lefebvre 
ƉŽŝŶƚĞĚŽƵƚ ? ŝƚǁĂƐĂŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ ƌƵůŝŶŐĐůĂƐƐŐƌĂĚƵĂůůǇ  ‘ŵĂƌŬĞĚ ?
ŵŽĚĞůůĞĚ ĂŶĚ ďƵŝůƚ ? Ă ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ǁŚĞƌĞ ƚŚĞ ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ďĞĐĂŵĞ
necessary but insufficient  Win other words where the uneven and combined 
development of productive forces reached a degree of exhaustion- through 
seizing the existing institutions and creating the other necessary ones for the 
maintenance of the capitalist accumulation (Lefebvre 1980/2009: 217). In this 
post-passive revolutionary process, the contradictions which had conditioned 
the passive revolution was eliminated by achieving a social consensus between 
the ruling class and the wider segments of the society (particularly peasantry) 
via giving compromises in the form of the agrarian reform, by maintaining the 
uninterrupted capitalist accumulation with the foreign dependent ISI based 
economic growth and by reshaping the social structure with a political 
programme of institutionalisation where the common denominator appeared 
as nationalism.  
However, the dependent feature of the ISI policies to the foreign finance 
brought the economy to a point of stalemate during the 1970s and 1980s. The 
ISI development had two important impacts on the particular nature of the 
economic growth in Mexico. Firstly, the forty years of foreign dependent ISI 
development laid the foundations of an industrial production which gradually 
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reached to a level that the productive forces would be integrated more closely 
to the North American productive forces, sharing similar production and 
demand patterns with the North American industry and capital. Secondly, the 
exhaustion of the capabilities of the ISI development in maintaining the 
capitalist accumulation enforced a premature and rapid reorientation of the 
economy through the deregulation of the market rules and liberalisation of the 
international trade. Therefore, the crisis of the ISI development was followed 
by a rapid and profound process of neoliberalisation and deregulation of whole 
economy and society which is again conducted by the State helping to regulate 
the integration of the national economy to the world markets (Lefebvre 
1979/2001: 777). The second section will focus on this process in which the 
Mexican peripheral capitalist space was transformed and rescaled within the 
neoliberal international division of labour. 
By revealing the specific spatiotemporal conditions that have structured the 
dialectical processes of formation, consolidation and transformation of the 
peripheral capitalist space in Mexico in the chapter three and this chapter, the 
third section will analyse the contemporary reproduction of these uneven 
relations of capitalist development. The expansion of the capitalist space 
towards the immediate geography of Mexico which appears in the form of 
regional integration projects such as Plan Puebla Panama (PPP which is 
currently called as Proyecto Mesoamerica -PM) will be analysed from a 
standpoint of the exhaustion of the ISI development as a tool of uninterrupted 
capitalist accumulation in an era of neoliberal rescaling. Concurrent with 
Lefebvre, the state once again appeared as the agency for the creation of the 
necessary spatial conditions of the production and reproduction needed for 
the capitalist accumulation, but this time on an international scale.  
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The PPP-PM was initiated, as a part of the global neoliberal rescaling of the 
capitalist spatiality, in order to create the necessary spatial infrastructure for 
the expansion of capital and facilitate the capitalist accumulation by creating 
the conditions of a unified, harmonised and standardised market in the Central 
American region which has been marginalised and relatively isolated from the 
international markets. Thus, by integrating its own periphery to the 
international markets, Mexico reproduces an uneven, asymmetric relationship 
of economic development, a similar process to the enlarged reproduction and 
uneven development that was previously defined by Luxemburg and Trotsky. 
In other words, after being integrated to the international division of labour 
and securing this positioning irreversibly with its membership to NAFTA, now it 
becomes the mediator of the integration of Central America into world 
markets through PPP-PM.    
4.1. The post-passive revolutionary transformation of the peripheral 
capitalist space in Mexico: the institutionalisation of the Mexican Revolution 
Lefebvre accurately captured the role of the state in the formation and 
maintenance of the uninterrupted capitalist accumulation. He emphasised the 
role of state in the capitalist development by assuming the responsibility of the 
production and reproduction of the necessary spatial infrastructure for the 
productive forces and for the organisation of the everyday life. Furthermore, 
and very significantly, Lefebvre underlined the dialectical  Wthus, continual, not 
fixed- nature of this process of capitalist accumulation which interacts with 
and transforms the political element (Lefebvre 1964/2009: 59).  
Parallel to the global economic crisis of 1929, the way which the hegemony of 
the national ruling class did maintain and further the capitalist accumulation 
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during the second phase of uneven development was the implementation of 
the Import Substitution Industrial development (ISI) policies and the creation 
of the necessary spatial practices for the industrial and economic growth. 
Therefore, in this period, the state did not just implement the import 
substitution policies but actively engaged with the infrastructural development 
such as energy production and in the creation of financial bodies to maintain 
the resource flow to finance the expansion of the productive forces. 
Simultaneously, as a part of the social-democratic compromise, the ruling class 
declared the end of class differences and immobilised the society, either 
violently repressing it or by incorporating with consent. The whole process of 
this post-passive revolutionary uneven capitalist development should be seen 
as a very complex and comprehensive formation/consolidation of the nation-
state. And the main features of this process have been determined by the 
quantitative growth that was mediated by the national ruling class (Lefebvre 
1966/2009: 139). Cardoso and Faletto (1979) make a similar conclusion by 
explaining the relationship between the periods where the productive forces 
were controlled and expanded by the enclave types of foreign capital or 
national bourgeoisie -which was still dependent on the foreign financing. It is 
possible to argue that the exogenous character of the peripheral capitalist 
space has been reproduced throughout this post-passive revolutionary process 
and, therefore, this section will unravel the conditions that transformed and 
maintained this dependency.   
The product of the Mexican passive revolution was a peripheral capitalist 
nation-state yet to be institutionalised. With the triumph of the 
constitutionalists over Victoria Huerta and the old revolutionary allies Zapata 
and Villa, Carrancist politics elevated itself on the one hand from the social 
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forces of the old regime and on the other hand from the already mobilised 
peasantry and working class and represented the vision of the middle class 
particularly within the urban and rural areas that had developed during the 
Porfiriato. By 1916, the popular armies of Carranza aŶĚ KďƌĞŐſn did 
completely seize the political and military power but, ironically, a national 
state structure was non-existent (Leal 1975: 51). Therefore, the task in front of 
the revolutionaries was the institutionalisation of the new socio-economic 
relations through establishing the foundations of the new centralised nation-
state. In that sense, the power struggle between this new institutional and 
administrative organisation and the foreign oil companies, the church and the 
organised labour  Wparticularly with the  ‘ŽŶĨĞĚĞƌĂĐŝſŶ ZĞŐŝŽŶĂů KďƌĞƌĂ
DĞǆŝĐĂŶĂ ? (the Regional Confederation of Mexican Labour -CROM) and the 
 ‘ŽŶĨĞĚĞƌĂĐŝſŶĚĞdƌĂďĂũĂĚŽƌĞƐĚĞDĠǆŝĐŽ ? (The Confederation of the Mexican 
Workers -CTM) - did have a significant impact on the formation of this new 
capitalist nation-state (Meyer 1991: 202). 
dŚĞ  ‘ŚǇďƌŝĚ ?ŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶŽĨ  ? ? ? ?ĚƌĞǁ the lines of this struggle.  Article 123 
was adopting a very liberal labour law inspired by the labour law of Britain that 
restricted monopolies, a liberal education system with Article 3, reiteration of 
the separation of the Church and the State with Article 130; all were defining 
the legal framework of a bourgeois society. However, simultaneously Article 27 
declared the whole nation as the ultimate owner of the subsoil wealth of the 
country. With this article, the expropriation of land for the public use by the 
means of indemnity was acknowledged (Herzog 1994: 104-105). Therefore, the 
constitution was recognising and protecting the capitalist social relations of 
production and property relations but, at the same time, establishing a strong 
federal government who would control and restrict it (Hamilton 1986a: 73).  
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Although, for the first time in Mexican history the unclearness and 
homogeneity has been eliminated on the landowning rights -and more 
importantly the inequality on landowning has been recognised in the 
constitution and the state has been assigned precisely to act for the sake of the 
society considering the benefits of the majority of the people with the 27
th 
article- a rigorous agrarian reform did not take ƉůĂĐĞ ?'ŽŶǌĄůĞǌ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?dŚĞ
vision of the revolutionary leaders did not include a meaningful redistribution 
of land; thus, the land distribution became a compromise dependent on the 
conjuncture (Ginzberg 1997: 56). The assassination of Carranza in 1920 did not 
change the structural conditions for the prioritisation of the establishment of 
the institutional framework for the political domination of the ruling class and 
the restructuration/restoration of the economy with the protagonist national 
bourgeoisie (Meyer 1994: 1186). 
The main characteristic of the new consolidated capitalist state was its 
determination to restore political order and to guarantee the economic 
development at any cost. It was determined to eliminate the opposition or 
criticisms in order to maintain the process of reorganisation  Wsuch as the Yaqui 
Indians of Sonora, striking workers that organised under the anarcho-
syndicalist union of the  ‘ŽŶĨĞĚĞƌĂĐŝſŶ 'ĞŶĞƌĂů ĚĞ dƌĂďĂũĂĚŽƌĞƐ ? (General 
Confederation of Workers  WCGT), the Communist Party when it ceased to 
collaborate and the Catholic peasants. The agency of this political programme 
reached ŝƚƐŚŝŐŚĞƐƚĚĞŐƌĞĞŽĨĐŽŚĞƐŝŽŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞ ‘Partido 
EĂĐŝŽŶĂů ZĞǀŽůƵĐŝŽŶĂƌŝŽ ? (the National Revolutionary Party -PNR) in 1929 
which formed a political bureaucracy that could control the federal state and 
eliminate the multiple centres of authority like caudillos and revolutionary 
generals (Leal 1975: 52; Meyer 1991: 203). PNR emerged as the main 
194 
 
instrument to control the ambitious revolutionary generals as well as the local 
governors and regional leaders who were trying to establish a local political 
base within the already mobilised regional power structures of the peasantry 
and workers. At the same time, PNR resolved the problem of the orderly 
transfer of the political power by finally institutionalising the presidential 
elections (Hamilton 1998: 80).   
It is possible to analyse this post-passive revolutionary 
restoration/reconstruction process in two interrelated yet distinct periods. 
During the first period, Mexico had witnessed the reestablishment of the 
federal authority over regionalism, the institutionalisation of the political 
power, and implementation of a profound economic and social programme. 
This period, ǁŚŝĐŚŚĂƐŝƚƐƌŽŽƚƐŝŶĂƌƌĂŶǌĂ ?ƐƉƌĞsidency until his assassination, 
ĐĂŶďĞƌŽƵŐŚůǇŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƉƌĞƐŝĚĞŶĐǇŽĨůǀĂƌŽKďƌĞŐſŶ ? ? ? ? ?-24) and 
ƚŚĞƉƌĞƐŝĚĞŶĐǇŽĨWůƵƚĂƌĐŽůşĂƐĂůůĞƐ ? ? ? ? ?-28) and between 1928 and 1934 
when the polŝƚŝĐĂů ƉŽǁĞƌ ŽĨ ĂůůĞƐ ƌĞŵĂŝŶĞĚ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘:ĞĨĞ DĂǆŝŵĂƚŽ ?. The 
reorganisation headed by the ruling class with an offensive strategy on the 
class differences in this period was based on a triangular consensus between 
ƚŚĞĂƌŵǇ ?ƚƌĂĚĞƵŶŝŽŶƐĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘ĂŐƌĂƌŝƐƚĂƐ ? where nationalism appeared as the 
common denominator. The second and last phase of the great reforming 
period of the Mexican passive revolution represented by the rise of 
 ‘ĂƌĚĞŶŝƐŵŽ ? ?the continuity of the nation-state building, corporatism through 
the compromises of the ruling class and the capitalist development but in a 
different manner. With the conditions of the great depression, the corporatism 
ŽĨƚŚĞƌƵůŝŶŐĐůĂƐƐƚŽŽŬƚŚĞƐŚĂƉĞŽĨĠƚĂƚŝƐŵ ?<ŶŝŐŚƚ ? ?  ? P ? ? ? ) ?dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ, in 
these two distinct but interrelated periods, it can be said that the Calles 
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ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶŚĂĚďĞŐƵŶ ƚŽ ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐĞ ƚŚĞ ƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ ƚŚĞĄƌĚĞŶĂƐ
administration had completed the process (Meyer 1991: 218). 
With the Constitution of 1917, the state was assuming the function of the 
 ‘^ƵƉƌĞŵĞ ƌďŝƚĞƌ ?, independent from the social classes which later on 
strengthened with the establishment of tripartite organs such as the  ‘>ĂďŽƵƌ
ZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĂƌĚ ? ?  ‘EĂƚŝŽŶĂů ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ŽŶ DŝŶŝŵƵŵ tĂŐĞƐ ? ? ‘EĂƚŝŽŶĂů
ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶĨŽƌƚŚĞWĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶŽĨtŽƌŬĞƌƐŝŶŽŵƉĂŶǇWƌŽĨŝƚƐ ?ƚŚĂƚwere in 
charge of conciliating different class interests (Leal 1975: 55). These organs and 
the arbiter role of the state in return served to immobilise the working class 
that gradually turned into the bases of popular support. In 1931, a new labour 
ĐŽĚĞ  ‘>Ă >ĞǇ &ĞĚĞƌĂů dƌĂďĂũŽ ? (Federal Labour Law) was accepted with the 
encouragement of the CROM. The law regulated the article 123 of the 
constitution and established very restricted and ordered labour-employer 
relations where the trade unions assigned to help in ĨŝŶĚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƉĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚ
ĨŽƌŵƵůĂ ĨŽƌ ĐůĂƐƐ ƉĞĂĐĞ ? ďǇ ŵĂŬŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞ ǁŽƌŬĞƌ ĂŶĚ
ĞŵƉůŽǇĞƌ ‘ŚĂƌŵŽŶŝŽƵƐ ?ũƵƐƚĂŶĚŽƌĚĞƌůǇ ? ?ĞůĂƌďĞ ? ? ? ? P    ) ?
ƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞƉƌĞƐŝĚĞŶĐŝĞƐŽĨůǀĂƌŽKďƌĞŐſŶĂŶĚůşĂƐĂůůĞƐĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ
DĂǆŝŵĂƚŽ ?ƚŚĞƌĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƌĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞĂƐĂ ‘ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐůŝŬĞ ?
mechanism which creates the necessary conditions for the economic 
development were based on a nationalist programme that aimed for a 
systematic expansion of the productive forces. The centralisation and re-
institutionalisation of the state by laying down the administrative foundations 
of the state intervention was the necessary condition for the accumulation of 
ĐĂƉŝƚĂůĂŶĚƐƚĂƌƚĞĚĂƐĞĂƌůǇĂƐĂƌƌĂŶǌĂ ?ƐƉƌĞƐŝĚĞŶĐǇďǇƚŚĞĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ
 ‘^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌşĂ ĚĞ /ŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂ ? ŽŵĞƌĐŝŽ Ǉ dƌĂďĂũŽ ? (the ministry of industry, 
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commerce and labour) in 1917. The role and the authority of the state was 
significantly expanded by the creation of other administrative instruments 
such as  ‘ŽŵŝƐŝſŶ EĂĐŝŽŶĂů ĚĞ ĂŵŝŶŽƐ ? (National Highway Commission), the 
 ‘ŽŵŝƐŝſŶ EĂĐŝŽŶĂů ĚĞ /ƌƌŝŐĂĐŝſŶ ? (National Irrigation Commission), and the 
 ‘ŽŵŝƐƐŝſŶEĂĐŝŽŶĂůĚĞ&ƵĞƌǌĂDŽƚƌŝǌ ? (National Power Comission) during the 
ƉƌĞƐŝĚĞŶĐŝĞƐŽĨKďƌĞŐſŶ and Calles (Middlebrook 1995: 24). These institutions 
enabled the construction of the basic infrastructures through public 
investments which significantly increased the total cultivated land and the 
network of highways enhanced the production and productivity in general 
 ?DŝĞƌ Ǉ dĞƌĄŶ ĂŶĚ ĚĞ ůĂ DŽƌĂ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ) ? Ɛ Ă ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂů ŝŶĨƌĂƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂů
necessity for the industrial growth, the  ‘ŽŵŝƐŝſŶ EĂĐŝŽŶĂů ĚĞ ZŝĞŐŽ ? was 
established to construct hydroelectric dams for the energy production 
(Hamilton 1988: 83).  
With the help of these governmental bodies, a four year plan of building ten 
thousand kilometres of road networks was undertaken and materialised, and 
the construction of the South Pacific railway from Nogales (Arizona) to 
Guadalajara was completed. It is important to note that the construction of 
dams and canals between 1925 and 1928 accounted for 6.5 percent of the 
national budget which manifests the role of state in the formation of the 
necessary conditions of the economic growth (Meyer 1991: 220).   
Parallel to the administrative re-organisation, the state emerged as the 
primary financial source and the controlling mechanism of the capital 
accumulation, allocation and investment. The Constitution of 1917 gave the 
responsibility for determining the monetary and credit policies exclusively to 
the federal government and with the article 73 and 28 entrusted it to legislate, 
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establish and control the credit institutions and the central bank (Navarrete 
1967: 115). In 1924, the  ‘ŽŵŝƐŝſŶ EĂĐŝŽŶĂů ĂŶĐĂƌŝĂ ? (National Banking 
Commission) was created alongside the  ‘ĂŶĐŽĚĞDĠǆŝĐŽ ? (1925) as a central 
bank with an initial 50 million pesos capital and other financial institutions 
such as  ‘ĂŶĐŽ EĂĐŝŽŶĂů ĚĞ ƌĠĚŝƚŽ ŐƌşĐŽůĂ ? (National Bank of Agricultural 
Credit) (1926) had been set up as the main sources of capital distribution 
(Middlebrook 1995: 25). The establishment of the  ‘ĂŶĐŽEĂĐŝŽŶĂů,ŝƉŽƚĞĐĂƌŝŽ
Urbano y de Obras PƷďůŝĐĂƐ ? (National Bank of Urban Mortgages and Public 
Works  WBANOBRAS -1933),  ‘EĂĐŝŽŶĂů &ŝŶĂŶĐŝĞƌĂ ? (NAFINSA -1934), and the 
 ‘ĂŶĐŽ EĂĐŝŽŶĂů ŽŵĞƌĐŝŽ ǆƚĞƌŝŽƌ ? (National Bank of Foreign Commerce -
1937), significantly increased the role of the state in the financial system. 
While 80 percent of the banking sector financing was private in the beginning 
of the 1930s, it was decreased to 38 percent in 1939, with the Central Bank 
holding 34 percent and the other national banks financing 28 percent of the 
banking sector (Tamayo 1988: 685). In that sense, the state became the most 
substantive credit source of the capitalist accumulation process. However, it 
ŚĂƐ ƚŽ ďĞ ŶŽƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƐƚĂƚĞ ĂƐ Ă ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝŶŐ ƐŽƵƌĐĞ ? ĚŝĚ ŶŽƚ ĐŚĂŶŐĞ ƚŚĞ
exogenous character of the peripheral capitalist accumulation since this 
financing was also dependent on the foreign financial sources in different 
forms; international loans, investments and aids or the overvaluation of the 
national currency. The reconstruction of the banking system was very crucial 
for the success of the national bourgeoisie to have the sufficient support in 
order to carry out the continual economic growth and furthering the expansion 
of the capitalist productive forces (Morton 2011: 99). 
Meanwhile, under the Calles administration, the  ‘^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌşĂ ĚĞ ,ĂĐŝĞŶĚĂ Ǉ
ƌĠĚŝƚŽWƷďůŝĐŽ ? (the Ministry of Hacienda and Finance) was strengthened and 
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became the body in charge of the centralisation of the financial control of the 
federal government. The ministry of finance also become responsible for the 
supervision of the emission of the national currency. While technically the 
central bank was independent from the state, five of the nine members of the 
directive board were appointed by the ministry of finance; thus, in practice it 
was ensured that the policies of the bank would be compatible with the 
federal ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ ?ĂŝŵƐƚŽƐƉĞĞĚƵƉ economic development (Beteta 1967: 
73). Thus, the state emerged as the main promoter and mediator of the 
conditions of the capital accumulation that became, in time of necessity, able 
to canalise resources to the favoured sectors (Hamilton 1998: 84).           
Therefore, at the end of the 1920s, the state appeared as the body that was 
providing guarantees to the modern sectors of the national bourgeoisie and to 
the foreign capital. The direct investments of the foreign capital on the railway 
operations, mining and electricity production had expanded and increased in 
value. It is worth noting that during this period the North American capital 
strengthened its dominant position in the Mexican economy. The U.S. origin 
foreign capital was reaching 80 percent in the mineral production and 95 
percent in the oil production. Meanwhile, the U.S. had become the main 
foreign trade partner of Mexico. Mainly composed of minerals and agricultural 
products the U.S. was the consumer of 65 to 85 percent of the Mexican 
exports while also the main importer of the Mexican economy by selling iron 
and steel, machinery, tools, automobiles and construction materials which 
constituted 75 percent of the total imports of Mexico (Hamilton 1998: 77). 
Calles also sought to maintain the balance between the social forces that were 
being forcibly incorporated inƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚ ? tŚŝůĞ KďƌĞŐſŶ
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had focused on giving compromises to the peasantry by paying off Zapatistas 
and other peasant groups in Morelia and Guerrero and distributed one million 
hector ejidal land in four years, Calles considerably slowed this process of land 
distribution. He took the leader of CROM, Luis N. Morones, into his cabinet and 
hence gained a strong popular support among almost one million organised 
workers (Meyer 1994: 1189). CROM which was tied to the state from its very 
ŽƌŝŐŝŶƐ ƉůĂǇĞĚ Ă ǀĞƌǇ ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ ƌŽůĞ ĨŽƌ ĂĐŚŝĞǀŝŶŐ ĂůůĞƐ ? Ăŝŵ to reconcile 
capital and labour under the supervision of state and demobilise the working 
class (Delarbe 1976: 135; Meyer 1991: 229). 
At the end of the reconstruction of the economy and institutionalisation of the 
political power the conditions of the post-passive revolutionary period became 
more apparent in the rise of Cardenismo within the context of the great 
ĚĞƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?ƐĂƐƚƌŽŶŐĐĞŶƚƌĂůŝƐƚ ?ĄƌĚĞŶĂƐďĞůŝĞǀĞĚin the federal state as the 
utmost national authority and acknowledged that the private capital would 
play the most significant role in the reform process while some corporatist 
components -that have strongly controlled and linked to the national body- 
would also be existing and benefiting (Ginzberg 1997: 84).
33
 In that sense, the 
last profound reforming process of the Mexican revolution was, in fact, 
representing a continuity of a dialectical process of state-building, corporatism 
and capitalist development (Knight 1991: 245).  
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 For a great comparison between two agrarista governors Adalberto TejĄda and LĄzaro 
CĄrdenas who governed Veracruz and MichoacĄn between 1928 and 1934 see Eitan Ginzberg 
 ? ? ? ? ? )  ‘/ĚĞŽůŽŐşa, polştica y la cuestiſŶ ĚĞ ůĂƐ ƉƌŝŽƌŝĚĂĚĞƐ P >ĄǌĂƌŽ ĄƌĚĞŶĂƐ Ǉ ĚĂůďĞƌƚŽ
Tejada, 1928- ? ? ? ? ? ?Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos, 13(1), pp. 55-85. Ginzberg 
ĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞĚ ƚŚĞ ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ dĞũĂĚĂ ĂŶĚ ĄƌĚĞŶĂƐ ŝŶ ƚĞƌŵƐ ŽĨ ĨŽƌŵŝŶŐ Ă ƉŽƉƵlar 
front based on a radical and decentralised peasant movement in the former  Wand failed in the 
presidential elections-, or on a centralist movement that brings peasantry, working class and 
the bourgeois together in the latter.     
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Knight (1991) directly explained the differences of Cardenismo  Win terms of the 
agrarian reform and the manner of the state interventionism- from its 
ƉƌĞĚĞĐĞƐƐŽƌƐ ? strategies with the impact of Great Depression. The economic 
contraction was already a reality since 1926 but, in 1932, the Mexican foreign 
trade fell by two thirds and the import capacity of Mexico fell by almost fifty 
percent. The falling exports brought great distress to the export-oriented 
regions like Yucatan and Laguna and many agricultural lands remained 
uncultivated (Knight 1991: 257). Thus, the hacienda which played a significant 
role during the primitive capitalist accumulation and the uneven and combined 
development of the capitalist forces throughout the 19
th
 century had gradually 
became an obstacle to the  ‘ƉĞĂĐĞĨƵů ? ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐƚ ƐŽĐŝal 
relations, and was now ready to be eliminated with the great Agrarian reform 
ŽĨ>ĂǌĂƌŽĄƌĚĞŶĂƐ ? 
Ǉ ? ? ? ? ?ĄƌĚĞŶĂƐŚĂĚĚŝƐƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚ ? ?ŵŝůůŝŽŶŚĞĐƚĂƌĞƐŽĨůĂŶĚ ?ƚŚƵƐ ?ŵĂŬŝŶŐ ? ?
percent of the cultivated land ejidal property and the total number of 
recipients reached to 800 thousand peasants which doubled the ejidal 
population of 1930. Therefore, organised under the  ‘ŽŶĨĞĚĞƌĂĐŝſŶ ĚĞ
ĂŵƉĞƐŝŶŽƐ DĞǆŝĐĂŶŽƐ ? (the Mexican Peasants Confederation -CCM), the 
peasantry mobilisation was taken under control by the state, once and for all. 
The National Bank of Ejidal Credit (ĂŶĐŽ EĂĐŝŽŶĂů ĚĞ ƌĠĚŝƚŽ ĚĞ ũŝĚĂů  W
established in 1937) became the main financing source of the agrarian reform 
and the modernisation of the agricultural production and undertook ambitious 
projects of irrigation, road construction and electrification of the rural areas -a 
process which eventually the private sector was benefited mostly from it 
(Knight 1991: 261). 
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A parallel process was occurring within the working class movement. With the 
establishment of the  ‘ŽŶĨĞĚĂƌĂĐŝſŶĚĞdƌĂďĂũĂĚŽƌĞƐĚĞDĠǆŝĐŽ ? (the Mexican 
Workers Confederation -CTM) as the biggest working organisation both 
including vertical and horizontal unions, the working class was turned into an 
organised mass movement under the state aegis consolidating the government 
ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ? dŚĞ ƉŽƉƵůĂƌ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ŽĨ ĄƌĚĞŶĂƐ ŶĞĞĚĞĚ ƐƵĐŚ ĂŶ ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĞĚ ĂŶĚ
independent labour movement which is loyal to the government (Delarbe 
 ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ) ? dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ? ĄƌĚĞŶĂƐ ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĂůůǇ ĂƉƉĞĂůĞĚ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƵŶĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů
support of the organised labour and peasantry either for the implementation 
ŽĨ ŚŝƐ  ‘^ŝǆ-zĞĂƌ WůĂŶ ? ĂŶĚ ƌĞĨŽƌŵƐ Žƌ ƚŚĞ Ğxpropriation of railways and 
petroleum (Delarbe 1976: 141). This support was not generated by the general 
ƐǇŵƉĂƚŚǇ ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ ĄƌĚĞŶĂƐ ďƵƚ, rather, it was a product of the concrete 
benefits offered by the Cardenista policies to the oil workers or to the 
ejidatarios of the Laguna (Knight 1994: 80). 
The expropriation and fundamental reorganisation of the railways in 1937 and 
petroleum in 1938 undeƌ ƚŚĞ  ‘WĞƚƌſůĞŽƐ DĞǆŝĐĂŶŽƐ ? (PEMEX) did not change 
ƚŚĞ ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ? ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚhad been established in 
these companies became an appendix of the state bureaucracy gradually 
(Knight 1991: 279). Furthermore, the expropriations did not have an impact on 
the Mexican economy while the foreign investment and the North American 
credits remained channelled on mines, steel, paper, cement and chemical 
production and hydroelectric power projects (Knight 1991: 306). 
Therefore, when the great reformation process of the Mexican passive 
revolution finally ended, the Mexican capitalist accumulation and industrial 
development -which had its roots in the colonial period and reached its climax 
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during the Porfiriato (1876-1910) and which was characterised in the previous 
chapters by its exogenous character and limitation to the uneven exchange of 
primary products- was not changed by the revolutionaries but, in fact, 
institutionalised and mediated through the concessions of the state to the 
peasantry and the working classes. However, the fundamental change in the 
structure of the Mexican economy was the consolidation of the industrial 
expansion which moved from the production pattern of the exportation of 
primary goods to an economy that the capital accumulation mainly based on 
the development of the import substitution industries (Smith 1991: 323). The 
development of the manufacturing industry starting from the 1940s within the 
context of increasing demand on Mexican products during the war period laid 
the foundations of the industries and capital that re-oriented for the 
exportation in 1980s trade liberalisation. 
4.2. Neoliberal restructuring and trade liberalisation as the conditions of the 
export-oriented positioning of Mexico  
sŝůůĂƌĞĂů ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? )ƉĞƌŝŽĚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĚŝƐƚŝŶŐƵŝƐŚĞƐ ƚǁŽĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚ Ɛƚages in the import 
substitution-oriented economic growth and industrial expansion of the 
Mexican economy. During the first stage (1939-1958), the intermediary goods 
and capital were needed for the domestic production of the consumer goods 
which created a structural demand in the importation of these factors while 
the exportation remained limited with the primary goods and manifested a 
sluggish growth which was mainly dependent on the international demand. 
However, gradually the capability of the exportation of the primary goods to 
finance the expansion of the industrial growth was decreased in the post-war 
era (Fujii 2000: 1008). The export of this limited number of primary goods was 
a significant condition of the successful functioning of the import substitution-
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oriented economic programme in terms of financing the imports of the 
necessary intermediary goods and the machinery. In the absence of a 
substantial growth of these sectors, appealing to the short term foreign 
financial loans eventually becomes inevitable. In this first stage, thanks to the 
war time demand created by the U.S. and UK for the Mexican goods and 
additionally with government support a significant expansion of the industrial 
production was materialised. Furthermore, the Mexican governments had 
used the devaluation as a financial tool in order to control the balance of 
payments and to limit imports. Nominal devaluation in the Mexican peso was 
approximately 78 percent in 1948, 1949 and 1950, coupled with these external 
conditions and the growth of the Mexican imports (8.2%) lagged behind the 
ƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂůŐƌŽǁƚŚŽĨƚŚĞĞǆƉŽƌƚƐ  ?ZĂŵşƌĞǌ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?DĞĂŶǁŚŝů , the foreign 
investment reached to 1.134 million dollars of which 505 million dollars 
constituting the foreign debt that used as a way of short-term financing of the 
ISI development (Villareal 1976: 11).  
In the second more complex and advanced stage of the import substitution-
oriented policies (1959-1970), the production pattern of the Mexican economy 
moved to the manufactured commodities, particularly to the production of the 
intermediary goods. Although during this stage the capacity and the diversity 
in the production of the manufactured goods increased considerably, the 
impact of this structural change on the exports remained limited due to the 
overvalued rate of exchange rates. During this period, while the growth of the 
importation of goods dynamically expanded to 6 billion dollars in 1976 from 2 
billion dollars in 1959, the growth of the exports did not catch the same pace 
and only increased to 3.35 billion dollars from 772 million dollars during the 
same period (NAFINSA 1978: 388). Thus, gradually the deficit in the balance of 
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payments increased from 152 million dollars in 1959, to 1.115 million dollars in 
1970 and to 3.692 million dollars in 1974 even the exports of goods and 
services grew more than three-fold. The disequilibrium in the payments of the 
Mexican economy was also accentuated by the increasing payments of 
imported services particularly caused by the foreign investment returns and 
debts payments (Villareal 1976: 13; Table 4.1).  
Table 4.1. Macroeconomic Performance of Mexico during the first half of 1970s  
Year 1970-1971 1971-1972 1972-1973 1973-1974 1974-1975 1970-1975 
GDP growth 
(%) 
3.4 7.3 7.6 5.9 4.0 5.7 
Inflation rate  
(WPI) (%) 
5.4 4.9 12 23.7 15 12 
 
Year 1970       1971        1972       1973      1974        1975 1970-75 
Current 
Account 
Balance* 
 
-1.115 
      
      -718.9 
 
-1.303.1 
 
-2.399 
 
    -3.633 
 
-4.331.7 
 
-14.493 
Balance of  
liquidity 
-1.651 -1.174.9 -799.1 1.554 3.010 -3.643.4 -10.840 
Source: Villareal (1976: 194), Cuadro 48: Mexico: Alcance de los Objetivos de Equilibrio Interno y Externo 
*million dollars.   
 
The exhaustion of the stabilised growth model, which leaves the financing of 
the industrial and infrastructural expansion mostly to the private sector, led 
the ĐŚĞǀĞƌƌşĂ ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ  ? ? ? ? ?-76) to substantially increase the public 
expenditure to revive its deteriorating legitimacy, and thus, raising the 
aggregate demand and accelerating the ISI policies by substituting the capital 
goods production (Morton 2011: 113). This led to a considerable increase of 
the money supply and put a significant pressure on the exchange rate, and 
ŐƌĂĚƵĂůůǇ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƐĞƌǀĞƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĂŶĐŽ ĚĞ DĠǆŝĐŽ ĚĞƚĞƌŝŽƌĂƚĞĚ  ?ZĂŵşƌĞǌ  ? ? ? ? P
52). 
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As it has been argued above, the last significant ISI period during the 
ƉƌĞƐŝĚĞŶĐǇŽĨĐŚĞǀĞƌƌşĂĞŶĚĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ ? ?ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚĚĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨthe peso in 
1976 after 22 years of stable currency policy (12.5 peso/dollar). Furthermore, 
talks with the IMF commenced and a three-year austerity programme was 
initiated which was envisaged trade liberalisation and a substantial reduction 
of the public deficit through the reduction of public employment. However, 
the discovery of the 40.194 billion barrels oil reserves in 1978 had altered the 
macroeconomic perceptions and started a period ŽĨ  ‘ƉĞƚƌŽůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ŝŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ 
the commitments for the reduction of public deficits had been largely 
ĚŝƐƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚ ?ZĂŵşƌĞǌ ? ? ? ? P ? ?; del Castillo 1996: 28). At that point, there were 
two main sources that were financing this increasing public spending; the 
money supply and borrowing from private sector which made the dependent 
and exogenous character of the peripheral capitalist accumulation more 
salient. The rate of money supply soared from 33.2 percent in 1980 to 61 
percent in 1982 while the foreign debt grew from the 29 percent of GDP in 
1979 to 61 percent of GDP in 1982 climbing from 3.2 billion dollars to 100 
billion dollars  ?ZĂŵşƌĞǌ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ?; Otero 1996: 6). In that sense, Mexico had 
exhausted all foreign dependent ways of financing the ISI strategies  W
agriculture, oil revenues and foreign debts- and was forced to reorient its 
economy very rapidly towards another form of foreign dependent economic 
growth (Otero 1996: 7).   
The overvaluation of the peso resulted in the heavy speculation against the 
currency by the end of 1981 which drove the Mexican foreign exchange 
market into a severe crisis. In 1982, the Mexican bankers and the external 
financial resources pulled their money out of Mexico -repeating the capital 
flight of 1976 and 1977- whiĐŚ ĚƌĂŝŶĞĚ ƚŚĞ ĂŶĐŽ ĚĞ DĠǆŝĐŽ ?Ɛ ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ
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exchange reserves, making it unable service its foreign debt. This led to the 90-
day moratorium of the foreign debt servicing and the nationalisation of the 
Mexican-owned commercial banks (Marois 2012: 71). These draconian 
measures had been recommended by the IMF under the name of an economic 
adjustment and stabilisation programme (ůWƌŽŐƌĂŵĂ/ŵĞĚŝĂƚŽZĞŽƌĚĞŶĂĐŝſŶ
Economica) which was implemented by the administrations of de la Madrid 
(1982-88) and Salinas de Gortari (1988-94). The programme envisaged a very 
sharp reduction in public spending accompanied by the complete reorientation 
of economy by liberalising the domestic and foreign trade regimes  ?ZĂŵşƌĞǌ
1993: 181).  
Although the increasing oil prices helped Mexico to generate foreign currency 
 Wwhich was reaching 70 percent of the foreign currency generated by the total 
exports- the disequilibrium of the balance of payments continued (Fujii 2000: 
1011). From 1982 to 1986, the annual growth remained 0.3 and the GDP 
decreased by 2.4 each year. When the international financial markets closed 
the capital flow to Mexico starting from the beginning of 1980s, the Mexican 
economy found itself being forced to open its economy and transform towards 
an export-oriented economy starting in 1987. In this respect, the pace of 
economic liberalisation accelerated when Mexico entered into a General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Traders (GATT) in 1986, accompanied by the 
extensive cuts in the public spending (Gates 1996: 47).   
It can be claimed that although the ISI policies had been successful between 
1940 and 1970 in achieving a 6.5 percent annual economic growth and in 
expanding the industrial production up to a significant level which later on 
became the basis for the EOI development in the 1980s, the overprotection, 
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overregulation and indiscriminate generic stimulation created an 
uncompetitive and inefficient economic environment where the monopolies 
could take advantage of the continual appreciation of the value of the peso 
(Vellinga 2000: 294; Villareal and Villareal 2001: 777). Therefore, the trade 
liberalisation and re-orientation of the economy for the exportation of 
manufactured goods was seen as the only option for tackling the balance of 
payment crisis. In fact, since the first oil shock, the replacement of the planned 
economy with an export-orientated liberal economy was being defended in 
order to avoid the inevitable economic stalemate. However, a transition period 
was envisaged for this wholesale transformation which would start with the 
realisation of the foreign exchange rates. This short-term monetary policy 
would be followed by the adaptation of a model of export orientation that 
necessitates devaluation of the peso, stabilisation of the public spending (thus 
balance of payments) and the liberalisation of trade (Villareal 1976: 205). 
Under the presidency of Salinas, these features of the neoliberal restructuring 
were implemented very rapidly and vigorously. While the extensive 
deregulation and tax reform procedures were undertaken, 800 public 
enterprises either sold or closed down which not only increased the role of the 
private sector in the economy but also accumulated 23.7 billion dollars of 
revenue between 1989-1993, and the traditional ejidal was system exposed to 
the national and -unconstitutionally- EŽƌƚŚŵĞƌŝĐĂŶĐĂƉŝƚĂů ?ƐĂƐƐĂƵůƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ
 ‘WůĂŶ EĂĐŝŽŶĂů ĚĞ DŽĚĞƌŶŝǌĂĐŝſŶ ĚĞů ĂŵƉŽ ?(National Plan of Rural 
Modernisation) between 1990-1994 paving way to the liberal NAFTA system of 
agribusiness (Dussel 1996: 65; Gates 1996: 51).  
The transformation of the Mexican economy from an ISI based economy to an 
economy to an export-oriented industrial growth (EOI) based on the 
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exportation of manufactured goods brought an expansion of both maquiladora 
and non-maquiladora industries and between 1989 and 1997 the total exports 
grew by 13 percent annually. In this respect, as it was a central aspect of the ISI 
strategies, the manufacturing sector and its shift towards a  ‘ĨůĞǆŝďůĞ
ƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ŵŽĚĞů ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚ ƚŽ ďĞ Ă ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂnt element of the 
macroeconomic liberalisation of Mexico (Dussel 1996: 64-65). The expansion 
of the maquila industry gradually became a very significant aspect of the EOI 
based neoliberal reorganisation and, by 2001 the maquila industry reached a 
size of 3600 firms employing 1.3 million workers (26 percent of the industrial 
employment; in 2004, 24.5 percent) responsible for 50 percent of the total 
exports that spread to all of the other regions where the maquila is not 
traditionally developed (Harris 1993: 164; Biles 2004: 521).  
Initially designed with the  ‘WƌŽŐƌĂŵĂĚĞ /ŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůŝǌĂĐŝſŶĚĞ ůĂ&ŽŶƚĞƌĂEŽƌƚĞ
ĚĞDĠǆŝĐŽ ? (Border Industrialisation Programme) in 1965 for the absorption of 
the 200.000 Mexican seasonal workers that had returned to Mexico in 1964 
ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ƵŶŝůĂƚĞƌĂůƚĞƌŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƌĂĐĞƌŽWƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ ?
that had permitted the Mexican workers to work in the U.S. temporarily, the 
maquila was gradually tailored to meet the needs of the peripheral economy in 
the neoliberal economic system (South 1990: 551). The production in maquila 
is based on the tax exempt importation of the primary materials and 
components to assemble and finalise the production and export back to 
market of the parenting company  Wthe United States. The maquila 
manufacturing is mainly motivated by cheap labour and its flexibility in terms 
of location/relocation options and precarious labour relations.    
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The maquila programme during the 1970s and 1980s did formalise and 
liberalise the maquila manufacturing and the territorial restrictions that limited 
the maquila industry to a 20 km strip south of the U.S. border and the 
limitations on the access to the domestic markets for the maquila outputs 
were lifted (MacLachlan and Aguilar: 1998: 317). During the early 1990s 
ŵĂƋƵŝůĂĚŽƌĂƐǁĞƌĞƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ŬĞǇƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ?ŝŶƚŚĞŽǀĞƌĂůůƌĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌŝŶŐ
of the Mexican economy towards neoliberalism and free trade. In the example 
ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƐƚĂƚĞŽĨzƵĐĂƚĄŶ ?the abundant workforce which had been created by 
the collapse of the henequen industry in the 1970s and the decreasing 
employment capacities in mining and agriculture created appropriate 
ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ŵĂƋƵŝůĂ ĞǆƉĂŶƐŝŽŶ ? dŚĞ ŵĂƋƵŝůĂƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ zƵĐĂƚĄŶ ƐƚĂƚĞ
became more profitable since the average wages are 30 percent less than the 
EŽƌƚŚĞƌŶ ďŽƌĚĞƌ ŵĂƋƵŝůĂĚŽƌĂƐ ? dŚĞ  ‘,ĞŶĞƋƵĞŶ ŽŶĞ ZĞƐƚƌƵcturing 
WƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ ? ƚŚĂƚ ǁĂƐ implemented by the government in 1984 to achieve a 
 ‘ďĂůĂŶĐĞĚĂŶĚƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďůĞƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ?ŚĂƐƉůĂǇĞĚĂƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚƌŽůĞ
in its expansion in the region. The export-oriented maquiladora industry first 
ůŽĐĂƚĞĚ ĂŶĚ ĐŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĐĂƉŝƚĂů ĐŝƚǇ DĠƌŝĚĂ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞŶ ĞǆƉĂŶĚĞĚ
towards the rural areas where the wages are even cheaper (Biles 2004: 526).      
The liberalisation of the maquiladora rules and the devaluation of the Mexican 
peso in 1982 and 1995 played a significant role in the expansion of the 
maquiladora industry and maquila employment in the interior parts of Mexico 
ĞǀĞŶ ƚŚŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ ďŽƌĚĞƌ ĐŝƚŝĞƐ ƐƵĐŚ ĂƐ :ƵĄƌĞǌ ? dŝũƵĂŶĂ ĂŶĚDĂƚĂŵŽƌŽƐ Ɛƚŝůů
accounted for almost half of the total maquila employment. This should be 
seen as the initial phase of intensification of the neoliberal capitalist relations 
of production towards the relatively underdeveloped regions of the periphery. 
In the long run the inner states like DƵƌĂŶŐŽ ?:ĂůŝƐĐŽĂŶĚzƵĐĂƚĄŶƵƚŝůŝƐĞĚƚŚĞ 
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comparative advantage in ensuring lower wages than the northern cities, and 
thus became more attractive for the maquilas who continually aims to find 
cheaper unskilled labour. Therefore, while the low-technology labour-intensive 
clothing and textile production is minor in the North, it composed the 40 
percent of the production of the maquilas in the inner states by 1995 
(MacLahan and Aguilar 1998: 320).  
However, this rapid growth in both maquila and non-maquila manufacturing 
did not change the balance of payments problem since the Mexican imports 
showed high levels of elasticity which had been increasing due to the 
expansion of the exports of the manufactured goods. In other words, Mexico 
needed to import the components of the manufactured goods to be exported 
and consumed in the domestic market. In the 1994 peso crisis, the trade deficit 
that was financed by the volatile portfolio capital reached 68.5 billion dollars 
which led to the subsequent devaluation of the peso (Fujii 2000: 1012). The 
nationalisation of the banking system in 1982 until the conclusion of the 
reprivatisation of the banks in 1992 left the biggest corporate conglomerates 
temporarily deprived from the financing of the necessary technological 
modernisation of the industries in order to respond to the pressures of the 
export-orientation which had been intensified after NAFTA membership. In 
1996, the imports of heavy machinery and equipment from the U.S. reached 
15.3 percent (611 million dollars) of the total exports from this country and 
increased to 21.2 percent (1.026 millon dollars) in the following year (Vellinga 
2000: 302). Under the NAFTA conditions, the big business (grupos) had not 
only found itself enforced to internationalise in the technomanagerial field but 
also encountered channels to establish co-investments and partnerships with 
the North American companies both in Mexico and abroad (Vellinga 2000: 
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303). During the Salinas administration, the export initiatives were significantly 
limited to the modernisation of custom rules, ports and railways in order to 
maintain the exogenous variables of the liberalisation. The automotive, 
computer and pharmaceutical industries remained as exceptions where the 
investments dominated by the transnational companies enjoyed import-duty 
free inputs or valued-added tax reimbursements (Dussel 1996: 71).         
The rapid liberalisation of the markets and the international trade regime by 
reducing the tariffs accompanied by the overvaluation of the peso (around 30 
percent), which stimulated the export-oriented industry to develop on a 
pattern that requires importation of the intermediate goods. Mexico, in a very 
short time, became one of the most open and liberal economies in the world in 
terms of its integration to the international trade and financial markets 
(Villareal and Villareal 2001: 778). However, this rapid and ambitious 
integration led to the cycles of expansion of economic output-appreciation of 
national currency-rising importation-depreciation of the national currency 
 ?şĂǌ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ?With the liberalisation of the foreign investment regulations, 
the foreign investments became the main financing source of the EOI model 
and the current account deficit. However, it is important to note that the share 
of the foreign direct investment in the manufacturing sector in the total 
foreign investments fell from 54.4 percent in 1988 to below 30 percent in 
 ? ? ? ? ? ŵĂŬŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĞǆŽŐĞŶŽƵƐ ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌ ŽĨ DĞǆŝĐŽ ?Ɛ peripheral capitalist 
spatiality more dependent on the volatile portfolio investments. In 1990, the 
Salinas administration took advantage of the privatisation of the nationalised 
banks to further liberalise the financial system through amending Articles 28 
and 123 of the Mexican constitution to permit full private ownership of the 
commercial banks (Marois 2012: 81). In addition to foreign direct and portfolio 
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investment, the dependency on the external debt in the form of private 
borrowings and dollar denominated government bonds that were called 
 ‘ƚĞƐŽďŽŶŽƐ ? were increased significantly (Dussel 1996: 68-70). This 
uncontrolled expansion of the foreign debt eventually resulted in the 1994 
debt crises which once again drained foreign exchange reserves and pushed 
the interest rates high (Marois 2012: 96). In this respect, the dependency of 
the peripheral capitalist space on the external finance has been reproduced 
and perpetuated through the neoliberal reforms and restructuring processes 
as well. 
Thus, it is possible to claim that suffering from the lack of technological and 
financial competitiveness, the prematurely and very rapidly liberalised 
peripheral economy finds itself structurally forced and capable to expand 
towards its own periphery and create the conditions of an uneven 
development ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚŽƐĞ  ‘ŵĂƌŐŝŶĂů ? ƐƉĂĐĞƐ within the processes of neoliberal 
territorialisation. The expansion of the maquiladora industries towards inner 
and southern Mexico and from there towards Central America is one of the 
significant indicators of this expansion and integration process of the 
neoliberal capitalist production patterns. This process of expansion has been 
followed by the increasing formalisation and normalisation of the very 
exploitative maquiladora system and the inevitable unification with the non-
maquiladora industries. In this pƌŽĐĞƐƐ ŽĨ  ‘ŵĂƋƵŝůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ŽĨ industry, every 
manufacturing plant in Mexico was expected to resemble the maquiladora yet 
they would be free from maquiladora regulations (MacLachan and Aguilar 
1998: 329). Thus, in the long term the unionised, higher waged and regulated 
manufacturing industry would be replaced by flexible, non-organised, and 
precarious and underpaid forms of production which completely rely on the 
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foreign  Wmainly U.S.- demand and supply. Four industries that accounted for 
75 percent of the U.S. owned maquiladoras; apparel, electronic accessories 
(including computer parts and electronic circuitry) electronic machinery 
(including television sets and other small domestic appliances), and transport 
equipment and parts (primarily motor vehicles) are the industries that can 
easily be separated from the R&D, component production and final assembly, 
which creates a further dependency on the parent country and thus a high 
level of sensibility in terms of the employment volatility (Bergin et al. 2009: 
1666).  
In that sense, parallel to the neoliberal restructuring and adjustment of the 
Mexican economy which resulted in the integration of Mexico with NAFTA and 
relocated the Mexican economy within the new international division of labour 
through changing the production patterns and structures. Since the neoliberal 
restructuring and its membership to NAFTA, the exports of Mexico increased 
unprecedentedly from 61 billion dollars to 350 billion dollars in 2011 (Table 
4.2). 
Table 4.2.Total exports/imports of Mexico 
between 1990 and 2011 in US dollars 
Year Exports Imports 
1990 40.62 41.48 
1991 42.6 49.8 
1992 46.04 61.87 
1993 51.79 65.31 
1994 60.82 79.39 
1995 79.45 72.57 
1996 95.55 88.77 
1997 110.16 109.4 
1998 117.35 125.36 
1999 136.01 141.46 
2000 166.25 174.23 
2001 158.8 168.42 
2002 160.51 168.17 
2003 164.69 170.44 
2004 187.49 195.75 
2005 214.19 221.94 
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2006 250.01 256.25 
2007 271.4 281.53 
2008 290.5 307.1 
2009 229.46 234.28 
2010 297.78 300.76 
2011 349.81 351.17 
Source: /E'/ ? ĂŶĐŽ ĚĞ /ŶĨŽƌŵĂĐŝſŶ ĐŽŶſŵŝĐĂ 
(2012). 
 
It has also been observed that labour-intensive manufacturing is replacing 
itself with the production of the high value added manufacturing and service 
sector in the north and central Mexico while labour-intensive manufacturing of 
capital goods would be reallocated in the south and southeast of the country, 
reproducing the conditions of the uneven development both domestically 
between the regions of Mexico that exacerbated the social polarisation and 
externally between Mexico and the other members of NAFTA by making 
Mexico more dependent in its international trade (Otero 1996: 3; Torres 2006: 
48). By 2011, the share of North America in the total exports of Mexico 
reached 81.6 percent of the total exports while the total exports to the Central 
American countries expanded more than three-fold from 1.8 billion dollars in 
2002 to 5.5 billion dollars in 2011 (Table 4.3). This North American dependent 
structure of the Mexican economy is the product of the neoliberal rescaling 
that was undertaken during the 1980s which led to the total incorporation of 
Mexico into the North American economic structure through the NAFTA. In 
this respect, for Mexico, the NAFTA membership meant more than a 
comprehensive free trade agreement but a significant step towards securing 
the wholesale incorporation of Mexico into the global market through entering 
the liberalised trade regime in North America (del Castillo 1996: 29). While this 
process transformed the Mexican peripheral capitalist space by intensifying 
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the neoliberal capitalist production relations domestically, it gradually reached 
a level of expansion in the form of regional integration projects.    
The territorial scale is under a new process of flexibilisation and its qualitative 
expression on the configuration of different industrial sectors has increased 
the importance of the maquila in the periphery correspondingly. In this 
respĞĐƚ ?ƚŚĞK/ƚƵƌŶŽĨDĞǆŝĐŽ ?ƐŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŐĂǀĞĂƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞ
to the transnational corporations in linking Mexico to the global markets 
integrating Mexican subsidiaries with the transnational parent companies. This 
process was consolidated with the NAFTA which established tight transnational 
linkages between the U.S., Canada and Mexico in capital-intensive, high-
technology industries (Gereffi 1996: 96). Therefore, it is possible to argue that 
the maquiladora is a form of industrial production that  corresponds with the 
neoliberal rescaling of the capitalist spatiality in the periphery which bases 
itself on the use of cheap workforce in the production of labour-intensive 
products that rely on the importation of the input and capital goods even 
though the focus on the cheap workforce for ensuring the comparative 
advantage globally threatens the labour and environmental standards and 
opens the way for abuses (Horowitz 2009: 679). Nevertheless, the maquila 
gradually transformed to the level of export manufacturing industry with the 
elimination of the tariffs on the manufactured goods between U.S. and Mexico 
in 2001 under the NAFTA agreement and, thus, formally will be disappeared 
but will remain expanding towards the south-southeast regions and Central 
America as a part of the extensification process of the neoliberal capitalist 
spatiality towards the marginal spaces. 
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Table 4.3. Total exports of Mexico between 2002 and 2011 in millions of US dollars. 
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Total Exports 161.045.980 164.766.436 187.998.555 214.232.956 249.925.144 271.875.312 291.342.595 
America total 151.549.015 154.238.538 176.472.020 199.234.173 231.237.940 247.914.511 262.794.849 
North America 144.888.989 147.335.147 167.813.533 187.797.317 216.975.603 229.624.214 240.625.085 
Canada 2.991.332 3.041.792 3.291.546 4.234.478 5.176.222 6.490.957 7.102.354 
United States of 
America 141.897.658 144.293.358 164.521.988 183.562.840 211.799.379 223.133.256 233.522.733 
Central America 1.832.416 1.899.029 2.085.884 2.864.278 3.415.679 4.304.187 4.922.797 
Costa Rica 372.915 352.472 387.256 420.683 521.797 687.219 919.724 
El Salvador 291.688 286.372 317.243 471.601 496.913 518.341 801.084 
Guatemala 548.187 590.096 672.465 863.711 935.444 1.152.403 1.385.105 
Honduras 155.669 160.607 182.054 239.608 284.529 382.401 457.749 
Nicaragua 92.954 130.696 150.590 324.123 522.378 730.367 372.810 
WĂŶĂŵĄ 303.861 319.778 315.774 463.340 567.665 730.616 864.157 
Other Central 
American  
countries 67.140 59.009 60.501 81.214 86.951 102.840 122.167 
South America 2.903.092 2.760.876 4.047.352 5.846.878 7.977.818 10.909.379 13.840.148 
 
Source: INEGI -ŝƌĞĐĐŝſŶ'ĞŶĞƌĂůĚĞŽŶƚĂďŝůŝĚĂĚEĂĐŝŽŶĂůǇƐƚĂĚşƐƚŝĐĂƐĐŽŶſŵŝĐĂƐ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?
 
217 
 
It is also important to recall that the processes of social transformation and 
change are dialectical processes and, in that, respect the neoliberal rescaling of 
the peripheral capitalist spatiality in Mexico which culminated in the 
incorporation of Mexico into the North American economic structure through 
the NAFTA needs to be understood in these dialectical terms. The rebellion of 
ƚŚĞ  ‘ũĠƌĐŝƚŽ ĂƉĂƚŝƐƚĂ ĚĞ >ŝďĞƌĂĐŝſŶ EĂĐŝŽŶĂů ?(The Zapatista National 
Liberation Army  WEZLN) in January 1994 in Chiapas should be located within 
this process of neoliberal re-territorialisation. The restructuring of the 
traditional agricultural production by subjecting it to the global market 
conditions through NAFTA directly threatened the livelihood of the small-scale 
producer indigenous communities in Chiapas and in the rest of rural Mexico 
which translated into the EZLN rebellion (Harvey 1996: 188). One of the main 
instruments of the neoliberal re-territorialisation of the countryside in the 
periphery is the conversion of the rain-fed small scale agricultural production 
to cash crop cultivation which will be observed in the next section as a key 
strategy of the agricultural policies of the Plan Puebla-Panama. The 
liberalisation of the international trade regime of the agricultural products and 
the removal of the government subsidies comprised the other component of 
the neoliberal restructuring of the agricultural sectors. In this respect, as the 
largest maize and coffee producing state, the indigenous communities in 
Chiapas felt the direct effects of this process starting from the administration 
of de la Madrid (Harvey 1996: 193). These communities became the social base 
ŽĨƚŚĞ>EĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘ŽŶǀĞŶĐŝŽŶEĂĐŝŽŶĂůĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐŽ ?(National Democratic 
Convention) which was held in August 1994 and brought many different 
indigenous groups from Chol, Tojolabal, Tzeltal, Tzotzil and Zoque people 
together against the neoliberal restructuring by demanding the withdrawal of 
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the modifications made to Article 27 to accommodate the NAFTA rules, land 
redistribution and recognition of the autonomy of the indigenous communities  
(Stephen 1995: 95). These counter-hegemonic movements did emerge in 
different scales in different political forms and comprised a significant 
dialectical moment and, thereby, should not be ignored even though they are 
either violently eliminated or incorporated/watered down within the process.  
4.3. Plan Puebla-Panama/Proyecto Mesoamerica: the expansion of the 
capitalist spatiality towards the Central American region  
The central proposition of this section is that the neoliberal rescaling of the 
peripheral capitalist space in Mexico has structured the expansion of the 
peripheral capitalist spatiality towards the marginal spaces in the form of 
regional integration projects, reproducing the features of the formation of the 
peripheral capitalist spatiality that was discussed previously (chapter two). The 
centre/periphery relations, in other words the contradictions between the 
centre and the periphery results in the fashioning of the dominated space by 
the dominant space as Lefebvre put it (Lefebvre 1979/2009: 190). However, 
this fashioning should not be seen as a wholesale submission but also as a 
process of development and centralisation of the peripheral social space; rapid 
in some regions and sectors of the social practice and sluggish in the other 
numerous ones -which can be identified as the uneven development of the 
capitalist social space. This unevenness can be located in the differences 
between the levels of economic development between different regions in 
Mexico. By 2010, the total share of net GDP in the six states among the thirty-
two states of Mexico accounted for 49.1 percent of the total GDP (8.369 billion 
pesos) of Mexico even though there is no oil production in these six states 
(Table 4.4).  
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Table 4.4. The Net GDP changes of some states between 2003 and 2010 (on 
the basis of 2003 prices). 
 
In 2010, the GDP of the Federal District reached to 1.440 million pesos (18%); 
State of Mexico: 748 million pesos (8.9%); NL: 605 million pesos (7.2%); Jalisco: 
521 million pesos (6.2%); Veracruz: 395 million pesos (4.7%); Guanajuato: 
344.3 million pesos (4.1%); Puebla: 299 million pesos (3.6%); Chiapas: 158.2 
million pesos (1.9%); Quintana Roo: 130 million pesos (1.5%). Source: INEGI -
ŝƌĞĐĐŝſŶ'ĞŶĞƌĂůĚĞŽŶƚĂďŝůŝĚĂĚEĂĐŝŽŶĂůǇƐƚĂĚşƐƚŝĐĂƐĐŽŶſŵŝĐĂƐ(2012).  
 
Although it is an ongoing process, the fashioning of the Mexican peripheral 
capitalist space eventually resulted in the integration with the centre as a 
structural part of it, and thus, in reproduction of an uneven centre/periphery 
relations with its own periphery by extending the neoliberal rescaling towards 
ƚŚĞƐĞŵĂƌŐŝŶĂůƐƉĂĐĞƐ ?dŚĞ ‘WůĂŶWƵĞďůĂ-WĂŶĂŵĄ ?ŝƐĂĐŽŶĐƌĞƚĞĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨƚŚĞ
capitalist mode of production that realising itself; as a totality that absorbs the 
ĞŶƚƌĂůŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ‘ŵĂƌŐŝŶĂů ?ƐƉĂĐĞƐǁŚĞƌĞƚŚŽƐĞƐŽcial relations of production 
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were not unfolded and consolidated properly and are still posing obstacles to 
its deepening (Lefebvre 1980/2009: 218-219). The representation of the 
 ‘ƌĞŐŝŽŶ ? ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ďĂƐŝƐ ŽĨ the reinvention of an old geographical term  W
Mesoamerica- is directly determined by these structural conditions.   
It has been observed in this work (chapter one) that unlike the mainstream 
ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ ƉŽůŝĐǇ ƐƚƵĚŝĞƐ ? DĞǆŝĐŽ ?Ɛ ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ĞŶƚƌĂů ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ
countries needs to be analysed within this spatiotemporal processes of 
transformation that is conditioned by the ongoing neoliberal rescaling of 
Mexico within the capitalist, international division of labour. While the 
Mexican economy has been re-orientated towards an export-oriented 
industrial structure in the last thirty years, its foreign relations with the 
countries in the region were transformed correspondingly, reflecting this 
ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂů ĐŚĂŶŐĞ ? dŚŝƐ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ ĨŝƌƐƚ ĚǇŶĂŵŝĐ ďĞŚŝŶĚ DĞǆŝĐŽ ?Ɛ ŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞƐ ƚŽ
establish closer relationships with the Central American countries which 
ĐƵůŵŝŶĂƚĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ  ‘WůĂŶ WƵĞďůĂ-WĂŶĂŵĄ ?  ?WWW ) ĂŶĚ ŝƚƐ ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŽƌ ƉůĂŶ, the 
 ‘WƌŽǇĞĐƚŽ ĚĞ /ŶƚĞŐƌĂĐŝſŶ Ǉ ĞƐĂƌƌŽůůŽ ĚĞ DĞƐŽĂŵĠƌŝĐĂ ? (Mesoamerican 
Integration and Development Project- PM). 
The second dynamic behind the PPP-PM is the long term process of the 
expansion of the ĐĂƉŝƚĂů ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ ƌĂƚŚĞƌŵĂƌŐŝŶĂůŝƐĞĚ Žƌ  ‘ƌĞƐĞƌǀĞĚ ?ƉƌŽƚĞĐƚĞĚ ?
spaces. The investment for the creation of the necessary conditions of the 
capitalist expansion in the neoliberal era directly produces and reproduces an 
uneven relationship by creating a regional international division of labour. 
Torres (2006) argued that space continually faces a dynamic of devaluation, 
valorisation and revaluation within the process of the expansion of capitalism. 
ZĞƐŽŶĂƚŝŶŐ ǁŝƚŚ >ĞĨĞďǀƌĞ ?Ɛ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŽĨ  ‘ŵŽŶĚŝĂliƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?  Wwhich is different to 
221 
 
the concept of globalisation- Torres argued that in the contemporary level of 
the development of the productive forces, the expansion of capitalism that 
emerges on the scale of the nation-state appears as a vigorous delocalisation 
and re-localisation of the productive forces, particularly in the reserved spaces 
in an asymmetric way. The peripheral spaces that had already reached a level 
of development of the productive forces via being incorporated into the 
international capitalist system now would establish the channels of neoliberal 
expansion towards the new economic spaces within the country  Wsouth and 
southeast Mexico- and towards the Central American countries by the 
valorisation and integration of those spaces (Torres 2006: 23).   
The third dynamic behind the PPP is related to the limited level of capital 
accumulation within the Central American countries. The twenty years of 
steady growth (1950-1970) through the excessively foreign oriented import 
substitution policies had resulted in the concentration of the wealth in the 
hands of a small portion of the population and, during the 1970s, the 
indebtedness, inflation and budget deficits began to affect all Central American 
economies. From the late 1970s the monetary instability and devaluations 
started to emerge and, during the early 1980s, the Central American 
economies entered a fully fledged economic crisis, where the immediate 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚŝƐĐƌŝƐŝƐǁĂƐƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂůĂĚũƵƐƚŵĞŶƚĂŶĚƚƌĂĚĞůŝďĞƌĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĞůĨşŶ
2006: 130). The Central American Common Market (DĞƌĐĂĚŽ ŽŵƷŶ ĞŶƚƌŽ
Americana -CACM) which had been formed in order to foment the economic 
growth started to receive criticism for closing the market while the solution to 
the crisis was defined as the complete insertion of the region in the 
international markets through the agro-industrialisation and the diversification 
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ŽĨĞǆƉŽƌƚƐŽŶƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐŽĨĂ ‘ŶĞǁ ?ĨŽƌŵŽĨƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?'ŽƌŽƐƚŝĂŐĂĂŶĚ
Marchetti 1988: 121). 
However, in the neoliberal era, the uneven expansion of the productive forces 
are even more complex than the previous pattern. The comparative advantage 
and competitiveness cannot solemnly be attributed to the cheap labour force 
anymore and to attract foreign capital and direct investments the existence of 
the infrastructural conditions to produce cheaper and better commodities and 
services becomes a significant aspect. In that sense, the state appears as the 
responsible agency for the creation of a favourable economic environment by 
providing the basic infrastructure and the mechanisms for the development of 
technology, education and health to promote investment and economic 
development. In terms of the market potential, resources, and its geographical 
location, the region of PPP-PM manifests attractive assets for the integration 
with the international markets such as the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, the arc of 
ƚŚĞDĞǆŝĐĂŶ'ƵůĨ ?ƚŚĞzƵĐĂƚĄŶƉĞŶŝŶƐƵůĂǁŚŝĐŚis seen to possess an enormous 
ĂŶĚ ĂůŵŽƐƚ ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůǇ  ‘ƵŶĚĞƌƵƚŝlised geo-ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů ?  ?DĂƌşŶ  ? ? ? ? P
143; Torres 2006: 57).  
PPP-WDĨŝƌƐƚĞŵĞƌŐĞĚĂƐĂƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞ  ‘WůĂŶEĂĐŝŽŶĂůĚĞĞƐĂƌƌŽůůŽ ? (National 
Development Plan) in 2002 in which a regional framework divided the country 
into five sub-ƌĞŐŝŽŶƐ ?  ‘ŶŽƌƚŚĞĂƐƚ ?northwest, centre-west, central and south-
ƐŽƵƚŚĞĂƐƚ ? ? dŚĞ  ‘ĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ WƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ EŽƌƚŚĞƌŶ ŽƌĚĞ  ? ? ƚŚĞ
 ‘ĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚWƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞŽĨEĂƵƚŝĐĂůEĞƚǁŽƌŬ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘'ƌĂŶĚsŝƐŝŽŶWƌŽũĞĐƚ ?
were the other regional development projects that had been initiated with the 
PPP. The common objective that had been shared by all these projects was 
achieving economic growth through extending the global market conditions 
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towards the marginalised spaces by heavily investing on infrastructure, and 
thus, creating the necessary conditions for the expansion of the export-
oriented manufacturing industry, particularly maquila industry where the 
capital can take advantage of the cheap labour force (Zamora 2006b: 88).   
However, it is possible to state that the PPP-PM was not the first development 
project that had been considered for the region. In 1958, five countries in the 
region -Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Costa Rica- signed an 
agreement for the creation of a common Central American market which 
resulted in the formation of  ‘DĞƌĐĂĚŽ ŽŵƷŶ ĞŶƚƌŽĂŵĞƌŝĐĂŶŽ ? (MCCA) in 
1960. With this agreement, it was decided to harmonise the tariffs with the 
third countries for the protection of the incipient ISIs and traditional export 
products; liberalise the intraregional trade; and the establishment of the 
 ‘ĂŶĐŽ ĞŶƚƌŽĂŵĞƌŝĐĂŶŽ ĚĞ /ŶƚĞŐƌĂĐŝſŶ ĐŽŶſŵŝĐĂ ? (the Central American 
Bank of Economic Integration -BCIE). Mexico favoured this regional formation, 
and argued that this sub-regional integration should fuse itself with the wider 
perspective of the  ‘>ĂƚŝŶŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ&ƌĞĞdƌĂĚĞŽŶĞ ?ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚDĞǆŝĐŽĐŽƵůĚƉůĂǇ
a bridging role (Luna 1974: 20).  
ƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƉƌĞƐŝĚĞŶĐǇ ŽĨ 'ƵƐƚĂǀŽ şĂǌ KƌĚĂǌ  ? ? ? ? ?-1970), the interest of 
Mexico on the economic integration with the Central American countries 
ďĞĐĂŵĞ ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂů ? dŚĞ şĂǌ ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶƐŝƐƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ǁĂƐ ŶŽƚ ƚŚĞ ĞŶƚƌĂů
American economies that would open their economies to Mexican products 
which would further exacerbate the disequilibrium in the foreign trade, but 
Mexico who would increase the imports from those economies. Nevertheless, 
when the BCIE took 5 million dollars of debt from Mexico in 1966, 70 percent 
of the loan was designated to use in the purchase of Mexican products (Luna 
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1974: 22). This manifests that the uneven expansion of the capitalist 
accumulation towards the Central American states was already conditioned by 
the high level of industrial development of the Mexican economy compared to 
other Central American economies due to the three decades of ISI polices. 
The first free trade agreement was signed between Mexico and Costa Rica in 
1994, which was followed by Nicaragua in 1997, and with Guatemala, 
Honduras and El Salvador (Triuangulo del Norte) in 2000. These trade 
agreements are complete replicas of the NAFTA even in adopting the certain 
ĂƐƉĞĐƚƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĨĂŝůĞĚ  ‘DƵůƚŝůĂƚĞƌĂů ŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ŽŶ /ŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ ?  WĂůĂĐŝŽƐ  ? ? ? ? P
 ? ? ? ) ? dŚĞ ŵƵůƚŝƉůĞ &d ?Ɛ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƌĞŐŝŽŶwere recently replaced by the unified 
FTA in December 2011 and, therefore, this market between Mexico and five 
Central American countries which represents 150 million people and where 
the bilateral foreign trade had reached to more than 6.5 billion dollars by 
increasing 3.6 times in the last 10 years has been harmonised under one trade 
regime (El Universal, 2011). The region also represents the fourth destination 
for the Mexican investments in Latin America reaching 5.2 billion dollars, 
where Costa Rica takes the first place and the Guatemala received the least.     
Since the export-oriented neoliberal restructuring of the Mexican economy 
commenced, the interest towards the south-southeast of Mexico and Central 
American countries gained a considerable momentum. The valorisation and 
commercialisation of the Isthmus of Tehuantepec -one of the most reserved 
and deprived spaces but yet seen as strategically significant -has been at the 
ĐĞŶƚƌĞ ŽĨ ĂƚƚƌĂĐƚŝŽŶ ƐŝŶĐĞ >ſƉĞǌ WŽƌƚŝůůŽ ?Ɛ ƉƌĞƐŝĚency (Alejo and Mora 2007: 
71). The  ‘Proyecto Alta-Omega ?  ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ƚŚĞ  ‘Programa de Desarrollo Integral 
ĚĞů /ƐƚŵŽ ĚĞ dĞŚƵĂŶƚĞƉĞĐ ? (1996), and lastly the  ‘WƌŽǇĞĐƚŽ ĚĞů ŽƌƌĞĚŽƌ
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ŝŽůſŐŝĐŽDĞƐŽĂŵĞƌŝĐĂŶŽ ? (the Project of Mesoamerican Biological Corridor - 
MBC) which has been supported by the World Bank were the initial projects 
that were initiated in the region (Zamaro 2006b: 90, 91). MBC was created as 
ƚŚĞ ‘&ŽƌĞƐƚ>ŝĨĞŽƌƌŝĚŽƌ ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ?ƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞĂƵƐƉŝĐĞƐŽĨ ‘WĂƐĞŽWĂŶƚĞƌĂWƌŽũĞĐƚ ?.
DĂƌşŶ ĂƌŐƵĞƐ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ŝƐ ƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ƚŽ ŽďƐĞƌǀĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞƐĞǀĞƌĂů ĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐ
published by the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and World Bank 
that the MBC is recognised as the central aspect of the PPP. These projects 
targeted environmental conservation but through the profitable management 
and strategic privatisation of the biological wealth of the Central American 
ƌĞŐŝŽŶ  ?DĂƌşŶ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ?-140). Additionally, during the presidency of Ernesto 
Zedillo (PRI), a plan for the construction of major transportation corridors that 
would integrate the south-southeast Mexico with the centre of the country by 
the construction of super highways and ports and thereby would facilitate the 
exchange of commodity and resources has been designed, particularly by the 
sub-secretary of the ministry of finance, Santiago Levy, who then became the 
director of the IMSS (Social Security) during the presidency of Vincente Fox 
(PAN) in 2000 (Carou et al 2007: 10). This plan was published in 1996, as a part 
of the  ‘EĂƚŝŽŶĂů hƌďĂŶ ĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ WůĂŶ ?  ? ? ? ?-   ? ? ? ?which envisaged the 
integration of one hundred major metropolitan areas mainly by the 
construction of continental trans-ŵŽĚĂůůĂŶĚďƌŝĚŐĞƐ ?DĂƌşŶ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?-146).  
In the evolution of the PPP-PM as a comprehensive Central American project 
the summits of Tuxtla (13 summits between 1991 and 2011) played a 
considerable role. In 1991, the head of states of Mexico and the Central 
American countries met for the first time in Tuxtla 'ƵƚŝĠƌƌĞǌ  ?Chiapas) and 
ĨŽƌŵĞĚ ƚŚĞ  ‘DĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵŽĨdƵǆƚůĂ ?  ?DĞĐĂŶŝƐŵŽĚĞŝĄůŽŐŽǇŽŶĐĞƌƚĂĐŝſŶĚĞ
Tuxtla or Cumbres de Tuxtla- Mecanismo Tuxtla). The economic development 
226 
 
of the region was declared as the central occupation of the mechanism (Cruz 
2007: 149). Following its NAFTA membership, Mexico became a primary 
proponent of this regional mechanism and in the summit of Tuxtla II (Costa 
Rica 1996), these summits gained a concrete institutional framework which 
ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĚ ƚŚĞ  ‘DĞĐĂŶŝƐŵŽ ĚĞ ŝĄůŽŐŽ Ǉ ŽŶĐĞƌƚĂĐŝſŶ ĞŶƚƌĞ DĠǆŝĐŽ Ǉ
ĞŶƚƌŽĂŵĠƌŝĐĂ ? (The mechanism of Dialogue and Coordination between 
Mexico and Central America) including the presidents of Panama and Belize, 
the foreign ŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƐ ? ƌĞƵŶŝŽŶ ? ĂŶĚ ŚŝŐŚ ĂŶĚ ƐƵď-commissions (Carou and 
Valencia: 2007: 29). 
The PPP was launched in the extraordinary summit of 2001 following the 
Tuxtla IV (Guatemala 2000) by the initiative of President Vincente Fox 
incorporating two strategies: (1) the strategy for the development of the 
south-southeast of Mexico, and (2) the strategy for the transformation and 
modernisation of Central America for the 21
st
 century (Table 4.5). With these 
two strategies, one general objective and eight specific projects constituted a 
mega-project that covered nine south-southeast states of Mexico (Puebla, 
'ƵĞƌƌĞƌŽ ?sĞƌĂĐƌƵǌ ?KĂǆĂĐĂ ?ĂŵƉĞĐŚĞ ?YƵŝŶƚĂŶĂZŽŽ ?dĂďĂƐĐŽ ?zƵ ĂƚĄŶĂŶĚ
Chiapas) and seven Central American states (Guatemala, Belize, Honduras, El 
Salvador, NicarĂŐƵĂ ?ŽƐƚĂZŝĐĂĂŶĚWĂŶĂŵĄ ) ?dŚĞ ůĞǀĞůƐŽĨƚŚĞ ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŽŶƚŽ
the world markets, the adaptation of the technological innovation mechanisms 
and the infrastructure of transportation and communication facilities are the 
aspects which, in fact, defined the borders of the PPP region as reaching to 
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Ŭŵ ?with a population of 110 million34 (Alejo and Mora: 2007: 73).  
 
                                                          
34
 With Colombia which has been included to the project since 2006.  
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Table 4.5. Plan Puebla-WĂŶĂŵĄ PDĞƐŽĂŵĞƌŝĐĂŶŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞƐĂŶĚŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ 
Initiative Objective 
 
Mesoamerican Initiative for  
Sustainable Development 
(Coordinator country: Nicaragua)   
 
Promoting the conservation and 
sustainable management of the 
natural sources and ensuring 
the participation of the local 
communities, particularly in the 
environmental management 
  
Mesoamerican Initiative for the 
Human Development  
(Coordinator country: Mexico) 
Decreasing the poverty, 
facilitating the access of the 
vulnerable segments of the 
society to the basic social 
services and contributing to the 
full development of the Central 
American nations 
  
Mesoamerican Initiative for the  
Prevention and Mitigation of the  
Natural Disasters 
 ?ŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚŽƌĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ PWĂŶĂŵĄ ) 
Reducing the risks of natural 
disasters as a strategic 
transversal centre, also 
developing instruments and 
capacities for establishing 
criterion and indicators for the 
identification and reduction of 
the risks of natural disasters in 
the urban planning.  
  
Mesoamerican Initiative for Tourism 
(Coordinator country: Belize)  
Stimulating the tourism for the 
integration and development of 
the Central American countries, 
promoting the conservation and 
sustainable management of the 
natural resources, decrease the 
weaknesses against the natural 
disasters, recognise and respect 
the ethnic, cultural diversity and 
including both private and social 
participation for the 
achievement  
 
Mesoamerican Initiative for the  
Facilitation of Commerce and Increasing 
the Competitiveness  
(Coordinator country: Honduras) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contributing to speed up the 
commercial exchange in the 
Central American region and 
increase the levels of 
competitiveness of the 
manufacturing sector by the 
means of leading actions to 
reduce intra-regional 
commercial exchange costs.  
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Mesoamerican Energy Initiative  
(Coordinator country: Guatemala) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mesoamerican Initiative of the Integration 
of the Telecommunication Services 
(Coordinator country: El Salvador)    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mesoamerican Initiative of Transport 
(Coordinator country: Costa Rica)  
 
Promoting the economic and 
social development of the 
Mesoamerican nations by the 
means of more extensive and 
better electrical services and 
forming the electrical markets 
to attract private sector 
participation.  
 
Promoting an authentic 
Mesoamerican society of 
information by the means of 
connectivity and using the 
Information and 
Communication Technologies 
(ICT) as the modern tools for 
development.   
 
Promoting the physical 
integration of the region for 
facilitating the transportation of 
persons and goods and by that 
reducing the costs of these 
activities.  
  
Source: PPP official website via Carou and Valencia (2007), 33. 
 
The main objective of this mega-project has been officially defined as 
encouraging the human and ecological richness of the Mesoamerica within a 
framework of development which would respect and promote the cultural and 
ethnic diversity, create employment, increase productivity and, achieve 
economic growth by utilising the biodiversity in a sustainable way. However, 
Carou and Valencia (2007) argued that the WWW ŝƐ Ă  ‘ŐĞŽƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů ƚŽŽů ? ƚŚĂƚ
would integrate Central America to the NAFTA and United States through 
Mexico, particularly by the construction of the mere physical infrastructure 
and by the harmonisation of rules and standardisation of goods and services 
under a unified market. With the inclusion of Colombia in 2006 the PPP 
extended towards the Andean region, forming a pro-CAFTA (Central America 
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Free Trade Agreement) and pro-&d ?ƌĞĂĚĞ>ŝďƌĞŽŵĞƌĐŝŽĚĞ ůĂƐŵĠƌŝĐĂƐ- 
ALCA) union in the heartland of Latin America that would play a significant role 
in the integration of the whole continent into a unified economic area (Palacios 
2 ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ? ŽƌŽŶĂĚŽ ĂŶĚ DŽƌĂ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ) ? Ɛ ^ŽůşƐ  ? ? ? ? ? ) Đ ĞĂƌůǇstated, the 
main concern of the PPP is not eliminating the uneven relationship between 
the north and south or decreasing the asymmetries that had been 
strengthened and augmented since the implementation of the trade 
liberalisation programmes but constructing the necessary structural conditions 
for the good functioning of the CAFTA and the ALCA. The CAFTA not only 
eliminated tariffs and barriers on foreign trade between the US and Central 
American economies but also accelerated the processes of privatisation and 
structural adjustment in these countries by enabling the North American 
capital to invest in those key industries that were traditionally owned by the 
ƉƵďůŝĐƐĞĐƚŽƌ ?^ŽůşƐ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ?,Žǁever, the lack of the certain infrastructure 
hampers further integration. That is the reason why the priorities of the 
programme are defined as the construction of the energy interconnectivity, 
the integration of the communication services and, lastly, the integration and 
modernisation of the transportation infrastructure via constructing 
superhighways, highway hubs, and inter-ocean connections and the 
rehabilitation of ports which would increase the productivity and enable the 
influx of capital and investmĞŶƚ ?^ŽůşƐ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ?  
It is possible to notice an emphasis on the development of the physical 
conditions in order to iŶĐƌĞĂƐĞ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƌĞŶƚĂďŝůŝƚǇ ? ŽĨ south-southeast Mexico 
through the expansion of manufacturing, agro-industries, tourism, etc., and 
the role ŽĨƐƚĂƚĞŝŶƚŚŝƐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ?/ŶƚŚĞĨĂŵŽƵƐƐƚƵĚǇ ‘dŚĞ^ŽƵƚŚůƐŽǆŝƐƚƐ PŶ
Essay on Regional Development in MeǆŝĐŽ ?-which was written by some of the 
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most important ideological fathers of the neoliberal reforms in Mexico during 
the 1990s under the banner of Salinismo- ĄǀŝůĂ Ğƚ Ăů. (2002) claimed that 
Mexico needs to integrate the south to the centre and the north through 
substantial public investment in the transportation and hydroelectric 
infrastructure to utilise the rich natural resources in the region. This team 
which was in office during the presidency of Zedillo and then during the 
presidency of Fox argued that the public policies against poverty in the region 
should be separated from the regional development objectives and the state 
should only eliminate the obstacles that were inhibiting the economic 
potential. The sƚĂƚĞ ?Ɛ ƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ Žŝů ĞǆƚƌĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ
petrochemicals and distribution and marketing of electricity along the 
communal ownership of land, water and subsoil resources were perceived as 
the main sources of backwardness (Bartra 2004: 36-38). PPP-PM reflects this 
understanding of neoliberal re-territorialisation; rescaling the periphery and 
incorporating the reserved backward spaces into the international markets 
though establishing the necessary conditions for the formation of peripheral 
capitalist spatiality. 
The propositions of the PPP for the incorporation of the region within the 
world markets through profitable utilisation of its resources with the 
establishment of the necessary conditions of the uneven capitalist 
accumulation cover several areas. The region represents one of the richest and 
highest levels of biodiversity in the world  Wand the richest in genetic diversity- 
yet unexploited. The World Bank had initiated thĞ  ‘DĞƐŽĂŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂl 
ŽƌƌŝĚŽƌ ?  ?D ) ƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ƚŚĂƚ ǁas incorporated into the PPP. It aimed to 
 ‘ƉƌŽŵŽƚĞŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝǀĞĨŽƌŵƐƚŽŵĂŶĂŐĞƚŚĞďŝŽĚŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ
ŝƚƐ ƐƵƐƚĂŝŶĂďůĞ ĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?  ?ĞůŐĂĚŽ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ) ?This project was in line with 
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the neoliberal elimination of state support from the agricultural sector in 
Mexico, leaving the technological support of the agricultural activities to the 
private biotechnology sector dominated by the transnational corporations that 
aim for global profit maximisation (Poitras 2008: 130). The Zedillo 
ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞĚĂůůƚŚĞ ‘WƌŽƚĞĐƚĞĚEĂƚƵƌĂůƌĞĂƐ ?of Quintana Roo, 
Campeche, Yucatan, Tabasco and Chiapas into the MBC and, during the Fox 
administration, the area which would be subjected to commercial exploitation 
extended beyond Los Chimalapas of Oaxaca (Navarro and Carlsen 2004: 341). 
MBC became the administrative unit of PPP for the environmental projects, 
including the investments in the circulation of the animals and seeds and for 
the trade of greenhouse gas emission reductions (Peregrina 2003: 107).   
In this respect, in the agricultural issues, the PPP stands as much problematic 
as in the other issues. The export-oriented agricultural production remained 
the primary source of revenue in the foreign trade for all other Central 
American countries and south-southeast Mexico is also demonstrating the 
same structural pattern. Although agricultural production is the principal 
economic activity in the region, all those economies are also net importers of 
agro-ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚƐ ? ƉƌŝŵĂƌŝůǇ ŐƌĂŝŶ ? ĐĞƌĞĂůƐ ĂŶĚ ĐŽƌŶ  ?ĞůĨşŶ  ? ? ? ?Ă P  ? ? ) ?Mexico 
was the second largest importer of U.S. corn which accounted for 24 percent 
of the total corn consumption in 2000 while the share of US corn in the total 
Mexican corn consumption was 14 percent in 1994. In accordance with the 
NAFTA regulations, Mexico removed the price support mechanisms in the corn 
production and, thereby, the Mexican corn producers were forced to converge 
with the international markets very rapidly, while they simultaneously faced 
fierce competition from the genetically modified corn and cereal producing 
transnational corporations and large-scale farmers who enjoyed significant 
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government subsidies (Fitting 2008: 139). Furthermore, the agricultural 
production structures of these economies are not complementary but similar. 
Thus, the further integration, and the harmonisation of the rules and standards 
would not bring any solution to the contemporary problems of the agricultural 
sector but would worsen with the incorporation of these highly unique regions 
into the profit schemes that introduce genetic banks, seeds, exotic plants and 
plantations which will be dominated by the transnational companies, 
eliminating the subsistence and small-scale commercial agriculture  ?DĂƌşŶ
 ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ?ĞůĨşŶ  ? ? ? ?ď P  ? ? ? ) ? In this respect, the neoliberal rescaling of the 
agricultural sector in the periphery induced the rural migration that providing 
the necessary flexible labour in the periphery in maquiladora work or in the 
United States in illegal work sending remittances to Mexico which reached 25 
billion dollars in 2005 (Fitting 2008: 147-149). The PPP aimed to extend this 
trend towards the Central American region, thereby to reproduce the specific 
conditions of the formation of the peripheral capitalist spatiality, as it was 
discussed previously.       
In relation to that, another area that the PPP had great interest in was 
decreasing the unemployment by stimulating the export-oriented 
manufacturing sector. Thus, it incorporated the  ‘WƌŽŐƌĂŵĂ DĂƌĐŚĂ Ăů ^Ƶƌ ? 
(March towards the South Programme) which aimed to expand the maquila 
production in the south-southeast of Mexico and further extend this expansion 
towards the Central American states. The extension of the north-south road 
connection and the cheap labour and energy costs expected to aid the further 
development of the maquila industry in the region since the daily industrial 
wages change between 2 dollars (Nicaragua) to 10 dollars (Belize) while the 
average wage in a Mexican maquiladora is between 15 and 20 dollars per day 
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(Pisani and Label 2003: 38). The investors would receive a series of subsidies 
such as free land to establish an investment, tax discounts and financial 
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ?,ĞƌŶĄŶĚĞǌĂŶĚ,ĞƌŶĄŶĚĞǌ P ? ? ? ? P ? ) ?
In the PPP, the most important part of the investment was envisaged to be 
diverted to the construction of the infrastructure, building highways, airports, 
ports and railways. The constructions of the Gulf, Pacific and Transismic 
highway corridors and the creation of 16 highway hubs, the modernisation and 
construction of railways between Chiapas and Mayab and in the Isthmus of 
Tehuantepec were among the proposed projects. The 85% of the financial 
sources were destined for the construction and modernisation of the highways 
and 11% of the sources were reserved for the creation of the electrical 
connections, mainly between Belize, Guatemala and Mexico in the first phase 
which will be followed by the dam building projects between Chiapas and 
'ƵĂƚĞŵĂůĂ  ?DĂƌşŶ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ?-208; Zamaro 2006b: 121). Therefore, as it was 
observed in chapter two, the construction of the infrastructural conditions 
appeared once again in the formation of the peripheral capitalist spatiality in 
terms of the neoliberal rescaling processes.    
For the objective of connecting the energy markets in the region, the  ‘^ŝƐƚĞŵĂ
de IŶƚĞƌĐŽŶĞǆŝſŶ ůĠĐƚƌŝĐĂ ƉĂƌĂ ůŽƐ WĂşƐĞƐ ĚĞ ŵĠƌŝĐĂ ĞŶƚƌĂů ? (System of 
Electrical Interconnection for the Countries in Central America- SIEPAC) -which 
was established in 1998 for the unification of the electricity services- has been 
incorporated into the PPP. It has been decided that under SIEPAC the existing 
line would be extended with 1.802 km of new lines which will be connected to 
south-southeast Mexico and the area from Guatemala to Panama would be 
ŽƉĞƌĂƚĞĚƵŶĚĞƌŽŶĞĞůĞĐƚƌŝĐĂůƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ŽůĂŹŽƐ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) 
234 
 
The primary financial sources of the PPP has emerged as the World Bank, 
 ‘ĂŶĐŽĞŶƚƌŽĂŵĞƌŝĐĂŶŽĚĞ/ŶƚĞŐƌĂĐŝſŶĐŽŶſŵŝĐĂ ? (Central American Bank of 
Economic Integration -BCIE),  ‘ĂŶĐŽ /ŶƚĞƌĂŵĞƌŝĐĂŶŽ ĚĞ ĞƐĂƌƌŽůůŽ ? (Inter-
american Bank of Development -/ ) ?  ‘ŽŵŝƐŝſŶ ĐŽŶſŵŝĐĂ ƉĂƌĂ ŵĠƌŝĐĂ
>ĂƚŝŶĂ Ǉ Ğů ĂƌŝďĞ ? (Economic Commission for Latin America and Caribbean -
CEPAL), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the funds 
that will be established by the national governments. During the Tuxtla 
Summit in San Salvador, an  ‘ǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞ ŽŵŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ? ǁĂƐ formed,  ‘'ƌƵƉŽ
dĠĐŶŝĐŽ /ŶƚĞƌŝŶƐƚŝƚƵĐŝŽŶĂů ? (Inter-institutional Technical Group -GTI) which has 
been assigned as the executive organ that coordinates the funds from the 
BCIE, BID, CEPAL, SICA, and UNDP (Delfin 2006: 149). In this respect, as it will 
be observed in the next chapter (chapter five) as well, it can be argued that the 
regional integration projects reproduce the dependency on foreign finance, 
thus extend the uneven and exogenous characteristics  Wsimilarly defined by 
Luxemburg and Trotsky in the explanation of the 19
th
 century formation of the 
peripheral capitalist spatiality- of the capitalist spatial relations towards the 
marginal spaces.   
The opposition of the local communities and the long term inactivity 
associated the PPP with inefficiency and apathy. Nevertheless, the PPP helped 
to institutionalise the Tuxtla Mechanism in initiating and conducting the 
regional projects in Central America and draw the attention of the 
international financial sources to these regional infrastructural projects 
(Ascencio 2008: 11-12). At that point, in 2008, the tenth summit of Tuxtla 
Mechanism decided to consolidate and reaffirm the dedication of the member 
states to the objectives of the PPP, and renamed the project as  ‘WƌŽǇĞĐƚŽĚĞ
/ŶƚĞŐƌĂĐŝſŶ Ǉ ĞƐĂƌƌŽůůŽ ĚĞ DĞƐŽĂŵĠƌŝĐĂ ? (The Mesoamerican Project of 
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Integration and Development  WPM). At the same summit, the institutional 
framework was renewed  ?^ĄŶĐŚĞǌ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ). 
It is appropriate to claim that the PM adopted the same agenda of as the PPP, 
though exclusively focused on three areas and significantly concretised the 
ƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚƉƌŽũĞĐƚƐ ?&ŝƌƐƚůǇ ?ŝŶƚŚĞĂƌĞĂŽĨƚƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĞ ‘Red Internacional 
ĚĞ ĂƌƌĞƚĞƌĂƐDĞƐŽĂŵĞƌŝĐĂŶĂƐ ? (International Network of the Mesoamerican 
Highways  W RICAM) -that covers 13.132 km highway in total- has been 
established (PM 2009: 10). For the projects that will be undertaken in 2012, 
422.6 million dollars credit had been guaranteed from the BID, and BCIE by 
Panama, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Belize and Honduras. The project of the 
 ‘ŽƌƌĞĚŽƌ WĂĐşĨŝĐŽ ?  ?WĂĐŝĨŝĐ ŽƌƌŝĚŽƌ  WCP) which planned the construction of 
3.244 km of  ‘ĨŝǀĞ ƐƚĂƌ ? ƐƵƉĞƌŚŝŐŚǁĂǇ ĨƌŽŵ DĞǆŝĐŽ ƚŽ WĂŶĂŵĂ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ  ? ?
and 2020 has been formally defined as one of the priorities of the project (PM 
2011: 8). Furthermore, the implementation of a unified system of transit 
transportation of goods has been completed from Mexico to Nicaragua which 
substantially decreased the amount of time spent on the border in the 
commercial freights through the harmonisation of the rules and procedures 
(PM 2011: 11).  
Secondly, the creation of a unified energy market received special interest in 
PM as it was in PPP ?/ŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚƚŚĞ ‘ZĞŐŝŽŶĂůůĞĐƚƌŝĐŝƚǇDĂƌŬĞƚ ?, the 
construction of the interconnection infrastructure has been accelerated with 
the participation of foreign capital investments. SIEPAC has completed the 
electrical connection between Mexico and Guatemala and the interconnection 
between Panama and Colombia is expected to be operational in 2014.  
&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ?ĂƐĂƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞ ‘DĞƐŽĂŵĞƌŝĐĂŶWƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞŽĨŝŽĨƵĞůƐ ? ?ŝŶ2010 
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a biodiesel plant was established in Chiapas which has three additional plants 
in El Salvador, Honduras and Colombia (PM 2011: 18).              
Lastly, the interconnection and integration of the telecommunication services 
infrastructure became the third area that the PM had been focusing on. Within 
this objective, the  ‘ĞŶƚƌĂůŵĞƌŝĐĂŶEĞƚǁŽƌŬŽĨ&ŝďƌĞKƉƚŝĐĂďůĞƐ ? ?Z )is 
incorporated into the electrical interconnection programme and the 
construction of the network has been 90 percent completed by the end of 
2011. It has also been decided that following the completion of the last phase, 
the REDCA will be opening to the market for the participation of the private 
enterprises (PM 2011: 22).  
To sum up, it is right to claim that a meaningful analysis of the PPP and PM is 
only possible by locating and observing the PPP and PM within the specific 
spatiotemporal processes where the peripheral capitalist space in Mexico was 
transformed and structurally conditioned to expand towards the marginal 
spaces by incorporating these spaces into the international markets, thereby 
establishing the conditions of the capitalist accumulation or, in other words, 
producing new peripheral capitalist spaces. These processes also need to be 
identified within the global rescaling of the capitalism in which the neoliberal 
capitalist relations of production intensified and extended through the 
reproduction of the exogenous features of the peripheral capitalist space 
formation through the uneven relationship between the centre and marginal 
spaces in the form of regional integration projects. Only such an analysis can 
unravel the underpinning dynamics of the formation of these specific socio-
spatial forms of neoliberal capitalism.  
 
237 
 
4.4. Conclusion  
This chapter has analysed the spatiotemporal processes in which the 
peripheral capitalist spatiality in Mexico were transformed and expanded. The 
passive revolution was institutionalised during the post-passive revolutionary 
period while the limited bourgeois-in-formation changed the conditions of 
uneven and combined nature of the development of capitalist productive 
forces and the social relations of production, by gradually establishing its 
political hegemony within the newly reorganised nation-state. By assuming the 
political power, the limited national bourgeois also assumed the mediatory 
role of maintaining the capitalist accumulation and uneven development of 
economy and, thus, further consolidated the peripheral positioning of the 
Mexican capitalist space through the reconstruction and reorganisation of the 
state and society. 
The global economic depression aided the national bourgeois to further its 
hegemony by expanding the industrial production through protectionism and 
state-planned and financed ISI development. However, although the import 
substitution policies that had been implemented in Mexico between 1939 and 
1982 had succeeded in expanding the manufacturing industry and installed the 
infrastructure for the further capitalist accumulation, with the changing global 
capitalist environment these policies gradually lost their ability to create 
employment, concentrated the investment in some particular public sectors, 
and generated an unsustainably dependent growth on foreign financing 
(Villareal 1976: 7). This dependency on foreign financing and investment of the 
ISI development lead to the contraction of the economy and subsequent crisis 
of liquidity in 1980s.     
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In this period of transformation, the Mexican economy underwent a wholesale 
reorganisation in terms of trade liberalisation and deregulation. The rapid 
trade liberalisation led to an ongoing process of profound structural change in 
the production patterns of the Mexican economy by orienting it towards the 
export of manufactured goods. This structural transformation became 
irreversible with the incorporation of Mexico into the North American 
economic structure through the membership of the NAFTA which reproduced 
and rescaled the uneven relationship between Mexico and the North America 
in a different political form.  
It has been observed in this chapter that the neoliberal rescaling of the 
Mexican peripheral capitalist space had started to reproduce similar processes 
of uneven relationship with its immediate geography by channelling the 
neoliberal rescaling towards these marginal spaces in the form of regional 
integration projects. These processes recall the characteristics of the formation 
of the peripheral capitalist space in Mexico and Turkey which has been 
detailed previously (chapter two) in terms of its exogenous features in the 
establishment of the necessary conditions of the peripheral capitalist 
development. Therefore, it is important to identify these dynamics within the 
processes of global restructuring of the neoliberal capitalism. Starting as early 
as from the presidency of Salinas Gortari, the construction of the necessary 
infrastructural and institutional framework in Central America which would 
enable the incorporation of the region within the neoliberal international 
division of labour became the main focuses of the Mexican government in the 
formulation of its relations with the Central American states.  
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From this reading, the common features of the PRIst five-year plans during the 
early 1980s and the Plan Puebla-Panama which has been introduced by the 
PANist President Vicente Fox and transformed into Proyecto Mesoamerica 
during the presidency of Felipe Calderſn is seen as a continuity which has been 
conditioned by the dialectical processes of neoliberal capitalist rescaling in the 
periphery. The PPP-PM is an expression of a process that capitalism realises 
itself through the subordination and integration of the marginal spaces with 
the global markets within the neoliberal capitalist division of labour. Therefore, 
this process needs to be analysed in terms of these specific spatiotemporal 
conditions which are part of a wider process and subject to constant change 
and transformation.   
In the next chapter (chapter five), the same specific spatiotemporal processes 
of consolidation, transformation and expansion of the capitalist social space in 
the periphery will be explained in the case of Turkey. Determined by the same 
structural conditions the peripheral capitalist space in Turkey followed a 
similar path of development and transformation which strengthens the 
spatiotemporal specific conceptual framework for the production and 
reproduction of the peripheral capitalist space that was presented in the 
previous sections (chapter two) of this work. 
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Chapter 5: Peripheral forms of the worldwide restructuring/rescaling of 
capitalist spatiality: the regional economic integration projects of Turkey    
 ‘^ƉĂĐĞƐ ďƌŽŬĞŶ ĚŽǁŶ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŚŽŵŽŐĞŶŽƵƐ ĂƌĞ ƉůĂĐĞĚ ŝŶĂ ŚŝĞƌĂƌĐŚǇ ? ? ?ƚŚĞ
distinction between the strong points of space and centres and the peripheries. 
The domination of centres over the dominated spaces guarantees the 
homogenous character of space...The centres link up the peripheries, coordinate 
them, submit them to global strategy of ƚŚĞ^ƚĂƚĞ ? ? 
-,ĞŶƌŝ >ĞĨĞďǀƌĞ ?  ‘ dŚŽƵŐŚƚ ĞĐŽŵĞ tŽƌůĚ P DƵƐƚ tĞ ďĂŶĚŽ  DĂƌǆ ? ? ?
(1980/2009: 215).
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This chapter aims to locate and analyse the regional economic integration 
and development projects of Turkey within the worldwide processes of 
neoliberal restructuring and/or rescaling of capitalist spatiality and spatial 
relations. As it has been argued in the previous chapter (chapter four which 
focused on the regional economic integration projects of Mexico), this 
chapter also underlines the specific spatiotemporal processes in which the 
particular socio-spatial configurations (peripheral capitalist space) on 
different scales have been unfurled and re-territorialised. Before undertaking 
such an analysis, two important aspects of these regional projects should be 
recalled. Firstly, this specific scalar configuration of the peripheral capitalist 
spatiality should be clearly exposed by the analysis of the processes of 
production, consolidation and transformation of the peripheral capitalist 
space. Secondly, the regional integration projects that had been initiated and 
                                                          
35
 KƌŝŐŝŶĂůůǇ ƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚ ĂƐ  ‘hŶĞ ƉĞŶƐĠĞ ĚĞǀĞŶƵĞ ŵŽŶĚĞ P &ĂƵƚ-ŝů ĂďĂŶĚŽŶŶĞƌ DĂƌǆ Ó ? ?  ? ? ? ? ? ) ?
and the translation taken from  ‘^ƉĂĐĞĂŶĚDŽĚĞŽĨWƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?State, Space World: selected 
essays/Henri Lefebvre, (ed) Neil Brenner and Stuart Elden (2009) pp. 210-222.  
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implemented through these peripheral socio-spatial organisations needs to 
be evaluated within the worldwide neoliberal restructuring of the capitalist 
spatiality. In this re-territorialisation process, the capitalist spatiality is 
 ‘ŝŶƚĞŶƐŝĨŝĞĚ ?ĂŶĚ  ‘ĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚ ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ the mediation of the state power (Soja 
et al. 1983: 199). 
The first aspect has been delivered in chapter three with the specific 
conceptual framework that has been presented by linking the concepts of 
Luxemburg, Trotsky and Gramsci for the analysis of the formation and 
consolidation of the peripheral capitalist spatiality. This allows the definition 
of the specific socio-spatial conditions which determine the processes of 
neoliberal rescaling of the marginal spaces through the regional integration 
projects in Mexico and Turkey.  
As it has been defined previously and analysed in the Mexican case, while the 
passive revolution unclogged the blocked dialectical process of formation of 
the peripheral capitalist space in Mexico, during the post-passive 
revolutionary period the passive revolution had been institutionalised 
through the establishment of the bourgeois hegemony within the newly 
formed political and economic structures. Thereby, the peripheral 
development of the capitalist forces is further consolidated and deepened 
and paved the way to its transformation by expanding this exogenous 
process. Similarly, the post-passive revolutionary period in Turkey has been 
marked by a process of rapid urbanisation parallel to the expansion of 
industrial production on the basis of ISI development strategies. This period 
of ISI development in the post-World War context should be seen as the 
deepening of the uneven development of the capitalist space in which Turkey 
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has been positioned within the periphery of the international division of 
labour. The government-led industrial expansion was formulated by the five-
year government development plans and had been directly and indirectly 
financed by foreign  Wparticularly European- capital during the post-World 
War Keynesian economic structure which eventually transformed into a 
different structural form of the uneven capitalist relationship between centre 
and periphery. In this type of industrial expansion, the state institutions and 
financial sources played a significant role in the organisation and allocation of 
both public and private investment through maintaining the exogenous 
features of the peripheral capitalist development.    
However, the limits and unsustainable nature of the ISI development became 
more evident during the course of the worldwide neoliberal restructuring of 
the capitalist spatiality. This led to a significant reorientation and re-
territorialisation of the peripheral capitalist space in Turkey in terms of the 
Export Oriented Industrial (EOI) development model of industrial 
restructuring. It is important to note that the restructuring of the capitalist 
spatiality in the periphery through the reorientation of the industrial 
structure throughout the late 1970s and 1980s is built upon the 
institutionalised and concretised, in other words, matured, uneven 
relationship between centre and periphery during the post-passive 
revolutionary period, as explained before. 
This transformation period of the peripheral capitalist spatiality of Turkey 
from the limited capitalist accumulation through an economy dominated by 
the production of agricultural and raw material goods towards a largely 
industrialised peripheral economy can be defined as the emergence of the 
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peripheral spatiality in a new form which is more strongly integrated to the 
capitalist centre that later on culminated in the securing and  ‘upgrading ? of 
this integrated relationship by the membership of Turkey in the European 
Customs Union (ECU). Conjoining the periphery strongly with the centre in 
the context of worldwide restructuring of the capitalist spatiality led the 
peripheral capitalist space to channel (extensification as Soja puts it) and 
expand these forms of capitalist spatial relations both inward and outward 
towards the marginal spaces.   
Therefore, this chapter will be focusing on these two processes; in the first 
section the process where the peripheral capitalist spatiality deepened with 
the industrial expansion that has been materialised by statist ISI strategies 
during the post-passive revolutionary period (1930-1980); and the process in 
which the industrial structure has been reoriented towards EOI development 
strategies that led to the regional economic integration projects of Turkey 
during the 1980s will be elaborated. In the second section, the regional 
economic integration projects of Turkey will be evaluated in three areas; the 
initiatives for the creation of the institutional conditions of the free market 
economy through the Black Sea Economic Organisation comprising the ex-
Soviet bloc countries in the Black Sea region and Balkan countries including 
Turkey and Greece, the initiatives for the construction of necessary 
commercial infrastructures such as Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil and gas, Nabucco 
gas pipelines or Trans-caucasus rail and highǁĂǇƐ ? ĂŶĚ ĨŝŶĂůůǇ ƚŚĞ  ‘>ĞǀĂŶƚ
WƌŽũĞĐƚ ? ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ dƵƌŬĞǇ ? ^ǇƌŝĂ ? >ĞďĂŶŽŶ ĂŶĚ :ŽƌĚĂŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ ŽŵďŝŶĞƐ ƚŚĞ
strategies presented by the previous two. These projects will be analysed 
through emphasising the specific spatiotemporal process in which they have 
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been conditioned as part of the worldwide restructuring/rescaling of the 
capitalist spatiality.  
5.1. The post-passive revolutionary transformation of the peripheral 
ĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐƚƐƉĂƚŝĂůŝƚǇ PƚŚĞŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞzŽƵŶŐdƵƌŬ ‘ZĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ?
Ɛ ŝƚ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ĂƌŐƵĞĚ ďĞĨŽƌĞ  ?ĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ƚŚƌĞĞ ) ? 'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ?ƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ŽĨ ƉĂƐƐŝǀĞ
revolution successfully captures the specific socio-spatial configuration of the 
peripheral positioning of Turkey within the capitalist international division of 
labour and the historical conditions of the development of capitalist 
spatiality. Hence, by ůŝŶŬŝŶŐ'ƌĂŵƐĐŝ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐ of Luxemburg 
and Trotsky, a specific approach to the analysis of the peripheral capitalist 
spatiality was presented. It was argued that in the spatiotemporal analysis of 
the peripheral capitalist space formation these three theories are 
complementary; while >ƵǆĞŵďƵƌŐ ?Ɛ ĂŶĚ dƌŽƚŬƐǇ ?Ɛtheories of enlarged 
reproduction and uneven and combined development unravel the dialectical 
formation of the peripheral capitalist spatiality through highlighting its 
exogenous and uneven conditions, Gramsci disclosed a historical moment 
within this dialectical process. This spatiotemporally specific approach that 
was previously conceptualised places an emphasis on the particular 
spatiotemporal processes in which particular socio-spatial configurations 
have formed and transformed the capitalist space in the periphery. The 
neoliberal restructuring is the last and ongoing phase of this specific 
spatiotemporal process and the contemporary expansion of the peripheral 
capitalist spatiality towards the marginal spaces is conditioned by it.  
The concept of passive revolution firstly draws attention to the moment 
when the developing capitalist social relations within the existing social 
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formation lead to the transcending of the existing socio-spatial form and 
consolidate itself by incorporating the reactionary social forces and, thus, 
produce a new form of political authority (Gramsci 2007: 106, 107; Morton 
2003: 632). This new political form is comprised of a dialectical combination 
of the progressive and reactionary social forces and becomes the ultimate 
ĞǆƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ ŽĨ Ă  ‘ƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ-ƌĞƐƚŽƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? Žƌ  ‘ƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ ƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ?
since the peripheral bourgeoisie could not achieve an organic equilibrium by 
establishing its hegemony over the whole society which causes interruptions 
to the development of capitalism (Gramsci 2007: 53; Morton 2007: 66). 
Hence, the concept of passive revolution refers to a crucial stage of the 
modern state formation  Wparticularly in the periphery- which is a 
precondition of the establishment and further consolidation of capitalism 
(Morton 2011: 34). As it has been argued before, the passive revolution of 
the Young Turks eliminated the old regime and its systemic contradictions by 
establishing a precarious hegemony of the national bourgeoisie. The period 
that follows the passive revolution defined in this work as post-passive 
revolution where the national bourgeoisie institutionalise the passive 
revolution and strengthen its hegemony by the reorganisation of the state 
and society and ensure the economic growth.    
dŚĞƉĞƌŝŽĚďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ  ? ? ? ?zŽƵŶŐdƵƌŬ ƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞ  ? ? ? ?  ‘>ĂǁŽŶ
ƚŚĞDĂŝŶƚĞŶĂŶĐĞŽĨKƌĚĞƌ ?36 (Takrir-ŝ^ƺŬƸŶ<ĂŶƵŶƵ) when the follow up of 
                                                          
36
 /Ŷ EŽǀĞŵďĞƌ  ? ? ? ? Ă ĚŝƐƐŝĚĞŶƚ ŐƌŽƵƉ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ ZĞƉƵďůŝĐĂŶ WĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ WĂƌƚǇ ĨŽƌŵĞĚ ĂŶ
opposition party that was called Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet 
&ŦƌŬĂƐŦ -TCF) who defined liberalism and popular sovereignty as their primary objectives. 
Kemalists received this opposition as a counter-revolution and when a Kurdish rebellion broke 
out in February 1925, this extraordinary law has been enacted which gave an absolute power 
to the government for the next two years. In accordance with that law, In June 1925 the 
Progressive Republican Party was dissolved which brought political stability first time in 
seventeen years and marked the end of Young Turk passive revolution with the triumph of 
liberals (Ahmad 1993: 56-58).    
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the CUP (Committee of Union and Progress) Kemalist movement did 
establish its complete authority was an example of such a passive revolution 
where the bourgeois ideology reigned by leaning on the masses composed by 
the incŝƉŝĞŶƚ ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ĐůĂƐƐ ĂŶĚ ƉĞĂƐĂŶƚƌǇ  ?ŚŵĂĚ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ƺƌcher 2004: 
176). Kemalists increased their influence on the peasantry through the 
establishment of the Republican People ?s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi  W
CHP) where the local notables assumed a significant role in the mobilisation 
and support of the peasantry around a strong and central government in 
Ankara. Since the predominant majority of the Turkish peasantry was land-
owning  Wexcept in southeast Anatolia where the proportion between the 
large and small landholders was vice versa- there was no significant demand 
of land reform similar to the Mexican case. The tithe was eliminated in 1925, 
the  ‘KĨĨŝĐĞ ĨŽƌ ^Žŝů WƌŽĚƵĐƚƐ ?  ?dƺƌŬŝǇĞ ŝƌĂĂƚ DĂŚƐƵůůĞƌŝ KĨŝƐŝ -TMO) was 
founded in 1932 which secured the purchase of the agricultural products at a 
fixed price and, thus, eliminated the intermediary merchants and linked the 
ƐŵĂůů ĨĂƌŵĞƌ ĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ŵĂƌŬĞƚ ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ  ?<ĞǇĚĞƌ  ? ?  ? P  ? ? ? ? ƺƌĐŚĞƌ
2004: 198). These offices also supported the falling prices of agricultural 
products or tried to generate foreign exchange by encouraging the expanded 
cultivation as was the case for wheat after the onset of the Great Depression 
(Birtek 1985: 412). Completing the TMO policies, rural cooperatives were 
established which then became subject to credits that were allocated by the 
Agricultural Bank (Atasoy 2005: 58).  By 1925, it was possible to complete 
what the Young Turk revolution of CUP had commenced but not achieved; 
replacing the ancient rĠgime with a new liberal social and political order 
ǁŚĞƌĞĂƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌŝĂůƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞ  ‘dƵƌŬŝƐŚŶĂƚŝŽŶ ? Wclaimed to be not 
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ethnic- would ďĞ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵŵŽŶ ĚĞŶŽŵŝŶĂƚŽƌ ŽĨ Ă  ‘ĐůĂƐƐůĞƐƐ ? ƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ  ?ŚŵĂĚ
 ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?ƺƌĐŚĞƌ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ?,ĂŶŝŽŒůƵ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ? 
Although political stability was established for the first time since the 1908 
Young Turk revolution and 12 years of continual fighting, the war-torn 
Turkish economy found an unfavourable international economic 
environment for an economic recuperation and development. Like its 
predecessor, CUP, the Kemalists were strong believers in market economy 
principles such as private entrepreneurship and property rights and 
particularly the necessity of foreign investment.
37
 In that sense, the 
institutionalisation of the Young Turk passive revolution by the Kemalists has 
been materialised through the consolidation of the market economy in which 
the state played a mediating role and the establishment of the orderly 
transfer of the political power where the state institutions and the 
ZĞƉƵďůŝĐĂŶWĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐWĂƌƚǇďĞĐĂŵĞĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůǇĐŽŶŐƌƵĞŶƚ ? 
/ŶƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƐƉĞĐƚƌƵŵ ?ƚŚĞ ‘>ĂǁŽŶƚŚĞDĂŝŶƚĞŶĂŶĐĞŽĨKƌĚĞƌ ?ƌĞŵĂŝŶĞĚŝŶ
force until 1929 and any political organisation outside the state party had 
been disbanded. It had been claimed that since the party achieved to 
transcend the class differences there was no necessity to form any other 
political party which would aim to undermine the social unity. In accordance 
ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĂƚ ? Ă ůĞŐĂĐǇ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ zŽƵŶŐ dƵƌŬ ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ? ƚŚĞ  ‘dƵƌŬŝƐŚ ,ĞĂƌƚŚƐ ?
association (dƺƌŬ KĐĂŬůĂƌŦ) was closed down in 1931. This association was 
founded by the CUP in order to disseminate the nationalist ideology and to 
                                                          
37
 /Ŷ ƚŚĞ  ‘&ŝƌƐƚ dƵƌŬŝƐŚ ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ŽŶŐƌĞƐƐ ? ƚŚĂƚ ŚĞůĚ ŝŶ /ǌŵŝƌ ŝŶ &ĞďƌƵĂƌǇ  ? ? ? ? ? ŝƚ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ
argued that the development of the national industry is an indispensible necessity for the 
national independence. Nevertheless, it is ĂůƐŽƌĞĐŽƌĚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨĂ ‘ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ?
Turkish economy, the private investment and foreign capital would play a significant role 
while ƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞĂůƐŽƚĂŬĞƐƚŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨŵĂũŽƌŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚƐ ?ŚŵĂĚ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?ƺƌĐŚĞƌ
2004: 195).   
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entrench the reforms such as the new Family Law that was to give women 
greater rights, bringing the judicial system under the secular control, and 
creating the necessary conditions for girls ? education, and when it was closed 
the association was reaching 32000 members in 267 branches (Szyliowicz 
1966: 270; Keyder 1987: 99; ƺƌĐŚĞƌ ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ) ? /Ŷturn, it was replaced by 
 ‘WĞŽƉůĞ ?Ɛ ,ŽŵĞƐ ? in 1932 (Halk Evleri) in towns and by  ‘WĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐZŽŽŵƐ ? in 
large villages in 1939 where they were run to and act as the local branches of 
ƚŚĞƉĂƌƚǇ ?<ĂƌĂƂŵĞƌůŝŽŒůƵ ? ? ? ?Ă P ? ? ?ŚŵĂĚ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ?ƺƌĐŚĞƌ  ? ? P ? ? ? ) ?
tŝƚŚƚŚĞĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞ ‘sŝůůĂŐĞ/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞƐ ? ?<ƂǇŶƐƚŝƚƺůĞƌŝ-1937), this 
institutional framework became the backbone of the process of establishing 
poliƚŝĐĂůĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƌĞĂĐŚŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ŚĞĂƌƚƐĂŶĚŵŝŶĚƐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ
 ‘ŵŽƚŝǀĂƚĞĂŶĚƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵ ?ƚŚĞŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇƉĞŽƉůĞƉĂƌĂůůĞůƚŽƚŚĞƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞĂŶĚ
principles of the Revolution which now had been concretised within the Party 
 ?^ǌǇůŝŽǁŝĐǌ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ?<ĂƌĂƂŵĞƌůŝŽŒůƵ ? ? ? ?Ă P ? ? ?<ĂƌĂƂŵĞƌůŝŽŒůƵ ? ? ? ?ď P ? ? ) ?
dŚĞdƵƌŬŝƐŚtŽŵĞŶ ?ƐhŶŝŽŶǁŚŝĐŚŚĂĚďĞĞŶĨŽƵŶĚed in 1924 by women who 
were active in the national resistance was also dissolved since the party 
claimed its aim to give equal rights to Turkish women had already been 
ĂĐŚŝĞǀĞĚ  ?ƺƌĐŚĞƌ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ) ? tŚŝůĞ Ă ŶĞǁ ƉƌĞƐƐ ůĂǁ ĂůůŽǁĞĚ ƚŚĞ
government to close any newspapeƌƐĂŶĚŵĂŐĂǌŝŶĞƐ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚ with the 
ŐĞŶĞƌĂů ƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ? ? ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ ǁĂƐ ĐůŽƐĞůǇ
affiliated with the Young Turks, the  ‘TurŬŝƐŚDĂƐŽŶŝĐ^ŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ǁĂƐŽƵƚůĂǁĞĚ
ŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ  ‘ƌĞĨŽƌŵ ?ŽĨ ƚŚĞ /ƐƚĂŶďƵůhŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ ?ĂƌƺůĨƺŶƵŶ), two-
thirds of the non-Kemalist teaching staff had been expelled and substituted 
by the German scholars and scientists who started to leave Germany after 
,ŝƚůĞƌ ĐĂŵĞ ƚŽ ƉŽǁĞƌ  ?<ĞǇĚĞƌ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ƺƌĐŚĞƌ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ? ŚŵĂĚ  ? ? ? ? P
231). Therefore, there was no political organisation or activity left to mobilise 
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people and challenge the one-party state structure which allowed the State 
to place an emphasis on the national unity and solidarity that denies class 
ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚĂŶĚĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ  ?ƺƌĐŚĞƌ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ) ? /Ŷ ƚŚŝƐƐĞŶƐĞ ? ŝƚ ĐĂŶďĞĂƌŐƵĞĚ
that the Young Turk passive revolution was successfully institutionalised.  
However, the aim of the consolidation of a working market economy in 
accordance with a substantially growing national industry faced significant 
difficulties. Firstly, the departure of the majority of the non-Muslim 
population which dominated the manufacturing and commercial sectors in 
the Ottoman Empire meant a substantial economic loss, both in terms of 
financial capital and in the numbers of the manufacturing labour force for 
Turkey (Atasoy 2005: 52). The second difficulty was the disadvantaged import 
tariffs which had remained at the pre-war level until 1929 due to the 
>ĂƵƐĂŶŶĞ ƚƌĞĂƚǇ  ?ƺƌĐŚĞƌ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ) ? EĞǀĞƌƚŚĞůĞƐƐ ? ƚŚĞ ĚĞƚĞƌŝŽƌĂƚŝŶŐ
international economic environment that culminated in the world recession 
during the 1930s gave a relative freedom to the Kemalist regime to develop 
ůŽĐĂů ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ  ?ǇĚŦŶ 2005: 26). The Young Turk etatism remained limited 
ĞǀĞŶ ƚŚŽƵŐŚ ŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ƚŚĞ  ‘>Ăǁ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ /ŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ? ǁĂƐ
enacted and simultaneously the pre-war tariffs and the right of issuing paper 
money which had been previously restricted to the French-British owned 
Ottoman Bank was legislated (Keyder 1981: 9). In 1927, ƚŚĞ  ‘>Ăǁ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ
Encouragement of /ŶĚƵƐƚƌǇ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ǁas built on the previous 1913 law was 
passed, bringing tax exemptions, land grants, permissions to import 
investment goods without payment of duties, reductions of freight fares and 
subsidise ƉƵďůŝĐƉƵƌĐŚĂƐĞƐ ?<ĞǇĚĞƌ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?ƺƌĐŚĞƌ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ? 
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dŚĞ  ? ? ? ?  ‘ŶĐŽƵƌĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ>Ăǁ ?did not exclude foreign capital; hence, until 
the world recession the foreign capital heavily invested particularly in the 
merchant capital, production of raw material and goods for domestic 
consumption. Foreign investment was concentrated mainly in the banking 
sector, trading companies and insurance, alongside the mining, cement 
manufacture and food processing sector where mining and manufacturing 
accounted for two-thirds of the total foreign investments. In this respect, the 
role of foreign financial sources that, observed previously in chapter two kept 
its significance in the process of consolidation of the peripheral capitalist 
space. This manifests the exogenous and uneven patterns in the relationship 
between the centre and the periphery, maintained and deepened by the 
gradual expansion of the foreign capital investment towards the production 
of exportable goods that concentrated in the particular parts of the country 
(Keyder 1981: 62). Foreign capital had also invested in the joint ventures such 
as in textile and electricity production (Atasoy 2005: 55).  
Nevertheless, this laissez-faire orientation was not contradictory to the 
^ƚĂƚĞ ?Ɛ ƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĞĐŽŶŽŵǇ ?the state intervened where there was a 
need for major investment or in order to channel resources for private 
investments. One of the major public investment areas was the railway 
ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ  ?ǇĚŦŶ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ) ? ƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ůĂƐƚ ƋƵĂƌƚĞƌ ŽĨƚŚĞ  ? ?th century, 
Turkish railway construction  Wfinanced and operated by European capital- 
was concentrated geographically in the Balkan region and Western Anatolia; 
hence, during the 1920s, 800 km of track has been built in order to connect 
the Eastern parts of the Asian Minor with the West. In 1924, the government 
decided to buy the foreign owned railway companies and, by 1930, 3000 km 
of track was bought in total. The remaining 2400 km of foreign owned tracks 
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were bought by the State eventually and more railway construction was 
undertaken during the  ? ? ? ?Ɛ  ?<ĞǇĚĞƌ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ? ƺƌĐŚĞƌ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ) ? dŚĞ
expropriation of the railways and the construction of the new tracks served 
as the infrastructural element for the etatist programme and also allowed 
the state to use and control the resource flows and their direction (Birtek 
1985: 412).  
Another major state investment during the late 1920s was the nationalisation 
of the foreign owned monopolies in a number of sectors such as tobacco, 
alcohol, sugar, matches, salt, gasoline and explosives, and the expropriation 
of the foreign companies delivering public services such as electricity, tram 
and water companies, particularly after the elimination of the restrictions 
ĞŶǀŝƐĂŐĞĚďǇƚŚĞ>ĂƵƐĂŶŶĞƚƌĞĂƚǇ ŝŶ ? ? ? ?  ?<ĞǇĚĞƌ  ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ƺƌĐŚĞƌ  ? ? ? ? P
196, Atasoy 2005: 54).   
Naturally, parallel to this level of state presence in the economy, the control 
and the constitution of the financial institutions in order to create credit or 
money supply for the economic development was a necessity. The financial 
development was a significant characteristic of the 19
th
 century 
concentration and centralisation of capital on a world scale which 
enthusiastically participated in the formation of the capitalist forces in the 
periphery through the multi-national financial bodies and trusts (Bukharin 
1976: 96-103). In the Ottoman Turkey, there had been individual bankers and 
lenders and it was not until 1845 that a bank supported by the government -
the Banque de Constantinople- was established as a foreign currency 
regulating agency. The creation of this semi-official bank was a necessity 
following the introduction of paper money (1839) and the adoption of bi-
252 
 
metallic decimal standard (Eldem 2005: 436). In 1856, the Ottoman Bank was 
established  Walthough registered in London- and in 1863 it conceded the 
status of a state bank and changed its name ƚŽ  ‘/ŵƉĞƌŝĂůKƚƚŽŵĂŶĂŶŬ ?ďǇ
undertaking the responsibility of issuing paper money while continuing to 
function as a commercial bank and as an intermediary of the British and 
French investments in the Ottoman Empire (Keyder 1981: 102; Eldem 2005: 
437).  The first Turkish bank, the Agricultural Bank was founded in 1888 as 
the central institution of the Hamidian agricultural reforms, but remained 
limited in satisfying the needs of the agricultural producers as a credit 
institution (Quataert 1975: 211). The Young Turk revolutionaries took 
advantage of the war circumstances to force out the British and French 
financial institutions, replacing them with Turkish banks both through 
ĨŽƵŶĚŝŶŐďĂŶŬƐ ŝŶ /ƐƚĂŶďƵůĂŶĚ ůŽĐĂůďĂŶŬƐ ŝŶŶĂƚŽůŝĂ ?ǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞ  ‘EĂƚŝŽŶĂů
Credit ĂŶŬ ?  ?7ƚŝďĂƌ-ŝ DŝůůŠ ĂŶŬĂƐŦ) that established in 1917 appears as the 
most significant  ?ƺƌĐŚĞƌ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ) ? dŚŝƐ ƉŽůŝĐǇ ŽĨ ĐƌĞĂƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ
financial resources had been continued by the Kemalists, alongside the 
return of the Allied origin banks sucŚ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ  ‘ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ ǆƉƌĞƐƐ ŽŵƉĂŶǇ ? ?
 ‘ƌĞĚŝƚ >ǇŽŶŶĂŝƐ ? ?  ‘ĂŶƋƵĞ ĚĞ ůĂ ^ĞŝŶĞ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ĂŶĐŽ Ěŝ ZŽŵĂ ? ? ǁŚŝůĞ ƚŚĞ
 ‘ĞƵƚƐĐŚĞĂŶŬ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĞƵƚƐĐŚĞKƌŝĞŶƚĂŶŬ ?ŚĂĚĚĞĞƉĞŶĞĚŝƚƐŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐŝŶ
the joint ventures and direct investments (Keyder 1981: 102-105).  
In order to ensure the continual creation of credit sources and the money 
supply that would fuel the industrial investments and economic 
development, ƚŚĞ ‘ƵƐŝŶĞƐƐĂŶŬ ? ?7ƔĂŶŬĂƐŦ) was established in 1924 which 
then merged with the National Credit Bank in 1927. Simultaneously, the 
former Agricultural Bank was reconstituted and strengthened in financial 
ƚĞƌŵƐ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ĂŶŬŽĨ/ŶĚƵƐƚƌǇĂŶĚDŝŶĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ƚŚĞ ‘ĂŶŬŽĨ ZĞĂůƐƚĂƚĞĂŶĚ
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KƌƉŚĂŶƐ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ) ? ƚŚĞ  ‘/ŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂů ƌĞĚŝƚ ĂŶŬ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ) ĂŶĚ ĨŝŶĂůůǇ ƚŚĞ  ‘ĞŶƚƌĂů
ĂŶŬ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ) ǁĞƌĞ ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ  ?<ĞǇĚĞƌ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ?- ? ? ?  ƺƌĐŚĞƌ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ?
Atasoy 2005: 57).   
While the agricultural exports were the major source of revenue during the 
short period following the war, the limits of the agricultural exports to cover 
the imports of machinery and other industrial inputs for the expansion of the 
consumer-good producing industries and other manufactured products 
(Atasoy 2005: 52) and the falling prices of the agricultural goods with the 
world crisis gradually decreased its importance in the economy. In that sense, 
it is possible to argue that the domination of the economic expansion by the 
increasing industrial production -dependent on the foreign financial 
resources and machinery- was spatiotemporally conditioned (Birtek 1985: 
408, 410) and led to a qualitative change of the position of Turkey within the 
capitalist international division of labour by moving her away from the 
generation of surplus primarily through the agricultural exports -which was 
successful for a historically specific period of the capitalist spatial 
development (Keyder 1981: 12).   
The world depression had significantly affected the merchant capital and 
agricultural production while the manufacturing sector had benefited most 
from the protectionist economic environment, the steady moving away from 
the free trade policies and the ƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐŵŽƌĞĂĐƚŝǀĞƌŽůĞŝŶƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ
necessary political and economic infrastructure for the capital accumulation 
besides its encouragement and financial support of the private investment 
 ?<ĞǇĚĞƌ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ?ǇĚŦn 2005: 27). The etatist response of the periphery to 
the Great Depression reached its climax in 1934, when the first Five-Year 
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Industrialisation plan -which was inspired greatly by the First Soviet Five-Year 
Plan (1929-1933)- was launched mainly for the production of textiles and 
intermediary goods such as copper, steel, ceramics, glass, chemicals, paper 
and food processing (Fry 1971: 306; Pamuk 1981: 26; Birtek 1985: 408; 
Keyder 1987: 106). Under this Five-Year plan, two large holding companies 
were established: Sumerian Bank (^ƺŵĞƌďĂŶŬ) was concerned with the 
financing, construction and operation of state enterprises in the industrial 
area and the Hittite Bank (Etibank) was responsible for the mining of coal, 
sulphur, copper, chrome and iron ore (Okyar 1965: 101; Birtek 1985: 413; 
ƺƌĐŚĞƌ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ?ůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂƐĞĐŽŶĚĨŝǀĞ-year plan 
which defined the intermediate and capital intensive goods production as its 
priority was interrupted during the Second World War (Fry 1971: 306; 
ůƚƵŶŦƔŦŬ ĂŶĚ dƺƌ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ) ? ĂƐ Ă ƌĞƐƵůƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŝŶŐ ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂů
investments of the government the annual growth in the industrial sector 
reached 10 percent of the GNP while the annual growth remained much 
lower than the agricultural production throughout the 1930s (Togan 1994: 2).  
The period following the Second World War witnessed a new stage of 
integration with the world economy by positioning itself within the 
international division of labour through its incorporation to the Marshall Aid 
Programme. In the same way, Turkey became a member of the IMF and the 
World Bank (WB) in 1947 and the other major international economic 
organisations such as ILO, GATT and OEEC (Organisation for European 
Economic Cooperation). Particularly the financial support from the WB was 
conditioned by dƵƌŬĞǇ ?ƐĐŽŵƉůŝĂŶĐĞƚŽŝƚƐƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐƚŚĂƚĂĚǀŽĐĂƚŝŶŐĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ
reorientation on the basis of the comparative advantages which were 
determined as the agricultural production in case ŽĨdƵƌŬĞǇ ?ǇĚŦŶ ? ? ? ? P ? ?-
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29). Coupled with the increasing problems of financing the existing state 
owned enterprises (Birtek 1985: 414-415), government led industrialisation 
plans had been pushed away in favour of the policies that aimed for an 
expansion in the agricultural production and the other primary goods 
 ?ĞůąƐƵŶĂŶĚZŽĚƌŝŬ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ? 
As a result of this, and with the stimulation of the high post-war demand, the 
agricultural output began to increase more rapidly in the immediate period 
following the Second World War and stabilised until the 1980s with a 3 
percent annual growth (Pamuk 2008: 292). However, this drastic change in 
the agricultural output was a product of the rapid mechanisation of the 
Turkish agriculture which started in 1948 with the tractors, tractor drawn 
equipment, combine harvesters and trailers imported from the United States 
and, later, from European countries purchased by farmers under liberal 
credit terms provided by state owned banks (Aktan 1957: 276). Even though 
ƚŚĞ ŶĞǁ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ  ‘ĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐ WĂƌƚǇ ?  ?Demokrat Parti) defeated CHP in 
1950 with an anti-etatist and pro-private investment economic programme, 
the Turkish economy significantly remained dependent upon public 
investments and financing. In the first half of the 1950s, the economy 
expanded rapidly through this sharp increase in the agricultural output and 
the substantial increase in the agricultural exports due to the worldwide 
post-war expansion (Okyar 1979: 335 ?ĞĕĞŶĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ? 
However, it is very important to note that this increase in the capacity of the 
capital accumulation through agricultural exports was very specific in the 
post-war context, and thus, was exhausted rapidly in the first half of the 
1950s and the economy entered a phase of foreign exchange shortage with 
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the falling prices of agricultural products in the global markets. The high 
inflation rates -which appears as a characteristic of the peripheral capitalist 
ƐƉĂƚŝĂů ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĨŽƌŵ ŽĨ ĠƚĂƚŝƐŵ- put a pressure on the debt 
servicing, which started to consume the large part of the export earnings 
with the liberal international trade regulations and the free market economic 
ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ  ?dŽŐĂŶ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ?ǇĚŦŶ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ) ? /Ŷ ƚŚĂƚ ĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ? ƚŚĞĂ ŝ-ĠƚĂƚŝƐƚ
DP government increased the public expenditure with inflationary forms of 
financing which led to the implementation of price and credit controls that is, 
in fact, a very short termed and inefficient policy in a high inflationary 
economic environment (Okyar 1965: 104; Fry 1971: 307). Eventually, the 
government was forced to devalue the Turkish lira from 2.8 to 9.0 to a dollar 
in 1958 and simultaneously agreed with the OEEC and IMF on a stabilisation 
programme including debt restructuring and foreign financial assistance 
which also subsequently failed to rehabilitate the balance of payment crises 
in the following two years (Hershlag 1968: 147; Kazgan 1999: 101).   
The high inflation, economic instability and political unrest culminated in the 
 ? ? ? ? ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ĐŽƵƉ Ě ?ĠƚĂƚ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ ƌĞǀĞƌƐĂů ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĠƚĂƚŝƐƚ ƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ǁĞƌĞ 
officially accepted but this time in a more institutionalised form. The  ‘State 
Planning Organisation ? (SPO) was established and became the central 
institutional organ which was entrusted with the preparation and 
implementation of five-year development plans in the new constitution of 
 ? ? ? ? ?&ƌǇ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ?ǇĚŦŶ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?dŚĞĨŝƌƐƚ38 five-year development plan 
aimed for 7 percent annual growth by giving a significant emphasis to the 
State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) and perceived the private sector as the 
                                                          
38
 Although the first five-year industrialisation plan was implemented in 1934, the first five-
year plan that launched by the SPO was also called first.   
257 
 
complementary part of the planned economy (SPO 1962: 2-3). This reversal 
to the planned economy should be seen as a product of the spatiotemporal 
ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ dƵƌŬĞǇ ?Ɛ ƉĞƌŝƉŚĞƌĂů ĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐƚ ƐƉĂƚŝĂůŝƚǇ ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ Ă ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů
decision. The industrial growth became the determinant sector in the 
economic expansion and on the development of the agriculture and service 
sectors (Bairam 1991: 1279) while its maintenance and development 
remained highly dependent upon foreign financial input. This structural 
ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞƐ dƵƌŬĞǇ ?Ɛ  WĂŶĚ ĂƐ ŝƚ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶƐŚŽǁŶ DĞǆŝĐŽ ?Ɛ- 
peripheral capitalist spatiality became more apparent in the period of 
planned economy and its liquidation through the 1980s neoliberal 
restructuring.  
The implementation of the five-year development plans led to a rapid 
expansion within the manufacturing and service sectors in contrast with the 
limited growth before the 1960s. During the implementation of the three 
successive five-year plans, the GNP increased by 6.4 percent between 1963 
and 1967, 6.7 percent between 1968 and 1972 and 7.2 percent between 
1973 and 1977. Parallel to the positive expansion of the manufacture sector, 
the share of agriculture in total output declined from 38.4 percent in 1962 to 
23.3 percent in 1977, and the share of industrial sector increased from 22.3 
percent to 31.5 percent in the same period. This rapid structural change 
towards the expansion of the industrial production and accelerated capital 
accumulation had been heavily dependent on the public investments that 
channelled through the SEEs which particularly focused on inward-looking 
import substitution for the domestic consumption (Fry 1971: 313- ? ? ? ?ĞĕĞŶ
et al 1994: 39; Pamuk 267-273).  
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Meanwhile, this unprecedented increase in the public investments in the 
manufacturing sector through SEEs led to the emergence of a highly capital-
intensive manufacturing sector (Bayar 1996: 777). In this first stage of 
expansion of the import substitution oriented industrial development, the 
cost was financed mainly by the domestic savings and the increasing 
ŝŵŵŝŐƌĂŶƚ ǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ? ƌĞŵŝƚƚĂŶĐĞƐ which is another feature peculiar to 
peripheral spatiality. The purchasing power created by the immigrant 
ǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?ƌĞŵŝƚƚĂŶĐĞƐĨŽƌƚŚĞŐŽŽĚƐƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚďǇƚhe SEEs was striking and it 
reached its climax during the early 1970s (Pamuk 1981: 29). The share of the 
ǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?ƌemittances in the finance of the balance of payments reached 109 
percent in 1972 and 154 percent in 1973. However, while the volume of the 
foreign exchange inflow through the remittances constantly increased after 
1973, the portion of the workerƐ ?ƌĞŵŝƚƚĂŶces that compensated the balance 
of payments decreased significantly due to the continual substantial increase 
of the ŝŵƉŽƌƚƐ ?ƌƚƵŬŽŒůƵ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?
The increase of the imports can be explained with the transformation of the 
industrial production structure during the 1970s when the import 
substitution started to move towards more complex patterns of industrial 
production such as consumer durables, intermediate and capital goods. As it 
was previously observed in the Mexican case, in this inescapable stage of the 
ISI production the reliance of the peripheral capitalist space on the foreign 
financial resources substantially increases. Meanwhile, in the case of Turkey 
as it was the case for Mexico, the total factor productivity had continually 
increased and increased more in the public manufacturing sector than 
private sector which indicates a technological change was undergoing in the 
industrial production led by the SEEs. However the dƵƌŬŝƐŚ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ ?
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import substitution policies which had been based on an unrealistic, effective 
exchange rate, import restrictions and unreal interest rates received the first 
shock with the first oil crisis in 1973 when the favourable international 
ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĞŶĚĞĚ ?ĞĕĞŶĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?
In the period between 1973 and 1978, dƵƌŬĞǇ ?Ɛ ďĂůĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ ƉĂǇŵĞŶƚƐ
deteriorated significantly up to a point of stalemate. The sharp increase in 
the value of the Turkish imports was caused directly by the oil price increase 
in 1974. While the economic expansion was heavily dependent on the foreign 
credits, the long term discouragement of the exportation of the SEE products 
and the lack of direct foreign investments led to the rapid erosion of the 
foreign exchange reserves and eventually to the sharp increase in the 
ĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůĚĞďƚ ?^ĂƌĂĕŽŒůƵ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?-123). As Table 5.1 shows while the public 
investments increased continually, the domestic savings remained stagnant, 
causing an increasing need for foreign financial resources (Rodrik 1990: 3). 
During this period, the government kept subsidising the prices of the 
commodities that produced by the SEEs as well as the energy prices while the 
real exchange rate and real interest rates were allowed to appreciate. This 
led to the complete reliance of SEEs on public financing through the central 
bank and acquiring short term foreign loans which resulted in a rapidly 
climbing inflation and a deep payment crisis that forced the government to 
suspend the foreign exchange transfers for imports in February 1977 
 ?^ĂƌĂĕŽŒůƵ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ?bĞŶƐĞƐ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ? 
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Table 5.1. Investment-savings balances, 1973-1977 (percent of GNP) 
       
1973 
1974 1975 1976 1977 
      
Investment      
   Private  
11.1 
 10.0  10.3  13.1  11.9 
   Public  7.0  10.8  12.2  11.6  13.1 
      
Domestic 
Savings  
     
   Private 11.6  11.0  8.5  11.2  11.7 
   Public  8.8  7.4  9.0  8.1  6.4 
 
Foreign 
Savings 
     
(Current 
account 
deficit) 
-2.2  2.3  5.0  5.4  6.9 
Source: Rodrik 1990: 31.   
 
Inflation rose to 24.1 percent in 1977 from 15.6 percent in 1976, and to 36 
percent in the last quarter of 1977. Simultaneously, as a result of the 
increasing public spending the short term loans had risen to 6.146 million 
dollars in 1977 from 229 million dollars in 1974 (Okyar 1983: 534). These 
macroeconomic conditions (Table 5.2) forced the recently elected central-left 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ƺůĞŶƚ ĐĞǀŝƚ ƚŽ ƐŝŐŶ Ă ƐƚĂŶĚ-by agreement with the IMF in 
April 1978. This programme aimed to decrease the balance of payment 
deficit to 4 percent in 1978 from 7 percent through an expected expansion of 
ƚŚĞĞǆƉŽƌƚƐĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞ ? ?ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚĚĞǀĂůƵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞdƵƌŬŝƐŚůŝƌĂ ?ĞĕĞŶĞƚ
al 1994: 44). The IMF conditioned the release of the envisaged SDRs with the 
ability of the Turkish government to comply with the limits that had been 
established for the public sector borrowings that were financed by the 
central bank, the limits for the contracting new external debts, not 
introducing new schemes of multiple currency practices, payment or import 
restrictions and entering to the new bilateral agreements with the fund 
members (Okyar 1983: 535; Kazgan 1999: 132). 
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      Table5.2. Macroeconomic Performance of Turkey during the 1970s  
Year Real GDP  
Growth 
Inflation 
Rate  
(WPI) (%) 
Current 
Account 
Balance 
(million %) 
Investment  
(% of GDP) 
 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
 
1974  W 77  
average 
 
1978 
1979 
1980 
 
1978- 80 
average 
 
6.0  
4. I  
8.8  
8.9  
8.9  
4.9 
 
7.3  
 
 
 4.3 
-0.6 
-1.0 
 
 0.9 
 
 
18.0 
20.5 
29.9 
10.1 
15.6 
24.1 
 
19.9 
 
 
52.6 
63.9 
107.2 
 
74.6 
 
 
 47  
 534 
-662 
-1.889 
-2.286 
-3.431 
 
-2.067 
 
 
-1.595 
-1.203 
-3.304 
 
-2.034 
 
 
20.1 
18.1 
20.7 
22.5 
24.7 
25.0 
 
23.2 
 
 
18.5 
18.3 
21.4 
 
19.4 
 
               ^ŽƵƌĐĞ PĞůąƐƵŶĂŶĚZŽĚƌŝŬ ? ? ? ? PƉƉ ? ? ? 
 
However, it was already unrealistic to expect an ISI oriented peripheral 
economy to decrease imports while the expansion and running of the 
economy is dependent on the import of raw material and machinery. 
Therefore, the macroeconomic conditions deteriorated extremely; the high 
rates of inflation and the stringency of foreign exchange led to widespread 
shortages of basic goods such as sugar, cooking oil and petroleum. Although 
the Turkish government successfully appealed to the OECD for an emergency 
aid, it was conditional on reaching another stand-by agreement with the IMF. 
The IMF approved the new stand-by agreement in June 1979 with a 
stabilisation programme which included the devaluation of the Turkish lira by 
43.7 percent, and strictly limited the central bank financing of the public 
sector deficits. The unprecedented increase in the volume of the money in 
circulation eventually flamed the inflation from 51 percent to 81 percent in 
1979, while the value of exports had further decreased from 2.288 million 
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dollars in 1978 to 2.261 million dollars in 1979 which contrast to the imports 
which had increased from 4.599 million dollars to 5.067 million dollars. 
(Okyar 1983: 539-540; Ekinci 1990: 75- ? ? ? /ƐŵŝŚĂŶ Ğƚ Ăů  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ? ǇĚŦŶ
2005: 40-41).  
The failure to achieve any macroeconomic upturn and the widespread urban 
armed conflict between right and left wing political groups led to the colossal 
defeat of the governing centre-left CHP in the local elections which caused 
the resignation of the government. CHP cadres were firmly believed to the 
virtues of the national economic independence and supported the strong 
state intervention in the economy, thus, they were reluctant to eliminate 
public financing of SEEs. Under those conditions, a minority government was 
formed by the centre-right leader Demirel, in November 1979, who was 
determined to strictly implement the stabilisation programme of the IMF. 
However, within the current worldwide rescaling of the global capitalist 
spatiality it was apparent that the Turkish economy needed to be 
restructured and repositioned within the international division of labour 
rather than reassuring the good functioning of the SEEs which was 
continually dependent on the foreign financial resources. The key themes of 
this neoliberal restructuring narrative were trade liberalisation with the 
deregulation of the terms of international trade and the limitation of the 
state presence in the economy with the extensive privatisation of the SEEs in 
accordance with the reorientation towards the export promotion strategy. It 
has to be noted that these two main themes had several implications varying 
from the deregulation of the domestic market to a militant policy of 
repressing wage incomes (Yeldan 1989: 274). The next section outlines this 
process of neoliberal restructuring of the peripheral capitalist spatiality of 
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Turkey in terms of these aspects and their further implications as part of the 
worldwide rescaling of the capitalist space where the capitalist social 
relations had ďĞĞŶ ‘ŝŶƚĞŶƐŝĨŝĞĚĂŶĚĞǆƚĞŶƐŝĨŝĞĚ ?ĚƵƌŝŶŐthe 1980s.  
5.2. Neoliberal restructuring and trade liberalisation as the condition of the 
export-oriented positioning of Turkey  
The main aim of this section is analysing the underpinning dynamics of the 
spatiotemporal processes where the peripheral capitalist space in Turkey was 
conditioned to expand towards its immediate periphery in the form of 
regional integration projects as a part of the global rescaling of the neoliberal 
capitalism. In this respect, it will be analysed first the structural conditions 
where the import substitution oriented economy reached its limits and faced 
a crisis and was forced to be restructured towards export-oriented industrial 
growth.  
5.2.1. The crisis of the ISI and the conditions of the neoliberal restructuring of 
the Turkish Economy 
Following the failure of the 1978 and 1979 stand-by agreements, it became 
clear for the foreign financial sources  Wparticularly for the IMF- that the 
Turkish economy needed to undertake a drastic structural adjustment 
programme which would have long-term implications while simultaneously 
completing the short term monetary measures to ameliorate the 
macroeconomic conditions. In accordance with that, the Demirel government 
installed a new ecoŶŽŵŝĐƚĞĂŵŚĞĂĚĞĚďǇƚŚĞ ‘ƵŶĚĞƌƐĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇƚŽƚŚĞƉƌŝŵĞ
ŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ ?dƵƌŐƵƚPǌĂůĂŶĚŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞĚĂŵĂũŽƌĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐƚĂďŝůƐĂƚŝŽŶƉĂĐŬĂŐĞ
on January 24, 1980, that marked the starting point of the entire 
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reorientation of the Turkish economy and the neoliberal rescaling of the 
ƉĞƌŝƉŚĞƌĂůĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐƚƐƉĂƚŝĂůŝƚǇ ?PŶŝƔĂŶĚtĞďď ? ? ? ? P ? ) ?
The structural adjustment programme received immediate pledges of 
financial support from the IMF, the World Bank, OECD, EEC, European 
Settlement Bank and Islamic Development Bank which would enable the 
government to successfully make the external transfers and regain its 
creditworthiness (Candemir 1994: 110).  However, the programme received a 
great deal of political opposition within the parliament which weakened the 
hands of the minority government and the measures were completely 
ƌĞũĞĐƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞǀĞƌǇƐƚƌŽŶŐĂŶĚŵŝůŝƚĂŶƚƚƌĂĚĞƵŶŝŽŶƐ ?bĞŶƐĞƐ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ?
The programme was informally negotiated with the IMF before its 
presentation, and thus, it was in line with the similar stabilisation and 
structural adjustment programmes orchestrated by the international 
financial organisations in other peripheral economies, particularly in Latin 
America. The main objectives of the January 24 stabilisation programme 
were; eliminating the inflationary cycle; solving the unsustainable pressure 
on the balance of payments; ensuring the price stability; liberalisation of 
foreign trade and payments in order to shift the production patterns towards 
the export orientation; a complete privatisation of economic life through 
decreasing the role and presence of the state in the economy and relying on 
ƚŚĞ ĨŽƌĐĞƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĚĞƌĞŐƵůĂƚĞĚ ĨƌĞĞ ŵĂƌŬĞƚ  ?bĞŶƐĞƐ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ?  ƌƚƵŒƌƵů ĂŶĚ
^ĞůĕƵŬ ? ? ? ? P ? ) ? 
In order to ameliorate the foreign exchange account and the conditions for 
foreign trade, the January 24 measures devaluated the Turkish lira by 48 
percent. Moreover, the government subsidised agricultural export goods 
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became subjected to a levy and subsidies on the agricultural inputs such as 
fertilisers decreased significantly. The government also reduced the stamp 
duty of the imported goods to 1 percent and moved to a more flexible 
ĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞƌĂƚĞƚŽŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞƚŚĞƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌŽĨƐĂǀŝŶŐƐŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ?ƌĞŵŝƚƚĂŶĐĞƐ
and the competitiveness of the Turkish export products (Kaynak and Erol 
1989: 212). In order to liberalise the internal market, it was decided to 
decontrol the prices in the private sector and increase the administrated 
prices of goods and services in the public sector. Therefore, the  ‘ŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ
ĨŽƌWƌŝĐĞŽŶƚƌŽů ?ǁĂƐ abolished and the commodities produced by the SEEs 
were subjected to substantial price increases. A new economic organ called 
 ‘DŽŶĞǇĂŶĚƌĞĚŝƚŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ? was also established under the control of the 
undersecretary to the prime minister to eliminate the role of ministers in the 
coordination of the monetary and credit policies. The economic policy 
making authorities that had been previously divided among the ministries of 
Finance, Industry, and Commerce and the SPO were unified and attached to 
ƚŚĞƉƌŝŵĞŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ ?Ɛ office (Okyar 1983: 544-545; Kaynak and Erol 1989: 212). 
The support of the international financial institutions for the January 24 
measures was unprecedented. The IMF made 1.7 billion dollars available 
(which is almost 9 times of the Turkish quota) as special drawing rights (SDR) 
between 1980 and 1985 and the World Bank released 1.6 billion dollars 
ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƐĂŵĞ ƉĞƌŝŽĚ ĂƐ Ă ƉĂƌƚ ŽĨ ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂů ĂĚũƵƐƚŵĞŶƚ ůŽĂŶƐ  ?^ĂƌĂĕŽŒůƵ
1987: 128). Nevertheless, there were two significant concerns of the IMF on 
the high real wages and on the nominal determination of the interest rates 
by the government which was causing high negative real interest rates. It was 
agreed that the nominal rates would be increased gradually to the level of 
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positive real interest rates and a committee was established to be 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞĨŽƌƚŚĞǁĂŐĞƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?ĞĕĞŶĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? P  ? ) ? 
However, the implementation of these draconian and highly inflationary 
macroeconomic measures, that were aiming to restore economic stability 
and international creditworthiness, was in danger since it had received very 
strong opposition from different sections of society and particularly from the 
organised labour with the ŐƌŽǁŝŶŐ ǁĂŐĞ ĚĞŵĂŶĚƐ  ?bĞŶƐĞƐ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ) ?
Throughout the 1980s, the head of the economic team and the architect of 
the stabilisation programme, the undersecretary to the prime minister Turgut 
PǌĂů, had expressed that there was little prospect for the implementation of 
the austerity measures in such an improper political climate (Ahmad 1985: 7). 
Since the 1978 stand-by agreement, the IMF had already been mentioning 
ƚŚĞ  ‘ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ ? ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐ ƌĞĂů ǁĂŐĞƐ ĚƵĞƚŽ ƚŚĞ ǁĂŐĞ
settlements obtained by the trade unions, particularly within the SEEs (Okyar 
1983: 547).  
The future of the programme was secured when the Turkish army took over 
power and dissolved the parliament in September 12, 1980, ǁŚŝůĞĞŵŝƌĞů ?Ɛ
minority government was preparing for a general election to gain a majority 
in the parliament which was expected to further hamper the implementation 
of the austerity measures. The immediate measures and laws enacted by the 
ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ ũƵŶƚĂ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ƚŚĞ  ‘EĂƚŝŽŶĂů ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ŽƵŶĐŝů ?  ?E^ ) and the new 
constitution which was voted and accepted in 1982 ensured the political 
requirements for the implementation of the economic programme including 
laws and amendments that were put into practice to eliminate three major 
resisting forces within the society; political parties, strong trade unions and 
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the universities. Since the 1961 constitution allegedly democratised Turkish 
politics, it had been seen as a major cause that behind the political anarchy 
and economic collapse between 1978 and 1980 the military junta dedicated 
itself to bringing stability to the country by depoliticising the society (Ahmad 
1981: 6, Ahmad 1985: 214). All political parties had been outlawed, one of 
the two main labour confederations, the  ‘Confederation of Revolutionary 
Labour Unions ? (DISK), had been disbanded and the leaders were jailed; all 
strikes and collective bargaining over wages had been suspended. In 
December 1980, ƚŚĞ  ‘,ŝŐŚ ƌďŝƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ŽƵŶĐŝů ? ǁas established in order to 
ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞ ǁĂŐĞ ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞƐ ? tŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ  ‘,ŝŐŚĞƌ ĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶ >Ăǁ ?ŝŶ  ? ? ? ?, the 
universities were overly-centralised and many respected professors and 
academic staff were ĚŝƐŵŝƐƐĞĚ  ?PŶŝƔ ĂŶĚ tĞďď  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ) ? The military 
ŽƵŶĐŝůĂƉƉŽŝŶƚĞĚPǌĂůĂƐƚŚĞĚĞƉƵƚǇƉƌŝŵĞŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ ŝŶĐŚĂƌŐĞŽĨĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ
affairs. Apart from the sixteen months of interregnum in 1982-1983, he 
remained in charge of economic affairs throughout the 1980s until his 
Motherland party lost significant popular support in the 1987 general and 
1989 popular elections. Hence, the neoliberal rescaling of the Turkish 
economy and society was identified wiƚŚ PǌĂů ?Ɛ ŶĂŵĞ ? ĂƐ ŝt was identified 
ǁŝƚŚ ‘^ĂůŝŶĂƐ ?ŝŶDĞǆŝĐŽ ?ZŽĚƌŝŬ ? ? ? ? P ? ) ? 
In this period, the efforts to implement short term stabilisation measures 
went hand in hand with the long term structural adjustment policies. The 
deregulation and decontrolling of the internal market paralleled and 
completed the policies towards the liberalisation of the international trade. 
The quota list for imported goods abolished in 1981, advanced deposit 
requirements on industrial imports was reduced, export credits had been 
introduced and the export licensing requirements were eliminated while the 
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capital account had been ůŝďĞƌĂůŝƐĞĚ ďǇ  ‘ĚĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐŝƐŝŶŐ ? ƚŚĞ ĞǆĐŚĂŶŐĞ ƌĂƚĞ
 ?^ĂƌĂĕŽŒůƵ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ?-  ? ĞĕĞŶ Ğƚ Ăů  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ŝďŽŽŒůƵ ĂŶĚ <ŝďƌŝƚĕŝŽŒůƵ P
2004: 46). The reform of the SEEs went beyond the removal of the price 
subsidies and tax preferences towards the complete elimination of the 
central bank financing of the public enterprises. The monopolies of the SEEs 
were abolished in commodities like tea, tobacco and airlines and the 
privatisation of the public enterprises were legally authorised in 1986 
 ?^ĂƌĂĕŽŒůƵ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?-  ?bĞŶƐĞƐ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ? 
Simultaneously, the government adopted an ambitious programme of export 
incentives that included tax rebate schemes, duty free imports of the 
intermediates and raw materials, and exemption from VAT for those 
commodities, foreign exchange allocations and exemptions from corporate 
income tax (Togan 1994: 74). These incentives created a significant increase 
in the exports of the manufacturing sector while the growth in the 
agricultural production remained limited which indicated the acceleration of 
the already decreasing role of agricultural sector in the production of surplus 
and the increasing role of export-oriented manufacturing (Yeldan 1989: 275). 
Throughout the 1980s, the depreciation of the Turkish lira continued in order 
to slow down the import and give momentum to the export of manufactured 
goods. Thus, the exports of Turkey rose to 11.7 billion dollars in 1988 from 
2.9 billion dollars in 1980. Manufactured products of the SEEs such as 
textiles, glass, iron and steel also shared a significant role in the increase of 
ĞǆƉŽƌƚƐ  ?bĞŶƐĞƐ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ) ? dŚĞ ĂŶŶƵĂů ƌĂƚĞƐ ŽĨ ŐƌŽǁƚŚĚƵring 1981-1983 
were 4.0 percent, during 1984-1985 were 5.5 percent and during 1986-1987 
were 7.8 percent. Even with the depreciation of the lira the import of 
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consumption goods continued to increase. The international trade 
liberalisation and a superior export-led growth was successfully achieved and 
creditworthiness was re-established; meanwhile, the real wages continued to 
decrease, the income distribution deteriorated and the external debt grew 
significantly (Kaynak and Erol 1989: 213- ? ? ? ?ĞĕĞŶĞƚĂů ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ? 
Although, the January 24 package enjoyed relative success in terms of 
ameliorating the macroeconomic aspects and creditworthiness, it failed to 
control inflation and could not achieve a sustainable fiscal balance. Starting in 
1987, the macroeconomic imbalances once again reappeared; public sector 
requirement increased above  ? ? ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ 'W ĂŐĂŝŶ ? ŬǇƺǌ ĂŶĚ
Boratav (2003) argued that one of the main reasons for the failure of the 
macroeconomic stability efforts was the premature liberalisation of the 
domestic financial markets before achieving the fiscal discipline and control 
of inflation. Deregulation of the interest rates eventually made the public 
borrowing extremely difficult. The response was the 1989 liberalisation of the 
ĐĂƉŝƚĂů ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐ ǁŚŝĐŚ ĂŐŐƌĂǀĂƚĞĚ ƚŚĞ ƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ  ?ŬǇƺǌ ĂŶĚ ŽƌĂƚĂǀ  ? ? ? ? P
1551).  Furthermore, after the ban on the senior political figures was lifted in 
 ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞƉŽƉƵůĂƌƐƵƉƉŽƌƚďĞŚŝŶĚPǌĂů ?ƐDŽƚŚĞƌůĂŶĚWĂƌƚǇ, which had been 
enjoying a majority within the national assembly and single-party 
government, ceased and, in the 1991 general elections the era of coalition 
governments re-started even though the neoliberal consensus remained 
intact (Yalman 2009 : 11).  
In the coalition government between a centre-right and a centre-left party, 
the implementation of the anti-inflationary policies based on monetary 
tightening and controlling the interest rates without reducing the public 
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sector borrowing or adopting an ambitious privatisation programme was a 
difficult task. Therefore, trade imbalances started to increase with the real 
appreciation of the Turkish lira which brought major economic crises and 
recessions in 1991 and 1994. The crisis in 1994 was followed by a 
considerable devaluation of the Turkish lira attached to a comprehensive 
stabilisation programme (April 5 programme) and another stand-by 
agreement with the IMF. However, the real appreciation of the Turkish lira 
continued and consumed the 1994 devaluation which eventually had an 
upward impact on the interest rates, making it difficult for the government to 
follow debt-ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝŶŐƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ?ƌƚƵŒƌƵůĂŶĚ^ĞůĕƵŬ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ? 
The failure of the 1999 IMF backed disinflation programme which envisaged 
economic growth with a fixed exchange rate policy and a substantial control 
of the inflation while the privatisation process accelerated (Alper 2001: 60) 
reinforced the anti-state discourse by mainly attributing the failure of the 
programme to the public sector for not maintaining the austerity targets set 
by the IMF. Therefore, in the post-crisis period, the neoliberal orthodoxy 
found a fertile environment to complete its anti-statist hegemonic agenda 
which was started and successfully implemeŶƚĞĚ ƵŶĚĞƌ PǌĂů ?Ɛ ƌƵůĞ ǁŝƚŚ
military backing but was then interrupted during the 1990s due to the re-
emergence of the distributive demands channelled through political parties 
and interest groups with the end of the military rule (Yalman 2002: 20; 
Yalman 2009: 237-254). The neoliberal hegemonic discourse of privatisation, 
flexible labour markets, flexible exchange rate regimes, financial de-
regulation and fiscal austerity were represented as the necessary structural 
reforms and dominated the popular and political mind (Cizre and Yeldan 
2005: 392). 
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In this context, a new economic programme was launched in the spring of 
2001 which combined those structural reforms and long term 
macroeconomic policies aimed at stabilisation and economic growth through 
the expansion of the export-oriented industrial sector. The continuity and the 
coherency of the fiscal policy which aimed to keep the public debt under 
control and to achieve sustainable economic growth had been seen as the 
crucial part of the programme to ensure the creditworthiness of Turkey 
(Airaudo et al 2004: 4). The architect of the prŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ ǁĂƐ <ĞŵĂů ĞƌǀŝƔ
who was appointed as the minister of economy, was pointed out that the 
quality of the fiscal policy depended on its support to the economic growth 
 ?ĞƌǀŝƔ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ) ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ƚŚĞƚŚƌĞĞ-party coalition government had lost 
its credibility in terms of the implementation and the continuity of the 
economic programme and the political vacuum was filled by the victory of 
the Justice and Development Party (ĚĂůĞƚ ǀĞ<ĂůŬŦŶŵĂ WĂƌƚŝƐŝ -AKP) in the 
general election of 2002 which gave the AKP the parliamentary majority to 
form a single-party government. The AKP government had successfully 
implemented the three-ǇĞĂƌ ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ƐƚĂďŝůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ ŽĨ ĞƌǀŝƔ
with the electoral support and with consensus on the anti-state discourse of 
the neoliberal orthodoxy and, thus, finally emerged as the unique agency 
that was able to institutionalise the neoliberal restructuring process 
 ?ĞĚŝƌŚĂŶŽŒůƵ ĂŶĚ zĂůŵĂŶ  ? ? ? ?: 111). Three aspects of this further 
entrenchment and concretisation of the neoliberal hegemony were; the self-
regulating financial markets, privatisation and the export-oriented industrial 
growth.  
In terms of the first aspect, the supervision and regulation of the banking 
system was already introduced in 1985 with the law on banking regulations 
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as a part of the ongoing neoliberal restructuring process that gives an 
ultimate authority to the treasury in the supervision and regulation of the 
banking system. dŚĞ PǌĂů ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ initially advocated a rapid 
deregulation of the finance and banking sectors but the uncontrolled 
financial market quickly resulted in the collapse of the brokerage system in 
1982. Therefore, in 1983, the Saving Deposit Insurance Fund (Tasarruf 
DĞǀĚƵĂƚŦ^ŝŐŽƌƚĂFonu) was founded to guarantee the bank deposits and, in 
that way, to increase the faith in the banking sector which was followed by 
the 1985 Banking Law (Marois 2012: 106). However, since the increasing 
reliance of the private banks on the income coming from the purchases of 
government securities facilitated the debt financing, the treasury gradually 
faced a dilemma between the regulation of the system and the maintenance 
of the government security sales. Furthermore, the lack of autonomous 
decision making capability of the treasury politicised the regulatory 
apparatus particularly in the period during the 1990s when the political 
authority was divided between multiple parties forming unstable coalition 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ ?ůƉĞƌĂŶĚPŶŝƔ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?
In 1999, the IMF and World Bank  Wand, up to a level, the EU- urged the 
Turkish government to form a banking regulation apparatus within the 
framework of the ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ ?dŚƵƐ ? ƚŚĞ  ‘ĂŶŬŝŶŐZĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ
^ƵƉĞƌǀŝƐŝŽŶ ŐĞŶĐǇ  ?Z^ ) ? ǁĂƐ ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ  ? ? ? ?ĂŶŬƐ Đƚ ? dŚĞ
new institution aimed to rehabilitate and improve the performance of the 
banking sector and to undermine the capacity of politicians to influence the 
banking system. The autonomous position of the BRSA was strengthened 
after the liquidity and banking crisis of 2000- ? ? ? ? ?ĚƵĞƚŽƚŚĞ/D& ?ƐƉŽǁĞƌĨƵů
position in the post-ĐƌŝƐŝƐƉĞƌŝŽĚ  ?ůƉĞƌ ĂŶĚ PŶŝƔ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ) ? dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?<W
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inherited a well regulated, stabilised and strengthened banking system when 
it assumed power in 2002.    
It can be argued that the privatisation process of the SEEs was sluggish 
throughout the structural adjustment. Alper (2001) argued that the delays 
and postponements in the privatisation process, such as the privatisation of 
Turk Telekom and 51 percent of Turkish Airlines, deprived the government of 
a substantial income and became one of the financial factors that caused the 
banking crisis of 2000-2001. Following the establishment of the Istanbul 
Stock Exchange in 1986, it was attempted to channel the privatisation 
operations through this emerging capital-market institution but soon this 
type of privatisation process was found to be risky for capital market 
development (PŶŝƔ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ? ) ? dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ? ƚŚĞprivatisation of the SEEs 
remained very limited until the AKP victory in the 2002 general elections 
which made it possible to form a single party government and undertake 
block privatisation of the SEEs. As it is shown in the Table 5.3, during the AKP 
rule, the privatisation income had reached an unprecedented level and 
ended the role of the state in the economic activity completely.  
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Table 5.3. Privatisation in Turkey between 1985  W 2011 
Source: Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Privatisation Administration (2011). 
 
5.2.2. The neoliberal rescaling of the peripheral capitalist space through the 
reorientation of the Turkish economy  
The transformation of the Turkish economy from ISI development to EOI 
based growth is the third aspect of the structural adjustment of the 
peripheral ĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐƚƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨǁŽƌůĚǁŝĚĞ ‘ŝŶƚĞŶƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ
ĂŶĚĞǆƚĞŶƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨƚŚĞĐĂƉŝƚĂůŝƐƚƐƉĂƚŝĂůŝƚǇ ?dƵƌŬĞǇƐŝŐŶĞĚƚŚĞ ‘ƐƐŽĐŝĂƚŝŽŶ
ŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ? ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ ĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?  ?ŶŬĂƌĂdƌĞĂƚǇ ) ŝŶ
September 1963 which assigned preparatory and transitional stages for the 
eventual accession of Turkey to the community as a full member. In the 
beginning of the transitional period, an additional protocol was signed 
between Turkey and the EEC which envisaged that Turkey should be a 
member of the customs union before her full membership to the ECC 
 ?ĞůąƐƵŶĂŶĚZŽĚƌŝŬ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ?ƌĂƚ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ? 
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Following the preparatory period, Turkey and the EEC signed the 
Supplementary Protocol to the Ankara Treaty in 1970. With the protocol, the 
EEC eliminated all custom duties and charges on manufactured goods from 
Turkey from 1973 while some exceptions were made regarding some oil 
products and, in particular, textile products and, hence, the trade 
relationship between Turkey and EEC entered a new phase which brought a 
strong stimulation for the Turkish industrial production (Elveren and Kar 
2005: 5), even though Turkey did not reduce duties on some products until 
she committed to decrease the rates during the 1989-1992 period (Togan 
1994: 27). Turkey further simplified its tariff policies in 1993 by setting only 
two tariff rates as one for the EU/EFTA products and one for the imports 
from other countries (De Santis 2001: 115).  
By becoming a member of the Customs Union in 1996, Turkey was required 
to adopt all of the preferential trade agreements of the EU by 2001 and 
harmonise its national regulations and standards with the EU to avoid 
technical barriers to the trade of the Turkish industrial products (Togan et al 
2005: 94). Turkey also required harmonising its quality certification 
infrastructure with EU accreditation, certification, inspection and operation 
of standardisation rules. Gradually, Turkey harmonised its technical 
legislation, both in vertical and horizontal levels, which gave a comparative 
advantage in industrial products (Togan et al 2005: 108). By 2001, Turkey 
reduced the nominal protection rate on the industrial commodities to 1.34 
percent from 22.14 percent in 1994, and eliminated all ad valorem duty or 
quota applied in agricultural products, excluding hazelnuts and tomato paste 
(Togan 2000: 7). 
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Table 5.4 ?dƵƌŬĞǇ ?ƐǆƉŽƌƚƐ ?ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚ )ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ? ? ? ?-2010 
Years EU North 
Africa 
Near and 
Middle 
East 
Turkic 
republics 
2010 46.2 6.1 20.4 3.44 
2009 46 7.2 18.7 3.32 
2008 48 4.43 19.2 2.83 
2007 56 3.75 14.05 2.67 
2006 56 3.62 13.22 2.31 
2005 56.2 3.46 13.86 1.91 
2004 57.9 3.48 12.54 1.89 
2003 57.97 3.33 11.56 1.90 
2002 56.6 3.51 9.53 1.71 
2001 55.9 3.66 10.26 1.77 
2000 56.3 3.91 9.26 2.01 
1999 58 5.05 9.65 2.15 
1998 54.9 5.58 9.93 3.09 
1997 51.1 3.73 10.74 3.45 
1996 54 4.26 11.47 3.21 
     
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (2011) 
 
This comprehensive incorporation of the Turkish economy into the European 
economic structure had both a qualitative and quantitative impact on Turkish 
exports. While the share of the EU countries fell from 54 percent in 1996 to 
 ? ? ? ? ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚ ŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ŝŶ dƵƌŬĞǇ ?Ɛ ŽǀĞƌĂůů ĞǆƉŽƌƚƐ ? ƚŚĞ ǀŽůƵŵĞ ŽĨ ƚŚŝƐ ƚƌĂĚĞ
increased almost five-fold from 12.5 billion dollars to 52.6 in the same time 
period. At the same time, the volume of trade with the EU countries 
increased more than four-fold (Table 5.5).      
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Table 5.5 ?dƵƌŬĞǇ ?ƐǆƉŽƌƚƐ ?ǀŽůƵŵĞ )ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ? ? ? ?-2010 in million dollars 
Years EU North 
Africa 
Near and 
Middle 
East 
Turkic 
republics 
2010 52.685.304 7.025.168 23.294.873 3.921.072 
2009 47.013.415 7.415.776 19.192.808 3.999.485 
2008 63.390.419 5.850.262 25.430.395  3.749.451 
2007 60.398.502 4.029.683 15.081.322 2.874.467 
2006 47.934.746 3.096.665 11.315.751 1.981.603 
2005 41.364.962 2.544.398 10.184.230 1.409.257 
2004 36.580.859 2.203.356 7.921.284 1.194.307 
2003 27.393.762 1.576.974 5.465.810 889.114 
2002 20.415.034 1.266.596 3.439.789 619.345 
2001 17.545.567 1.149.647 3.261.099 557.362 
2000 15.664.421 1.087.400 2.572.846 572.451 
1999 15.424.238 1.343.558 2.566.397 573.617 
1998 14.809.293 1.506.038 2.680.645 834.983 
1997 13.434.739 980.157 2.821.084 907.834 
1996 12.563.345 991.085 2.595.420 747.290 
     
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (2011) 
 
It is possible to argue that this process of incorporation is determined by the 
neoliberal rescaling of the capitalist spatiality. The structural adjustment 
programme eliminated all obstacles and paved the way for the full 
integration of the Turkish economy with the international markets through 
the ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ  ?ĞĕĞŶ Ğƚ Ăů  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ) ? dŚĞ ƌĂƉŝĚ
integration of the Turkish economy to the international capital markets in the 
1990s increased the role of the capital-account channels over the traditional 
import-export account flows and, thus, played a significant role in the 
banking and liquidity crisis of Turkey in 2000-2001. Although it was not the 
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only cause behind the crisis, the increase in the strength of the U.S. dollar 
against the euro deteriorated the current account deficit of Turkey since 
while the key imports of Turkey were carried out in U.S. dollars, the majority 
of the exports were made in euros. This proves that the Turkish economy has 
been structurally attached more to the European economic system and 
became more vulnerable in terms of international financial fluctuations 
(Alper 2001: 75). When Turkey completed the liberalisation of its capital 
account through the recognition of the full convertibility of the Turkish lira 
and the de-regulation of all capital movements in its balance of payments 
transactions in 1989, a massive inflow of short term capital inflow led to the 
appreciation of the real exchange rates and a long term increase in the 
interest rates. This trend gradually flamed inflation and made it difficult for 
the public sector to finance its debts. In this respect, the central bank lost its 
control and independence over the financial markets and, thereby, the short 
term capital inflow dependency increased external fragility and 
creditworthiness while the financial and real sectors became disassociated 
from each other (Balkan and Yeldan 2002: 8). However, in the Turkish case, 
this process seemed to be a transitional one since once the creditworthiness 
in the international financial markets had been re-established with the 
existence of a strong political authority, the real sector recuperated to its 
pre-crisis position within the international division of labour, transformed 
and benefited from the neoliberal trade liberalisation and financial 
deregulation which facilitated the access to domestic and international 
markets.     
Since joining the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has been 
accepted as a part of the Acquis Communautaire, Turkey was also required to 
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fulfil the convergence criteria that includes price stability, interest rate 
convergence, meeting the limits on budget deficits and government debt, 
and exchange rate stability (Togan and Erel 2005: 14). As the Euro Zone 
economic policies had been sterilised from the political and distributive 
pressures of interest groups and political parties, Turkey needed to fully 
integrate with this system where any short term policy that would result in 
inflationary effects or cause budgetary imbalance would be avoided. The 
main macroeconomic figures show that throughout the implementation of 
the 2001 IMF stand-by agreement, Turkey either had reached or got close to 
the general macroeconomic conditions set by the EU in order to join the EMU 
(Table 5.6).     
 
Table 5.6 dƵƌŬĞǇ ?ƐDĂĐƌŽĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĐŽŵƉĂƚŝďŝůŝƚǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂŶĚDŽŶĞƚĂƌǇ
Union Criteria 
Year Inflation rate 
(%) 
Budget* 
Deficit            
(% of GDP) 
Interest 
rates** 
2002   29.7    9.03  41.3 
2003   18.4 5.55 32.1 
2004 9.3 2.38 25 
2005 7.7 -2.23 16.6 
2006 9.7   -2.1 19.4 
2007 8.4 -1.9 17.2 
2008    10.1   -0.4  22.2 
2009 6.5 2.9 9 
2010 
2011 
6.4 
5.5*** 
  - 
 - 
8.3 
11**** 
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey, State Planning 
Organisation (2011). *Consolidated budget. **Weighted Average Interest Rates for the Bank 
Loans (Turkish Lira - Commercial). ***Expected figure. ****September.  
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It is worth noting that public sector borrowing requirements also continually 
fell after the second half of 2001 from 12 percent to -2 percent in 2006. Due 
to the unfavourable external economic factors, this ratio increased to 6 
percent recently but still remained under the 10 percent threshold (Table 
5.7). 
 
Table 5.7 Public Sector Borrowing Requirement/GDP ratio  
 Source: Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (2011) 
In a political environment where the traditional central-bourgeois parties lost 
their electoral support, the AKP emerged as the only political power that 
could maintain the hegemonic programme of the neoliberal orthodoxy that 
links the maintenance of the sustainable balance of payments account 
(export-oriented long-term economic growth), elimination of the 
government ownership (privatisation) and banking system regulation (growth 
supporting financial system supported by a coherent fiscal policy) without 
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being overwhelmed by the democratic pressures of different interest groups. 
It is very important to note that the processes of the peripheral restructuring 
of the capitalist relations  Wwhere the economic structure had been 
reoriented towards EOI growth- through the establishment of the unrivalled 
neoliberal hegemony is well explained and defined in the literature (Yalman 
2002; Yeldan 2007; Yalman 2007; Yalman 2009 ? ĞĚŝƌŚĂŶŽŒůƵ ĂŶĚ zĂůŵĂŶ
2010). However, locating this particular moment within the peripheral 
spatiotemporal processes which manifest the continuity in the uneven 
relationship between the centre and periphery needs to be clearly posited. 
Otherwise, as it can be noted in the existing literature that there is a danger 
of overemphasising a specific stage and leaving out socio-spatially specific 
structures conditioned by the hierarchising, homogenising and fragmenting 
processes of the neoliberal capitalist social relations. The regional economic 
development projects of Turkey and Mexico (chapter four) are structurally 
conditioned by the transformation and subsequent expansion of the 
peripheral spatiality within the global neoliberal rescaling, and thus, need to 
be analysed within this spatiotemporally specific context where capitalist 
social relations have been intensified domestically and extended towards the 
marginal spaces.  
5.3. Regional economic integration projects of Turkey in the Black Sea, 
Caucasus and the East Mediterranean regions: the expansion of the capitalist 
space and social relations       
This section analyses the expansion of the peripheral capitalist spatiality 
towards the marginal spaces in the context of the worldwide neoliberal 
rescaling of capitalist social relations in the case of Turkey. As it has been 
previously shŽǁŶŝŶƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŽĨDĞǆŝĐŽ ?ƐŶĞŽliberal rescaling and its regional 
282 
 
integration projects, this multiscalar process of neoliberal reconfiguration of 
the capitalist spatiality gave rise to many regional and sub-national scales of 
strategies where the State power underwent a qualitative transformation 
(Lefebvre 2001: 773; Soja et al. 1983: 202; Swyngedouw 1992: 426; Brenner 
1998: 427). Furthermore, as it has also been argued in the Mexican case, it will 
be observed that through the contemporary regional integration projects of 
Turkey, the previously conceptualised (chapter two) exogenous and uneven 
features of the formation of the peripheral capitalist space have been 
reproduced in new socio-spatial forms. In this respect, the analysis of the 
expansion of the peripheral capitalist spatiality through the regional and sub-
national scales of strategies of Turkey, three different forms of regional 
integration strategy will be examined. The initiative that led to the 
establishment of the  ‘Black Sea Economic Organisation ? (BSEC) which aimed for 
the creation of the necessary legal and institutional conditions for the 
expansion of the capitalist development through integrating and incorporating 
the ex-Soviet bloc countries in the Black Sea and in the Balkans is the first 
strategy that will be analysed. The construction of the physical conditions for 
the expansion of the capitalist accumulation by building up the necessary 
infrastructure such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil line, Nabucco gas pipelines 
and Transcaucasus railway and highways will be the second strategy in which 
the capitalist spatiality expanded towards the marginal spaces. Finally the 
 ‘>ĞǀĂŶƚWƌŽũĞĐƚ ?ďĞƚǁĞĞŶdƵƌŬĞǇ ?^ǇƌŝĂ ?>ĞďĂŶŽŶĂŶĚ :ŽƌĚĂŶǁŚŝĐŚĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚ
the previous two strategies  Wcreation of necessary legal/institutional and 
physical conditions- will be observed. These projects will be analysed through 
emphasising the specific spatiotemporal processes in which they have been 
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structurally conditioned as a part of the worldwide restructuring/rescaling of 
the capitalist spatiality. 
dǁŽ ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐ ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ƉƵƚ ĨŽƌǁĂƌĚ ƚŽ ĞǆƉůĂŝŶ dƵƌŬĞǇ ?Ɛ ƌĞĐĞŶƚ ƌĞŐional 
integration efforts through mainstream approaches in the self-claimed fields of 
Europanisation, European integration and Turkish foreign policy studies. The 
ĨŝƌƐƚ ŐƌŽƵƉ ŽĨ ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐ ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ dƵƌŬĞǇ ?Ɛ ĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ ƌĞŐŝŽŶĂů
policies should be seen as the natural side-ƉƌŽĚƵĐƚƐ ŽĨ dƵƌŬĞǇ ?Ɛ ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂů
convergence with the European Union and, ďǇ  ‘ďĞŝŶŐ Ă ƉĂƌƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƚĞĂŵ ?,
dƵƌŬĞǇ ƉůĂǇƐ Ă ƌŽůĞ ĐŽŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ hŶŝŽŶ ?Ɛ ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ
ƌĞŐŝŽŶ ?DƺĨƚƺůĞƌ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?ŵĞƌƐŽŶĂŶĚdŽĐĐŝ P ? ? ?ǇĚŦŶĂŶĚĕŦŬŵĞƔĞ ? ? ? ? P 
265). This argument gained support among the mainstream studies after 
Turkey gained EU membership candidate status in 1999 and started candidacy 
negotiations in 2004. However, currently it has been replaced by another 
mainstream argument that claims these ƉƌŽũĞĐƚƐ ĂƌĞ Ă ƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ dƵƌŬĞǇ ?Ɛ
 ‘ŶĞǁ ŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐĂů ǀŝƐŝŽŶ ? ůǇŝŶŐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽƉĞƌ ƵƚŝůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ŝƚƐ ƵŶŝƋƵĞ
ŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐĂůƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?ĂǀƵƚŽŒůƵ ? ? ? ? P ? ?ĂǀƵƚŽŒůƵ ? ? ? ? P6; Aras 2009: 3-6). 
It has also argued that Turkey started to assign areas of influence parallel to its 
geopolitical frontiers and started to put an emphasis on the surrounding sub-
regions to increase the economic interdependency as an undeclared regional 
hegemony (Murinson 200 ? P  ? ? ? ? ĂǀƵƚŽŒůƵ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ) ďǇ  ‘ƌĞ-ŝŶƚĞŐƌĂƚŝŶŐ ? 
regions that were in fact historically united (Larabee 2010: 160)
39
.         
Both of these very limited and superficial arguments do share the same thin 
conceptualisation that boils down the rational choice of the political actors for 
                                                          
39
 This type of rhetorical re-creation of a region on the basis of an assumption that these 
divided sub-regions were in fact historically unified is strikingly similar to the case of re-
invention of the Mesoamerican geographical imagination which had been promoted by the 
Plan Puebla-Panama  W PM.    
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the sake of national interests. Neither of them questions the continuity 
between those policies during the whole period of neoliberal restructuring, nor 
do they provide a meaningful analysis of the characteristics of these projects in 
depth. In other words, rather than focusing on the longƵĞ ĚƵƌĠĞ ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ, 
these studies focuses on the short time span in a journalistic way and, thus, fail 
to provide a meaningful analysis of these regional integration projects. 
In 1992, the six Black Sea nations, Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russia, Turkey 
and Ukraine, as well as five other countries in the immediate neighbourhood 
of the Black Sea region, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Greece and Moldova, 
signed the agreement which formed ƚŚĞ  ‘ůĂĐŬ^ĞĂŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ
 ?^ ) ?ŝŶ/ƐƚĂŶďƵů ?dŚŝƐŵƵůƚŝ-lateral cooperation programme was planned by 
dƵƌŬĞǇ ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ PǌĂů administration and found a fertile ground for its 
initiation after the dismantling of the Soviet Union (Manoli 2007: 8). One of the 
initial objectives of the formation of the BSEC was to create Ă ‘ĨƌĞĞƚƌĂĚĞǌŽŶĞ ?
in the region but gradually the emphasis was given to economic cooperation 
which would facilitate the process of transition to the market economy 
structures in the former Soviet economies of the region (Dikkaya and Orhan 
2004: 64). In its founding declaration, the ^ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚŝƚƐĂŝŵĂƐ ‘ŝĚĞŶƚŝĨǇŝŶŐ ?
ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐĂŶĚĐĂƌƌǇŝŶŐŽƵƚ ? ĐŽŶĐƌĞƚĞƉƌŽũĞĐƚƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞĂƌĞĂƐŽĨ  ‘ƚƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚĂŶĚ
communications, including their infrastructure; informatics; exchange of 
economic and commercial information, including statistics; standardization 
and certification of products; energy; mining and processing of mineral raw 
materials; tourism; agriculture and agro-industries; veterinary and sanitary 
protection; health care and pharmaceuticals; and science and technology ? 
(BSEC 1992: 2). Among these areas, laying regional and trans-regional fibre 
optic cables, energy transportation projects and a transportation infrastructure 
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integrated with the European networks were defined as the special priorities 
of the organisation (BSEC 1996: 4-5).   
BSEC member states defined the organisation as a part of the European 
architecture and therefore, gave a special importance to the process of 
economic integration with the European Union (BSEC 1996: 1). The aim of 
economic integration with the EU claimed to be achieved through the trade 
ůŝďĞƌĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ŚĂƌŵŽŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ ƚƌĂĚĞ ? ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƚŚĞ ŵĞŵďĞƌ
states, and also with the EU countries (BSEC 1998: 1). According to the BSEC 
Istanbul Declaration, the member countries were committed to reduce or 
eliminate all kinds of obstacles before the expansion of the mutual trade in 
goods and services. The obstacles refer mainly to the structural barriers 
including tariffs and legal frameworks (BSEC 2002, Tsardanidis 2005: 367).    
However, the economic characteristics of the BSEC countries reveal that 
Greece, Russia and Turkey have the greatest percentages of the service sectors 
and the lowest percentages of agriculture overall in their GDPs (Dikkaya and 
Orhan 2004: 68). This means that among BSEC countries, these three countries 
would benefit most from trade liberalisation and the harmonisation of foreign 
trade. Another important positive aspect would be for the biggest energy 
importing economies of Greece and Turkey from other members of the BSEC, 
Russia and Ukraine (Dikkaya and Orhan 2004: 73).  
The BSEC defined the private sector as the driving force of the consolidation of 
the BSEC process, so it aimed to encourage the maximum involvement of the 
private enterprises in the BSEC projects. In that sense, the participant 
countries agreĞĚƚŽĐƌĞĂƚĞĂĨĂǀŽƵƌĂďůĞ ‘ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ ? ?ĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞ
free movement of businessmen and ensuring appropriate conditions for 
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investment, capital flows and economic cooperation, particularly by 
eliminating the double taxation (BSEC 1992: 3). The BSEC also assumed 
ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƐŽůŝĚĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐ ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ  ‘ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ Ă
ƵŶŝƚĞĚ ƵƌŽƉĞ ? ? ǁŚĞƌĞ ƚŚĞ ĨƌĞĞ ŵĂƌŬĞƚ ĞĐŽŶŽŵǇwas perceived as the 
ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƉĂƌƚŽĨĂ ‘ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐĂŶĚŽƉĞŶƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? ?^ ? ? ? ? P ?-2; BSEC 2002: 
65).    
In 1994, the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB) was established 
in Thessalonica, Greece, with one billion dollar SDR  ‘ƚŽĂƐƐŝƐƚƚŚĞŝŶƚƌĂ-regional 
trade, especially of capital goods, to finance common regional projects and 
enterprises, cooperate with the international financial institutions, establish 
and operate Special Funds for specific purposes and to promote investment in 
economic and social infrastructure projects by way of guarantees, 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? ?^d ? ? ? ? P ?-4; Micu 1996: 
1). While the BSTDB increased its financial capacity, it envisaged increasing its 
role as the financial arm of the BSEC, ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽũĞĐƚƐ ŝŶ  ‘ƉŚǇƐŝĐĂů
infrastructure and related services; social infrastructure; renewable energy; 
power generation, transport and distribution; municipal services; and 
ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂůƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?^d ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ) ? /ŶƚŚĂƚƐĞŶƐĞ, the BSTDB put an 
emphasis on supporting the banking, finance and energy sectors and transport 
ŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞƐƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ǆƚĞŶƐŝŽŶŽĨDŽƚŽƌǁĂǇƐŽĨƚŚĞ^ĞĂŝŶƚŚĞ^ZĞŐŝŽŶ ?
(MSBR) ĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘ůĂĐŬ^ĞĂZŝŶŐ,ŝŐŚǁĂǇ ? ?^Z, ) ?^d ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ 
it can be argued that, in a sense, the BSEC aimed to establish the necessary 
conditions of the neoliberal rescaling of the capitalist space, reproducing the 
exogenous and uneven character of the peripheral capitalist spatiality. 
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The institutionalisation agenda of the BSEC later went beyond the 
establishment of the financial conditions. The BSEC undertook initiatives in 
terms of security issues such as terrorism, drugs, organised crime and illegal 
ŝŵŵŝŐƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?dƐĂƌĚĂŶŝĚŝƐ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ?/Ŷ ? ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞ ‘ůĂĐŬ^ĞĂEĂǀĂůŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ
dĂƐŬ'ƌŽƵƉ ?ůĂĐŬƐĞĂĨŽƌ ) ?ĨŽƵŶĚŝŶŐĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚwas signed by the officials from 
Black Sea countries in Istanbul to form an emergency force that could be 
tasked with missions of search and rescue, humanitarian aid, de-mining 
measures, environmental protection and training operations (Emerson and 
Tocci 2004: 12).    
The BSEC also developed inter-regional collaborations and coordination 
meetings with other regional organisations such as the Adriatic-Ionian 
Initiative (AII), the Danube Cooperation Process (DCP), the Southeast European 
Cooperative Initiative (SECI), the Council of Baltic Sea States and the Nordic 
Council of Ministers (Tsardanidis 2005: 379). Establishing a closer economic 
cooperation between BSEC and EU is one of the most emphasised objectives 
ƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?dŚĞ ? ? ?  ‘U-BSEC Platform 
ĨŽƌ ŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚ ĞŶǀŝƐĂŐĞĚ ƐƵĐŚ Ă ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƵŶĚĞƌůŝŶĞĚ ƚŚĞ
development of network infrastructure in transport, energy and 
telecommunication as one of the priority areas (Tsardanidis 2005: 381). Also, 
the BSTDB established strong financial partnerships with Austrian 
(Oesterreichische Entwicklungsbank -OeEB), German (<ƌĞĚŝƚĂŶƐƚĂůƚ Ĩƺƌ
Wiederaufbau -KfW Banking Group) and Dutch (Nederlandse Financierings  W
FMO) development banks (BSTDB 2009: 13-14).  
Therefore, it can be argued that the rescaled and export-oriented Turkey 
played a significant role in the initiation of the BSEC facil
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territorialisation processes of the former COMECON economies to the free 
market economies and integrated them with the European economic 
structure. The BSEC became one of the platforms that through the neoliberal 
rescaling can be channelled towards the marginal spaces, and capitalist 
peripheral spatiality can be extended through Turkey in the form of the 
development of the necessary infrastructure and institutions for the 
ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŵĂƌŬĞƚ ĞĐŽŶŽŵǇ  ?ŽĐƵƚŽŒůƵ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ) ? dŚĞƐĞ ƉƌŽũĞĐƚƐ
were financed and supported significantly by the European capital through the 
development banks. As the financial arm of the BSEC, in 2010, the BSTDB 
financed or co-financed wind farms, airport construction, industry parks, 
private financial institutions and small and middle enterprises (SMEs) in the 
member states (BSTDB 2010: 21)
40
.  
dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?dƵƌŬĞǇ ?ƐƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵů ŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĨŽundation of the BSEC should 
be seen as a structurally conditioned project within the global rescaling of the 
capitalist spatiality where the neoliberal social relations of capitalism extends 
towards the marginal spaces within the periphery of the peripheral capitalist 
space, establishing the conditions of the capitalist accumulation both in terms 
of institutional framework and physical infrastructure. The peripheral capitalist 
space which is already integrated with the centre in a different form of uneven 
relationship assumes a spatiotemporally specific role in this global rescaling 
process by channelling the neoliberal re-territorialisation and reproduction of 
                                                          
40
 As an example of these financing operations, in 2010, the BSTDB operated and co-financed 
with the Dutch FMO a 105 million dollar project to support the growth strategy of a Turkish 
bank called  ‘ůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝĨďĂŶŬ ? who wanted to expand its portfolio by extending the credits 
available to the small and medium size enterprises (BSTDB 2010: 27). This shows what extent 
the neoliberal capitalist rescaling can be channelled from a multi-national development bank 
to a SME manufacturer without establishing a direct link between the two.    
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different forms of uneven relationships between the centre and the marginal 
spaces.  
The creation of the physical conditions of the capitalist accumulation in the 
Caspian and Trans-Caucasus regions should be elaborated as another area that 
the neoliberal capitalist rescaling has been channelled by Turkey to its region. 
It can be argued that there are two major factors which ĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶ dƵƌŬĞǇ ?Ɛ
initiatives to create an energy hub in the region in which the major regional oil 
and gas pipelines will be connected. Firstly, the Turkish economy is dependent 
on imported energy supplies; 65 percent in its total energy consumption and 
this dependency is expected to increase to 75 percent in the next fifteen years. 
The energy problem of Turkey deepened with the UN Security Council 
resolution in 1990 which closed the Kirkuk-zƵŵƵƌƚĂůŦk oil line that used to 
transport Iraqi oil to the Turkish port of Ceyhan by creating more dependency 
and causing huge loss of revenues (Baran 2005: 104). Currently, the Russian 
&ĞĚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐƵƉƉůŝĞƐ ? ?ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚŽĨdƵƌŬĞǇ ?ƐŐĂƐŶĞĞĚ, and with the crude oil in 
total ?dƵƌŬĞǇ ?ƐĞŶĞƌŐǇ ŝŵƉŽƌƚƐĂmount to around 30 billion dollars every year 
(Barysch 2007: 2).  
The sĞĐŽŶĚĂƐƉĞĐƚŽĨdƵƌŬĞǇ ?ƐŽŝů ĂŶĚŐĂƐƉŝƉĞůŝŶĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶĞĨĨŽƌƚƐ ŝƐ ƚŚĞ
dependence of the EU economies on the energy supplies in the Caspian Sea 
and Central Asia regions. EU economies have a strong dependency on the 
Russian Federation since 30 percent of the crude oil and 50 percent of the 
natural gas are imported from this source while six of the EU economies 
receive all of their crude oil from Russia (Baran 2007: 132). The immediate 
economic implication of this reliance is high tariff rates of the Russian pipelines 
and an increase in energy costs (Kalicki 2001: 123). Therefore, the EU 
290 
 
Commission planned to strengthen the existing infrastructure besides investing 
in new physical capaciƚŝĞƐ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ  ‘ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ
Investment Bank ?  ?/ ) ? ƚŚĞ  ‘ƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ ĂŶŬ ĨŽƌ ZĞĐŽŶƐtruction and 
ĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ? ?Z ), and ƚŚĞ ‘EĞŝŐŚďŽƵƌŚŽŽĚ/ŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚ&ƵŶĚ ? ?dĞŬŝŶĞƚĂů ?
2010: 47). In that sense, the  ‘'ƌĞĂƚĞƌĂƐƉŝĂŶ^ĞĂ ? ?'^ )ƌĞŐŝŽŶ appeared as a 
potential alternative energy route and resource for the European markets 
 ?ŝƌĞƐƐĞůŝŽŒůƵ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ? 
In 1994, a group of oil companies headed by British Petroleum (BP) signed an 
agreement with the Azerbaijan state oil company (SOCAR) for the production 
of oil in the Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli (ACG) offshore oil fields in the Caspian Sea 
which contains an estimated 5.4 million barrels of oil reserves. Today, the 
participating companies of the ACG operations are conducted by the British 
Petroleum (BP)-led Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC) which 
consists of many major multinational oil companies; BP (operator  W 35.78%), 
Azerbaijani SOCAR (11.65%), American Chevron (11.27%), Japanese INPEX 
(10.96%), Norwegian Statoil (8.56%), American ExxonMobil (8%), Turkish TPAO 
 ? ? ? ? ?á? ) ?:ĂƉĂŶĞƐĞ/dK,h ? ? ? ?á? ) ?ŵĞƌŝĐĂŶ,ĞƐƐ ? ? ? ? ?á? ) ?ĂďĂůŦ ?   ? P ? ? ) ? 
With the increasing production capabilities, the transportation of this oil to the 
western energy markets became an attention grabbing issue (Tekin and 
Williams 2010: 149). As an alternative to the insufficient Baku-Supsa line, the 
Turkish state-owned Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (BOTAS) and the AIOC 
played a significant role in the initiation and construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline to transport crude oil produced by Azerbaijan and 
Kazakhstan to world markets via a pipeline through Azerbaijan, Georgia and 
Turkey. In 1999, Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia signed an Intergovernmental 
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Agreement for the construction of the BTC in Istanbul. The BTC became a 
multi-international consortium, with the shareholders being BP (30.1%); AzBTC 
(25.00%); Chevron (8.90%); Statoil (8.71%); TPAO (6.53%); ENI (5.00%); Total 
(5.00%), Itochu (3.40%); INPEX (2.50%), ConocoPhillips (2.50%) and Hess 
(2.36%) (BabĂůŦ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ? 
In 2005, the first oil was pumped from Baku and the first oil reached the port 
of Ceyhan in 2006. The importance of the BTC has been defined as being a 
ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ ƉĂƌƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐ  ‘ĂƐƚ-tĞƐƚ ^ƵƉĞƌŚŝŐŚǁĂǇ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ŝŶĐůƵĚĞƐ
upgraded highways, pipelines, railroads, ports, ferries, fibre-optic lines, 
electricity transmission lines that will make it easier to trade for the Central 
Asian and Caucasian economies, not with the West but with the world market 
(Cornell et al. 2005: 21). In other words, the BTC is a project that aims to 
integrate and locate the economies and resources in Central Asia and the 
Caucasus within the international division of labour. Both the AIOC and the 
BTC consortiums are clear examples of expansion of the capital as a result of 
structural determinants rather than initiatives taken by certain political agents.  
Parallel to the BTC the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (South Caucasus Pipeline -SCP) 
natural gas pipeline became operational in 2007 and carries 10-15 billion cubic 
metres of natural gas from the ĂƐƉŝĂŶ^ĞĂƚŽƵƌŽƉĞ ? ? ? ?ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚŽĨƵƌŽƉĞ ?Ɛ
total natural gas import (Tekin and Williams 2009: 346). Thus, a project of 
constructing a natural gas pipeline from Turkey to Austria has been proposed 
which will carry 31 billion cubic metres of natural gas from Turkmenistan and, 
possibly, in the future, from Iraq as well with a pipeline connection under the 
Caspian Sea to the SCP. Although this huge infrastructure project  WNabucco- 
would be very costly, it has been argued that the immediate economic impacts 
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would be quite considerable since the construction of the line would ease the 
monopoly of the Gazprom in the gas price designation (Barysch 2010: 7). In the 
recent European CommiƐƐŝŽŶƌĞƉŽƌƚƐŽŶdƵƌŬĞǇ ?ƐƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŽŶƚŚĞŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ
process, Nabucco has been mentioned as among the priority projects of the EU 
and, thus, Turkey should pursue an effort to support it (Tekin and Williams 
2009: 351, Tekin and Williams 2010: 163-164).   
Besides the oil and gas pipeline construction projects, Turkey also worked for 
the further integration of the Central Asian and Caucasian economies to the 
west European and world markets through other infrastructural projects. As 
part of the Eurasian Rail Network and the Transport Corridor Europe the 
Caucasus-Asia programme (TRACECA) was launched in order to construct and 
rehabilitate the TransCaucasus railway network. Turkey completed the railway 
construction between Tbilisi and Kars which connected  the Asian and 
European railway networks and cut the freight distance from Europe to Asia by 
50 percent (Gorshkov and Bagaturia 2000: 47).  
To sum up, as in the BSE ĐĂƐĞ ? dƵƌŬĞǇ ?Ɛ ĞĨĨŽƌƚƐ ƚŽ ĐƌĞĂƚĞ the physical 
infrastructure that would integrate the marginal spaces located on her 
periphery to the world markets should be analysed within the context where 
the neoliberal capitalist spatiality has been re-territorialised globally. Turkish 
investments in these infrastructure projects in its periphery is directly 
conditioned by the reorientation of its peripheral capitalist spatiality towards 
an EOI based economic growth that necessitated the inclusion of the 
peripheral spaces through the reproduction of an uneven relationship and the 
features of peripheral capitalist space formation (chapter two), locating those 
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spaces both as the potential markets for the manufactured goods and, at the 
same time, as the raw material and energy sources. 
Another recent regional initiative undertaken by Turkey is the Levant Project 
which ĂŝŵĞĚƚŽŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞƚŚĞƚƌĂĚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶĨŽƵƌ ‘ĂƐƚDĞĚŝƚĞƌƌĂŶĞĂŶ ?
countries: Turkey, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. The project defined 14 issue 
areas which cover themes such as logistic infrastructure, financial services, 
regional investment, free movement of persons and commodities, tourism, 
infrastructure projects financing, research and development and the trade 
relations with third countries (DEIK 2011).  The  ‘Foreign Economic Relations 
Board ? (DEIK) which is an autonomous government agency established a forum 
between the Turkish, Syrian, Lebanese and Jordanian Chambers of Commerce 
in order to realise the aims of the project.  
Since the 1990s, Turkish officials put an emphasis on the openness policy 
through ensuring a visa-free movement of people between her neighbouring 
countries while, with the increasing commercial links, this policy gradually 
became realised. The  ‘>ĞǀĂŶƚƉƌŽũĞĐƚ ?ĂŝŵƐƚŽĂĐŚŝĞǀĞƚǁŽŽďũĞĐƚives. Firstly, it 
aimed to substantially harmonise and integrate the legal and physical 
conditions of trade between the four countries (DEIK 2011). Since Turkey has 
already substantially harmonised its legal framework of trade within a 
European framework, harmonising the legal framework for the foreign trade 
means Syria, Lebanon and Jordan can adopt the legal framework of the 
European Union and harmonise with it. In this matter, adaptation of one 
language and a united system of customs has been highlighted as a matter of 
focus (DEIK 2011).  
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The second objective of the project is the upgrading of the physical and 
financial infrastructure and institutions in order to facilitate the international 
trade between those four countries. In that sense, Turkey will upgrade the 
railways and existing highways for the better transportation of goods and 
services and the bank branches will be opened for connecting and facilitating 
financial transactions (Interview 3, 2011).  
dŚĞ ‘>ĞǀĂŶƚWƌŽũĞĐƚ ? ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?has been terminated due to the current political 
turmoil in Syria although it aimed to integrate economically underdeveloped 
regions with the world markets through standardising and harmonising the 
financial and commercial institutions and legal frameworks, thereby 
establishing the necessary conditions for the uneven development of the 
peripheral capitalist space ?dŚƵƐ ?ŝƚĐĂŶďĞĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ ‘>ĞǀĂŶƚWƌŽũĞĐƚ ?ŝƐĂ
project that would reproduce uneven relationships within the context of global 
neoliberal rescaling where the capitalist spatiality is intensified and extended.      
5.4. Conclusion   
This chapter focused on the specific spatiotemporal processes in which the 
centre-periphery relationship had been produced, reproduced and 
consolidated while the peripheral capitalist spatiality simultaneously formed, 
transformed and expanded. In order to analyse these processes, this chapter 
pointed out that each stage of this spatiotemporal process is equally significant 
in understanding the specific forms of socio-spatial configurations.  
It is observed in this chapter that the post-passive revolutionary period -where 
the peripheral capitalist spatiality of Turkey had been consolidated- was 
marked by the ISI developmental form of capitalist accumulation which has 
been spatiotemporally conditioned. The limited national bourgeoisie based its 
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hegemony on the nation-state consensus which assumed the responsibility of 
the economic growth and the industrial expansion. Therefore, the legitimacy of 
the bourgeois hegemony linked with the maintenance of the capitalist 
accumulation. Since the ISI development was heavily dependent on foreign 
financial resources while the capitalist accumulation has been furthered during 
this period, it did also deepen the uneven relationship between the centre and 
the periphery. The exhaustion of the ISI based strategies during the 1970s 
marked the diminishing legitimacy of the bourgeois hegemony which resulted 
ŝŶƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇĐŽƵƉĚ ?ĠƚĂƚ ?dŚĞ ? ? ? ?ĐŽƵƉĚ ?ĠƚĂƚĚŝĚƉĂǀĞƚŚĞǁĂǇĨŽƌƚŚĞ
recuperation of the bourgeois legitimacy through the restructuring of the 
capitalist spatiality. 
The deepened unevenness manifested itself more concretely during the 
worldwide neoliberal rescaling of the capitalist spatiality where these 
peripheral spaces -and Turkey- underwent very drastic transformation 
processes of structural adjustment and re-reorientation of the industrial 
ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ ?dŚŝƐƌĞŽƌŝĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞĐƵůŵŝŶĂƚĞĚŝŶdƵƌŬĞǇ ?Ɛ
incorporation into the European economic structure through the ECU, which 
ƌĞƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĞĚ dƵƌŬĞǇ ?Ɛ ƉĞƌŝƉŚĞƌĂů ůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŶĞŽůŝďĞƌĂů ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝonal 
capitalist division of labour.  
This chapter echoes the similar rescaling process that had been discussed in 
the previous chapter (chapter four) on the restructuring of the Mexican 
peripheral capitalist spatiality and argued that the regional economic 
integration and development projects of Turkey need to be evaluated as a part 
of the worldwide neoliberal restructuring process where the marginal spaces 
had been incorporated into the capitalist periphery. Turkey plays a significant 
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role in the reproduction of the uneven relationship through the extending the 
peripheral capitalist spatiality towards those spaces in the form of regional 
integration projects. It has been observed in this section that the regional 
integration initiatives of Turkey are establishing the necessary conditions for 
the expansion of the capitalist social relations and therefore channel the 
neoliberal rescaling processes to its immediate geography through reproducing 
the exogenous and uneven features of the peripheral capitalist space 
formation.  
In this respect, the regional integration projects that have been initiated in 
Turkey during the late 1980s and the more recent and ambitious projects 
undertaken by the AKP government were analysed within the same 
spatiotemporal process where the peripheral capitalist spatiality was extended 
towards the  ‘ƵŶƵƚŝůŝƐĞĚ ?marginal spaces. Therefore, as the previous chapter 
examined the underpinning spatiotemporal conditions of these regional 
integration projects and defined them as the incorporation of the marginal 
spaces into the international division of labour within the context of neoliberal 
re-territorialisation, this chapter also identified the same spatiotemporal 
conditions which are being reproduced in the immediate periphery of Turkey 
and located these projects as a part of the same global process of 
transformation of the capitalist spatiality.  
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Conclusion 
 ‘dŚĞƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞƚƌƵƚŚĐĂŶďĞĂƚƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚƚŽŚƵŵĂŶƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐŝƐŶŽƚ
a question of theory but it is a practical question. Man must prove this truth, i.e., 
the reality and power, the this-worldliness of his thinking in practice. The dispute 
over the reality or non-reality of thinking which isolates itself from practice is a 
puƌĞůǇƐĐŚŽůĂƐƚŝĐƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ? ?
-<ĂƌůDĂƌǆ ‘dŚĞƐĞƐŽŶ&ĞƵĞƌďĂĐŚ ?, (1845/1998: 572). 
 ‘dŚĞƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨ ƐƉĂĐĞĐĂŶŶŽƚ ƌĞĚƵĐĞ ƚŚĞ ůŝǀĞĚƚŽ ƚŚĞĐŽŶĐĞŝǀĞĚ ?ŶŽƌ ƚŚĞ
body to a geometric or optic abstraction. On the contrary this understanding 
must begin with the lived and the body, that is, from a space occupied by an 
ŽƌŐĂŶŝĐůŝǀŝŶŐĂŶĚƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐďĞŝŶŐ ? ? 
-,ĞŶƌŝ>ĞĨĞďǀƌĞ ‘Ğů ?ƚĂƚ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?: 229). 
 
This work proposes an alternative analysis of the regional economic 
integration and development projects of Mexico and Turkey through 
presenting a spatiotemporal analysis of the processes of formation, 
consolidation, transformation and expansion of the peripheral capitalist 
spatiality. It is argued that the existing ahistoric and spaceless themes and 
categories which have been produced and reproduced by the conventional 
social sciences where time and space are separated into fixed, self-evident 
and measurable units on the basis of the unquestioned Newtonian and 
Cartesian premises are incapable of providing a meaningful analysis of the 
constantly transforming social reality. Therefore, this work employed an 
incorporated comparison (McMichael 1990; McMichael 1992) in providing 
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the spatiotemporal analysis of the regional integration projects of Mexico 
and Turkey which defined and explained those projects in terms of the 
temporally and spatially specific dialectical processes that conditioned the 
contemporary expansion of the peripheral capitalist spatiality. 
This section aims to give a brief summary of the thesis, present the central 
propositions and contribution of the work, and discuss its limitations. In 
order to do that, first it will point out the central propositions and the 
contribution of the thesis. This will be followed by the discussion of the major 
limitations of the thesis which can be considered and elaborated in a further 
inquiry. In the last instance, the issues that are intertwined with the social 
research but go beyond it will be briefly stated.   
Central propositions and contribution 
In the first chapter of this work, a critique of the mainstream approaches in 
international relations and foreign policy studies are presented and it is 
argued that these approaches are unable to provide a meaningful analysis of 
world politics and its change. It is observed that one of the main reasons for 
this inability is the dependence on the disciplinary parameters and borders of 
international relations as an institutionalised, self-defined and uncontested 
field of social research. The positivist epistemology separated and 
compartmentalised the social sciences into disciplines that would operate 
within the mostly self-defined and uncontested borders which lead to the 
creation of an ahistoric and spaceless social inquiry that privileges the 
simultaneous over the historic and the immediate over the distant. While 
between the past and future a symmetry is established, the present time 
became the main focus of the social sciences as the source ŽĨ  ‘episodic 
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history ?which gives the primary and objective data to construct or validate a 
social theory. In this respect, the positivist foundations of the mainstream 
international studies lead to the descriptive analysis of world politics which 
takes the space as the neutral container of the social life. Thereby, the 
mainstream works on the international relations mainly focused on the 
formal institutional explanations that ultimately fail to provide structural and 
systemic examinations of the social reality and social change. In that respect, 
it has been argued that a broader understanding of the social reality and 
social change is necessary which grasps the social space in its historicity.  
It is important to reinstate that this broader understanding does not mean an 
interdisciplinary work in the analysis of the world politics. An interdisciplinary 
approach which operates within the borders of the positivist ontology would 
only bring new issue areas into the analysis and reproduce the same ahistoric 
ĂŶĚƐƉĂĐĞůĞƐƐŶŽƚŝŽŶƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞŝŶĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂ ‘ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ?ĂƐƉĞĐƚƚŽƚŚĞ 
existing categories and concepts. As Wallerstein argued, a simple 
ŝŶƚĞƌĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĂƌǇ ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ƚŚĂƚ ĚŽĞƐ ŶŽƚ  ‘ƵŶƚŚŝŶŬ ? ƚŚĞ ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐƚ
epistemological foundations that rigidly separates the social sciences into 
different disciplines would not only fail to transcend this institutionalised 
separation but also strengthen these self-claimed disciplinary borders 
(Wallerstein 1996: 38; Wallerstein 2001: 2). Therefore, an alternative analysis 
needs to be built upon different conceptual foundations from the positivist 
understanding of the social reality.       
In this respect, this work presented an alternative conceptual framework for 
the analysis of the regional integration projects in Mexico and Turkey by 
locating those projects within the dialectical processes of the formation and 
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transformation of the peripheral capitalist spatiality. It is important to note 
that this alternative framework is directly established on the principles of 
inseparability and relativity of the social time and space. The unity of time 
and space rejects the positivist themes and categories produced through the 
ahistoric and spaceless history and geography which are the two main 
Newtonian and Cartesian premises that the mainstream international 
relations studies are built on. It is also argued in this work that the unity of 
time and space in the analysis of the social reality and its constant 
transformation can be established through the Marxist dialectical materialist 
method. Marxist dialectics defined and unravelled the complex and 
continually changing processes of the production of the social reality through 
the examination of the mutual realisation of the being and human 
consciousness, the creation of the physical and ideational world of human 
beings. On these premises, this work conceptualised and presented a 
spatiotemporally specific analysis through the incorporated comparison of 
the dialectical processes of the constant production and reproduction of the 
capitalist spatiality in Mexico and Turkey.   
Features of the exogenous formation of peripheral capitalist space 
The key feature of this spatiotemporally specific conceptual framework 
proposed in this thesis is the peripheral conditioning of the capitalist 
spatiality in Mexico and Turkey. Therefore, the work first aimed to explain 
and unravel the structural conditions and features of the peripheral capitalist 
spatiality which have been produced and reproduced constantly. In order to 
do that, the spatiotemporally specific theories of Luxemburg, Trotsky and 
Gramsci are linked to each other in a novel way in chapter two. By linking 
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these theories to each other, a strong conceptual tool is presented in the 
explanation of the interrelated processes of the development of peripheral 
capitalist spatiality during the 19
th
 century. Examining the development of 
the capitalist productive forces and social relations in Poland, Luxemburg 
demonstrated that the development of the capitalist spatiality in periphery is 
an integral part of the processes of the accumulation of capital in the 
industrialised ĐĞŶƚƌĞ ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ŚĞƌ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ ŽĨ  ‘ĞŶůĂƌŐĞĚreƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?
Enlarged reproduction is a necessary phase in the capitalist accumulation 
conditioned by the internal contradictions of capitalism which induces 
capitalist expansion. Building on this point, she examined the transformation 
of the traditional social relations in the periphery in the case of Poland 
parallel to the replacement of the natural economy and the initiation of the 
primitive accumulation which gradually evolved into the foreign operated 
development of capitalist forces. And the point that Luxemburg left, Trotsky 
continued. Trotsky focused on the rapid development of the Russian 
capitalist productive forces during the 19
th
 century which was retarded 
previously due to the geographical positioning of the country. This type of 
foreign induced rapid industrial development in the periphery was identified 
as the uneven and combined development of capitalism by Trotsky in which 
some sectors in society flourished and transformed swiftly while the others 
remained sluggish and even, up to a degree protected the pre-capitalist 
forms. Explaining the Italian Risorgimento, Gramsci emphasised the limited 
development of the national bourgeois in Italy conditioned by this rapid, 
exogenous, peripheral development of capitalism. His theory of passive 
revolution highlights a significant historical moment that the blocked 
dialectic in the process of capitalist development had been unclogged and 
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laid down the conditions for the consolidation of the peripheral capitalist 
spatiality. In that sense, it is a moment that the limited bourgeoisie resolves 
the contradictions of the uneven and combined development and establishes 
its hegemony by driving support from the popular forces. The national 
bourgeoisie then consolidates the peripheral capitalist spatiality during the 
post-passive revolutionary period by reorganising the state and society in a 
revolutionary manner but without changing the capitalist social relations and 
economic structure. These three theories allowed the conceptualisation of 
the dialectical formation and movement of the peripheral capitalist spatiality 
and, therefore unravelled the temporally and spatially specific features of the 
complex and contested processes of peripheral capitalist space formation in 
Mexico and Turkey. And on these premises, the post-passive revolutionary 
consolidation, neoliberal transformation and expansion of the peripheral 
capitalist space in Mexico and Turkey has been built upon (Table 1).   
Therefore, the spatiotemporally specific conceptual framework that is 
constructed and employed in this work is a crucial part of the incorporated 
comparison of the regional integration projects of Mexico and Turkey. It has 
been observed that since they were structured by the same spatiotemporal 
conditions these two social spaces followed strikingly similar processes of 
development and transformation of their peripheral capitalist spatiality even 
though they are located in different geographies with different 
morphological and cultural characteristics, natural resources, in different size 
and populations. In this respect, contrary to the mainstream social sciences, 
this work focused on the interrelated dialectical processes rather than the 
reified ahistoric and spaceless units of analysis. It is important to note that 
this dialectical approach does not perceive these spatiotemporal processes as 
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linear and deterministic developments or in terms of historical necessity but, 
on the contrary, identifies them as dynamic processes of production and 
reproduction of the uneven development of social space which is continually 
contested and reshaped. 
The production of peripheral capitalist space in Mexico and Turkey 
In chapter three, the analysis started from the period when, for the first time, 
the impacts of the industrial revolution began to be felt in the pre-capitalist 
geographies. The gradually developing unequal relationship led to the reform 
attempts of the Bourbons in Mexico and the Nizam-ŦĞĚŠĚ reforms of Sultan 
Selim III and Sultan Mahmud II in Ottoman Turkey as can be seen in the first 
column of Table 1. These reforms were limited in the sense of bringing 
substantial social reorganisation by remaining in the area of the 
administrative and military restructuring and exclusively aiming to increase 
the state revenues by the efficient and orderly taxation of the production in 
land. However, the further maturation and expansion of the capitalist centre 
towards these peripheral spaces replaced the natural economies in Mexico 
and Turkey with the capitalist commodity economy, thus gradually dissolved 
the traditional social relations of pre-capitalist production, particularly the 
property relations of land. This was quickly translated into the liberal political 
programme comprising the recognition of private property, individual rights 
and constitutionalism which struggled with the traditional social forces in the 
form of reactionary conservatism. It was during this period that the modern 
administrative apparatuses were introduced, the first penal codes were 
ĂĚĂƉƚĞĚ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ŽĚĞ EĂƉŽůĞſŶ and the first commercial courts were 
established, etc. Parallel to the further development of the capitalist 
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spatiality, both in Mexico and Turkey, the capitalist social relations succeeded 
in eliminating these traditional social relations and their reactionary forces. In 
Mexico, independence was gained from Spain in 1820, the extra-economic 
control of the Church and the colonial bureaucracy was defeated with the 
1857 constitution. In Ottoman Turkey, the high clergy lost its military power 
when the Janissaries were eliminated in 1826 and reactionary conservatism 
remained limited throughout the Tanzimat regime. 
Both during the Restored Republic in Mexico and the Tanzimat regime in 
Ottoman Turkey, the capitalist social relations continued to unfurl but the 
rapid uneven and combined expansion of the capitalist productive forces 
ŽŶůǇ ŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůŝƐĞĚ ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚĂƌŝĂŶ ƌĞŐŝŵĞƐ ŽĨ 'ĞŶĞƌĂů WŽƌĨŝƌŝŽ şĂǌ
(1876-1910) and Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1876-1909). During this period, the 
railways and other necessary infrastructure for the capitalist accumulation 
were constructed, the extraction and exports of the raw materials increased 
considerably, the agricultural production was integrated with the world 
markets and was thereby oriented parallel to the needs of the international 
demands, and the manufacture of the commodities for the domestic 
consumption was expanded. This process was directly induced by foreign 
capital investment either through the direct investments in the railway 
constructions, mining or agricultural plantations or through the public loans 
which substantially increased due to the expanding and strengthening central 
state apparatuses. The foreign financial institutions became the dominant 
economic actors during this period in both countries enabling the 
investments in the industrial expansion and in the infrastructural 
development. Parallel to this economic development, the state structure and 
the political power reached its highest level of centralisation, both through 
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the improved means of transportation and through the enhancement of the 
administrative and military power of the central government. Ironically, the 
aims of the 19
th
 century economic programme of the Mexican and Ottoman 
liberals were achieved during the progressive Caesarist periods of the 
Porfirian and Hamidian administrations which suspended the constitutional 
processes and maintained the political stability through eliminating any kind 
of opposition to the central authority. 
Post-passive revolutionary consolidation 
It is argued in this work that the contradictions accumulated through the 
uneven and combined development of the capitalist forces led to the passive 
revolutions of Mexico (1910-1920) and Turkey (1908-1925) which eliminated 
the old regime and replaced it with the precarious hegemony of the limited 
national bourgeoisie in the political form of Mexican and Turkish nation-
states. The peripheral capitalist space was consolidated and institutionalised 
during the post-passive revolutionary period which allowed the national 
bourgeoisie to reorganise the state and society through deepening the 
legitimisation of its hegemony. In the context of the global economic 
contraction, the national bourgeoisies in Mexico and Turkey found fertile 
ground to achieve the economic growth through the dependent industrial 
expansion materialised by the ISI strategies (Table 1). With the  
implementation of these policies, the government appeared as the supreme 
arbiter of the  ‘classless ? society and an important economic actor, in terms of 
allocating financial resources, planning and establishing public economic 
enterprises and continuing the construction of the necessary infrastructure 
for the exogenous capitalist accumulation. ISI was a historical and foreign 
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dependent response to the balance of payment problems in the periphery 
during the global capitalist contraction but simultaneously facilitated the 
expansion of the domestic industries in the manufacture of capital intensive 
goods for the consumption in the national markets. 
The neoliberal transformation 
However, the limited and exogenous nature of the ISI policies for achieving 
sustainable industrial expansion and economic growth became a significant 
problem for both Mexico and Turkey in the post-War period. During the 
worldwide rescaling of neoliberal capitalism both economies underwent 
significant restructuring processes which reoriented the industrial production 
patterns towards an export-oriented growth strategy. This neoliberal 
restructuring of the peripheral capitalist spatiality eventually incorporated 
Mexico and Turkey into the centre through the NAFTA and European 
Customs Union while simultaneously creating the necessary conditions to 
ĞǆƚĞŶĚŝƚƐĞůĨƚŽǁĂƌĚƐƚŚĞ ‘ŵĂƌŐŝŶĂů ?ƐƉĂĐĞƐŝŶƚŚĞĨŽƌŵŽĨƌĞŐŝŽŶĂů integration 
projects. In this respect, this work located and defined these projects as a 
part of the contemporary worldwide rescaling of the neoliberal capitalist 
relations and the reproduction and extension of the uneven development of 
the capitalist spatiality on the sub-regional scale.  
Contemporary expansion of the peripheral capitalist space 
It is observed in this work that the regional integration projects that have 
been initiated in Mexico and Turkey are structurally conditioned rather than 
strategically decided by an institutional/official or personal/political agency. 
These projects aim to establish the necessary institutional framework and 
physical infrastructure for the expansion of the neoliberal capitalist social 
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relations towards the marginalised spaces through incorporating those 
regions into the international division of labour (Table 1). In the case of 
Mexico, the Plan Puebla-Panama (PPP) has been initiated in order to 
integrate south-southeast Mexico and Central American countries with the 
international markets. It is important to note that this project did not start 
with the political initiative of the President Vicente Fox but emerged much 
earlier in different forms parallel to the neoliberal restructuring of Mexico 
during the  ? ? ? ?ƐĂŶĚƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐDĞǆŝĐŽ ?ƐŽǁŶŝŶĐŽrporation into 
the North American economic structure. The plan envisaged major 
infrastructural development projects which would enable the expansion of 
the maquiladora industry, exploiting the cheap labour force and valorising 
ƚŚĞ ĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇ ƌŝĐŚ ĂŶĚ  ‘ƵŶĚĞƌƵƚŝůŝƐĞĚ ?natural resources and biodiversity of 
the region. This aim corresponds with the worldwide neoliberal rescaling 
process where the reserved spaces will be integrated with the international 
markets and utilised.  
Structured by the same spatiotemporal conditions, Turkey initiated several 
regional integration projects parallel to the export-oriented neoliberal 
restructuring of its economy which culminated in its incorporation into the 
European economic structure through the European Customs Union. 
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Turkey initiated the Black Sea 
Economic Corporation (BSEC) to facilitate the transformation of the socialist 
economies into the capitalist market economies. The BSEC was later 
transformed into a regional cooperation organisation which finances the 
local infrastructure projects and invests in small and medium enterprises. 
Turkey has also been the primary proponent of the other regional 
infrastructure projects that would increase the commercial connectivity and 
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industrial productivity in the region. In that sense, Turkey energetically 
sought the completion of the projects like the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan gas and oil 
pipeline, the NABUCCO gas pipeline and the Trans-Caucasus railway which 
were projects that the multinationally financed and operated. Recently, the 
 ‘>ĞǀĂŶƚWƌŽũĞĐƚ ?ďĞƚǁĞĞŶdƵƌŬĞǇ ?^ǇƌŝĂ ?>ĞďĂŶŽŶĂŶĚ:ŽƌĂŶǁĂƐŝŶŝƚŝĂƚĞĚďǇ
Turkey in order to establish the necessary physical and legal conditions for 
the development of capitalist social relations in the East Mediterranean 
region.  
Therefore, this work presented a spatiotemporally specific analysis which has 
argued that the regional integration projects of Mexico and Turkey are 
structurally conditioned by the expansion of the peripheral capitalist 
spatiality where the conditions of the global rescaling processes of the 
neoliberal capitalist spatiality have been channelled to the marginal spaces 
(Table 1). These regional integration projects aim to incorporate those 
marginal spaces into the global neoliberal economic structure through the 
establishment of the necessary conditions for the expansion of the capitalist 
productive forces and social relations which reproduce the uneven and 
exogenous features of the peripheral capitalist state formation processes. 
It was also empirically shown that the transition to capitalism follows 
different dialectical tracks in the centre and in the periphery and takes 
different socio-spatial forms. These different socio-spatial forms are also 
subject to continual transformation comprising interrelated processes in 
which the social space has been produced, contested and reproduced -or 
ruptured- on multiple social scales. In that sense, the conceptual framework 
that had been presented in this work can be used in the exploration of similar 
 Table 1. SPATIOTEMPORAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PERIPHERAL CAPITALIST SPACE IN MEXICO AND TURKEY 
 Features of the exogenous formation of peripheral capitalist 
space 
Features of the post-passive 
revolutionary consolidation 
Features of the neoliberal 
transformation 
Features of the contemporary 
expansion 
Introduction of 
the commodity 
economy and 
enlarged 
reproduction 
Uneven and combined 
development 
Passive 
revolution 
The consolidation of the 
peripheral capitalist spatiality 
through the 
institutionalisation of the 
bourgeois hegemony under 
PNR  
Cardenismo and the 
consolidation of PRI 
ISI oriented dependent 
industrial development 
1940-1982 
The exhaustion and crisis of 
the dependent ISI 
development and the 
neoliberal restructuring 
1982 peso crisis, EOI 
reorientation, rapid 
liberalisation of foreign trade, 
deregulation and privatisation  
NAFTA membership - 1994 
Reproduction of the uneven conditions 
of the exogenous formation of 
peripheral capitalist space in Central 
American region 
Plan Puebla-Panama, Proyecto 
Mesoamerica 
MEXICO 
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dialectical processes and in examining similar and different aspects of the 
formation and transformation of the peripheral capitalist spaces that had 
been structured by the same spatiotemporal conditions. Furthermore, it was 
argued that all other inter-spatial relations in the form of regional integration 
and economic development projects should be evaluated from a 
spatiotemporally specific context which would enable to explore the 
underlying social relations behind social change on different scales. 
Critical self-reflections 
It is important to emphasise the dialectical nature of the process of 
formation and reproduction of the capitalist spaces since the production of 
social space needs to be seen as a dynamic and contested process rather 
than a deterministic subordination of the periphery to the centre. This aspect 
can also be considered as one of the limitations of this work. The resistance 
to the expansion of the neoliberal capitalist productive forces and social 
relations has not been examined through in-depth analysis in this work. 
Nevertheless, the reactionary/revolutionary contestations and resistance will 
be a determinant factor in the upcoming resolution of the contradictions that 
have been cultivated by the neoliberal capitalist social relations in the 
modern society and its contemporary extension towards the marginal spaces. 
The indigenous resistance movements in the south-southeast Mexico and in 
the further south, in the Maya region, the momentous student movement of 
 ‘YoSoy132 ? against the presidential candidate of PRI -EŶƌŝƋƵĞ WĞŹĂ EŝĞƚŽ- 
who is associated with Salinismo, or the rise of democratic and Christian 
socialist movements in the wider Central American region can be seen as the 
initial responses to the expanding neoliberal social relations. The neoliberal 
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rescaling and extension of the peripheral capitalist spatiality deteriorated 
even more with the constant pauperisation and dispossession of the local 
and indigenous communities in the region who lived under the assault of the 
capitalist expansion in the last two centuries. It is also possible to observe 
that sporadic and disconnected forms of resistances are gaining momentum 
in Turkey for the first time in thirty years after the military coup of 1980 even 
though the ruling neoliberal AKP party enjoys the climax of its political 
power ?dŚĞd<>ǁŽƌŬĞƌƐ ? ůŽŶŐƚĞƌŵƌĞƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ ƚŚĞƉƌŝǀĂƚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ
ƚŚĞ ƉƵďůŝĐ ĐŝŐĂƌĞƚƚĞ ĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ? ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚĞĚ ƚĞĂĐŚĞƌƐ ? ŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ĂŶĚ ƚŚĞ
several environmentalist anti micro-dam initiatives received very harsh 
reactions from the state authority which shows the seriousness of the 
counter-hegemonic capabilities of these groups. In the immediate geography 
of Turkey, the response to the neoliberal expansion can be seen as the 
increasing aspirations for the adaptation of a liberal programme which would 
eliminate the extra-economic measures of the existing autocratic regimes 
and would guarantee the political and economic rights.  
The dialectical nature of the global processes of neoliberal re-
territorialisation of capitalist spatiality which were channelled in the 
periphery through the spatial expansion of the neoliberal practices and the 
counter-hegemonic resistances to these processes is perfectly captured in 
>ĞĨĞďǀƌĞ ?ƐŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨautogestion. Autogestion or self-management is defined 
as a site and stake of constant struggle which is born spontaneously from the 
capitalist mode of production (Lefebvre 1966/2009: 149; Lefebvre 
1979/2001: 779). It appears from the zones of weakness of the capitalist 
society and could turn it to the strong counter-hegemonic points (Lefebvre 
1966/2009: 144). The 1871 Paris Commune was a good example of the 
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counter-hegemonic spatial practice of autogestion where the weakest point 
of the French bourgeois was seized by the working class and turned into the 
strongest site of the revolutionary struggle. Marx emphasised the dialectical 
nature of this struggle by defining the Commune as the direct antithesis of 
the French Empire. In this respect, he argued that the working class cannot 
emancipate itself by simply seizing  ‘the ready-made state machinery and 
wielding ŝƚ ĨŽƌ ŝƚƐŽǁŶ ƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐ ?  ?DĂƌǆ  ? ? ? ? P  ? ? ) ? dŚĞ emancipation of the 
working class was due to the antagonism of the Commune against the State 
power and functions which was materialised through the establishment of 
the true democratic institutions (Marx 1966: 70).  
Therefore, autogestion cannot coexist with the State since it is the antithesis 
of it and, in that way, it reveals the contradictions of the contemporary 
society. Whether the resistances mentioned above would culminate in a 
moment of autogestion or will degenerate to co-gestion (co-management) is 
a further question. Nevertheless, it is possible to argue that the counter-
hegemonic space and spatiality which was ĚĞĨŝŶĞĚĂƐ ‘ƐƉĂĐĞŽĨĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞŽƌ
ĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŝĂů ƐƉĂĐĞ ? ďǇ >ĞĨĞďǀƌĞ ǁŝůů ďĞ ďƵŝůƚ upon with the same 
contradictions laid by the neoliberal restructuring (Lefebvre 1978/2009: 248). 
Therefore, the zones of weakness -in which the contradictions of the 
neoliberal processes of intensification and extension will be most salient and 
where the most contested, repressed and humiliated sectors of the society 
can be find- will be the sites of capitalist tensions ready to be unclogged by a 
strategy of autogestion can be these peripheral spaces conditioned by the 
contemporary re-territorialisation (Lefebvre 1966/2009: 142).   
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It is also important to consider that the capitalist spatiality comprises many 
other social aspects and dimensions which would significantly expand the 
scale of the work. Transition to the capitalist spatiality and its transformation 
has a substantial impact on the society on many different scales; from the 
material surroundings, to art and daily life. This includes the formal and 
informal representations of the space in urban planning, monuments and 
other social spaces where the official and non-official discourses are 
produced and reproduced parallel to the processes of reproduction and 
transformation of the capitalist spaces. These representations differ in a 
multiscalar way, and take different forms and make different impacts on the 
national, regional and local scales. This research mainly focused on the 
transition and transformation of the social space on the national scale which 
can only outline the more complex and conflicting processes on other scales. 
Therefore, a future work can explore the transformation on the scale of the 
 ‘ƐƵďŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞĚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĐŽƵůĚďĞƚŚĞŵĂŝŶƐŝƚĞŽĨthe concrete struggle or the 
source of autogestion where the weak points of capitalist state power and 
the contradictions laid and maintained by it would be confronted (Lefebvre 
1978/2009: 250).     
Beyond the research 
As Lefebvre pointed out, the analysis of the contemporary state -the 
neoliberal capitalist state to be precise- is an essential part of the resistance 
and political action. The analysis of the state enables a political agenda that 
unravels the mysteries of the capitalist state which is constructed and 
maintained by the ideological hegemony of the bourgeois and the 
revolutionary politics can benefit from this analysis by first destroying the 
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 ‘ƐƉĂƌŬůŝŶŐĂƉƉĞĂƌĂŶĐĞ ?of the neoliberal capitalist society that blurs the truth 
of the underlying social relations of production, as Lefebvre put it 
(1964/2009: 64). Therefore, locating, analysing and defining the global 
rescaling processes of capitalism where the neoliberal social relations of 
production have been intensified and extended is equally crucial for the 
textile workers in the maquiladoras of dĞŚƵĂĐĄŶ-Puebla and for the peasants 
of the East-Anatolian mountains who struggle against the micro-dam 
constructions that valorise ƚŚĞ  ‘ƵŶĚĞƌƵƚŝůŝƐĞĚ ? Ɛubsoil resources. Since the 
neoliberal spatiality is not confined in one region or locality, the vitality of the 
analysis of its expansion is relevant on all other social scales as well. In that 
sense, the dispossessed urban proletariat and the displaced or forcibly 
incorporated peasant communities are the subjects of the same process of 
capitalist transformation. Therefore, it is possible to claim that a meaningful 
contestation of the existing process can only be formulated with the active 
participation of the revolutionary working class and through the unification 
of different strategies that confront the neoliberal rescaling on different 
scales, on a broader front enlightened by a profound analysis of the 
spatiotemporal dynamics underlying this multiscalar process of 
transformation.  
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